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Abstract 
The Shanghai Municipal Council, which managed the International Settlement at the 
heart of Shanghai from 1854 until 1943, profoundly shaped the development of the city 
politically, socially and geographically. It was dominated by British expatriates and 
settlers, but they shared power with an array of other nationalities, in a unique 
experiment in transnational governance. This thesis provides the first in-depth study of 
how the council functioned in the twentieth century and how it influenced and was 
influenced by contemporary changes locally, nationally and internationally. It argues 
that the council was profoundly important in this period, much more so than has been 
appreciated in the literature to date. The council was both subject to colonial influence 
and autonomous in its activities, so is best characterised as a semi-colonial institution, a 
concept which is tested and defined in this thesis. This study also provides a more 
precise understanding of the nature of Britain's informal empire in China, which was 
not confined to either diplomacy or trade but was experienced first and foremost 
through the activities of the Shanghai Municipal Council, in the mundane matters of 
daily life and in the many moments of strife and tension which occurred in this period. 
This thesis therefore furthers our understanding of foreign imperialism in China in all its 
complexities, with implications for the fields of both modem Chinese and colonial 
history. 
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Introduction: Studying the Nature of Semi-colonialism in Shanghai 
`The heart of Shanghai is the International Settlement, the city the foreign devils built... 
In theory the sovereignty of the place was vested in the consuls representing the powers 
which had treaties with China. In practice these consuls had little or nothing to say 
about the way the place was governed. A start was made by turning civic affairs over to 
an unpaid committee known as the Shanghai Municipal Council which functioned like 
the Board of Selectmen in a New England village or like the board of directors of a big 
corporation. It is this municipal council which through a continuous service of almost a 
hundred years has guided Shanghai in its development from a huddle of houses on a 
muddy foreshore to one of the finest and largest cities in the world. " 
Carl Crow, writing on his return to the USA after leaving a war-torn Shanghai, captures 
in the passage above the peculiar nature of the governance of the city's International 
Settlement. Occupying a narrow space between colonial power and independent 
government, the Shanghai Municipal Council (SMC) forged for itself remarkable 
authority to manage the affairs of the Settlement. While not carving a city from nothing, 
as Crow suggests, the SMC certainly profoundly shaped the development of Shanghai 
and its politics. This thesis provides the first in-depth analysis of how the council 
managed the International Settlement, which was at once uniquely cosmopolitan, 
undeniably Chinese, and yet profoundly British in nature. The Settlement formed an 
important part of Britain's informal empire, but the Shanghai Municipal Council which 
ran it was a semi-colonial authority with no direct counterpart anywhere in the world. 
Studying how the council developed and functioned therefore compels a fresh 
understanding of both these concepts (informal empire and semi-colonialism) in 
practice, while redressing a significant gap in modern Chinese historiography. 
' Carl Crow, Foreign Devils in the Flowery Kingdom (Hong Kong: Earnshaw Books, 2007; first 
published 1940), pp. 158-9. 
1 
In recent years there has been a resurgence of interest in the study of informal 
empire among historians. The term `informal empire' dates to at least its use by C. R. 
Fay in 1934,2 and it gained wide currency, particularly in the British literature, from 
1953 when Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher made it central to their thesis on the 
nature of British imperialism. 3 These historians used the term to refer to the way in 
which merchants pursued their free trading activities with the political, diplomatic and 
military backing of the British government in parts of the globe beyond the reach of the 
formal administrative structures of British imperialism. For Robinson and Gallagher, 
informal empire thus differed from formal empire only in degree. 4 They placed great 
importance on informal empire as the preferred practice of the British authorities, who, 
they argued, adopted the more expensive policy of formal annexation only where it was 
necessary to safeguard British trading interests. The cases of British involvement in 
Argentina and Egypt are often cited as key examples of informal empire, but the term is 
applied to various parts of Latin America, the Middle East and East Asia. The treaty 
ports along the southern and eastern coast of China, opened up to western settlement for 
the purposes of trade by treaties following the conclusion of the First Opium War in 
1842, are also located by (particularly British) historians such as Robert Bickers as 
belonging to this world of informal empire, s and none more so than Shanghai. 
2 C. R. Fay, Imperial Economy and its Place in the Formation of Economic Doctrine, 1600-1932 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1934), p. 104. Fay's later contribution to The Cambridge History of the British Empire 
is sometimes wrongly cited as the first use of the term `informal empire', for example by Andrew 
Thompson in `Afterword: Informal Empire: Past, Present and Future', in Informal Empire in Latin 
America: Culture, Commerce and Capital, ed. by Matthew Brown (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008), p. 229. See 
C. R. Fay, `The Movement Towards Free Trade, 1820-1853', in The Cambridge History of the British 
Empire, Vol. II: The Growth of the New Empire, 1783-1870, ed. by J. Holland Rose (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1940), p. 399. 
3 John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, `The Imperialism of Free Trade', Economic History Review, New 
Ser., Vol. 6, No. 1 (1953), pp. 1-15. 
° Gallagher and Robinson, `Imperialism of Free Trade', p. 7. 
S Robert Bickers, Britain in China: Community, Culture and Colonialism 1900-1949 (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1999). 
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John King Fairbank provides still the most authoritative, though not 
unproblematic, account of this process of the `opening up' of China to western trade and 
influence. 6 Following the British victory in the First Opium War, the Chinese 
government was left with no choice but to open up the five ports of Canton 
(Guangzhou), Amoy (Xiamen), Ningpo (Ningbo), Foochow (Fuzhou) and Shanghai to 
foreign settlement and trade, in addition to the cessation of Hong Kong and the payment 
of reparations, according to the terms of the 1842 Treaty of Nanjing. Shanghai rapidly 
overtook Canton as the most important centre of foreign influence in China, a position it 
maintained as more treaty ports were added by the subsequent `unequal treaties', 7 
notably the Treaties of Wangxia (in 1844 with the United States), Whampoa (also in 
1844 with France), Tianjin (in 1858 with Britain, France, Russia and the USA, and in 
1861 with Prussia and the German Customs Union) and Shimonoseki (in 1895 with 
Japan). 
Fairbank's model of `China's response to the west' through the opening of treaty 
ports has been thoroughly revised by such notable historians as Paul Cohen, who almost 
thirty years ago advocated a `China-centred' approach. 8 This entailed moving away 
from (in a nod to Edward Said) `a Western-centeredness that robs China of its 
autonomy and makes of it, in the end, an intellectual possession of the West' to `a more 
interior approach' to Chinese history which cast China as the active creator of its own 
history. 9 China-centred histories have since been written widely. Indeed, the pendulum 
6 John King Fairbank, Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast: the Opening of the Treaty Ports, 1842- 
1854 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969), especially pp. 81-103 for the First Opium War and 
subsequent negotiations over the Treaty of Nanjing, and 195-99 for the treaties negotiated by the United 
States and France. 
Though widely used in the English and Chinese literature, the term `unequal treaties' is heavily 
politically weighted. 
Paul A. Cohen, Discovering History in China: American Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese Past 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), especially pp. 9-55. 
Cohen, Discovering History in China, pp. 151,153. 
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swung rather too far in that direction, with histories written as though there had been no 
foreign encroachment into or influence on China. In a backlash against this trend, 
William Kirby argued in 1997 that `there is no point in searching for some uniquely 
"China-centred" historical narrative [for the Republican period]... Everything important 
had an international dimension. ' 10 Happily, by 2005 Rana Mitter could comment that 
`The call to bring the foreign back into modern Chinese history has had an enriching 
effect on the field'. ' 1 The point has now been reached where historians can examine the 
realities of the interactions between China and western powers bearing both sides of this 
debate in mind and seeking to avoid the pitfalls of both: an over-simplification of the 
nature of the history of modem China as either dependent on or independent of western 
stimulus. 
The kind of history written by Fairbank, driven by sources in diplomatic records 
and charting the political developments of the Sino-British relationship, 12 was partially 
superseded as the broader trend to write socio-economic history from the 1960s filtered 
into the field of China Studies by the 1980s. Shanghai has been the site many historians 
have chosen in which to locate their studies on aspects of Chinese life from native place 
associations to prostitution, due to both its importance as the largest of the treaty ports 
and the strongest economy of East Asia and its legendary status as a city of unparalleled 
10 William C. Kirby, `The Internationalization of China: Foreign Relations at Home and Abroad in the 
Republican Era', China Quarterly, No. 150, Special Issue: Reappraising Republic China (June 1997), p. 
433. Robert Bickers echoed this assertion two years later, writing that `there is no doubting... the 
absurdity of writing modem Chinese history as if there was no western presence, or with a caricatured 
foreign presence, which has often been the net effect. ' Bickers, Britain in China, p. 6. 
11 Rana Mitter, `Historiographical Review: Modernity, Internationalization, and War in the History of 
Modern China', Historical Journal, Vol. 48, No. 2 (2005), p. 528. 
12 Work in the 1960s and '70s by Nicholas Clifford and Gerald Graham would also belong to this 
category. Nicholas R. Clifford, Retreat from China: British Policy in the Far East, 1937-1941 (London: 
Longmans, 1967); Gerald S. Graham, The China Station: War and Diplomacy, 1830-1860 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978). 
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opportunity and vice in both the Chinese and western collective memory. 13 Much work 
has rightly redressed a concentration on the foreign impact on the city, though important 
progress has also been made in understanding this dominant minority community, not 
least by Robert Bickers. 14 Bickers' work locates the British presence in Shanghai, the 
strongest foreign group, within the broader imperialism of the British empire '15 
providing valuable insights into the behaviour, motivations and mindsets of the British 
in cities like Shanghai. 
Research on the way in which the British presence in Shanghai can be located in 
relation to informal empire in China and beyond is, however, somewhat lacking. The 
work that has been done focuses largely on the Chinese Maritime Customs Service 
(CMCS), a fascinating and revealing instance of a Chinese institution staffed and run in 
the main by foreign (overwhelmingly British) officials. 16 In contrast, the Shanghai 
Municipal Council, the governing body of the International Settlement - without doubt 
the most compelling expression of informal empire in China and the self-styled `model 
settlement' for other outposts of foreign imperialism on the Chinese mainland - has 
received comparatively little scholarly attention in the Anglophone literature. 17 In 1854 
13 Contributions by Emily Honig and Christian Henriot stand out in these two areas of the field. Emily 
Honig, Creating Chinese Ethnicity: Subei People in Shanghai, 1850-1980 (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1992); Christian Henriot, Prostitution and Sexuality in Shanghai: a Social History, 1849-1949, 
trans. by Nogl Castelino (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
14 Robert Bickers, Empire Made Me: An Englishman Adrift in Shanghai (London: Allen Lane, 2003) 
provides an analysis of the nature of the International Settlement through the lens of a biography of an 
ordinary recruit to the Shanghai Municipal Police force named Maurice Tinkler. 
15 Most notable here among many relevant works is Bickers, Britain in China. 
16 See Martyn Atkins, Informal Empire in Crisis: British Diplomacy and the Chinese Customs Succession, 
1927-1929 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell East Asia Series, 1995) and in particular the work of researchers 
associated with the Chinese Maritime Customs Project at the University of Bristol including Donna 
Brunero, Britain's Imperial Cornerstone in China: the Chinese Maritime Customs Service, 1854-1949 
(London: Routledge, 2006), the July 2006 special issue of Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 40, No. 3, doctoral 
research by both Catherine Ladds and Felix Boecking, and various articles by Robert Bickers, including 
`Purloined Letters: History and the Chinese Maritime Customs Service', Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 40, 
No. 3 (2005), p. 692. Hans van de Ven is also working on the Customs Service. 
17 Indeed, Mary Wilgus in her study of informal empire in China makes no mention at all of the SMC or 
International Settlement. Mary H. Wilgus, Sir Claude MacDonald, the Open Door, and British Informal 
Empire in China, 1895-1900 (New York: Garland, 1987). Relevant work has been done, however, by 
5 
the Shanghai Municipal Council replaced the Committee of Roads and Jetties which 
had run the English Settlement since 1845, two years after its establishment in 
accordance with the Treaty of Nanjing. The Shanghai Municipal Police (SMP) and 
Shanghai Volunteer Corps (SVC) were formed in the same year, and all three were 
established in response to the seizure of the Chinese City by Taiping rebels the previous 
year. ' 8 The smaller American Settlement merged with the English in 1863 to form the 
International Settlement, though the French Government refused to sanction the 
inclusion of the French Concession. 19 From then on, the SMC strengthened its 
independence from the consular body as a self-governing entity, even as individual 
foreign subjects in the Settlement remained subject to consular authority. 
The Land Regulations governing the council's electorate and powers were 
initially drawn up by the Chinese authorities, with revisions by the Land Renters in 
response to the changing conditions in Shanghai approved by the foreign diplomatic 
body and Chinese government at Beijing in 1854,1869 and 1898. They essentially 
formed a constitution for the council but were increasingly inadequate as time went on, 
allowing the ratepayers, for example, the power to block innovations which would have 
given Chinese residents more of a voice in the running of the Settlement. Franchise was 
granted by the ownership of property: according to Article XIX of the 1898 Land 
Regulations, which remained in use for the remainder of the council's existence, 
foreigners (non-Chinese in the parlance of the time) who owned land worth at least Tls. 
500 and paid property taxes of Tls. 10 or more per year, or who were householders 
John Darwin and, fifty years ago, Nathan Pelcovits: John Darwin, `Imperialism and the Victorians: The 
Dynamics of Territorial Expansion', English Historical Review, Vol. 112, No. 447 (June 1997), pp. 614- 
642; Nathan Pelcovits, Old China Hands and the Foreign O, fice (New York: American Institute of 
Pacific Relations, King's Crown Press, 1948). 
18 Robert Bickers, `Shanghailanders: The Formation and Identity of the British Settler Community in 
Shanghai, 1843-1937', Past and Present, 159 (May 1998), pp. 165-6. 
19 Richard Feetham, Report of the Hon. Mr. Justice Feetham, C. M. G. to the Shanghai Municipal Council 
(Shanghai: North-China Daily News & Herald, 1931), Vol. 1, p. 28. 
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paying at least Tls. 500 per year in assessed rent, were entitled to elect council members 
and vote at ratepayers' meetings. 20 Convention dictated the nationalities represented on 
the council, but British members dominated. 
The SMC managed a far greater expanse of land than was ever envisaged by the 
Chinese and British who negotiated its existence. With repeated expansions, as shown 
in Figure 1, the area of the Settlement increased from 138 acres in 1846 to 5,583 acres 
or 8.66 square miles from the end of the nineteenth century on, 21 and the council also 
assumed limited control of the external roads beyond the Settlement boundaries. In 
order to manage this area, it employed a large number of staff (it was the largest 
employer of British subjects in Shanghai, though a far greater number of Chinese were 
on its payroll) across a range of departments. The departments and their employees 
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Figure 1. Map showing the Settlement boundaries in 1914.22 
20 Feetham, Report, Vol. 1, p. 80. In 1930 there were 15 taels to the pound (sterling). For conversion rates, 
see Wakeman, Jr., Policing Shanghai, p. xi. 
21 F. C. Jones, Shanghai and Tientsin, with Special Reference to Foreign Institutions (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1940), p. 1. 
22 Map courtesy of Robert Bickers. 
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In contrast to their colleagues in the west, Chinese scholars have, for the last 
decade or so, increasingly directed their attention towards the functions of the SMC. 23 
This thesis builds on recent work by Chinese academics and makes use of the 
unprecedented access to the Shanghai Municipal Archives (SMA) now available to 
foreign scholars, to address the gap in the western literature on the nature of the SMC. 
An analysis of the ways in which the council functioned reveals the precise nature of 
informal empire in its institutional form, expanding the term from its origins as almost a 
synonym for `free trade imperialism'. 24 This traditional understanding of informal 
empire is based on its nature in the nineteenth century; shifting the period under 
analysis to the first half of the twentieth century reveals a very different phenomenon. 
The thesis explores how informal empire was practised `on the ground' through an 
examination of the implementation of SMC policies and its response to the changing 
challenges of managing this rapidly evolving heart of China's greatest metropolis. This 
enables us to answer the question, `what was informal empire? ' in a more meaningful 
way than has been possible up to this point. Free trade was certainly important: the 
Land Regulations which conferred authority on the SMC charged it with providing an 
environment conducive to conducting business, and this imperative informed much of 
the council's activities, from providing infrastructure and utilities to keeping taxation as 
low as possible. Yet there was more to the council than this: by the later period under 
discussion its activities had expanded significantly as the council behaved as if it 
governed a statelet rather than managed a settlement for the purposes of trade alone. 
A more nuanced understanding of the nature of informal empire on the basis of 
the workings of the SMC provides an increased appreciation of the variety present in 
23 The existing literature in Chinese is discussed below. 
u Britten Dean identified `informal empire' and `free-trade imperialism' as `close relatives', but was 
referring to the heyday of free trade from the 1830s to the 1870s. Britten Dean, `British Informal Empire: 
The Case of China', Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, Vol. 14 (1976), p. 64. 
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twentieth century European imperialism, as well as shedding new light on how informal 
empire was experienced by the inhabitants of Shanghai's International Settlement, both 
Chinese and foreign. Reaching below the surface of the political, military and 
mercantile apparatus of informal empire to reveal the day-to-day practice of managing 
such outposts of imperialism adds significantly to our understanding of the history of 
Shanghai and of imperialism more broadly. Moreover, due to its status as the largest of 
the treaty ports and among the first five to be opened to foreign settlement and 
governance, the study of the management of the International Settlement is also relevant 
to an understanding of the semi-colonial presence in all of the towns and cities 
throughout east and central east China which experienced this kind of imperialism, from 
the late nineteenth century until the Second World War. The `Shanghailanders' (settlers, 
as opposed to expatriates)25 considered theirs to be a `model settlement' and certainly 
the various other outposts of British influence along the Chinese coast looked to 
practice in Shanghai for precedents in how to construct and run a foreign community in 
China. 
Writing the history of Shanghai 
The history of the International Settlement was first written by those with a vested 
interest in its continuance and subsequently by those with fond memories of spending 
the best years of their lives there. The SMC itself commissioned a `History of Shanghai', 
by which was meant the history of the Settlement due to the Shanghailander myth that 
British settlers had founded it on nothing more than vacant mud flats. The writing of 
this history was duly begun by George L, anning and completed after his death by the 
25 See Bickers, `Shanghailanders', pp. 161-211. 
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journalist Samuel Couling, 26 but by the time the latter finished the second volume the 
political climate in Shanghai had rendered the publication of such a self-satisfied 
account of Britain's involvement in the city a political impossibility. The council 
ordered that the copies be pulped. 27 A few years earlier Couling had published his 
Encyclopaedia Sinica with entries for all the features of Shanghai of interest to its 
foreign community, including the Shanghai Municipal Council 28 The most noteworthy 
history produced in Shanghai during this period was that by Francis Hawks Pott, an 
American missionary and Director of St John's College in Shanghai. 29 His materials 
included those gathered by Lanning and Couling, but publishing as he did in 1928 just 
as the first Chinese members took their seats on the council, his is a somewhat less 
bombastic history. Nevertheless, it is a tale of the introduction of western civilisation to 
China through the International Settlement couched in the terms of empire - complete 
with the founding struggle in the form of the Battle of the Muddy Flat against the rebels 
of the Small Sword Society in 1854, to which a chapter is devoted. 30 In later years, 
former residents of Shanghai such as Brigadier Davidson-Houston wrote memoirs of 
their time in the International Settlement, 31 which echoed this legend of a civilising 
British presence in Shanghai, but also played upon the city's reputation for lawlessness 
and vice. 
In recent decades the history of Shanghai has become a sub-field in and of itself, 
with historians of modern China drawn to research myriad aspects of this city which has 
retained the legendary status it earned during its heyday. Space here permits only a 
26 George Lanning and Samuel Couling, The History of Shanghai, Part I (Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh, 
1921). 
27 Bickers, Britain in China, p. 39. 
28 Samuel Couling, Encyclopaedia Sinica (Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh, 1917). 
29 Francis Lister Hawks Pott, A Short History of Shanghai, Being an Account of the Growth and 
Development of the International Settlement (Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh, 1928). 
30 Hawks Pott, Short History, pp. 24-34. 
31 J. V. Davidson-Houston, Yellow Creek: the Story of Shanghai (London: Putnam, 1962). 
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review of some of the most significant contributions to that literature which have a 
particular bearing on interpretations of the nature and role of the International 
Settlement. Two popular movements which shaped the course of modem Chinese 
history have naturally attracted an array of highly informative scholarship: the May 
Fourth and May Thirtieth Movements of 1919 and 1925. Joseph Chen's 1971 volume 
on the former is still the best narrative account of the events in Shanghai that culminated 
in an eight-day strike by a combination of students, merchants and workers in protest 
against the Chinese government's acceptance of the terms agreed at the Paris Peace 
Conference. 32 The Conference failed to reward China for its participation in the First 
World War, rather granting German concessions in China to the Japanese. There 
followed a national patriotic movement with far-reaching consequences for Chinese 
politics and the council. 
The May Thirtieth Incident of 1925 has been described comprehensively by 
Richard Rigby. 33 In the first half of his book Rigby charts the development of the 
movement in the factories and streets of Shanghai. He explains how the SMP's shooting 
of protestors, killing twelve Chinese, in an already charged atmosphere produced 
massive strike action across the city, almost causing it to grind to a halt. The second part 
of the monograph is devoted to the motivations and actions of the main protagonists on 
both sides: the Communist and Nationalist Parties and the British officials in Shanghai 
and Whitehall. It is the British who are the focus of Nicholas Clifford's study of the 
Chinese `Revolution' of the mid-1920s. 34 Clifford seeks to understand how the tiny 
foreign minority rationalised, publically and to itself, its hold on power in the SMC and 
32 Joseph T. Chen, The May Fourth Movement in Shanghai: the Making of a Social Movement in Modern 
China (Leiden: Brill, 1971). 
33 Richard W. Rigby, The May 30 Movement: Events and Themes (Folkestone: Dawson, 1980). 
34 Nicholas R. Clifford, Spoilt Children of Empire: Westerners in Shanghai and the Chinese Revolution of 
the 1920s (Hanover, New Hampshire: Middlebury College Press, 1991). 
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Mixed Court, and how its bellicose behaviour precipitated its own decline. Key to this 
process was the division between the council's hostility to giving in to Chinese 
nationalist pressure and the measured sympathy with moderate nationalist aims 
expressed by the British government, on which the SMC increasingly relied for its 
position. 35 Although these two are thorough investigations of the May Thirtieth 
Movement and its implications (Clifford going further in addressing other key events of 
the decades), Rigby and Clifford were limited in their access to Chinese sources, so the 
more recent research by Tiina Airaksinen advances our understanding of these events. 36 
Airaksinen makes use of the previously closed materials at the Shanghai Municipal 
Archives, which the present thesis also exploits, in analysing British reactions to May 
Fourth and how they influenced the development of the movement. She argues that the 
failure of the council to placate the justified anger of Shanghai's Chinese contributed to 
the more radical nationalism that developed in the following years. 37 
Further work on the foreign community of Shanghai has been and continues to 
be written by Robert Bickers. In addition to articles on many aspects of the history of 
the International Settlement, Bickers' books on the nature of the British community in 
China more broadly, the experience of ordinary British employees of the SMC through 
the story of the policeman Maurice Tinkler, and the foreign powers' `scramble for 
China' are all highly relevant to this thesis. 38 Also pertinent to this study is Katherine 
Meyer's account of Shanghai's stresses as a treaty port between 1914 and 1921.39 Bryna 
Goodman has contributed to the debate over the semi-colonial nature of the 
31 Clifford, Spoilt Children of Empire, pp. 113-26. 
36 Tiina Helena Airaksinen, Love Your Country on Nanjing Road: the British and the May Fourth 
Movement in Shanghai (Helsinki: Renvall Institute, University of Helsinki, 2005). 
37 Airaksinen, Love Your Country, p. 17. 
39 Bickers, Britain in China; Empire Made Me; The Scramble for China: Foreign Devils in the ging 
Empire (London: Allen Lane, 2011). 
39 Katherine Brennan Meyer, `Splitting Apart: The Shanghai Treaty Port in Transition, 1914-1921' 
(Unpublished PhD Thesis, Temple University, 1985). 
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International Settlement with a study on the council's jubilee celebrations in 1893,40 
along with a body of work on the Chinese community in Shanghai. By uncovering the 
diverse agendas played out by the different Chinese and foreign participants in the 
celebrations, Goodman reveals the different ways in which the constituent groups of the 
International Settlement interpreted its social and political order and their place within 
it. 41 Tim Wright demonstrates the limitation of the power of the SMC as shown by the 
resistance to and defeat of its attempts to reform the system of rickshaw licensing in 
1934.42 This theme of different interpretations of the role and power of the council 
between the Chinese and foreign communities of the Settlement informs much of the 
work in this thesis. Also focussing on the 1930s, Jürgen Osterhammel argues that 
Japanese imperial power came to overshadow British semi-colonial authority in 
Shanghai during this decade. 43 He claims, however, that the British economic presence 
did not fall away as British political power declined due to increasingly close 
cooperation between British business and the Chinese elite. It is important to bear in 
mind this economic dimension to the British semi-colonial presence in Shanghai. Other 
foreign communities in Shanghai remain understudied, but Christian Henriot and Joshua 
Fogel have contributed to the English-language scholarship on the Japanese community, 
Chiara Betta has written on the Sephardic Jewish community, and Christine Comet 
works on the French Concession. 44 
40 Bryna Goodman, `Improvisations on a Semi-colonial Theme, or, How to Read a Celebration of 
Transnational Urban Community', Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 59, No. 4 (2000), pp. 889-926. 
41 Goodman, `Improvisations', p. 890. 
42 Tim Wright, `Shanghai Imperialists versus Rickshaw Racketeers: The Defeat of the 1934 Rickshaw 
Reforms', Modern China, Vol. 17, No. 1 (January 1991), pp. 76-111. 
43 Jurgen Osterhammel, `Imperialism in Transition: British Business and the Chinese Authorities, 1931- 
37', China Quarterly, No. 98 (June 1984), p. 260 and passim. 
44 Christian Henriot, `"Little Japan" in Shanghai: An Insulated Community, 1875-1945', in New Frontiers: 
Imperialism's New Communities in East Asia, 1842-1953, ed. by Robert Bickers and Christian Henriot 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), pp. 146-69; Joshua A. Fogel, "`Shanghai-Japan": The 
Japanese Residents' Association of Shanghai', Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 59, No. 4 (November 2000), 
pp. 927-50; Chiara Betta, `Marginal Westerners in Shanghai: the Baghdadi Jewish Community, 1845- 
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Much of the literature on Shanghai has focused on the city as the site where 
`modernity', a very loaded term, took root in China. Marie-Claire Bergere, for example, 
attributes China's modernisation to the bourgeoisie which was able to emerge in the 
treaty ports, especially Shanghai, due to the economic stimulation of western 
intervention and the retreat of the state from economic affairs under Republican rule. 45 
In response to this kind of work, Hanchao Lu wrote a ground-breaking exploration of 
everyday life in Republican Shanghai for the ordinary Chinese who dwelled in the city's 
back alleys. He argues that such people were little affected by the western-influenced 
modernity for which Shanghai is remembered, many of them living, for example, with 
no electricity or running water. 46 It is important to remember that many of the poorest 
Chinese in the Settlement functioned without knowledge or care of the Shanghai 
Municipal Council which ran it. It is also, however, an exaggeration to deny that the 
council's policies had any bearing on them, particularly as it expanded its role through 
the period and especially in relation to its efforts to improve public health and, later, 
industrial working conditions. While accepting the caution urged by Lu's work on the 
limitations of the foreign impact on everyday life, this thesis therefore argues that in fact 
the SMC was a very real presence in the lives of the inhabitants of the Settlement, 
though often in ways that would not have been immediately obvious to them. This 
included everything from licensing businesses and enforcing building regulations to 
providing free small pox inoculations and policing the streets. 
1931', in New Frontiers, pp. 38-54; Christine Cornet, `The Bumpy End of the French Concession and 
French Influence in Shanghai, 1937-1946', in In the Shadow of the Rising Sun: Shanghai under Japanese 
Occupation, ed. by Christian Henriot and Wen-Hsin Yeh (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 
r? 257-76. 
Marie-Claire Berglire, `The Shanghai Bankers' Association, 1915-1927: Modernisation and the 
Institutionalisation of Local Solidarities', in Frederic Wakeman, Jr. and Wen-hain Yeh (eds. ), Shanghai 
Sojourners (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), pp. 15-34 and Marie-Claire Berglire, The 
Golden Age of the Chinese Bourgeoisie, 1911-1937 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 
7-25. 
46 Hanchao Lu, Beyond the Neon Lights: Everyday Shanghai in the Early Twentieth Century (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1999), p. 121. 
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Leo Ou-fan Lee described Shanghai `as a cultural matrix of Chinese 
modernity'. 47 Lee's literary research is informed by an analysis of Shanghai's urban 
ecology, where old and new, Chinese and western all shared space. He considers 
Shanghai's print culture, cinema, books and journals in constructing an understanding 
of the city's cosmopolitanism as created and experienced by the Chinese literati. 
Recognising the significance of the semi-colonial impact on the city, he nonetheless 
concludes that a distinctly Chinese modernity emerged. 48 For Meng Yue, who builds on 
Lee's work, `the cultural identity of Shanghai is found somewhere between semi- 
colonialism and cosmopolitanism. ' 49 The western influence through semi-colonial 
domination of the city was undeniable, yet the culture of the city was more 
cosmopolitan than the west and, for Yue, it was this cosmopolitanism that most shaped 
it as the site for the meeting of `different worlds'. 50 She argues that this character 
ensured the shift of China's urban and cultural heartland from the declining Jiangnan 
cities to the coast and specifically Shanghai, which in turn facilitated a flowering of 
culture and modernity. Although her focus is cultural, Yue's emphasis on 
cosmopolitanism has significant implications for the more political subject of this thesis 
as the SMC functioned in an increasingly cosmopolitan society, which brought its own 
challenges. Cosmopolitanism is, however, a problematic concept in such an unequal 
setting as Republican Shanghai, as it implies access to the foreign cultural influences 
brought by the international mix of people who flocked to the city. In reality the 
Chinese population, as well as to a lesser degree other groups who were looked down 
47 Leo Ou-fan Lee, Shanghai Modern: The Flowering of a New Urban Culture in China, 1930-1945 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. xi. 
45 Lee, Shanghai Modern, p. 22 and passim. 
49 Meng Yue, Shanghai and the Edges of Empires (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006), p. 
Xi. 
so Ibid. Meng Yue does not consider the highly cosmopolitan western cities such as New York. 
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upon by the Anglo-Franco-American elite, were not as privy to this cosmopolitan 
culture as the dominant nationalities. 
This thesis does consider Shanghai to have been cosmopolitan, with this 
important caveat in mind, but it engages with and draws on the concept of 
transnationalism, which carries connotations of border crossing and exchange between 
nationalities without the implied equality of cosmopolitanism. Transnationalism 
emphasises the networks in which individuals and groups operated across borders and 
stresses the movement of people within these networks. Valuable work is being done on 
the transnational ambitions and influences of such interwar institutions as the League of 
Nations, but much of this is focused on Europe or the wider developed western world 
including also North America and Australasia. 5' Where transnationalism has been 
applied to the study of China, it has been confined largely to the cultural domain, with 
such notable works as Sheldon Hsiao-peng Lu's volume on transnational Chinese 
cinemas. Lu stresses the ways in which the transnational production and consumption 
of culture (film in this case) for and by audiences at home and overseas integrated China 
into a globalising world. 52 Lu also contributes to calls to problematise the concept of the 
`nation'. 53 This has implications for the study of such a unique political entity as the 
International Settlement, which behaved as a statelet and included so many nations 
within its borders. In this way the present study expands the application of the concept 
of transnationalism in China into political history. I also write of the international aspect 
s' For a majestic study of the role of international organisations in modem history, see Akira Iriye, Global 
Community: The Role of International Organisations in the Making of the Contemporary World (Los 
Angeles: University of Los Angeles Press, 2002). For a good selection of recent work on transnational 
history on Europe, see Contemporary European History, Vol. 14, No. 3, Theme Issue: Transnational 
Communities in European History, 1920-1970 (November 2005), pp. 421-582. 
52 Sheldon Hsiao-peng Lu, `Historical Introduction: Chinese Cinemas (1896-1996) and Transnational 
Film Studies', in Transnational Chinese Cinemas: Identity, Nationhood, Gender, ed. by Sheldon Hsiao- 
peng Lu (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1997), p. 3. 
Ibid. 
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of what was called, after all, the International Settlement, but where I deploy the term 
'transnational' I seek to convey the areas in which nations were not being represented 
by national groups and individuals in Shanghai, but rather the intersections between 
these groups and individuals of different nations were of primary importance. 
The concepts of informal empire and semi-colonialism 
The terms `informal empire' and `semi-colonialism' are sometimes used 
interchangeably, but they have subtle yet important differences. Put simply, imperialism 
is the extension of influence or control beyond a nation's borders politically, 
economically and/or culturally, while colonialism indicates specifically the bringing of 
foreign territory under formal control by an imperial power with a significant number of 
settlers from the dominant nation. Similarly, for the purposes of this thesis, informal 
empire describes areas in which an imperial power extends control politically, 
economically or culturally without formally subjecting it to the central imperial 
authority of the metropolis, while semi-colonialism is the partial control of foreign 
territory by an imperial power with the presence of colonial settlers, but which stops 
short of a claim of sovereignty over the territory. The unequal treaties between China 
and Britain, and the other powers which followed, gave the foreigners the right to 
occupy certain tracts of land, such as the areas that became Shanghai's International 
Settlement and French Concession, and to be subject to the laws of their own nations 
rather than those of China. Chinese sovereignty was thus severely impaired, and more 
so as the Land Regulations of the Settlement were revised in the foreigners' favour and 
as the SMC brought ever more land under its jurisdiction, but the territory remained at 
all times legally Chinese. It was thus only semi-colonised and an informal part of the 
empires of such countries as Britain and France. 
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Semi-colonialism (ban zhimin zhuyi -*MR I X) is a widely used term in China 
and has been for the last century. The Chinese usage adapts Lenin's concept of semi- 
colonialism as a transitional stage on the way to full colonisation, applying it to the 
Chinese context where Marxist historians perceived the partial penetration of foreign 
powers into a China stalled in the feudal stage of development. 54 Sun Yat-sen employed 
the terms `sub-' and `hypo-colonialism' to argue that `China is not the colony of one 
nation but all' and so was not better off than fully colonised nations, as he claims his 
countrymen believed, clinging to China's `semi-colonial' status, but far worse off. 55 
Most Chinese scholars have nonetheless adopted the term `semi-colonialism' to 
describe China's position vis-ä-vis the foreign powers. Hu Sheng (W-19) was, until his 
death in 2000, one of the most influential proponents of the official Chinese historical 
orthodoxy on the semi-colonialism of foreign powers in China in the so-called `century 
of national humiliation'. 56 A Communist Party member and very much a part of the 
political and academic establishment, he was a Professor at Peking University and the 
Director of the Research Unit on Party History at the Chinese Communist Party Central 
Committee, as well as being Vice-Chairman of the Seventh and Eighth National 
Committees of the Chinese People's Consultative Conference (1988-93 and 1993-98). It 
is perhaps because the term `semi-colonialism' as used by such theorists has such strong 
political and ideological connotations that many western, particularly British, scholars 
have preferred to describe the phenomenon in terms of informal empire. 
u Jurgen Osterhammel, `Semi-Colonialism and Informal Empire in Twentieth Century China: Toward a 
Framework of Analysis, ' in Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Jürgen Osterhammel (eds. ), Imperialism and 
Ater: Continuities and Discontinuities (London: Allen and Unwin, 1985), p. 296. 
Sun Yat-sen, San Min Chu I: The Three Principles of the People, ed. by L. T. Chen, trans. by Frank W. 
Price (Shanghai: Institute for Pacific Relations, 1927), pp. 38-9. 
56 Hu Sheng's seminal work on the subject was Imperialism and Chinese Politics (Westport, 
Conn.: Hyperion Press, 1973; first published as Diguo zhuyi yu Zhongguo zhengshi I&MIX-1i'ß' Mäß( 
*(Beijing: 1952)). 
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Historians in the United States have been more willing to use the teen semi- 
colonialism, however, as the debate over informal empire has been largely confined to 
the British academy. Rhoads Murphey positioned semi-colonialism in China in 
opposition to British colonialism along the lines of the `Indian model of western 
penetration. '57 He described the limitation of the imperial encroachment on Chinese soil 
in terms of the treaty ports being fundamentally separate from the rest of China'58 which 
falls foul of a trend abhorred by Jeffrey Wasserstrom of treating Shanghai and its sister 
treaty ports as though they were not part of China at all. 59 Paul Cohen levels the 
additional criticism that Murphey's assumption that foreigners wanted to convert China 
into a full colony but were held back by China's strength lacks any supporting 
evidence. 60 Rather, the semi-colonial control of China suited the interests of the foreign 
powers perfectly. Cohen also uses the term semi-colonialism, but prefers to speak of a 
colonialism of a `partial, multiple, and layered character. 61 In this way, he is referring 
to the semi-colonial nature of the Chinese experience of imperialism alongside the fact 
that it was domination `by a plurality of foreign nations' and that this partial colonialism 
`was until 1912 spliced onto the full colonialism of the Manchus', making the 
significant point that, until its collapse, the Qing dynasty was a form of expansionist 
colonial domination over the Han Chinese. This approach, however, risks the term 
losing its usefulness and instead being lost in ever more specific qualifications. Ruth 
Rogaski coined the term `hypercolonial' to describe the colonialism by many nations 
side by side in Tianjin, with explicit reference to Sun Yat-sen's `hypo-colonial' concept, 
57 Rhoads Murphey, The Outsiders: The Western Experience in India and China (Ann Arbor: University 
of Michigan Press, 1977), especially pp. 12,134-6. 
Murphey, Outsiders, p. 225. 
Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, `Locating Old Shanghai: Having Fits about Where it Fits', in Joseph W. 
Esherick (ed. ), Remaking the Chinese City: Modernity and National Identity, 1900-1950 (Honolulu: 
University of Hawai'i Press, 2000), p. 202. 
60 Cohen, Discovering History in China, p. 135. 
61 Cohen, Discovering History in China, pp. 144-5. 
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while Wasserstrom prefers to speak of `quasi-colonialism' in China, but again the value 
of adding ever more terms to the glossary of Chinese studies in this way is 
questionable. 62 It is preferable to define clearly what is meant by the existing terms of 
`semi-colonial' and `informal empire' and apply them advisedly. 
The concept of semi-colonialism has been applied beyond the political to the 
cultural realm. Shu-mei Shih's concept of the `cultural politics' of semi-colonialism 
from the perspective of literary analysis is illuminating. 63 According to Shih, the 
westerners and Japanese in Shanghai pursued their own forms of modernity grounded in 
the political context of their respective colonialism and imperialism, which 
simultaneously aided in legitimating and disseminating imperialist ideologies. These 
forms of imperial modernity `fundamentally affected modern Chinese cultural 
production. '64 Shih uses the term semi-colonialism `to describe the specific effects of 
multiple imperialist presences in China and their fragmentary colonial geography 
(largely confined to coastal cities) and control, as well as the resulting social and 
cultural formations. '65 She argues that the term semi-colonialism conveys the significant 
fact that the competition between different colonial powers in China had a specific 
impact on the ways in which China was subordinated to them. 66 This thesis accepts the 
usefulness of the term `semi-colonial' and uses it alongside `informal empire' to 
characterise the nature of the foreign imperialism that was manifest in the Shanghai 
Municipal Council. Moreover, the study of the SMC in all its facets enables a more 
62 Ruth Rogaski, Hygienic Modernity: Meanings of Health and Disease in Treaty-Port China (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2004), p. 11; Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, Global Shanghai, 1850-2010: A 
History in Fragments (New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 38 and passim in Wasserstrom's work. 
63 Shu-mei Shih, The Lure of the Modern: Writing Modernism in Semi-colonial China. 1917-1937 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), pp. 30-40. 
Shih, Lure of the Modern, p. 30. 
63 Shih, Lure of the Modern, p. 31. 66 Shih, Lure of the Modern, p. 32. 
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precise understanding of the nature of both semi-colonialism and informal empire to 
emerge. 
As noted at the opening of this Introduction, the two most influential proponents 
of the notion of informal empire were Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, dubbed 
`the dynamic duo' by Stephen Howe. 67 Their groundbreaking article, `The Imperialism 
of Free Trade', published 60 years ago, argued that British imperial policy followed the 
working rule of `trade with informal control if possible; trade with rule when 
necessary'. 68 Informal empire was the preferred degree of colonisation both for reasons 
of economy and in adherence to the Victorian ideal of small government and minimal 
public expenditure. Thus, imperial expansion was dictated by the needs of free trade: 
sufficient controls were obtained to protect British trading interests around the world 
and kept to a minimum for the sake of economy, so only where informal influence was 
insufficient to safeguard these interests was the force of imperial Britain's military 
might brought to bear. The `imperialism of free trade' thesis has been found to be more 
applicable to some regions than others: it does not explain the expense of maintaining 
full colonies in India and West Africa, for example. It is particularly appropriate, 
however, as a model in the case of China's treaty ports, where foreign trade was enabled 
and protected by the privileges of extraterritoriality, and notably Shanghai, where 
foreign privilege extended to comprehensive self-government in the form of the SMC. 
These conditions proved highly conducive to profitable business and Shanghai 
remained the largest economy in China past the period addressed by this study until it 
was overtaken by Hong Kong, Britain's only colony in China, in the volume of its trade 
67 Stephen Howe, `The Slow Death and Strange Rebirths of Imperial History', Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History, Vol. 29, No. 2 (May 2001), p. 132. 
6s Gallagher and Robinson, `Imperialism of Free Trade', p. 13. 
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in 1958.69 Key to this conception of informal empire is the role played by local 
collaborators (used in this context with no negative connotation), notably compradors in 
the Chinese case, and mediators in building relations with indigenous authorities. 70 In 
addition to these indigenous partners in the semi-colonial project, foreign authorities 
required local man-power for menial work, just as they did in formal colonies. This 
reliance on indigenous support was certainly manifest in Shanghai's International 
Settlement, where the vast majority of SMC employees were Chinese. 
The Robinson-Gallagher thesis proved durable and influenced dozens of 
publications through the latter half of the twentieth century. 71 It was also highly 
controversial and a plethora of modifications were made with reference to different 
parts of Africa, Latin America and the Middle East, as well as Asia. 72 The first major 
attack came from Desmond Platt in 1968.73 Platt agreed that trade and later finance were 
the primary concerns governing British foreign policy in China as in Latin America and 
the Middle East. He argued, however, that although this sometimes led to a show of 
violence in order to open markets, it did not entail political control and so should not be 
69 Kerrie L. MacPherson, `Invisible Borders: Hong Kong, China and the Imperatives of Public Health', in 
Milton J. Lewis and Kerrie L. MacPherson (eds. ), Public Health in Asia and the Pacific: Historical and 
Comparative Perspectives (London: Routledge, 2008), p. 21. 
70 For an analysis of compradors, the collaborators who facilitated British business in the nineteenth 
century, see Hao Yen-p'ing, The Comprador in Nineteenth-Century China: Bridge Between East and 
West (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970). Hao also describes cooperation between 
Chinese and foreign businesses in The Commercial Revolution in Nineteenth-Century China: the Rise of 
Sino-Western Mercantile Capitalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), pp. 212-36. 
71 For a discussion of the Robinson-Gallagher thesis in historiography, see William Roger Lewis (ed. ), 
Imperialism: the Robinson and Gallagher Controversy (New York: New Viewpoints, 1976). 
72 These include Roger Owen's research on central Asia, Richard Graham's work on Latin America and 
numerous contributions on the partition period in African history. Roger Owen, The Middle East in the 
World Economy, 1800-1914 (London: I. B. Taurus, 1993); Richard Graham, Britain and the Onset of 
Modernization in Brazil 1850-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968); Peter Morris, Africa, 
America and Central Asia: Formal and Informal Empire in the Nineteenth Century (Exeter: University 
of Exeter, 1984), and others. 
73 D. C. M. Platt, `The Imperialism of Free Trade: Some Reservations' Economic History Review, New 
Series, Vol. 21, No. 2 (August 1968), pp. 296-306. Platt presented a further critique in `Further 
Objections to an "Imperialism of Free Trade", 1830-60', Economic History Review, New Series, Vol. 26, 
No. 1 (April 1973), pp. 77-91. He presented his own analysis of the significance of trade and finance on 
British foreign policy in Finance. Trade, and Politics in British Foreign Policy 1815-1914 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1968). 
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classified as imperialism. 74 Platt is rather too convinced by voices such as that of Sir 
Claude MacDonald, whom he quotes addressing a dinner of the China Association in 
1899 saying: 
British enterprise in China must be independent, individual and self-reliant. The 
moment it ceases to be this and leans too much on State assistance, it ceases to be 
enterprise, indeed I may say it ceases to be British. 'S 
Platt goes on to describe a similar declaration of the principles of British policy in China, 
that `We have no territorial or imperialistic aims', as the best `statement on British 
official motives since 1834. '76 But as this thesis makes clear, the SMC certainly did 
have `territorial' and `imperialistic aims', though it might have been as willing as the 
Foreign Office to deny them. Platt's key point of contention with Robinson and 
Gallagher was that the policy underlying British involvement in China did not change 
from the desire to ensure access for British trade and finance without securing political 
control, despite the changing circumstances within China. 77 
Peter Cain and A. G. Hopkins agreed with Robinson and Gallagher that 
economic concerns were central to a form of imperialism which preferred to engage in 
informal control where possible, enforcing formal rule only when deemed necessary to 
protect British economic interests. 78 But for Cain and Hopkins, those interests were 
dominated by financiers in London rather than local factors. The Cain and Hopkins 
model of `gentlemanly capitalism' has been widely criticised and aspects of it have been 
largely discredited. Niels Petersson provides a nuanced critique of the concept in the 
74 Platt, Finance, Trade, and Politics, pp. 263-5. 
'S Platt, Finance, Trade, and Politics, p. 289, quoting from Pelcovits, Old China Hands and the Foreign 
ce, p. 235. 0effl 
' Platt, Finance, Trade and Politics, p. 304, with quotation from a Foreign Office Memorandum of 1930. 
77 Platt, Finance, Trade and Politics, p. 307. 
79 Peter Cain and A. G. Hopkins, `Gentlemanly Capitalism, and British Expansion Overseas: New 
Imperialism, 1850-1945', Economic History Review, 2°d series, Vol. 40, No. 1 (1987), pp. 1-26; British 
imperialism, 1688-2000 (Harlow: Longman, 2002). 
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case of China, concluding that only the period 1905 to 1911 could accurately be 
described as characterised by gentlemanly capitalism, being the only time when the 
different forms of imperialism at work in China coincided in their strategies. 79 
Louise Guenther's study of the British community in Brazil brings a fresh 
approach to the study of informal empire. 80 The British in Bahia in the first half of the 
nineteenth century sought to preserve their `Britishness' and identify themselves with 
the British Empire, much as their counterparts in Shanghai a century later would do. 
Guenther's volume is, however, an historical anthropology of this community and, as 
with much recent writing on informal empire, engages little with the politics of semi- 
colonialism. 81 In this, the literature on the everyday workings of informal empire lags 
somewhat behind that for the formal empire. 82 Historians of informal empire have 
largely been focussed on Latin America, where European influence was exercised 
through the infrastructure of trade. 83 Imperial expansion in Latin America, however, 
lacked the degree of self-governance that foreign settlers and expatriates enjoyed in 
China, most notably in Shanghai, making the latter a more apt subject for the 
application of the term `semi-colonialism'. James Onley's examination of the British 
reliance on native agents in its informal imperial governance of Bahrain provides a case 
79 Niels P. Petersson, `Gentlemanly and Not-so-Gentlemanly Imperialism in China before the First World 
War', in Shigeru Akita (ed. ), Gentlemanly Capitalism, Imperialism and Global History 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), p. 116. The other papers found in this section of the volume 
together provide a comprehensive critique of the arguments of Cain and Hopkins in the context of 
informal empire in East Asia. 
80 Louise H. Guenther, British Merchants in Nineteenth-Century Brazil: Business, Culture, and Identity in 
Bahia, 1808-1850 (Oxford: Centre for Brazilian Studies, 2004). 
81 Guenther would fall foul of Britten Dean's criticism that much of the literature on informal empire 
focuses on `British attitudes' rather than on `concrete circumstances'. Dean, `British Informal Empire', p. 
75. 
82 Work on the nature of governance in the British Raj and in African colonies is more developed. See 
Peter Burroughs, `Imperial Institutions and the Government of Empire', in Porter (ed. ), Oxford History of 
the British Empire, Vol. 3: The Nineteenth Century, pp. 170-97. 83 For an up-to-date overview, see Brown (ed. ), Informal Empire. 
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study on the nature of another corner of informal empire, 84 closer in some ways to the 
Chinese case in terms of the role played by compradors, noted above. 
According to Jürgen Osterhammel, there are two alternatives in formulating a 
framework for the use of the concept of informal empire. The first is to take an ideal 
type of what constitutes informal empire, and assess how the reality measures up to the 
ideal. The second is to build a model that incorporates both important features of the 
ideal type and the basic characteristics of the reality of how informal empire was 
practiced in China. 85 The present thesis adopts the second approach and develops a new 
understanding of the nature of informal empire and semi-colonialism from a 
consideration of how the Shanghai Municipal Council functioned on the ground. 
Osterhammel identifies ten features of the ideal type of informal empire, though he 
stresses that it is not necessary or even likely for all ten to be present in an area for it to 
belong to the category of informal empire. Without wishing to quote all ten features, 
suffice it to say that they centre around the notion that a weaker country is exploited by 
a stronger country in pursuit of its real or perceived interests through the exercise of 
control over the weaker country's domestic and foreign policy-making, the maintenance 
of a military presence and strong economic establishment in the weaker country, and the 
support of local collaborators. 86 Almost all of Osterhammel's ten features are true of 
Britain's presence in Shanghai, arguably much more than they apply to Latin America 
or anywhere else in the world. Osterhammel's definition moves beyond the narrow 
attachment to the application of economic criteria which led Britten Dean to claim there 
was no such thing as informal empire, at least in the case of Sino-British relations. 87 
84 James Onley, The Arabian Frontier of the British Raj: Merchants. Rulers, and the British in the 
Nineteenth Century Gulf (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
ss Osterhammel, 'Semi-colonialism and Informal Empire', p. 299. 
eb Osterhammel, `Semi-colonialism and Informal Empire', pp. 297-8. 
87 Dean, `British Informal Empire', p. 76. 
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Osterhammel's keen desire to see China's important place within British imperial 
ambition recognised is apparent in his contributions to The Oxford History of the British 
Empire. Osterhammel argues that from Lord Macartne mission to the Qianlong 
Emperor in 1792, `China figured in grand designs of market conquest and global 
influence' and that `From the mid-nineteenth-century, China formed an integral part of 
the military, economic, and mental history of European and, in particular, of British 
imperialism. ' 88 He locates Shanghai's International Settlement as a key component of 
British informal empire in China, noting that it took imperial encroachment far beyond 
the purview of the treaties agreed between China and the foreign powers. Yet for 
Osterhammel, these treaties `were the legal infrastructure of informal empire', forming 
its core. 89 In fact, he equates Shanghai with Hong Kong as part of the formal empire 
which was far more apparent to ordinary Chinese than the legalistic informal empire of 
the treaties and consulates. 90 This thesis agrees with the importance Osterhammel 
attaches to the everyday experience of the SMC by the residents of the International 
Settlement, but argues that its independence from direct colonial authority in London 
and the involvement of nationals other than Britons in running it marks the Settlement 
as semi-colonial rather than fully colonial in the way that Hong Kong was. 
Ann Stoler argues that the kind of imperialism found in Central and East Asia, 
without clear borders and bounded polities, was and is the norm rather than the 
exception. 91 In strong terms, she accuses colonial studies of subscribing `to a myopic 
view of empire that sidelines a wide range of imperial forms as anomalous, casting their 
88 Jürgen Osterhammel, `Britain and China, 1842-1914', in Andrew Porter (ed. ), The Oxford History of 
the British Empire, Vol. 3: The Nineteenth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 146. 
89 Osterhammel, `Britain and China', p. 153. 
90 Osterhammel, 'Britain and China', p. 164. 
91 Ann Laura Stoler, `On Degrees of Imperial Sovereignty', Public Culture, Vol. 18, No. 1 (2006), p. 128. 
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political and territorial ambiguities as idiosyncratic. '92 By contrast, she advocates seeing 
imperial formations `as scaled genres of rule that produce and count on different 
degrees of sovereignty and gradations of rights. ' 93 She therefore rejects the 
characterisation of imperial formations that do not fit the classic European model of 
conquest, settlement and the confiscation of property as peripheral forms. This includes 
the notion of `informal empire', which Stoler rejects along with `indirect rule' as merely 
`unhelpful euphemisms' for imperialism and part of a `scholarly vocabulary [that] 
defers to the terms of empires themselves'. 94 It is certainly not the intention of this 
thesis to provide an apology for British imperialism in Shanghai, but it is necessary to 
employ terminology that differentiates the British domination of the International 
Settlement from formal annexation. I certainly subscribe, however, to Stoler's call for 
non-classical forms of imperialism to be given due attention by scholars. 
A conference held at the University of Bristol in 2007 on informal empire in 
Latin America concluded rightly that Stoler was wrong to dismiss the term informal 
empire out of hand. 95 Matthew Brown cited Frederick Cooper in refuting her argument 
to make the important point that if all unequal power relations were alike designated 
simply as forms of imperialism there would be no way in which to distinguish between 
them 96 In seeking to render it a useful working concept, Brown put forward his own 
definition of informal empire: he identified `a three-dimensional framework that posits 
commerce, capital and culture as three interdependent and mutually reinforcing 
influences that limited local sovereignty. ' He went on: 
92 Stoler, 'On Degrees', p. 127. 
93 Stoler, 'On Degrees', p. 128. 
94 Stoler, 'On Degrees', p. 136. 
95 Matthew Brown, 'Introduction', in Brown (ed. ), Informal Empire, p. 20. 
96 Frederick Cooper, Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2005), p. 15, cited in Brown, 'Introduction', p. 20. 
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Where one of those three conditions is lacking, no informal empire can be said to exist. 
The tentacles of informal empire must be found on the ground and in the mind. They 
must have an empirically demonstrable reality of asymmetrical power and of a 
measurable control being exerted; but also a cultural underpinning in the minds of the 
citizens and nations whose sovereignty is being compromised. Informal empire must be 
lived, and known, if it is to exist. 97 
This definition is certainly applicable to the case of Shanghai. But Brown was thinking 
primarily of Latin America, where `commerce, capital and culture' were indeed key. In 
China, however, and in Shanghai in particular, political power lay at the heart of the 
foreign encroachment. This thesis therefore advocates my own simple definition given 
at the beginning of this section: informal empire is the extension of political, economic 
and cultural control by an imperial power, without formally subjecting it to the central 
imperial authority of the metropolis. 
The Chinese literature 
The Republican period has been very much in vogue among Chinese historians in recent 
years, so this study is able to capitalise on material presented in the Chinese secondary 
literature which is at present unavailable in the English language. " Traditionally, the 
May Fourth Movement of 1919 has been characterised within Chinese historiography as 
the turning point from modem to contemporary history, as the dawning of a new era in 
which the semi-feudal and semi-colonial order was challenged, a process which 
97 Brown, `Introduction', p. 21. 
98 This includes the collection of essays in Shanghai Municipal Archives, Shanghai zufle zhl (Annals of 
the Shanghai concessions) (Shanghai: Shanghai shehui kexue chubanshe, 2001) and Shi Melding and Ma 
Zhanghlin (eds. ), Shanghai zujie zhi (Records of the Foreign Concessions of Shanghai) (Shanghai: 
Shanghai shehui kexueyuan chubanshe, 2001). 
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culminated with the 1949 victory of the Communist Party. The period addressed by 
this thesis would thus be seen as straddling the transition from the penultimate stage in 
the Marxist-Leninist periodisation of history and the final, socialist era. More recently, 
however, Chinese historians have challenged this division, choosing instead to follow 
the semi-colonial and semi-feudal characterisation of Chinese history right up to the 
1949 declaration of the People's Republic. 10° Either way, semi-colonialism is critical to 
Chinese interpretations of twentieth-century history. 
Historians in the PRC are limited in their analysis of historical issues, due both 
to the constrictions of publishing in a political climate where censorship remains a 
significant force and also to the comparatively short time the Chinese academy has had 
to develop since Deng Xiaoping's launch of the opening up policy at the start of the 
1980s. C. M. Turnbull noted in 1999 that although the opening up policy `broke down 
the decades-long physical isolation among scholars' and `to a degree facilitated research 
and exchange of ideas,... it did not soften the orthodox interpretation of imperialism 
among China's historians. ' 101 Chinese researchers also face the difficulty of lack of 
access to archives in the west. Chinese scholarship is, however, detailed and thorough in 
its narrative of historical accounts, due in part to the emphasis on historical materialism, 
making it useful to the present study. Moreover, Chinese historians are increasingly 
testing the waters of the censor's bureau in terms of what can and cannot be said, so this 
99 This literature is surveyed in Sha Jiansun and Gong Shuduo, Wusi yundong yu ershi shift Zhongguo de 
lishi daolu (The May Fourth Movement and the Path of 20°i Century Chinese History) (Bejing: Renmin 
chubanshe, 2001). This emphasis on the May Fourth Movement as a moment of transition is not unique to 
the Chinese literature: Rana Mitter takes the same incident as his flashpoint in the formation of modem 
China. Rana Mitter, A Bitter Revolution: China's Struggle with the Modern World (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004), especially pp. 1-25. 
100 Zhang Haipeng, `Introduction: Contemporary Historiography of China', International Committee of 
Historical Sciences Symposium on Chinese Historiography, 16 September 2007, at the Chinese Academy 
of Social Sciences, Beijing. <http: //www. cish. org/GB/Evenements/CASSIntro. htm>, accessed 27 June 
2009. Zhang is the Vice President and Secretary-General of the Association of Chinese Historians. 
101 C. M. Turnbull, `Formal and Informal Empire in East Asia', in Robin W. Winks (ed. ), The Oxford 





body of literature is increasingly significant, with a notable change in this direction in 
just the intervening decade since Turnbull wrote her contribution to The Oxford History 
of the British Empire. Journal articles are generally less tightly regulated than books and 
have been useful to the present study. As in the western literature, certain aspects of 
Shanghai's history have attracted particular attention from various different scholars. 
Shanghai's Mixed Court, for example, has been the subject of numerous articles. 102 
Public health in the concessions has also attracted the attention of a number of 
historians, most notably Hu Cheng (9A) who has published in the mainland and in 
Taiwanese journals. '03 
There is considerable interest among Chinese scholars in both the People's 
Republic and Taiwan in the history of the council and its Settlement. The SMC is 
literally termed the `works bureau' (gongbu ju I a13 N. ) in Chinese, while the 
International Settlement is translated variously as the `public concession' (gonggong 
zujie ýa #i A), `British concession' (Ying zujie A. ) or `British-American 
concession' (Ying-Mei zujie AX fff A). 104 The latter two Chinese names for the 
102 Hu Zhen, `Shanghai gonggong zujie huixie faquan zhi bianqian (1911-1912)' (`The Transformation of 
the Legal Rights in the Shanghai Mixed Court of International Settlement from 1911 to 1912'), Shixue 
yuekan (April2006), pp. 51-6; Li Huijuan, 'Lun Shanghai gonggong zujie hunhe fating' ('The 
International Mixed Court of Shanghai') Zhuzhou shifan gaodeng zhuanke xuexiao jiaoxuebao, Vol. 11, 
No. 3 (June 2006), pp. 48-51. There is also an English language literature on the Mixed Court, from 
Kotenev writing in the 1920s to the recent studies by Tahirih Lee and Thomas Stephens. A. M. Kotenev, 
Shanghai: Its Mixed Court and Council (Shanghai: North-China Daily News & Herald, 1925); Tahirih V. 
Lee, Law and Local Autonomy at the International Mixed Court of Shanghai (Unpublished PhD Thesis, 
Yale University, 1990); Thomas B. Stephens, Order and Discipline in China: the Shanghai Mixed Court 
1911-27 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002). 
lea Hu Cheng's most recent article on the subject is 'Cong "bu weisheng" de huaren xingxiang: Zhong 
wai jian de butong shu - yi Shanghai gonggong weisheng wei zhongxin de guancha (1860-1911)' ('The 
Image of the "Unsanitary Chinese": Differing Narratives of Foreigners and Chinese - Observations Based 
on Hygiene in Shanghai, 1860-1911'), Jindai shi yanjiu suo jikan, No. 56 (June 2007), pp. 1-43. See also 
Song Zhongmin, `Shanghai gonggong zujie de kuangquanbing fangzhi' ('The Prevention and Cure of 
Rabies in the Foreign Settlement of Shanghai'), Dang an yu shixue, No. 5 (2001), pp. 68-69, and Liu 
Wenxue, 'Shanghai gongbuju shipin weisheng guanli yanjiu 1898-1943' ('Research on the Management 
of the Public Hygiene of Foodstuffs by the Shanghai Municipal Council 1898-1943'), Shilin, No. 1 
(1999), pp. 64-82. This body of literature is useful to the present study. 
104 These terms were all employed by contemporaries of the SMC as well as being used by Chinese today. 
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Settlement perhaps more accurately represent its true character as heavily dominated by 
the British and, to a lesser extent, Americans. Describing it as a `public concession', 
however, carries connotations of openness and public ownership which seem a far cry 
from the reality of a settlement under the management of the SMC, elected by a 
privileged few from among an even smaller number of men eligible to be councillors. 
Meanwhile, the term `works bureau' is taken from the similar bodies which existed in 
Victorian England around the time of the establishment of the council in 1854 for the 
provision of basic public works. 105 It thus accurately represents the original function of 
the SMC, simply overseeing the maintenance of public roads, waterworks, cemeteries 
and so on, but gives no indication of the broad swathe of services undertaken by the 
council by the twentieth century that are investigated in this thesis. 
Chinese scholars, particularly in the PRC, are interested in points of tension 
between foreigners and Chinese in the Settlement, such as Hu Cheng's (J) 
investigation into the clashes between the two groups over the 1910 outbreak of 
plague 106 Yet historians on both sides of the Straits have in the last two decades come 
to something of a consensus that the British presence in cities like Shanghai promoted 
China's modernisation. 107 At a conference held in Shanghai in 1992, two eminent 
Chinese professors of history, Zhang Zhongli (Director of the Shanghai Academy of 
Social Sciences) and Pan Yunxiang (Director of the Shanghai History Museum) 
portrayed China as a passive receiver of modernisation from the west, primarily through 
105 Significantly, these municipal bodies were no more democratic than the SMC. 
106 Hu Cheng, `Jianyi, zhongzu yu zujie zhengzhi - 1910 nian Shanghai shuyi bingli faxianhou de hua 
yang chongtu' (`Quarantine, Race and Politics in the International Settlement: Clashes between Chinese 
and Foreigners after the Outbreak of Plague in Shanghai in 1910'), Jindal shi y+anjiu (April 2007), pp. 74- 
90. 
107 Osterhammel, `Britain and China', p. 148. This is in evidence in, for example, Shi Meiding and Ma 
Zhanghlin (eds. ), Shanghai zujie Al. 
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the foreign presence in Shanghai. 108 So while the SMC is denigrated as an imperialist 
body, disenfranchising the Chinese and excluding them from its public parks, 109 it is 
nevertheless portrayed as an unwitting benefactor of China as a whole by introducing 
the advantages of modern society. Most of the Chinese literature approaches the history 
of the British presence in China as a story of foreign impact and Chinese response, in 
the vein of Fairbank's generation of historians. There is perhaps nevertheless a limited 
appreciation of the ways in which the British-dominated council was independent from 
the formal diplomatic avenues of power through the consuls to the British imperial state 
in London. As explained above, and in contrast to the French Concession, the consular 
body had no formal authority over the Shanghai Municipal Council, and although the 
latter appealed to the British government for support in times of difficulty, it was proud 
of its independence and autonomy. Although Xiong Yuezhi (A ,) and his colleagues 
go into some depth in their study of Shanghai's foreign community, the nature of its 
links with the consular body and home governments is not fully explained. ' 10 
Many book-length studies in Chinese seek to straddle the line between academic 
work and popular history, fulfilling the long-standing Chinese Communist Party line 
that academic work should serve the role of educating the public, "' and capitalising on 
108 Zhang Zhongli and Pan Yunxiang, "The Influence of Shanghai's Modernization on the Economy of 
the Yangzi Valley, " in Frederic Wakeman, Jr. and Wang Xi (eds. ), China's Quest for Modernization: A 
Historical Perspective (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), p. 284. 
109 For a discussion of the widely accepted but mistaken view that Chinese were banned throughout the 
period (whereas they were belatedly admitted from 1928) by a sign with wording banning `Dogs and 
Chinese' when such a sign never existed, see Robert Bickers and Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, `Shanghai's 
"Chinese and Dogs Not Admitted" Sign: Legend, History and Contemporary Symbol', China Quarterly, 
No. 142 (June 1995), pp. 423-43. 
110 Xiong Yuezhi et al (eds. ), Shanghai de waiguoren (Foreigners in Shanghai) (Shanghai: Guji 
chubanshe, 2003). 
111 This data to the early days of the Chinese Communist Party. The Yan'an Rectification Campaign 
which began with Mao Zedong's speech "Reform in Learning, the Party and Literature" on 1 February 
1942, combined with his 1945 "Resolution on some Historical Questions", laid the framework according 
to which all modem Chinese history would be written until the 1990s. Boyd Compton (ed. ), Mao's China: 
Party Reform Documents, 1942-1944 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1952), pp. 23-25, and 
Mao Zedong, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1965) Vol. 111, pp. 
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a swell of public interest in Shanghai's rich yet shady past. Such volumes often simply 
repeat the chronology of treaty-port history and well-rehearsed perspectives on the 
exploitative nature of Sino-foreign relations. ' 12 There are also, however, a number of 
publications pursuing more independent lines of enquiry and encouraging interaction 
with foreign scholars. A useful example of such collaborative work is a 2003 volume on 
Shanghai's foreign concessions edited by Ma Changlin (4iß#), arguably the foremost 
Chinese scholar, alongside Xiong Yuezhi, on the history of the International Settlement, 
with contributions from twenty Chinese scholars along with the notable foreign 
historians Bryna Goodman, Christian Henriot and Robert Bickers. 113 The volume is 
divided into five sections to provide a comprehensive overview of how the history of 
the International Settlement and French Concession intersects with the areas of the 
economy, culture, society, and foreign relations, with the final section devoted to the 
institutional management of the concessions. Here, scholars cover the Shanghai 
Municipal Council and, to a lesser extent, the French Conseil municipal and how they 
managed public security, public works and public health. Although public security has 
been researched in the western literature by Frederic Wakeman and Robert Bickers, ' 14 
and Kerrie MacPherson made a comprehensive survey of the development of public 
health provision up to 1893,115 this institutional approach has been largely absent from 
western considerations of the foreign presence in Shanghai. It is highly pertinent to the 
present study. 
195-96. For more on Chinese historiography under Mao, see Albert Feuerwerker (ed. ), History in 
Communist China (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1968). 
112 Ma Changlin's 2009 volume is one addition to this genre. Ma Changlin, Shanghai de zujie (The 
Foreign Concessions of Shanghai) (Tianjin: Tianjin Education Press, 2009). 
113 Ma Changlin (ed. ), Zujie li de Shanghai (Shanghai in Foreign Concessions) (Shanghai: Shanghai shi 
dang'anguan, 2003). 
114 Wakeman, Policing Shanghai and Shanghai Badlands; Bickers, Empire Made Me and `Who Were the 
Shanghai Municipal Police, and Why Were They There? The British Recruits of 1919', in Bickers and 
Henriot (eds. ), New Frontiers, pp. 170-91. 
115Kerrie L. MacPherson, A Wilderness of Marshes: The Origins of Public Health in Shanghai, 1843- 
1893 (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1987). 
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Overall, historians in the People's Republic have over the last two decades 
systematically produced a comprehensive and detailed overview of the history of 
Shanghai in the Republican era which integrates its foreign community into the broader 
historical narrative. 116 A major volume on the management of the International 
Settlement by Ma Changlin, Li Xia (-V) and Shi Lei (FA) was published shortly 
before this thesis was completed. '7 It represents the latest research on the practical 
contribution of the SMC to the urban development of Shanghai, consisting of three 
sections devoted to public sanitation, public works, and utilities. This thesis 
complements this focus within the Chinese literature by placing these functions of the 
council in the context of the powers and limitations of the SMC within the political 
environment of Shanghai. 
The Work of the Shanghai Municipal Council 
Shanghai's International Settlement had a population of 1.12 million in 1935 (of whom 
39,000 were foreign residents) and such a population naturally had a great many 
pressing needs to be addressed by its governing body. 118 The emerging concerns which 
were precipitating change in the imperial metropolis, such as increased awareness of the 
need for public hygiene and righteous indignation over the exploitation of, in particular, 
women and children in factories, arrived fast in China in Shanghai's International 
Settlement. SMC action on these issues was shaped by changing British imperial 
116 The largest single contribution to this process came in 1999 with the mammoth 15 volumes of the 
Shanghai tongshi. Xiong Yuezhi (chief ed. ), Shanghai tongshi (General History of Shanghai), 15 vols. 
(Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1999). 
117 Ma Changlin, Li Xia and Shi Lei, `Shanghai gonggong zujie chengshi guanli yanjiu' ('Research on the 
Urban Management of the Shanghai International Settlement') (Shanghai: Zhong xi shuju, 2011). 
118 Shanghai Municipal Council, Report for the Year 1935 and Budget for the Year 1936 (Shanghai: Kelly 
& Walsh, 1935; hereafter, for example, SMC, Report for 1935), pp. 50-5 1. 
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concerns, which affected practice throughout the empire, and by new international 
standards set by such bodies as the League of Nations. 
Many technological advances in transportation and communication of the period, 
from tarmacadamed roads to the telephone, which enabled everyday life and trade to be 
conducted with greater ease and comfort, were similarly introduced to China through 
the Settlement. 119 But the balancing act between serving business interests, which 
always dominated the council's membership and agenda, and giving in to pressure for 
change from within and outside the Settlement was a constant source of tension for the 
SMC. This thesis explores how the council went about bringing such changes to the 
Settlement, whether in response to pressure from outsiders, or under pressure from 
within, or even as an expression of the council's own desire to be a beacon of 
civilisation in what was routinely perceived as the stagnant backwater of China, as with 
ensuring the provision of the electricity which powered this vibrant city. 120 The 
committees which transformed the decisions taken in the council chamber into practice 
on the streets of Shanghai were often the drivers of such change and innovation. The 
work of the Staff, Finance, Watch, Public Health, and Industrial and Social Committees 
are examined in order to explore the relationship between policy formulation and 
implementation. 
The International Settlement did not, of course, exist in isolation from the rest of 
China and the political changes which gathered pace as the century advanced had to be 
accommodated, if reluctantly, by the members of the SMC and the ratepayers whom 
119 Frank Dikötter rightly cautions, however, against the assumption that `modernity' was imposed from 
outside, arguing that Chinese elites and ordinary people often keenly embraced new innovations of their 
own volition. Frank Dikötter, Things Modern: Material Culture and Everyday Life in China (London: 
Hurst, 2007), pp. 4-5 and passim. 
120 The German firm which first introduced electricity to China in the International Settlement in 1882 
was bought in 1893 by the SMC, which operated it until 1929. G. C. Allen and Audrey G. Donnithorne, 
Western Enterprise in Far Eastern Economic Development: China and Japan (London: Allen & Unwin, 
1954), p. 145. 
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they represented. The massive influx of people fleeing the political turmoil surrounding 
the 1911 revolution created serious over-crowding, 121 leading to a variety of problems 
which the SMC had to address as best it could. Subsequently, the Settlement's status as 
a haven became more acute during the years of competition for influence between rival 
warlords. A more direct response was necessary from the council as, with the upsurge 
of nationalism in the 1920s, Chinese political representation became unavoidable. This 
development fundamentally changed the character of the SMC and is examined here in 
terms of how the presence of Chinese council members from 1928 altered the nature of 
the workings of the council and the issues it addressed. Previous scholarship has 
focused on the developments which led to the acceptance of Chinese council 
members, 122 but far less work has been done on their effect once they took up their 
posts. 123 Of course, Chinese had held official positions within the administrative 
structure of the International Settlement almost from its inception (in the police force, 
for example); as noted above, and just as in the formal empire, imperial rule depended 
on the work of cooperative local people. The advent of Chinese councillors, however, 
heralded a new period of direct engagement with the overwhelming majority Chinese 
population of the Settlement, which brought significant changes to the functioning of 
the council. 
During the Nanjing decade from 1927, the SMC at times married its interests 
with those of the Guomindang (Nationalist) government, for example in aiding the 
Chinese authorities in their efforts to suppress Communism, but more often the 
relationship with the Chinese authorities was tense. Conflicts characterised the period 
and created opportunities and difficulties for the SMC. Ultimately the Sino-Japanese 
121 As had earlier such influxes: the first in the wake of the Small Sword Uprising in 1853, followed by 
the much larger movement of people during the early 1860s at the time of the Taiping Rebellion. 122 Notably Clifford, Spoilt Children of Empire, especially pp. 149-53. 123 Although Clifford touches upon this: Clifford, Spoilt Children of Empire, pp. 263-66. 
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War of 1937-45 brought the existence of the council and the Settlement to an end. 124 
The Land Regulations which governed the Settlement and granted the SMC its mandate 
to manage it were suspended by the consular body in April 1941 and a consular- 
appointed council was established under the Provisional Council Agreement. This 
signalled the end of the SMC as an autonomous body, as the western powers attempted 
to block Japanese attempts to monopolise it. Thereafter the Japanese takeover of the 
council was, in the words of Robert Bickers, `slow, legalistic, and undertaken with due 
decorum. ' 125 Allied councillors resigned at Japanese request in January 1942, but 
continued to serve on committees, while most Allied staff remained in post. On 10 
October 1942, Britain and the United States declared their renunciation of 
extraterritorial rights in China, ratified first in the Sino-British Friendship Treaty of 
February 1943, which formally returned the International Settlement to Chinese control. 
The other western powers followed suit. For Shanghai's foreigners, especially those in 
the employ of the SMC like Eleanor Hinder (who noted the coincidence that this 
announcement came on the anniversary of the founding of the Republic of China), this 
marked the `end of an era'. 126 Indeed, Hinder claimed that for `those who considered 
that the special privileges were overdue for abrogation, the news was welcome', 
suggesting she counted herself among those for whom the extraterritorial rights of the 
foreign powers had been rendered obsolete by the events of the preceding decade, 
though she was of course writing with the benefit of hindsight. The aggressive 
imperialism of Japan made any form of foreign imperial presence in China an aberration 
that Chinese nationalism, which had been growing since the beginning of the century, 
124 The process is documented in Robert Bickers, `Settlers and Diplomats: the End of British Hegemony 
in the International Settlement, 1937-1945', in Henriot and Wen-hsin Yoh (eds. ) In the Shadow of the 
Rising Sun, pp. 229-56. 
125 Bickers, `Settlers and Diplomats', p. 247. 
126 Eleanor M. Hinder, Life and Labour in Shanghai: A Decade of Labour and Social Administration in 
the International Settlement (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1944), p. vii. 
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could no longer tolerate. But the Japanese kept the council functioning until August 
1943, and even maintained the use of English for council business, including in 
correspondence between Japanese, well into that year. ' 27 As Robert Bickers explains, 
the Japanese civil and military authorities saw value in preserving `the fiction of 
normality' of a neutral, foreign-run administration in Shanghai. But the fiction had to 
come to an end, and in August 1943 the Settlement ceased to exist as an 
administratively distinct area of the city. War had succeeded where Chinese nationalism 
had not, in abolishing the aberration of an authority (the SMC) managing a territory (the 
International Settlement) which it could not legally claim as its own. 
Sources 
Until the end of the twentieth century, scholars of Shanghai in this period depended 
upon the available sources in the diplomatic archives of, for example, Britain's Foreign 
and Colonial Offices and consular records at the US National Archives, and individual 
papers and printed materials from people and institutions based in `Old Shanghai'. This 
dissertation consults these sources, but is also able to exploit the archives of the 
Shanghai Municipal Council, which only opened comparatively recently and which 
enable us to examine fresh material to address the question of how the council ran the 
International Settlement in a depth never possible before. The minutes of the 
committees of the SMC are key to uncovering how they operated, the reforms they 
initiated and how these were implemented. Committee minutes, unlike the minutes of 
the full council's meetings, were kept secret from contemporary investigators, which 
caused some resentment and suspicion at the time but increases their value to the 
127 Bickers, `Settlers and Diplomats', p. 249. The final annual report, for 1942, published in July 1943, 
was issued in English as well as Japanese and Chinese. 
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historian as they often report candidly exchanges which were kept from the public 
record. Council correspondence also supplements the municipal minutes. 
Newspaper reports of key developments in the city's administration are 
consulted for a different perspective on developments in the Settlement, particularly the 
North-China Herald (NCH), the most widely-circulated foreign-language newspaper in 
China at this time, and the most well-established Chinese-language newspaper, Shenbao. 
The latter provides the main source of insight into contemporary Chinese perspectives 
on council activities, which is of course limiting as Shenbao had a particular editorial 
stance which was not a simple reflection of the views of its readers or the much wider 
public, the majority of whom were illiterate. 128 Nonetheless, it does provide a valuable 
indication of issues which resonated particularly with the more politically active 
sections of Shanghainese society and some of the views expressed within it. British 
newspapers, notably The Times and the Manchester Guardian, alongside Hansard 
records of parliamentary debates, give an indication of the importance attached to 
events in Shanghai back in the imperial metropolis. Of course, neither these newspapers 
nor the NCH can be used uncritically as a reflection of public opinion any more than 
Shenbao. Indeed, the Herald had at times (it varied according to the political leanings of 
the editor) a particularly strong editorial line, fiercely British and imperialistic in flavour 
and exemplary of the narrow `Shanghai Mind' as characterised by Arthur Ransome. 129 
Its readership included a diverse section of British expatriates and settlers from 
diplomats and missionaries to the ordinary working men among the Shanghailander 
population, as well as Chinese readers, some of whose letters to the editor can be found 
128 Bryna Goodman, for example, found that Shenbao created a nationalist motivation for a riot by the 
Ningbo community in Shanghai in 1898, which had in reality been grounded in native-place identity. 
Bryna Goodman, `The Locality as Microcosm of the Nation? Native Place Networks and Early Urban 
Nationalism in China', Modern China, Vol. 21, No. 4 (October 1995), pp. 393-4. 
129 Arthur Ransome, `The Shanghai Mind', in Arthur Ransome, The Chinese Puzzle (London: Unwin, 
1927), pp. 29-32. 
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within its pages, and subscribers further afield in Hong Kong and beyond. The NCH 
cannot be said to have represented such a varied cross-section of life, though there is no 
denying its influence and its editors appear to have sought to mould their readers to their 
own view of the treaty-port world through a consistently pro-British stance. 
Other major bodies of sources consulted include Eleanor Hinder's published 
works and archived papers at the State Library of New South Wales, Sydney, and 
reports of investigations conducted by the League of Nations and the SMC's own Child 
Labour Commission. Hinder was of course no impartial observer of the work conducted 
by the Industrial Division, but the use of this combination of sources from the 
perspective of the Division, the council, independent investigators and members of the 
public allows a balanced assessment to be made of this revealing aspect of the council's 
work. 
Structure of the thesis 
The thesis consists of five substantive chapters, the first of which examines the 
councillors and staff of the Shanghai Municipal Council. It reveals how councillors 
were elected (or selected) and from what constituencies, with implications for the 
policies pursued by the council as the interests represented by the council members 
influenced their priorities. The composition of the council changed significantly over 
this period as councillors were elected by an evolving constituency of ratepayers, the 
most significant change being the admission of Chinese councillors from 1928. This 
major turning point is therefore examined in detail, building on work by Nicholas 
Clifford on how the change was brought about to consider the impact of the new 
Chinese councillors. The assessment of their role continues in the subsequent chapters. 
This first chapter also considers the staff employed by the council - Chinese and foreign, 
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junior and senior - including how they were recruited and the backgrounds which 
informed their municipal service. The vast majority of employees were Chinese, but the 
senior positions were almost universally occupied by Britons. Many of the British 
members of the council and the staff came to Shanghai after experience in other areas of 
British colonial influence, bringing ideas with them which influenced practice in 
Shanghai. 130 The different departments and committees of the council had to cooperate 
over staffing issues. For example, when seeking to increase the numbers of police 
constables, the Watch Committee would work through the Staff Committee with 
approval from the Secretariat and the Finance Committee. Quarters for staff had to be 
built and maintained by the Public Works Department (PWD) and staff were provided 
with treatment in the hospital under the auspices of the Public Health Department. Thus 
staffing gets to the heart of exactly how the council operated internally. 
The second chapter establishes how the SMC gathered the revenues necessary 
for all its various activities: a crucial area which has been neglected in the literature. The 
chapter analyses the successes and difficulties experienced by the SMC in collecting 
taxes and raising loans, which provide a barometer of the strength of the council's 
position. The growing demands of the council through the period required ever greater 
revenues, and increases in taxation were opposed by ratepayers, especially the 
disenfranchised Chinese, yet in general the rates were paid by Chinese and foreigners 
alike. Taxation is not only a fundamental source of revenue for any government; it is 
also a sign of legitimacy. The capacity to exact payments from the inhabitants of the 
International Settlement demonstrates that the SMC enjoyed a sufficient degree of 
legitimacy in their eyes to do so. Such perceived legitimacy, in a council which had 
t30 This builds on work by other historians on the way the careers of individuals could span many 
different parts of the formal and informal empire. See David Lambert and Alan Lester (eds. ), Colonial 
Lives Across the British Empire: Imperial Careering in the Long Nineteenth Century 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
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little authority to undertake many of its activities according to the treaties and 
regulations upon which its authority was based, demonstrates how areas of the informal 
empire could become an established part of the political landscape without the need for 
formal colonisation. Furthermore, the council's ability to raise loans depended on its 
credit-worthiness, which fluctuated with Shanghai's political stability. The council was 
therefore at pains to preserve both political and economic stability in order to fulfil its 
function of serving the inhabitants of the Settlement in such a way as to enable them to 
pursue their own economic and business interests. 
This feeds into the third chapter's examination of the International Settlement as 
an expansionist and militarised colonial statelet. By 1900, the role of the Shanghai 
Municipal Council had grown dramatically from that first envisaged for its predecessor, 
the Committee of Roads and Jetties. The Settlement had been conceived initially as a 
small site in which foreign sojourners would live and work. In reality, however, from 
the 1850s the numbers of Chinese dwarfed the foreign population, 131 and the space 
given over to foreign control grew incrementally with successive extensions formalised 
in successive revisions to the Land Regulations in 1848,1863,1893 and 1899.132 In the 
period under examination in this thesis, the process of expansion continued with efforts 
to extend roads built by the council beyond the boundaries of the Settlement, without 
the permission of the Chinese authorities. The SMC could then insist on managing these 
roads and exact rates from businesses and property holders along them. The council was 
bullish in its dealings with the Chinese authorities over this and other areas of contested 
authority, behaving as an aggressive, expansionist force throughout the first half of the 
131 The first significant influx of Chinese to the Settlement was precipitated by the Small Sword Uprising 
of 1853, followed by the much greater flow of refugees from the Taiping rebellion from 1860 onwards. 
This led to a massive property boom in 1863-64 and a subsequent bust. Feetham, Report, Vol. 1, pp. 31- 
32. 
132 Yue, Shanghai and the Edges of Empires, p. 173. 
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period under examination. Key moments of tension in the twentieth century history of 
the Settlement are examined in this chapter to explore how the council created and 
exacerbate conflicts. Although the council was forced to scale back its expansionist 
ambitions in the face of a stronger Chinese state under the Nationalist government and 
growing popular Chinese nationalism, it remained highly militarised. The Shanghai 
Volunteer Corps and the municipal police force were regularly deployed in defence of 
the Settlement. This chapter therefore argues that the council functioned in many ways 
as a colonial statelet actively seeking to entrench its position, even as the political 
climate surrounding it made that position untenable in the long term. In this way 
informal empire in Shanghai resembled formal empire-building in the colonies. The 
chapter builds on the work discussed above by Nicholas Clifford, Robert Bickers and 
Tiina Airaksinen on relations between the British and Chinese of the Settlement in the 
1920s. 
The fourth chapter details the role of the Public Health Department, building on 
Kerne MacPherson's thorough study of the period up to 1893. MacPherson argues that 
the extension of the powers of the SMC in the nineteenth century came as a result of the 
growth of the perceived need for action on public health. 133 This chapter therefore 
provides the second half of this story: how the council fulfilled its increased role in this 
area. Ruth Rogaski has provided an excellent study of how the experience of 
imperialism in Tianjin influenced Chinese notions of public health and the use of the 
term weisheng (! t) to denote more than simple sanitation, hence her translation of the 
term as `hygienic modernity'. 134 This understanding informs the chapter's examination 
of the ways in which the SMC sought to improve public health within the Settlement 
133 MacPherson, Wilderness of Marshes, p. viii. 
134 Rogaski, Hygienic Modernity, p. 2 and passim. 
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and how this process intersects with the image of the city as a centre of modernity. 
Public health measures required cooperation with the French and Chinese authorities in 
the city, but tensions and conflicts dogged such efforts. Public health was moving up the 
international agenda in this period, with the founding of the Pan-American Sanitary 
Bureau in 1902 and the Office international d'hygiene publique (OIHP) in Europe in 
1907. After the First World War, the League of Nations was formed with its Health 
Organisation. The SMC was forced to address the public health needs of the 
International Settlement by the global climate of concern about the prevention of 
disease and by specific investigations into the health conditions of China. This chapter 
reveals how the SMC fulfilled one of its most important roles in the International 
Settlement, that of preserving and improving the health of its ever-increasing population. 
Changing conditions through the period and evolving expectations of the council's 
public health role reflect the challenges faced by semi-colonial authorities. 
The fifth and final chapter undertakes a similar study of the council's role in 
industrial reform within the Settlement. Shanghai earned a reputation for industrial 
exploitation alongside the other vices for which it was known, and local and 
international pressure was brought to bear on the SMC to address the problem. 
Eventually it established an industrial Section to try to bring about improvements in 
factory safety and working conditions, in response to action taken by the Chinese 
government. This chapter therefore offers further insights into the SMC's relationship 
with the Chinese authorities and with colonial and international actors such as the 
League of Nations International Labour Organisation. This chapter draws on work by 
Robin Porter on a generally under-researched topic, 13S as well as a number of studies 
into labour conditions in Shanghai in the period. S. A. Smith's investigation of 
135 Robin Porter, Industrial Reformers in Republican China (Armonk, NY: Sharpe, 1994). 
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nationalism and labour provides valuable background but does not go beyond 1927.136 
Emily Honig has made a comprehensive study of the position of women in Shanghai's 
cotton mills from 1919 until the birth of the People's Republic in 1949.137 This chapter 
builds on the findings of these historians in establishing how and why council policy 
changed over the period, and the extent to which it met with success. 
Finally, the Conclusion draws on the research presented in the preceding 
chapters to summarise the findings of the dissertation, principally that informal empire 
was more than the economic motivations for imperial expansion or the high politics of 
state-to-state relations through treaties and extraterritoriality, and much more than the 
outward appearance of colonial trappings in which foreign communities, particularly the 
British, actively sought to cloak themselves. Informal empire, for those, both indigenous 
and foreign, who lived in its outposts such as Shanghai, was fundamentally about the 
ways in which it facilitated the business of their everyday lives, about the changes it 
made in their working and living environments. This work was directed in the 
International Settlement by the Shanghai Municipal Council, a unique body based 
largely on English municipal governments, but with a degree of international input 
which included, from 1928, Chinese councillors. By studying the structure and activities 
of the SMC, this dissertation therefore presents an exemplar of transnational semi- 
colonialism in practice, with implications for our understanding of both Chinese history 
in this period and the nature of colonialism and semi-colonialism more broadly. Paul 
Cohen described `imperialism, seen in meta-historical terms as the master-key to an 
entire century of Chinese history' as a myth, but `as one force among several, operating 
136 S. A. Smith, Like Cattle and Horses: Nationalism and Labor in Shanghai, 1895-192 7 (London: Duke 
University Press, 2002). 
137 Emily Honig, Sisters and Strangers: Women in the Shanghai Cotton Mills, 1919-1949 (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1986). 
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in a wide range of concrete historical situations' as `not only real but of critical 
explanatory importance. ' He went on: 
The challenge for historians is to define with precision - with much greater 
precision than has generally been exercised in the past - the specific situations 
with regard to which imperialism was relevant and then to show how it was 
relevant. When this challenge has been met, we should end up with an 
understanding of the impact of imperialism on nineteenth- and twentieth-century 
China that is more complicated - and far more historically interesting - than 
anything presently available. 138 
Though issued in 1984, this challenge has still not been fully answered. This thesis, in 
providing a detailed history of how imperialism functioned in Shanghai through the 
semi-colonial body of the Shanghai Municipal Council, meets Cohen's challenge. 
IM Cohen, Discovering History in China, p. 147. 
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Chapter One: Councillors and Staff 
`[Those who drew up the Land Regulations] determined ... to establish an electorate 
limited to those persons who (according to their ideas) were to be classed as 
"respectable" and confine the right to sit on the Council to the much smaller class of 
those who may perhaps be called "people of importance". " 
In order to understand precisely what the Shanghai Municipal Council was and how it 
functioned on a daily basis, it is necessary to study the people who made up the council, 
both its employed staff and the council members themselves. Councillors represented 
the public face of the SMC and it was hoped that they would be both `respectable' and 
`men of importance', as the opening quotation indicates, though in reality the two did 
not always go together. Foreign (non-Chinese, and in this context mostly British) 
councillors were drawn from two distinct groups: ex-patriots representing the big 
trading interests of Shanghai, and settlers who had made the city their home. 2 They 
represented the moneyed, foreign elite, and this was the constituency which they 
primarily served. This chapter addresses how they were elected and how they developed 
policy to be implemented by the municipal staff. It focuses, however, on the individuals 
involved: the councillors and their employees who are introduced over the following 
pages reappear to a greater or lesser extent in the rest of the dissertation, so this chapter 
provides the cast of key characters who appeared on the municipal stage during the 
twentieth century. 
' Duncan McNeil, Legal Advisor to the SMC, commenting on Land Regulation XIX, concerning the 
qualifications to vote for and stand for election to the SMC, on 7 May 1909, quoted in F. S. A. Boume to 
D. Siffert, Senior Consul, 13 May 1909, in SMC, Report for 1909, p. 280. McNeil went on, `I do not 
know how these objects could have been carried out otherwise than by classification based on (a) 
ownership of property or (b) amount of income as shown by expenditure. ' 
2 Bickers, `Shanghailanders', pp. 161-211. On the significance of settlers in the empire world, see Robert 
Bickers, `Introduction: Britain and Britons over the Seas' in Settlers and Expatriates: Britons over the 
Seas (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 1-17. 
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A recent trend in imperial historiography has seen a revival of biography in the 
form of `life stories' that capture the lived experience of empire: presenters at a 
conference held at the University of Bristol in 2011 on `Colonial Circulations' 
advocated this approach, notably Maya Jasanoff and Clare Anderson. 3 Robert Bickers 
has already provided the definitive life story of a British man in the SMP in Empire 
Made Me, but the broader tapestry of the kinds of people who worked for the SMC 
remains unexplored. This chapter draws on this method to present studies of a number 
of individuals involved in the SMC, some of them typical figures, some of them key 
individuals who are worthy of study for their historical significance, which taken 
together allow a picture of the nature of the council to emerge. I accept Jasanotrs 
argument that we can `move beyond sceptical questions about how "representative" or 
"exceptional" a particular case might be by putting these studies in conversation with 
one another', and attempt to put this into practice. 
4 Prominent councillors (particularly 
chairmen and those who held office for several years) and staff are described in turn, 
primarily in relation to their work at the council rather than in biography, and within 
those two groups they are presented roughly in chronological order. The key turning 
point was 1928 when the first Chinese council members finally took their seats, so the 
developments which led to this watershed are also studied, along with an assessment of 
the new Chinese councillors' impact on council policy. From this point on, a body 
which had been heavily dominated by British trading concerns gradually became 
broader and more transnational in the interests it represented. This in turn affected the 
ways in which it functioned and the objectives which it sought to achieve in the last 
3 Maya Jasanoff, `The Kaleidoscope of Empire', paper presented to `Colonial Circulations' conference, 
University of Bristol, July 2011, cited with permission; Clare Anderson, Subaltern Lives: Convicts and 
Colonialism in the Indian Ocean (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 2012), 
`Introduction' circulated at `Colonial Circulations' conference, cited with permission. Anderson provides 
a comprehensive literature review of the recent colonial historiography using life stories on pp. 9,15-22. 
4 Jasanoff, `Kaleidoscope', p. 2. 
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decade before the Japanese took control of the council in 1941, and subsequently 
disbanded it in 1943.5 In this way this study writes Chinese back into the story of the 
management of the Settlement, which has been presumed to have been a solely British 
endeavour. In doing so it complicates the picture of Chinese nationalism and anti- 
imperialism by exploring the Chinese members of Shanghai's elite who were actively 
involved in the council, most of whom were at the same time opposed in principle to the 
very existence of the Settlement. 
I also draw on Jeffrey Wasserstrom's work on `border crossers' in Shanghai, a 
term which captures the ways in which many of these individuals, especially the 
Chinese, straddled the divide between Shanghai's Chinese and foreign communities, 6 
which leads to an analysis of the extent to which the council became a transnational 
institution in its final years. But rarely could British members of the council be thus 
characterised. Instead they were often border crossers within what Robert Bickers calls 
the `China coast establishment', 7 who benefited from the opportunities afforded by 
Britain's imperial intervention in China to make their fortunes. The studies of such men 
(they were all men) therefore engage with the work of David Lambert and Alan Lester 
on `colonial lives' and the `imperial networks' in which empire officials moved and 
operated. 8 Britons dominated the council's membership and staff: Nicholas Clifford 
pointed out that in 1925,827 of the 1,031 foreign members of the municipal staff were 
British, while 47 were American and just seven were Japanese. 9 But this chapter also 
S See Robert Bickers, `Settlers and Diplomats: The End of British Hegemony in the International 
Settlement, 1937-1945' in In the Shadow of the Rising Sun: Shanghai Under Japanese Occupation, ed. by 
Christian Henriot and Wen-hsin Yeh (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 229-56. 
6 Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, `Cosmopolitan Connections and Transnational Networks', in At the Crossroads 
of Empires: Middlemen, Social Networks, and State-building In Republican Shanghai, ed. by Nara Dillon 
and Jean C. Oi (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), p. 209 and passim. 
7 Bickers, Scramble for China, p. 366. 
$ Lambert and Lester (eds. ), Colonial Lives; Alan Lester, Imperial Networks: Creating Identities in 
Nineteenth-Century South Africa and Britain (London: Routledge, 2001). 
9 Clifford, Spoilt Children of Empire, p. 23. 
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brings out the diversity represented among those involved in the management of the 
International Settlement, particularly in its final decade. In building a more nuanced 
picture of the constitution of the SMC and the ways in which it changed from its long- 
standing character of being the bastion of the `spoilt children of empire', this challenges 
the assumption that the council was a static institution with but a very limited role in 
this period. 
Election and selection 
As the International Settlement grew rapidly in population, the number of nationalities 
represented also increased. By the time of the 1920 census, over 35 nationalities were 
recorded, from Armenians to Venezuelans. 10 The `foreign' population numbered 23,000, 
the most numerous group being the Japanese at over 10,000 residents, followed by the 
more than 5,000 British residents. Few parts of the world at this time (perhaps only New 
York) had such a cosmopolitan mix of nationalities in so small an area. )1 Significantly 
the Chinese population within the Settlement dwarfed the foreign with 760,000 Chinese 
residents, 12 the vast majority of whom were, like their foreign neighbours, 
comparatively recent arrivals in Shanghai, as people from neighbouring provinces and 
all over the country came to exploit the opportunities on offer in the burgeoning 
economy of the Settlement and the surrounding area. This was therefore the site of an 
unprecedented concentration of people from disparate backgrounds living side by side. 
The Shanghai Municipal Council, however, did not reflect this diversity. The members 
of the SMC were elected by foreign ratepayers, who met criteria based on a certain 
'0 Shanghai Municipal Council, Report for 1920 (Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh, 1920), pp. 271a-272a. 
11 Jones, Shanghai and Tientsin, p. 1. 
12 SMC, Report for 1920, pp. 271 a-272a. 
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ownership of property or who rented sizable properties, ' 3 from among an even smaller 
pool of moneyed landowners or renters eligible to stand for office: just three per cent of 
the foreign population were eligible and more than half of the voters were British. 14 
Many of the ratepayers held multiple votes by virtue of being representatives of 
property-owning firms as well as owning a qualifying amount of property in their own 
right. 15 The council therefore represented not the general views of the local community 
but those of a small section of wealthy foreign businessmen, predominantly expatriates, 
as seen below. Seats were unofficially reserved for certain nationalities, though no such 
provision was made in the Land Regulations. In 1902 the candidates included seven 
Britons (all elected), one American (elected), one German (elected), one Swiss 
(unelected) and one Japanese (unelected). The latter two had little chance of electoral 
success against the established pattern of seven Britons, an American and a German, 
which the North-China Herald described as being `strictly representative of the 
ratepayers according to their numbers'. 16 Between 1873 and 1914 there was always at 
least one German, alongside the seven Britons, an American and one or two other 
nationals. This pattern began to change in 1914 when, due to the First World War, the 
German member was replaced by a Russian, and two years later the first Japanese 
member was elected. The Russian left in 1918 and from 1919 there were usually two 
Americans on the council. 17 The Japanese membership was increased to two in 1927 
13 Indeed, Robert Bickers points out that only in the late 1930s did more than one sixth of the British 
population of the Settlement enjoy the right to vote in council elections due to the tight property-owning 
restrictions. Bickers, Britain In China, p. 127. 
14 Robert Bickers, Empire Made Me, p. 51. 
15 TNA T 160/1142116454/1: Stirling Fessenden, Chairman SMC, to G. de Rossi, Senior Consul, 
Shanghai, 4 September 1925. 
16 The North-China Herald, Supreme Court and Consular Gazette (hereafter NCH), 29 January 1902, p. 
165. 
17 Feetham, Report, Vol. II, p. 166. 
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and from the landmark year of 1928 three and then, from 1930, five Chinese members 
were finally admitted. ' 8 
Municipal elections were held annually. Between 1900 and 1940,24 elections 
were contested while in 16 years the number of candidates was either equal to or fewer 
than the number of seats, so members were nominated unopposed or, in the latter 
instance, co-opted to the council. The North-China Herald instructed its readers how to 
place their votes: eligible ratepayers should go to the council's Board Room and strike 
out the names of any candidate for whom they did not wish to vote, leaving nine names 
or fewer. 19 It was not a secret ballot - ratepayers signed their names - but only the poll 
clerks would see the ballot papers. There was little in the way of campaigning for votes; 
indeed a young candidate deemed too `pushful' in 1901 was lampooned in the Herald 
and The Rattle (Figure 2). 20 That year there were two more candidates than seats, one of 
whom was the `pushful' candidate, judged inexperienced and ignorant of municipal 
process, while the other was American so was discounted as the unofficially American 
seat was filled by the incumbent, leaving little contest. In 1902 one more candidate 
stood for election and there was little difference in the votes cast for the nine who won, 
each gaining between 202 and 259 votes apiece. 21 William G. Bayne, who won the most 
votes, was duly elected to the chair. This pattern of limited contestation continued into 
the 1920s, each year the Herald providing its editorial view of who were the strongest 
candidates for election, which was generally borne out as the ratepayers' cast their votes. 
16 Bickers, Empire Made Me, p. 51. 
19 NCH, 23 January 1901, p. 142. In later years polling stations, supervised by officers of the Revenue 
Office, were established at prominent properties in the Settlement: in 1920, for example, there were two, 
one at Sassoon House, part of the Cathay Hotel on the Bund, and one in the Hongkong and Shanghai 
Banking Corporation's property at 9 Broadway. SMC, Report for 1920, p. 44c. 
20 NCH, 23 January 1901, p. 142; 30 January 1901, pp. 192,223. 
21 NCH, 29 January 1902, p. 160. 
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In 16 years, however, the demands on council members' time combined with 
general apathy, due in part to a lack of local issues of contention in the British 
ratepaying community, to mean insufficient numbers of businessmen were willing to 
give up their time to serve on the SMC for the elections to be contested. Elections were 
thus sometimes less of a competition between candidates as a struggle to persuade 
enough candidates to stand, and crucially for someone to take on the role of chairman. 
The Foreign Office in London sometimes intervened to ensure a suitable British 
candidate was elected to the chair. When word reached Whitehall in 1922 that the then 
chairman, H. G. Simms, did not intend to stand for re-election, the Foreign Office leapt 
into action. Believing that Simms's employer, Charles Montague Ede, himself a former 
member of the SMC but now a property developer in Hong Kong and member of the 
colony's Legislative Council, was responsible for Simms stepping down, the Foreign 
Office demanded that that he be asked to `reconsider your decision in British 
interests' 22 In fact, Simms was planning to leave Shanghai in June 1922 anyway, so the 
Foreign Office cast around for other British candidates and even implored the British 
Minister in Beijing to travel to Shanghai himself to exercise his influence in persuading 
a suitable man to stand. 23 Finally, in the absence of other appropriate and willing 
candidates, the American Stirling Fessenden was approved as the next best thing to a 
British chairman. Such instances of interference from London were rare, but they 
demonstrate the extent to which the council was still subject to considerable imperial 
pressure, albeit from the Foreign rather than the Colonial Office, as well as the 
22 TNA FO 228/3176: Foreign Office to Hong Kong, 13 February 1922. 
23 TNA FO 228/3176: Garstin, Shanghai, to British Minister, Beijing, 30 March 1922. Garstin also 
attempted to persuade alternate candidates to the incumbent British council members not to stand in 1929 
and 1930 so as not to split the British vote and risk the informal quota of five Britons failing to be mat. 
Bickers, `Changing Shanghai's "Mind": Publicity, Reform and the British in Shanghai, 1928-1931', a 
lecture given at a meeting of the China Society, 20 March 1991, p. 14. 
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importance placed on ensuring British interests predominated in council affairs. 24 The 
Foreign Office might have had difficulty controlling the expansionist ambitions and 
antagonistic attitude to the Chinese elites, but it could and did exercise influence over 
the make-up of the council, hoping in this way to ensure British interests were served. 
In the more politically charged environment later in the 1920s, however, 
municipal affairs took on new importance and more British candidates stood for 
election, increasingly attempting to garner votes by taking a public stance on issues 
relevant to the Shanghailander establishment. In 1930, for example, H. E. Arnhold 
declared that he stood for `efficiency, economy, and the maintenance of the authority of 
the Council in the face of the continued attempts to undermine the same. ' 25 His 
advocacy of `a better understanding and ... closer cooperation between the Foreign and 
Chinese ratepayers' did not help his campaign among the racist Shanghailanders. Nor 
did insinuations by his fellow councillor, A. D. Bell, that under Arnhold's chairmanship 
there was unprecedented `acrimony' in council meetings due to Amhold acting alone 
rather than consulting properly with the council (Bell reported `things being done or 
attempted in the name of the Council without my knowledge or consent'). 
26 Arnhold re- 
entered the council chambers in 1932, however, and was re-elected to the chair in 1934. 
Bell, for his part, concentrated in 1930 on calls for less secrecy in council business, a 
popular promise which recurred in other election campaigns as the council continued to 
refuse the entry of the press or public into its chambers. 27 Otherwise Bell's manifesto 
was practical, advocating more improvements in public works, particularly refuse 
disposal, and calling for the immediate sale of the Telephone Company, to the profit of 
24 Anxieties caused by the increased Chinese nationalism brought by the May Fourth Movement may 
have been behind the Foreign Office's interference in 1922. 
zs Shanghai Times, 28 February 1930, p. 4. 
26 Shanghai Times, 28 February 1930, p. 4. 
27 The Municipal Gazette: Being the Official Organ of the Council for the Foreign Settlement of Shanghai, 
17 April 1930, p. 152. 
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the council. 28 Bell won re-election, defeating, among others, P. W. Massey, who echoed 
Bell's programme of public works but advocated the continued municipal control of the 
Telephone Company and, crucially, the more extensive employment of Chinese on the 
municipal staff, citing the economies to be gained on reduced recruitment from 
overseas. 29 Norman Leslie similarly missed out on a seat, despite his support for greater 
openness in council affairs, probably because his lack of experience in council affairs 
was considered a disadvantage at such a time of change in the municipal structure and 
because of his statement favouring `friendly cooperation with our neighbours'. 30 Many 
Shanghailanders found even the conservative SMC too liberal for its liking, especially 
following the admission of Chinese councillors. Ranald MacDonald, who made an 
impassioned speech against admitting more Chinese council members at the subsequent 
ratepayers' meeting, wrote to the British-owned Shanghai Times listing his preferred 
candidates based principally on their stance on this issue. 31 He claimed to speak for the 
rest of the British ratepaying community, and four of his five choices were indeed 
elected (the exception being Ernest Macnaghten, whom MacDonald opposed). The 
council was thus beholden to a reactionary electorate. 32 As was common, the American 
candidates in 1930, V. G. Lyman and Clifford French, were elected without the need to 
campaign as none of their compatriots stood for the two seats unofficially reserved for 
28 North-China Daily News (hereafter NCDN), 28 February 1930. 
29 Shanghai Times, 28 February 1930, p. 4. Massey was successful in standing for office in 1923-26, in 
1929, and again 1932-34. 
w Shanghai limes, 28 February 1930, p. 4. Leslie was elected the following year. 
31 Shanghai Times, 4 March 1930, p. 7. 
32 Two years later, Arthur de Sowerby, the editor of the China Journal and leading member of the 
Shanghai Fascisti and British Residents' Association, stood (unsuccessfully) for election in 1932 on a 
platform of representing Shanghailander rights against the SMC and lobbying against the reform of 
extraterritoriality. NCH, 15 March 1932, p. 403; 28 December 1932, p. 498, referenced in Bickers, 
'Shanghailanders', p. 199. 
55 
Americans: the debates in the press concerned only the British candidates, and it was 
they who set the tone of the council. 33 
Chinese members were elected annually through the Chinese Ratepayers' 
Association (CRA), which selected an election committee of 81 members, one third of 
which was chosen by the CRA itself, one third by the Nantao and Chapei Chambers of 
Commerce, and one third by the various guilds and street unions of the Settlement. 34 
Shenbao reported the results of the CRA's elections to the committee, complete with the 
percentage of votes cast for each candidate, which shows that the vote was contested, at 
least in 1927 ahead of the 1928 election to the SMC. 35 All members of the CRA were 
eligible to vote, and the qualifications for membership were modelled on those which 
entitled foreign ratepayers to vote in municipal elections: the ownership of real estate 
worth not less than Tls. 500 in value in the International Settlement, the payment of 
rates of at least Tls. 10 on property in the Settlement, or the payment of rates on an 
annual rental of Tis. 500 or more. 36 Chinese business interests thus dominated the 
selection process (as was true of the foreign councillors), and as these tended to be 
conservative, favouring the stability of the status quo in the Settlement, the men selected 
were somewhat more sympathetic to the SMC than some other sections of the local 
33 Lyman was an expatriate who worked for Standard Oil, while French was Vice-President of Andersen, 
Meyer and Company, a firm established by the Dane Vilhelm Meyer and incorporated in New York, 
representing General Electric in China. Christopher Bo Bramsen, Open Doors: Vilhelm Meyer and the 
Establishment of General Electric in China (Richmond: Curzon Press, 2001), p. 183. 
34 Bryna Goodman is dismissive of the CRA as inadaptable, `overly exclusive' and lacking real political 
power, but it was afforded considerable importance by the SMC. Bryna Goodman, `Democratic 
Calisthenics: The Culture of Urban Associations in the New Republic' in Changing Meanings of 
Citizenship in Modern China, ed. by Merle Goldman and Elizabeth J. Perry (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard 
University Press, 2002), p. 89; pp. 80-90. 
35 Shenbao, 23 November 1927. 
36 Hsi) Shuhsi, Japan and Shanghai, No. 4, Political and Economic Studies (Shanghai: Kelly and Walsh, 
1928), p. 7; Feetham, Report, Vol. 2, Appendix XXI, pp. 12-13, and Land Regulations in Vol. 1, 
Appendix IV, p. 80. Goodman explains that the CRA consciously adopted the form of the foreign 
Ratepayers' Association in order to assert parity with the foreign community and so achieve their aim of 
representation. Goodman, `Democratic Calisthenics', p. 89. 
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Chinese community. 37 Yet the CRA was one of the council's most vocal critics, so its 
members had to reconcile their opposition to the municipal system with their active 
participation in it. 
37 Marie-Claire Berglire argues that Chinese institutions such as guilds and the General Chamber of 
Commerce (and latterly the CRA) adopted democratic procedures due to the influence of SMC and other 
foreign organs. Berglire, Golden Age, p. 54. Elsewhere Berglire points to the SMC as the `model' for the 
election of members to the council of the Municipality of Greater Shanghai by taxpayers. Marie-Claire 
Berglire, Shanghai: China's Gateway to Modernity, trans. by Janet Lloyd (Stanford: Stanford University 







Figure 2: Rattle cartoon of campaigning candidates for the municipal election of 1901. 
The caption reads, `Never too proud to take a hint, our City Fathers propose in future to 
proclaim their "platforms" to the public before the general election. '38 
38 The Rattle, 20 March 1901. 
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Chinese representation 
Chinese representation had been mooted from the earliest days of the International 
Settlement. When the Settlement was established in 1863, the fifth of five propositions 
agreed by the ministers in Beijing was that `there shall be a Chinese element in the 
municipal system to whom reference shall be made and assent obtained to any measure 
affecting the Chinese residents. ' 39 This was a recognitivii that the character of the 
Settlement had changed from that initially envisaged for the first foreign settlements in 
Shanghai, in which it was not expected many Chinese would live. Proposals to enact the 
measure were considered but did not make their way into the Land Regulations. Some 
consultation with the Daotai over decisions concerning the Chinese residents, 
particularly taxation, was the only concession to the principle. The next serious 
consideration of Chinese representation came in 1906, in the wake of the Mixed Court 
riots of December 1905 (see pp. 175-77 of this thesis). The Chinese guilds suggested 
that similar problems could be averted in future if they were given the opportunity of 
putting the views of the Chinese community to the council before its actions produced 
such outrage. Yu Qiaqing (Yu Ya-ching fÄ N) informed Frederick Anderson, 
chairman of the council, that the guilds had decided to elect seven men to form an 
Executive Committee of the 40-strong Consulting Committee of Chinese Merchants to 
represent the interests of the guilds to the council. 40 Anderson defended the proposal 
against the doubts expressed by other members and replied welcoming the initiative. He 
was further assured by Yu that the Consulting Committee was free of Chinese officials 
" Feetham, Report, Vol. 1, p. 113. The account of the history of (the denial of) Chinese representation in 
the Settlement is drawn from this chapter (VI) of Feetham's report. The South African judge made a 
detailed study of the subject, and while he was broadly sympathetic to the council and racist in his views, 
he was critical of the failure to give representation to the Settlement's Chinese and implied, with 
justification, that the problems with the Settlement which he had been invited to investigate stemmed in 
no small part from this failure. 
' On the organisation of guilds in Shanghai, see Berg&e, Golden Age, p. 21. 
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and would not interfere with the running of the Settlement. Yet despite these assurances, 
the foreign ratepayers rejected the proposal, due to prejudice against sharing power with 
Chinese. 41 Justice Richard Feetham, who was investigating the background to Sino- 
British tensions in the Settlement, was characteristically generous to the SMC and cited 
the lack of opportunity for ratepayers to realise `the difficulties and problems with 
which their representatives on the Council are confronted' as the reason for this rebuff 
of Chinese cooperation. In reality it was rather a symptom of the racism of the 
Settlement's British community in general which was most certainly shared by the SMC 
itself (and was most infamously evident in its notorious ban of Chinese from the `public 
gardens' on the Bund). 2 
The question of Chinese representation re-emerged in the context of bargaining 
for further extensions to the Settlement boundaries in 1909, but meaningful Chinese 
representation was still seen as undesirable by the SMC's members. 43 In 1915 a Chinese 
Advisory Board representing the guilds and the local Chinese authorities was actually 
approved by the foreign ratepayers in return for an extension to the International 
Settlement, but failed to materialise when no extension was agreed. 44 This followed an 
agreement between the French Concession and Chinese authorities the previous year 
which admitted Chinese members to the Conseil municipal, although the Chinese rarely 
actually sat at its meetings and the power of the French Consul-General over the 
concession made the representation largely symbolic. 45 A Chinese Advisory Committee 
41 Even Feetham acknowledged that prejudice was largely to blame for the popular opposition to formal 
consultation of Chinese public opinion, though he excused it with reference to recent memories of the 
Boxer Rebellion. Feetham, Report, Vol. 1, p. 119. 
42 Bickers and Wasserstrom, `Shanghai's "Chinese and Dogs Not Admitted" Sign', pp. 444-66. 
43 Zhang Qian (ed. ), The Minutes of Shanghai Municipal Council (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 
2002), Vol. 17, p. 230,24 March 1909. 
44 Feetham, Report, Vol. 1, p. 124. 
45 The French Land Regulations had in fact always allowed for the possibility of Chinese representation. 
Hong Kong was also ahead of the International Settlement in this regard, having appointed its first 
Chinese member of the Legislative Council in 1880, although the first unofficial Chinese member of the 
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was established in 1919 with the unanimous approval of the ratepayers, who apparently 
recognised the need to make at least some concessions to Chinese public opinion. 
(The proposal by Edward S. Little, a British former council member of unusually liberal 
bent, perhaps due to his missionary background, that three Chinese members be 
admitted to the council was, however, roundly defeated. ) The move was also cautiously 
welcomed in the Chinese press. 47 The Chinese Ratepayers' Association, which led the 
campaign for Chinese representation on the council, was established in part to select the 
five members of the Committee, who met the council for the first time in May 1921. 
Yet the Committee had little impact, the SMC failing to refer questions to it, and it 
subsequently resigned in 1925 over the council's failure to respond adequately to the 
May Thirtieth Incident. The demand for true Chinese representation on the council grew 
to a deafening clamour, which reached the ears of the Foreign Office and the floor of 
the House of Commons, and the council finally bowed to the inevitable and resolved to 
admit Chinese members at the annual meeting of ratepayers the following year. 48 It took 
two more years for the details to be worked out between the council and the CRA, such 
as a concession to the Chinese argument that they should have more than three 
representatives in the form of six additional Chinese committee members and the 
Executive Council did not take his seat until 1926. Neither body had the autonomy of the SMC, being 
subordinate to the authority of the Governor of the colony and the Colonial Office. G. B. Endacott, 
Government and People in Hong Kong, 1841-1962: A Constitutional History (Hong Kong: Hong Kong 
University Press, 1964), pp. 89-96; Liu Shuyong, `Hong Kong: A Survey of Its Political and Economic 
Development over the Past 150 Years', China Quarterly, No. 151 (September 1997), pp. 584-5. 
' On the events which led to the establishment of the Chinese Advisory Committee, see Bryna Goodman, 
`Being Public: The Politics of Representation in 1918 Shanghai', Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, Vol. 
60, No. 1 (June 2000), pp. 45-88. The meetings of the Chinese Advisory Committee were covered in 
detail in the Chinese press, suggesting strong interest in the participation in municipal affairs among 
newspaper readers. See, for example, Shenbao, 2 May 1920, p. 10; 9,12 and 19 February 1921, p. 10 of 
each issue; 14 May 1921, p. 11. At the same time, discussions of the need for genuine Chinese 
representation appeared regularly in Shenbao from 1919: see '$' (Hua Shang yaogiu 
shiminquan ii, 'An Account of the Demand of Chinese Merchants for Municipal Democratic Rights), 
Shenbao, 2 December 1919, p. 10. See also 3 April 1921, p. 10; 2,23 and 28 May 1923, p. 13 of each 
issue. 
47 Shenbao, 3 April 1921, p. 10. 
a Clifford, Spoilt Children of Empire, p. 151 (see also pp. 148-53,263-66); Hansard, 22 June 1925,23 
February 1927,21 March 1927. 
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promise of a further two Chinese councillors. The progress of the negotiations was 
reported avidly in Shenbao, as Chinese ratepayers awaited their first opportunity to 
contribute to the running of the Settlement. 49 The CRA discussed who should represent 
the community and to what extent the Chinese government should be represented, and 
how to ensure Chinese interests were appropriately represented in municipal committees 
as well as the full council meetings, demonstrating a sincere desire to make the new 
arrangement work for the interests that the association represented. 50 On the other hand, 
an opinion piece put the advent of Chinese councillors in the context of the May Fourth 
Movement, arguing that it could not satisfy Chinese calls to control the Settlement. 51 
Chinese opinion was sharply divided over the issue. 
A protest over the municipal rates in 1927 (see following chapter) highlighted 
the slowness of progress on the issue of Chinese representation and forced the council 
to concede greater influence for Chinese within the municipal apparatus. Warning the 
Chinese negotiators that a proposal to elect more Chinese councillors than the three 
already approved would not be accepted by the ratepayers at their annual meeting, 
which was necessary for such constitutional change to be made, the council instead 
appointed a Chinese Advisory Committee. This had the advantage that it could be 
appointed without reference to the foreign ratepayers. Yu Qiaqing agreed to this, 
undertaking to ensure that the three Chinese members and six Chinese committee 
members were nominated and took their seats, on the condition that the council would 
propose increasing the number of Chinese council members further should this 
49 See Shenbao, 7 July 1927, p. 14; 27 August 1927, p. 14; 23 November 1927, p. 13 and 10 November 
1927, p. 1 of supplement. 
30 Shenbao, 9 February 1927. 
31 The author was identified as An Wensi Shenbao, 10 November 1927, p. 1 of supplement. See 
also a similar opinion expressed on 13 January 1928, p. 13. 
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experiment prove successful. It was on these terms that the first Chinese finally took 
their seats on the council in 1928. 
The innovation, when finally implemented, proved successful, Chinese 
councillors contributing constructively to municipal affairs, as outlined below. In 1930 
the council resolved to keep its word to increase the number of Chinese council 
members from three to five. 52 First, of course, the ratepaying community had to be 
convinced, so E. B. Macnaghten made a plea at the annual meeting, quoting 
Fessenden's uncharacteristically tactful praise the year before for the way in which `Our 
Chinese colleagues have shown themselves to be men of character, ability, breadth of 
view and energy, who have sincerely endeavoured to promote harmony and good will in 
the solution of many difficult and perplexing problems regarding which the Chinese and 
Foreign communities do not always see eye to eye. ' Macnaghten added his own 
qualified support: `The cooperation of the Chinese members during the past year has 
been as full and complete as is possible in this international community, where national 
interests and points of view in the natural course of things must at times appear almost 
irreconcilable. '53 He argued, slightly optimistically, that keeping to the planned increase 
of Chinese members voluntarily would promote `amicable Sino-foreign relations' for 
the benefit of the Settlement. 
Not all those present agreed: British lawyer Ranald MacDonald spoke for over 
half an hour of the folly of admitting more `Chinese sphinxes' whose political views 
were unknown to the council. Calling the proposal a `dangerous and insidious change' 
$2 ' [i]n accord with a tacit understanding between the foreign and Chinese communities at the time the 
three Chinese members first took their seats upon the Council that with the full cooperation of the 
Chinese the number of Chinese members, in the ordinary course of events, would be increased. ' Zhang 
Qian (ed. ), Minutes of the SMC, Vol. 23, p. 5,10 January 1930. 
s Municipal Gazette, p. 147,17 April 1930. Robert Bickers has pointed out that the foreign members of 
council publically praised their Chinese colleagues while complaining about them in private. Bickers, 
`Changing Shanghai's "Mind"', p. 11. 
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he listed five main reasons to reject it: the Settlement was and always had been foreign; 
there was no advantage to be gained for foreigners nor Chinese; the results of the 
investigations of Justice Feetham should be awaited before such changes were made; to 
pass the resolution `would appear to be an act of fawning sycophancy' with 
repercussions throughout China and `all over the world'; and it would inevitably lead to 
more Chinese councillors within a year or two `and you will thus have irretrievably sold 
the past and betrayed not merely those now in Shanghai but posterity'. 54 MacDonald 
contrasted the standard of governance in the Chinese city unfavourably with the 
Settlement's administration as evidence that the Chinese were unable to contribute 
positively to the council, suggesting patronisingly that they should instead be 
encouraged to sit on the council's committees in larger numbers so they might learn 
about municipal administration (as if the SMC provided a model of best practice). He 
also stirred up the defensive feelings of the Shanghailanders against alleged interference 
from the Foreign Office, Consular Body and Diplomatic Body, which Macnaghten 
denied. MacDonald evoked all the reasons for which Shanghai's foreign community, 
mainly the British, had so long opposed Chinese representation. They were still 
persuasive in 1930: the resolution was rejected and the council was forced to hold 
another special meeting in order to finally achieve equal numbers of Chinese and British 
members. It only succeeded with intense lobbying, laying on special buses to bring the 
ratepayers to the meeting during a strike, and ensuring a large turnout of Japanese, who 
claimed to favour greater Asian representation to balance the power of westerners in the 
Settlement. ss 
K Municipal Gazette, p. 150,17 April 1930. ss Bickers, `Changing Shanghai's "Mind"', p. 12.1930 also saw the publication of the annual report and 
Municipal Gazette in Chinese (in condensed form) for the first time, with the cooperation of the CRA. 
Chinese were finally being genuinely involved in the municipal administration. SMC, Report for 1930, p. 
328. 
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The council maintained the structure of five Britons, two Americans, five 
Chinese and two Japanese until April 1941, when the Provisional Council Agreement 
suspended the Land Regulations and the electoral process in order to introduce a 
consular-appointed council. 56 This was a compromise that diluted British dominance 
with a Dutch and a Swiss councillor whilst maintaining a strong British presence and a 
balance between the now more pressing polarities of Axis and Allied nationals (even as 
Shanghai remained neutral). Allied nationals resigned in January 1941 but continued to 
serve on the committ ees for several more months, just as the municipal staff continued 
to perform their duties. 57 Good relations between British and Japanese staff, argues 
Robert Bickers, indicate `the ongoing strength of the rhetoric of internationalism. '58 
Council members 
A total of 156 different men were members of the SMC between 1900 and 1943, 
holding their position for anything from one to 11 years. Between them they represented 
more than 65 companies, banks and other concerns, both locally-based and 
multinational. Members of the council were elected by all qualified ratepayers, who 
included both settlers who had made their permanent homes in Shanghai and expatriates 
who typically worked for trading houses based in London or Hong Kong. Settlers 
owned and controlled much of the property in Shanghai, but while their interests were 
well-represented, the data on the Shanghai Municipal Council suggests political power 
rested primarily in the hands of the expatriates. Table 1 shows the business interests of 
prominent twentieth-century members of the council, including all chairmen and other 
councillors who held office for more than five years. Of the 29 men included in the 
56 Bickers, `Settlers and Diplomats', p. 239. 
"Bickers, `Settlers and Diplomats', p. 247. 
-" Bickers, `Settlers and Diplomats', p. 248. 
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table, 18 were expatriates and 11 were settlers, defined by working in locally-based 
firms. But tellingly, of the 18 men to be elected to the chair over the years 1900-1942, 
13 were expatriates, holding the position for 27 years between them, and just five were 
settlers, occupying the chair for the remaining 16 years. An almost unbroken line of 
expatriates held the chair until 1923, whereafter settlers were much more likely to be 
given the position. 
The most important trading companies in Shanghai, representing the interests of 
big business, dominated. 59 The largest of these, Jardine, Matheson and Company, which 
traded primarily in opium, cotton, tea and silk, had the closest links to the council, 
providing a total of 12 councillors spanning 33 years between 1900 and 1941. Four of 
them acted as chairmen, the most senior position on the council, between them 
occupying the post for eight years. Jardine's' closest rival, Butterfield and Swire, was 
represented for 15 years in the twentieth century, as was the Hong Kong and Shanghai 
Bank, the SMC's own bankers. The Bank dominated more in the 1920s, having at least 
one member of the council every year from 1920-28, while the heyday for influence by 
Swire's came in the later 1920s and 1930s. Jardine's, on the other hand, was well- 
represented throughout the period. Between the 1870s and 1910s the Peninsula and 
Orient Steamship Navigation Company was well-represented, but its last council 
member, E. C. Richards, was elected in 1918. Chinese council members, when they 
joined, were also leading figures in local business, as shown below. The SMC thus did 
not simply represent the vocal Shanghailander community, as may be assumed, but was 
a more internationally-minded group of men, many of whom, while spending many 
" The same was true of the Hong Kong Legislative and Executive Councils, which were dominated by 
representatives of big business until reforms in 1991. Ming K. Chan, `The Legacy of the British 
Administration of Hong Kong: A View from Hong Kong', China Quarterly, No. 151 (September 1997), 
pp. 575-6. 
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years in Shanghai, continued to identity their interests largely with Britain (or, less 
commonly, with America or another home nation). 





E. A. Hewitt 1897-1901 (*1900-01) British Expatriate Peninsula & Orient 
Shipping Co. 
J. Prentice 1997-1901,1904,1907- 
09 
British Settler S. C. Farnham Boyd & Co. 




1901-03 (*1902-03) British Settler North China Insurance Co. 
Otto Meuser 1902-10 German Settler Rohde and Co. 
H. De Gray 1903-07,1909-12 
*1911-12 
American Expatriate China & Japan Trading Co. 
A. W. Burkill 1903-04,1907-08,1911- 
12 
British Settler A. R. Burkill & Co. 
Frederick 
Anderson 
* 1904-05 British Expatriate Ilbert & Co. (textile 
manufacturing) 
H. Keswick 1905-07 (* 1907) British Expatriate Jardine, Matheson & Co. 
C. Holliday * 1906 British Expatriate Holliday & Co. (traders) 
David Landale 1907-10 (*1908-10) British Expatriate Jardine, Matheson & Co. 
Heinz Figge 1910-14 German Expatriate Deutsch Asiatische Bank 
E. C. Pearce 1911-19 (*1913-19) British Expatriate I1bert & Co. (textile 
manufacturing) 
E. I. Ezra 1912-18 British Settler Ezra & Co. (opium traders) 
A. S. P. White- 
Cooper 
1913-18 British Settler Law 
W. L. Merriman 1913-19 American Expatriate American Trading Co. 
A. Brooke 
Smith 
1919-21 (*1920-21) British Expatriate Jardine, Matheson & Co. 
W. P. Lambe 1919-24,1928,1934-35 British Settler Wisner & Co. 
H. G. Simms 1920-23 (*1922-23) British Expatriate Property, insurance 
E. F. Mackay 1920-24 British Expatriate Butterfield & Swire 
V. G. Lyman 1921-29 American Expatriate Standard Oil 
Stirling 
Fessenden 
* 1923-28 American Settler Law 
p. W. Massey 1923-26,1929,1932-34 British Expatriate Holyoak, Massey & Co. 
(Hong Kong traders) 
Alexander 
Dunlop Bell 
1924-33 (*1932-33) British Expatriate Barlow & Co. (tea and 
rubber traders 
60 Settlers are defined as those working in locally-based firms, as opposed to expatriates working for 
international companies, based overseas. 
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Ernest 1926-27,1929-31,1935, British Expatriate British American Tobacco 
Macnaghten 1936,1938 *1930-31 
Harry Edward 1928-29,1932-36 British Settler Arnhold & Co. (property) 
Arnhold *1929,1934-36) 
Cornell Sidney 1933-39 (*1937-39) American Settler Law 
Franklin 
G. E. Mitchell 1936,1938-41 British Expatriate Butterfield & Swire 
William J. 1936,1938-40 (*1940) British Expatriate Jardine, Matheson & Co. 
Keswick 
John Hellyer 1934-35,1939, *1941 British Settler Liddell Bros. & Co. 
Liddell (traders) 
Table 1. Prominent foreign council members (all chairmen and those who held office 
for five years or more) and their business interests, 1900-1942. 
Turning to some of the individuals on the council, Stirling Fessenden was one of 
the most prominent figures of the 1920s and '30s, known in some quarters as the 
`mayor of Shanghai'. 61 He joined the council in 1920 and held the chair from 1923 to 
1929, when he told his colleagues he could not continue in the unpaid role, so was made 
Director (later Secretary) General from 1929. The scope of the post expanded rapidly 
and allowed Fessenden to continue to direct municipal activities until his retirement in 
1939 at the age of 64.62 Described as `one of the best known Americans in the Far East', 
Fessenden was nevertheless famously considered by many contemporaries to be `more 
British than the British'. 63 Indeed, while popular with the foreign community in 
Shanghai (references to his long service and ongoing friendship to the council, made 
when his retirement was announced at the annual meeting of ratepayers in 1938, were 
effusive and accompanied by `loud applause')64 he was deeply unpopular with the 
American authorities. In 1927 the US Consul General at Shanghai, Clarence Gauss, 
sought to use his influence to remove Fessenden from his powerful position. Gauss 
61 Harold E. Jones, `Shanghai's International Municipal Government', National Municipal Review, Vol. 
21, No. 3 (March 1932), p. 157. 
62 SMC, Reportfor 1939, p. 9. 
63 George F. Nellist (ed. ), Men of Shanghai and North China: A Standard Biographical Reference Work 
Shanghai: Oriental Press, 1933), p. 129; Clifford, Spoilt Children of Empire, p. 22. 
SMC, Report for 1939, p. 9. 
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directed the American Minister in Beijing to tell his British counterpart that the re- 
election of Fessenden `would not be acceptable to the American authorities', but the 
Minister, John MacMurray, replied that he thought such intervention inadvisable. 65 This 
illustrates the independence of the council, even as it caused considerable problems to 
the consular and diplomatic authorities, as well as the significance of Fessenden's role 
as chairman of the SMC, drawing the attention as it did of such senior figures. 
Following the undesired re-election, Gauss wrote angrily to the Secretary of State in 
Washington that 
The truculent attitude of this American citizen, who, through no fault or favor of 
the American Government, or its authorities in China, has been hoisted by his 
colleagues on the Shanghai Municipal Council to the position of its Chairman, 
and maintains himself in that public position - constantly emphasized in foreign 
houses of parliament to show the `international' character of the Shanghai 
municipal administration - by his attitude of faithful obedience to the will of the 
reactionary majority of the Council and their supporters, is in my opinion 
distinctly unbecoming and distastefu1.66 
The US Consul-General evidently felt his community was sidelined in the International 
Settlement where British interests held sway, and the presence of Fessenden, rather than 
helping boost the position of Americans in Shanghai, in fact enabled the status quo to 
continue under a cloak of international involvement. 
Fessenden devoted two decades of his life to the Shanghai Municipal Council, 
finding in it an outlet for his formidable talents in administration and his controlling 
tendencies. He was trained in law, indeed practising as a solicitor in Shanghai from 
65 US NARA, Consular Posts, Shanghai, RG 84, Vol. 1686,810.1: telegram from US Consulate to US 
Legation, 12 April, and reply, 13 April 1927. 
66 NARA, Consular Posts, Shanghai, RG 84, Vol. 1686,810.1: letter from American Consul General, 
Shanghai, to Secretary of State, Washington, D. C., 5 May 1927. 
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1905, and he was able to use his legal expertise in the service of the council as it 
negotiated the tricky waters of growing Chinese nationalism and accelerating Sino- 
Japanese tensions. He negotiated with the Green Gang's Du Yuesheng (fill -V) 
in 
February 1927, agreeing to allow Du to bring his gangsters and toughs through the 
International Settlement in order to assist Chiang Kai-shek's purge of the Communist 
Party. 67 More significantly for this thesis, he also oversaw the council's reluctant 
agreement to admit Chinese members in the wake of the May Thirtieth Movement, and 
the repeatedly stalled negotiations as the terms of Chinese representation were decided. 
As befitted a man of his local social and political standing, Fessenden was a 
member of many clubs and associations in Shanghai, from the exclusive (British) 
Shanghai Club on the Bund and the American Club, to the Rotary, a Sino-foreign 
organisation that encompassed many of the city's elite. 68 The latter was established in 
1919 with the explicit aim of being `international' (which is to say, to include Chinese 
as well as westerners in its membership), but three years later just four of its almost 70 
members were Chinese, 69 demonstrating the difficulties in forming transnational 
organisations at this early juncture. Fessenden also belonged to the more genuinely 
cosmopolitan Cercle Sportif Francais, the main French Club which was highly popular 
and, unusually, admitted Chinese and even women. 70 He certainly mixed with people of 
senior standing from all nationalities, but it is unlikely that his social circle extended far 
beyond the Anglo-American elite. The circles in which the members of the council 
67 Brian G. Martin, The Shanghai Green Gang: Politics and Organized Crime, 1919-1937 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1996), pp. 104-106; Robert M. Farnsworth, From Vagabond to Journalist: 
Edgar Snow in Asia, 1928-1941 (Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 1996), p. 27. 
68 `Sino-foreign' organisation is a term coined by Nicholas Clifford and adopted by Jeffrey Wasserstrom. 
Clifford, Spoilt Children of Empire, p. 71; Wasserstrom, `Cosmopolitan Connections', p. 208. 
69 Connie Fan and April Ma, `A Brief Look at the Rotary Club of Shanghai from 1919 to 1949' (Rotary 
Club of Shanghai, 2006), <http: //www. rotaryshanghai. orglindex. php? id=6&lang---cn>, accessed 27 June 
2010. 
70 Clifford, Spoilt Children of Empire, p. 72. 
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moved both reflected their elite position and shaped the interactions they were able to 
have with different sections of Shanghai society. Bickers describes it as `a bankers' 
council, an opium traders' council, a rubber-boom speculators' council, if not simply 
just another company board' with members connected by freemasonry, social clubs and 
sometimes by marriage. 71 The Settlement elite was small and incestuous and the SMC 
reflected this. 
Fessenden's fellow American on the council in the 1920s and again in the early 
1930s was Frank Jay Raven. Raven arrived in Shanghai from California in 1904, when 
he began his Shanghai career as an engineer working for the SMC. 72 He moved on, 
however, to make his fortune in land speculation, becoming a millionaire and a pillar of 
the local community (although he was convicted of fraud in 1935 and sent to serve a 
five-year jail sentence in the USA). 73 Raven was active in the establishment of the 
Rotary and the Union Club, another Sino-foreign organisation, also founded in 1919. It 
is no coincidence that in the wake of the upsurge of nationalist fervour that 
accompanied the May Fourth Movement there were suddenly efforts made to heal the 
rift between Chinese and westerners. The Union Club was a little more successful than 
the Rotary in its aims of bringing Chinese and foreign members together in one 
organisation. 74 Wasserstrom celebrates its significance in bringing together the most 
influential members of each community on an equal footing, though he also 
acknowledges that far from emerging naturally from the cosmopolitan nature of 
71 Bickers, Scramble for China, p. 367. 
n 'Appendix 1: Men of Shanghai', Fortune, Vol. 11, No. 1(January 1935), pp. 115-16, 
<http: //www. eamshaw. com/shanghai-ed-india/tales/library/fortune/t-fortune3. htm>, accessed 27/6/2010. 
73 Eileen P. Scully, Bargaining with the State from Afar: American Citizenship in Treaty Port China, 
1844-1942 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), pp. 187-91; Ronald Kent Shelp with Al Ehrbar, 
Fallen Giant: The Amazing Story of Hank Greenberg and the History of AIG (Hoboken, N. J.: Wiley, 
2006), p. 22. ' 
. 74 The Union Club was originally known as the ABC Club in explicit reference to its founding aim of 
bringing together Americans, Britons and Chinese in one institution. Wasserstrom, `Cosmopolitan 
Connections', pp. 20,213,221. 
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Shanghai, it was rather a self-conscious effort to `overcome entrenched patterns of 
fragmentation. ' 75 Yet Clifford rightly points out that membership of the Union Club 
declined soon after it opened and suggests as an explanation Chinese reluctance to 
belong to an organisation where Anglo-Americans patronisingly condescended to mix 
with them. 76 It is nonetheless significant that foreign members of the council like Raven 
were able to mix on equal terms at Union Club meetings and at the bar of the Cercle 
Sportif Francais with elite members of the Chinese community. 
Another association which brought together members of different sections of the 
Shanghai community, including many council members and staff, was the North China 
Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society (RAS). The RAS boasted its own library, museum 
and journal, and held regular lectures for the cultural and intellectual stimulation of its 
members. 77 Predominantly British, as indicated by the `Royal' prefix and affiliation to 
branches of the RAS in London, Hong Kong, as well as other East Asian outposts and 
several cities in India, the Society nevertheless also numbered many other nationalities 
among its members, including Chinese. Council members in the RAS included Frank 
Raven, A. D. Bell, and Xu Xinliu. Dozens of council employees also belonged to the 
RAS including Chief of the Industrial Section Eleanor Hinder and her Chinese assistant 
Zhu Yubao (Dyu Yu Bao); Secretary W. E. Leveson and Chinese Deputy Secretary T. 
K. Ho; and Commissioner of Public Health J. H. Jordan and Dr Mao Weiguang (Miau 
Wey-kaung) who also worked in the Public Health Department. The RAS was a 
significant mixing ground for such diverse individuals. It was aided financially by both 
the SMC and other foreign supporters and Chinese sponsors, such as Dr Wu Liande, 
Wasserstrom, `Cosmopolitan Connections', p. 219. n Clifford, Spoilt Children of Empire, p. 72. 
Peter Hibbard, `History of the Royal Asiatic Society China in Shanghai', 
<http: //www. royalasiaticsociety. org. cn/v/index. php? option=com content&view=article&id=46: beginnin 
g-&catid=34: general-history&Itemid=62>, accessed 15 January 2012. The RAS was re-established in 
2006.1 am grateful for additional information on its former incarnation from Peter Hibbard. 
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head of the Chinese government's quarantine service, who donated one fifth of the cost 
of the new RAS building in 1930, the largest individual donation the Society received. 78 
The council's support for the RAS was a rare example of municipal spending on non- 
essential services, reflecting the status it had in Shanghai but also the SMC's 
willingness to patronise a British institution: none of the other associations discussed 
here benefitted from direct municipal donations. Such associations contributed to the 
`cosmopolitan intimacy' of Shanghai society in which council members and employees 
interacted. 79 
After Fessenden's resignation as chairman the council returned to type, electing 
the Briton Harry Edward Arnhold to succeed him. A British Jew of German ancestry 
born in Hong Kong, Arnhold was a partner of the family firm Arnhold & Company, 
incorporated in Hong Kong but with headquarters in Shanghai. He had served its 
interests in London and Hankou as well as Shanghai, but had made his home in the 
International Settlement. 80 Arnhold's firm dealt in building and engineering supplies, 
while he was also chairman of the Shanghai Land Investment Company, a major 
property developer, and a number of other firms. He sat on the council in 1928,1929 
and from 1932 until 1936, despite being unpopular with the British authorities in 
Beijing because he was considered too much of a diehard. 81 According to Nicholas 
Clifford, the consuls and diplomats agreed that Arnhold was `violent', `rough, 
unscrupulous, and a die-hard of the worst kind'. 82 As a `die-hard' imperialist, he was 
n SMC support of the RAS included an annual grant of Its. 1,000, a donation to fund building repairs in 
1909 and another towards the new building in 1930. SMA U1-1-56: Finance Committee, 4 January 1909; 
Ul-1-61: Finance Committee, 29 October 1932. 
79 Robert Bickers, `Shanghailanders and Others: British Communities in China, 1843-1957' in Settlers 
and Expatriates, p. 277. 
so Nellist (ed. ), Men of Shanghai, p. 11. 
31 Bickers, `Changing Shanghai's "Mind"', p. 14. 
sz F/760/250/10 Lampson to F. O., 11 February 1929; F1999/250/10 Pratt minute of 22 April 1928; 893.00 
PR Shanghai/ 15 Cunningham to Legation, 4 May 1929, in Clifford, Spoilt Children of Empire, pp. 270- 
71, p. 331 n. 82. 
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typical of past and future chairmen. As noted above, however, Arnhold was 
nevertheless voted out in 1930 for being insufficiently bullish in his dealings with 
Chinese, demonstrating the extent to which the SMC reflected the prejudices of its 
small electorate. 
Arnhold & Co. was bought out by Sir Victor Sassoon in order to enter the 
Shanghai property market, making Arnhold Sassoon's man on the council. Born in 
Naples, Sassoon belonged to a leading Baghdadi Jewish family and had made his way 
to Shanghai via British India, London and Hong Kong. He was one of Shanghai's most 
prominent businessmen and key among its border crossers, thanks to the famous parties 
he regularly threw, to which he invited the elite from both the foreign and Chinese 
communities. 83 Through Arnhold, Sassoon's business interests were adequately 
represented on the council. Sassoon's father Edward had served on the SMC in 1879, as 
did other members of the Sephardic Jewish community. 84 Silas Hardoon, council 
member from 1899 to 1903, began his career in Shanghai as an employee of the 
Sassoons but became a partner and then a property magnate in his own right, owning 
much of Nanjing Road and dying in 1931 as reportedly the wealthiest man in East 
Asia. 85 Another successful Jewish property investor who sat on the council was E. I. 
Ezra, member from 1912 to 1918, who was the first council member to be born in 
China. 86 (Ezra's caricature appears on the top right of Figure 3 below, depicting the 
candidates for the 1913 election. ) These men were typical of the council in their wealth 
83 Wasserstrom, `Cosmopolitan Connections', p. 212. "On this community, see Maisie J. Meyer, `The Sephardic Jewish Community of Shanghai 1845-1939 
and the Question of Identity' (Unpublished PhD Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science, 1994). 
ss Chiara Betta, 'The Land System in the International Settlement: The Rise and Fall of the Hardoon 
Family, 1874-1956', paper presented at Treaty Ports in Modem China conference, University of Bristol, 
July 2011. See also Chiara Betta, "Silas Aaron Hardoon (1851-1931), Marginality and Adaptation in 
Shanghai, " unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, School of Oriental and African Studies, 1997. Hardoon lost 
his seat in 1904 as the result of being involved in a legal dispute with the council over the culverting of a 
creek running through his land. NCH, 15 January 1904, p. 95. 16 Betta, 'Marginal Westerners in Shanghai', p. 45. 
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and local prominence: all were members of the Shanghai Club, the British club on the 
Bund, which meant overcoming considerable prejudice against them as both Jews and 
`Orientals'. 87 Their business dealings were also somewhat questionable, with 
investments in the opium trade contributing to the capital they (particularly Ezra) spent 
on property. Yet these men also demonstrate the degree of diversity emerging even at 
the beginning of the twentieth century, as wealth and influence allowed them to 
overcome the prejudices of the Anglo-Saxon-dominated council and ratepayers. 
a Betta, `Land System', p. 7. 
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Figure 3. Caricatures of the candidates for election to the SMC in 1913.88 
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As in other treaty port organisations such as the Maritime Customs service, and 
indeed throughout Britain's imperial world, `British' very definitely incorporated the 
whole British Isles. 89 Brigadier-General Ernest Brander Macnaghten, born in India, had 
roots in County Antrim in Northern Ireland, and was a member of the SMC on and off 
from 1926 to 1938 and chairman in 1930 and 1931.90 He was Director of the British 
American Tobacco Company in China, but came to business after a long military career. 
After education in England Macnaghten returned to India with the Royal Artillery and 
went on to serve in South Africa during the Second Anglo-Boer War, West Africa, 
Somaliland, and France during the First World War. 91 He put his military experience to 
use as a Major in the Shanghai Volunteer Corps and was no doubt a formidable 
presence on the council. Scottish councillors included Alexander Dunlop Bell and 
William J. Keswick, who held the chair in 1932-33 and 1941 respectively. Chairmen 
were drawn primarily from the expatriates rather than permanent settlers among the 
councillors, and these men were no exception. Bell belonged to the British tea and 
rubber trading firm Barlow and Company, which operated throughout Asia; Keswick 
was a Director at Jardine's, as had been his father Henry and grandfather William, who 
had both also chaired the SMC. The grandson suffered for his service to the council, 
being shot in the arm in a Japanese assassination attempt in 1941, as described below. 
Benjamin Beith, another Scottish council member in the 1930s, was also a Jardine's 
Director. Beith had previously been an unofficial member of the Hong Kong Legislative 
Council, strengthening the ties between the Settlement and the colony. 92 Other key 
59 On the Irish emphasis within the Customs, see Catherine Ladds, "`Youthful, Likely Men, Able to Read, 
Write and Count": Joining the Foreign Staff of the Chinese Customs Service, 1854-1927, ' Journal of 
Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 36, No. 2 (June 2008), p. 233. 
9o Macnaghten stood for the chair again in 1934 but was defeated by Arnold by eight votes to six. China 
Weekly Review, Vol. 68,31 March 1934, p. 314. 
91 Nellist (ed. ), Men of Shanghai, p. 266. 
92 Nellist (ed. ), Men of Shanghai, p. 23. 
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firms represented included Butterfield and Swire's, represented by the Glaswegian N. S. 
Brown (in 1930 and 1931) among others. 93 The domination of the council by big British 
businesses remained clear throughout its existence, and moreover it was often the 
directors of the firms who stood for election: certainly the `people of importance' 
intended by the Land Regulations. Nevertheless, diversity was increasing within the 
council in this period, which meant significant changes in how it went about running the 
affairs of the Settlement. 
While the council had included a Japanese member since 1916, the first being a 
branch chief of the Japanese Residents' Association, they began to have real influence 
within the council from 1927 when the number of Japanese councillors increased to two 
and they were invited to join the council's committees, where specific policy decisions 
were deliberated. 94 Japanese members of the council were elected by the large Japanese 
ratepayers bloc, which turned out to vote more consistently than other foreign national 
groups. They were nominated by the Japanese Residents' Association, (membership of 
which was compulsory for all Japanese residents of Shanghai under Japanese law) 95 
which usually chose the Japanese candidates by consensus in advance of the vote to 
avoid splitting the constituent community. 96 Mark Peattie notes a `surprising degree of 
unanimity and cohesiveness' within Shanghai's Japanese community, so perhaps, 
uniquely among the council members, the Japanese can be said to have represented the 
broad interests of their constituent ratepayers as a whole, rather than merely the elite. 97 
93 Bickers writes that Brown, a great networker, was made the manager of Swire's specifically in order to 
get onto the SMC and help shape the direction of municipal affairs `by acting as a conciliatory and 
restraining influence'. Bickers, Britain in China, p. 178. 
94 Mark R. Peattie, `Japanese Treaty Port Settlements in China, 1895-1937', in Peter Duus, Ramon H. 
Meyers and Mark R. Peattie (eds. ), The Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895-1937 (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1989), pp. 190-91. 
95 Feetham, Report, Vol. II, p. 201. 
96 On the Japanese Residents' Association, see Fogel, "`Shanghai-Japan", pp. 927-50. 
97 Peattie, `Japanese Treaty Port Settlements', pp. 207-208. 
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Yet Christian Henriot argues that there was a deep cleavage within the community 
between the expatriate minority and the vast majority of lower and middle class 
residents, akin to that between British expatriates and Shanghailanders. 98 Japanese 
council members were drawn from the expatriate class so represented its interests above 
those of the resident majority, similarly again to most of the British councillors. 
Those nominated and elected were still chosen to best fit in with the British- 
dominated council, however: men such as Otoichi Okamoto, a member of the English 
bar. Okamoto was one of two members sent to investigate the conditions at the 
municipal Ward Road Gaol, following criticisms from the British prison reformer 
Margery Fry. 99 He and his colleague reported that they were `much impressed' by what 
they saw at the gaol, to the satisfaction of the rest of the council. The banker Kimiji 
Fukushima was a member from 1927 to 1932 and served on the Watch Committee, 
which oversaw the policing and defence of the Settlement. He repeatedly sought an 
increase in the Japanese branch of the Shanghai Municipal Police, favoured exclusively 
Japanese policing of Hongkou where the Japanese community was concentrated, and 
advocated the promotion of senior Japanese police officers to senior positions. 100 These 
were all key demands of the Japanese community which he explicitly saw as his duty to 
represent, referring to `his constituents' in meetings. 10' He argued his case persuasively 
but stopped short of demanding full equality in pay and terms between Japanese and 
British officers, choosing to focus his energy on what was achievable at the time. 
Japanese members of the SMC thus cooperated with their colleagues and sought to 
" Henriot, '"Little Japan"', p. 154. 
99 Frank Dikötter, Crime. Punishment and the Prison in Modern China (London: Hurst, 2002), pp. 312-13. 
100 Shanghai Municipal Archives (hereafter SMA), U1-1-89: SMC Watch Committee minutes, 21 June 
1928. Donald Jordan claims that Fukushima `symbolised Japan's economic power at Shanghai and, 
indirectly, the Seyukai cabinet that [the] Mitsui [Bank] represented. ' Donald Jordan, China's Trial by 
Fire: The Shanghai War of 1932 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001), p. 10. 
1°I SMA, U1-1-88: Watch Committee minutes, 27 May 1927. 
79 
maximise Japanese interests in a less militant way than was typical of the Japanese 
community in Shanghai by this period, as represented by the Japanese Ratepayers' 
Association and Federation of Street Unions. 102 
The question of Japanese representation on the council became more contentious, 
however, from 1937 when Japan occupied the rest of the city. As the Japanese 
population and thus the number of Japanese ratepayers in the Settlement increased far 
more rapidly than the rest of the foreign population, there was serious concern in the 
SMC, the wider western community, and in London about the possibility that the status 
quo would not be maintained and the Japanese ratepaying bloc would elect more 
Japanese council members at the expense of the British and American members. 
Exploiting the rules that allowed residents to hold more than one vote if they qualified 
as ratepayers or property owners for firms and as individuals, Japanese companies split 
their holdings to allow more Japanese votes to be exercised, further increasing the size 
of the voting bloc. Concern about this reached the Foreign Office in Whitehall: Ashley 
Clarke of the Foreign Office reported worriedly to the Secretary of the Treasury that the 
number of Japanese votes had increased from 873 of a total of 3,763 (23%) in 1936 to 
1,930 of a total of 3,841 (50%) in March 1939.103 British votes, meanwhile, fell from 
1,403 (37%) to 1,309 (34%) in the same period, and as the number of Japanese votes 
continued to rise rapidly they looked to be in a position to out-vote British interests at 
the 1940 ratepayers' meeting and select their own choice of council members. Special 
dispensation was therefore granted from the Treasury for the Consul-General to waive 
the fee for British companies wishing to re-register their land in the name of more 
ratepayers, to split and thus increase British votes in the same way as the Japanese. The 
102 Henriot, "`Little Japan"', p. 154. 
103 TNA T 160/1142/16454/1: Ashley Clarke, Foreign Office, to the Secretary of the Treasury, 2 
November 1939. 
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tactic worked: British votes increased by over 1,000, the approved five British and two 
American candidates were elected with around 8,000 votes each, while five Japanese 
candidates received around 5,000 votes apiece, maintaining the status quo. 104 This 
episode shows how flawed the democratic processes of the Settlement were, open to 
manipulation locally and from London at the expense of the Japanese majority when 
British domination was eventually threatened. For most of its existence, however, the 
balance of power was unquestionably with the British, and other members were eligible 
for election in part for their ability to work with the British. 
The first Chinese members of council were similarly chosen for their ability to 
work alongside westerners. Table 2 below shows the international connections of 
certain key Chinese council members, as well as their political affiliations and business 
concerns. One of the first two Chinese councillors, Yuan Lüdeng, had served on the 
Chinese and Foreign Famine Relief Committee, a self-evidently cooperative venture. 
He was educated at a Ningbo missionary college and became a Methodist pastor from 
1904 until 1912. Yuan was also active politically, being Deputy Chief Commissioner of 
Foreign Affairs and Communications in the Ningbo Military Government during the 
1911 revolution. 105 Along with his colleagues on the council, he was a prominent 
businessman, managing Chinese tobacco and shipping firms among others as well as 
working as a Manager at the American Trading Company. 106 His fellow Chinese 
pioneer on the council, Shanghai native Zhao Jinqing, had a similar set of affiliations, as 
a deacon of the First Baptist Church in Shanghai, former president of the Shanghai 
YMCA, and member of the central executive committee of the Chinese General 
104 TNA T 160/1142/16454/1: Greenway, Shanghai, 3 and 12 April 1940. A further `unofficial' British 
candidate stood for election but received fewer than 400 votes so was not elected. 
105 China Weekly Review, Who's Who in China (Shanghai: China Weekly Review, 1931), p. 487. 
106 Nellist (ed. ), Men of Shanghai, p. 475. 
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Chamber of Commerce. 107 He also had strong ties to Nanjing, directing or helping direct 
a number of government departments including the Shanghai branch of the Ministry of 
Industry, Commerce and Labour. 108 Yuan and Zhao were typical of a section of the 
Shanghainese elite in their prominence in business and politics. At the same time, their 
Christianity demonstrates a degree of exposure to western culture which would have 
aided their interactions with other council members. These first Chinese council 
members faced an uphill struggle to influence council activities, but they sought to 
maximise their influence by acting together on issues of importance to the Chinese 
municipal government, with some success. They criticised, for example, the council's 
refusal to allow the Commissioner of Foreign Affairs to establish stamp tax collecting 
bureaux in the Settlement in September 1928, insisting on their opposition being 
recorded in the minutes in an astute use of council procedure. 109 As a result, the council 
postponed the closing of the bureaux, despite the reservations of the foreign members 
that they signalled an infringement of the principle of excluding Chinese government 
bodies from the Settlement. 
Yuan and Zhao were followed onto the council in 1930 by similarly 
cosmopolitan Shanghainese. Prominent among them was Xu Xinliu, 110 Director of the 
National Commercial Bank in Shanghai and other financial and insurance companies. 
Xu was educated in Shanghai before going to Britain to complete a B. Sc. at 
Birmingham University, followed by training in commerce at Manchester and in 
finance in Paris. After returning to China he again travelled to Europe in 1918 on a 
107 Shirley S. Garrett, `The Chambers of Commerce and the YMCA', in Mark Elvin and G. William 
Skinner (eds. ), The Chinese City Between Two Worlds (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1974), p. 234. 
108 Nellist (ed. ), Men of Shanghai, p. 476. 
109 SMA, U1-1-1246: A. M. Kotenev, `Chinese taxation and government bureaux and officials in the 
International Settlement of Shanghai 1843-1930', compiled 16 May 1930, p. 81. 
110 Here, as with Chinese names elsewhere in this paper, I use the transliteration in common use at the 
time, with Pinyin and Chinese given in parentheses. 
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diplomatic mission and served as a technical delegate to the Paris Peace Conference. III 
Xu's international education and broad experience of Europe will have helped him to 
interact with the foreigners with whom he came into contact in the elite circles of 
Shanghai, which in turn facilitated his accession to the council once Chinese were 
finally admitted. Xu also illustrates the political prominence of the Chinese council 
members. 112 
II ' China Weekly Review, Who's Who, pp. 158-9. 
12 Xu allegedly paid the price for his political prominence with his life: he died in a plane crash that was 
blamed on the Japanese. See Zhang Jiasheng and Wang Lei, `Qinhua rijun mousha yinhangjia Xu Xinliu 
de neimu' ('The Inside Story of the Murder of Banker Xu Xinliu by the Invading Japanese Army', 
Wenshi Chungiu (June 2006), n. p. 
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Like Xu, Chen Tingrui received his higher education overseas. He initially funded 
his own way at the University of Michigan graduate law school before winning a rare 
scholarship: in admitting Chinese, the council was able to benefit from a highly educated 
and intelligent skill-base. At Michigan, Chen completed a thesis entitled `The Principles of 
State Succession as Revealed by the Versailles Treaty', ' demonstrating an extensive 
understanding of contemporary political issues which would be of use to him in his later 
council role. He practised and lectured in law in Shanghai on his return and went to Beijing 
in 1924 as part of the delegation sent to help settle the contentious issue of the rendition of 
the Mixed Court of the International Settlement. 2 This prior involvement in the politics of 
the municipality paved the way for him to join the council's Watch and Traffic Committees 
from 1928. He was a special editor of Shenbao, so may have been able to give the 
newspaper some insight into municipal business. 3 Chen and Xu served side by side on the 
Watch Committee and were active in raising the concerns of the Chinese community. In 
July 1928, in the first months of their membership, they suggested changes that could be 
made to improve security in the Settlement, including steps to restrict the trade in bullet- 
proof vests which aided violent criminals. 4 Immediate action was taken, the Commissioner 
of Police being requested to confer with the French Concession police in order to achieve 
the simultaneous adoption of the licensing of such vests, which suggests that the views of 
Chen and Xu were respected by their foreign counterparts. On other occasions Xu's opinion 
was specifically sought in committee meetings, such as on the appropriate admission 
' China Weekly Review, Who's Who, pp. 64-65. 
2 For more on this, see Manley 0. Hudson, 'The Rendition of the International Mixed Court at Shanghai', 
American Journal of International Law, Vol. 21, No. 3 (July 1927), pp. 451-471. 
3 Nellist (ed. ), Men of Shanghai, p. 60. 
4 SMA, U1-1-89: Watch Committee Minutes, 20 July 1928. 
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charges to the Shanghai Hospital for the Insane in a Finance Committee meeting. 5 The 
chairman was thus making the most of having access to a Chinese perspective on council 
matters. 
`The leading shipowner in China', Yu Qiaging was perhaps the highest profile of 
the Chinese council members. 6 He chaired the Chinese Ratepayers' Association before and 
during his years on the SMC, was president of the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce, 
and occupied a seat on the council of the Shanghai Municipal Government, which ran the 
Chinese municipality, from its formation in 1927. Indeed, Yu was one of only five of the 
original 13 members who were re-selected to this council in 1932, identifying him as a 
faithful supporter of the Nationalist regime and a close ally of Chiang Kai-shek. 7 His links 
to Chiang dated to at least 1919 when he contributed funds to the future Guomindang 
leader. 8 Yu moved from vocal critic of the SMC to chief negotiator with Fessenden over the 
terms by which Chinese would be admitted to the council, and then to constructive member 
of the council from 1929. It was a peculiarity of semi-colonial Shanghai that an individual 
could serve the Chinese authorities and the International Settlement simultaneously, and he 
helped facilitate relations between the SMC and Chinese Municipal Government by having 
a foot in each camp. Evidently, just as the foreign members of council were pillars of the 
Shanghai establishment, so too were their Chinese counterparts. It was this which made 
s SMA, U1-1-62: SMC Finance Committee Minutes, 22 September 1933. 
6 Nellist (ed. ), Men of Shanghai, p. 470. Yu was so well-known that Thibet Road (now Xizang Road) was 
renamed after him in 1943. SMA: Ui -16-9-209: letter from Percy Chu, Chairman of Committee on Road 
Names and Monuments in the International Settlement, to K. Okazaki, Chairman SMC, 15 May 1943. 
7 Christian Henriot, Shanghai 1927-1937: Municipal Power, Locality, and Modernization, trans. Noel 
Castelino (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993; first published Paris, 1991), pp. 53,60. According 
to Feng Xiaocai, he also had links to the Chinese Communist Party as a `bourgeois leftist'. Feng Xiaocai, 
"Zuo 11 "you " zhijian: beifa qianhou Yu Qiaging yu Zhonggong de hezuo yu fenbie ('Between the "Left" and 
"Right": Cooperation and Division between Yu Qiaqing and the Chinese Communist Party around the Time 
of the Northern Expedition'), Jindaishi yanjiu (Modern History Studies) (May 2010), pp. 31-48. 
Martin, Shanghai Green Gang, p. 81. 
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their arrival on the council more palatable to foreigners who little over a decade earlier 
would have had few if any opportunities for social intercourse with Chinese and, moreover, 
would not have desired such opportunities. 9 
In July 1930 the five Chinese members of the council proposed a change to the way 
in which the extra-Settlement roads were policed, as a potential solution to a long-running 
area of contention with the Chinese authorities. They wanted a Chinese Commissioner of 
Police, of equal rank to the current Commissioner, to be chosen in consultation with the 
Mayor of Shanghai and to take control of the Chinese branch of the Shanghai Municipal 
Police. The extra-Settlement roads would then be policed solely by members of this branch, 
taking orders solely from the Chinese commissioner. 10 Surprisingly, the Chairman, Arnold, 
agreed in principle that these proposals could be workable, with the exception of allowing 
the Chinese commissioner to stand on an equal footing with the current head of the force. 
Yu, Xu and fellow Chinese council member Liu Hongsheng were appointed to a committee 
to investigate how this could be enacted. ' 1 In fact, the plan did not come to f uition, but it is 
hard to know whether this was more due to a lack of political will within the council or the 
outbreak of Sino-Japanese hostilities in 1932. 
Both Chinese and Japanese council members sought to increase council spending on 
education for their respective communities. The council had long favoured the provision of 
9 For prevailing British attitudes to Chinese in this period, see Bickers, Britain in China, pp. 23-26,43-48 and 
passim. Yu was also involved in Shanghai's criminal underworld, being `sworn brothers' with Du Yuesheng's 
p°atron, Huang Jinrong (**V-)- Martin, Shanghai Green Gang, p. 21. 
SMA, U1-1-1247: A. M. Kotenev, `Extra-Settlement Roads 1853-1930', 1 December 1930, p. 116. 
1 Liu was another prominent businessman, managing or sitting on the board of directors of more than a dozen 
firms, including property, insurance, and primarily industrial concerns, many of them housed in the Liu 
Building, `one of the largest and most modern office buildings in Shanghai'. He was philanthropic with his 
wealth, founding two schools and a hospital in his hometown and the Thibet Road Hospital for Infectious 
Diseases in Shanghai. This suggests he would have supported municipal spending on Chinese health and 
education. Nellist (ed. ), Men ofShanghai, p. 223. 
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an English education for foreign children in its budgets, expecting Chinese to provide for 
their own offspring. The Thomas Hanbury Public Schools for (mainly Eurasian) boys and 
girls employed British teachers who taught in English from a curriculum suited to Britain 
rather than Asia, down to setting mathematics problems in pounds, shillings and pence. An 
international range of children attended, but Chinese children were excluded. When the 
council invited Justice Richard Feetham to investigate how to resolve municipal problems 
in 1930, he endorsed the demand of the Federation of Street Unions, a vocal champion of 
Chinese residents, that more should be spent on schools for Chinese. 12 Chinese education 
provision proved a sharply divisive issue for the Education Board, the Chinese and foreign 
representatives clashing over the terms of the policy. 13 Council members Hu Mengjia and 
Xu Xinliu intervened to ensure that further problems caused by the conflicting approach of 
the neighbouring educational authorities did not derail the programme. 14 They were 
successful and from 1931 a portion of the municipal income from Chinese rates was set 
aside for Chinese secondary education in the Settlement. In 1934, the Chinese councillors 
lobbied for the grant to Chinese schools to be increased, and at the same time the Japanese 
members made a similar claim for Japanese schools. 15 The other members opposed the 
suggestions, citing the need for budgetary restraint: the council and its committees divided 
along national lines where interests conflicted. A compromise was nonetheless reached that 
increased the grant to both Chinese and Japanese schools, though by less than was 
demanded, so the council and its committees were able to resolve such issues once all sides 
could sit at the same table to present their arguments. 
12 Feetham, Report, Vol. II, p. 9. 
13 Zhang Qian (ed. ), Minutes ofthe SMC, Vol. XXV, 3 June 1931, p. 59. 
14 Zhang Qian (ed. ), Minutes of the SMC, Vol. XXV, 17 June 1931, pp. 252-3. 
15 SMA, U1-1-62: Finance Committee minutes, 4 January 1934. 
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The minutes of council and committee meetings from 1928 indicate that the Chinese 
members contributed to council proceedings in a similar way to their British, American and 
Japanese counterparts, giving their opinion on matters under discussion when sought by the 
chairman. The examples above also show, however, that, like the Japanese, they acted as a 
discreet interest group on areas of council business when issues of contention for the 
Chinese authorities or community were on the table. Significantly, they were able to 
influence council policy by providing constructive solutions to controversial problems or 
simply by ensuring that Chinese interests were voiced at the appropriate moment. 
Municipal staff 
The council was in effect the executive committee intended to put the wishes of the 
ratepayers into practice. The day-to-day running of the Settlement was undertaken by the 
council's salaried staff, who were organised into departments under the direction of 
committees of council members and the occasional local expert from among the ratepayers. 
Nicholas Clifford argued that the council largely simply approved the actions taken by its 
senior employees, 16 which was true of much routine work, but any decisions that had to be 
taken were effectively made at the level of the committees: their recommendations were 
generally approved by the council. Committees consisted of members of the council with 
some relevant expertise and one or two similarly qualified ratepayers. In its use of 
committees the council followed common practice in English municipal government: 
Herman Finer called committees `the real workshops of local government, [where] policy is 
decided, resolutions are made..., a general control over the activities of the staff is 
16 Clifford, Spoilt Children of Empire, p. 22. 
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exercised, and the estimates of expenditure for the relevant Departments are prepared. 517 
The metropolitan influence is again apparent. 
Heads of department were present at committee meetings and could answer 
questions, but had no power to decide policy. It was increasingly the case, however, as 
committees grew in importance, that a strong character could persuade his or her committee 
to approve the actions he or she intended to take. J. H. Jordan, the Commissioner of Public 
Health, was one such figure, and Eleanor Hinder, the Australian Chief of the Industrial and 
Social Division and the only head of department not to be British (and male), was another. 
The vast majority of municipal staff were Chinese, but their municipal careers were 
confined to the lower ranks. From 1928 the council agreed to a policy of promoting more 
Chinese to senior positions, though the top posts remained beyond reach. By 1933 the 
policy was bearing fruit, with increasing promotion of Chinese to posts defined as `under 
letters of appointment', which had previously been a euphemism for foreign employee. 18 A 
Chinese auditor was appointed and heads of departments had to become used to working 
with a Chinese deputy. These changes were concessions to the demands of the Chinese 
Ratepayers' Association, but made little difference to the experience of most Shanghainese 
with municipal personnel. The many members of staff who represented the council in an 
everyday capacity - tax collectors, police, teachers, nurses, public health assistants, public 
works employees and so on - had always been Chinese. While the council was dominated 
by the British, therefore, its governance was experienced through Chinese mediators. 
n Herman Finer, English Local Government (London: Methuen, 1950; first published 1933), p. 239; for more 
on English local government committees, see pp. 232-42. 
18 Ul-1-62: Finance Committee, 22 September 1933. 
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Staff were recruited locally, in Britain and in parts of the British empire, especially 
Hong Kong. The primary recruiter was the council's agent in London, John Pook and Co., 
which advertised and coordinated interviews for candidates recruited in London. 
Advertisements were placed in newspapers and magazines (Robert Bickers quotes a notice 
in the People seeking recruits for the SMP alongside similar advertisements for workers 
required in the Seychelles, Singapore and Uganda). 19 Chinese employees (most notably, 
due to their numbers, the police) were recruited locally, but this was generally avoided for 
other nationalities. As for service in the empire, recruitment to the municipal staff from 
Europe all but halted during the First World War, resulting in increased local recruitment, 
including the establishment of a Japanese branch of the SMP, followed by a subsequent 
surge in new European staff from 1919. 
Terms of service for British employees were typical of colonial contracts: five year 
periods of employment punctuated by nine months' home leave, with shorter periods of 
annual leave to be taken within China. The SMC owned a sanatorium in the mountain 
resort town of Moganshan for employees to take respite from the heat of the city for periods 
of up to 20 days during the summer Months. 20 Salaries were generous by local and 
international standards. The French Concession paid its top officials, who were employees 
of the French Consul-General rather than the council per se, less than two thirds of the 
salaries received by their counterparts in the International Settlement: Tls. 11,100 for the 
chief of the Garde municipale in 1927, for example, as opposed to Tls. 18,000 for the 
19 Bickers, Empire Made Me, p. 32. 
m Employees could take their wives and children, accommodation permitting. U1-16-9: General Order, 17 
April 1935. 
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Commissioner of the Shanghai Municipal Police. 2 ' An eye was kept on how competitive 
the salaries offered in Shanghai were compared with similar positions in Britain and they 
were adjusted if found to be lacking. 22 High salaries generally ensured a steady supply of 
good applicants: typically eight per place for the SMP 23 Foreign employees were paid an 
allowance in addition to the basic salary, ostensibly to compensate for living abroad but in 
reality to ensure a standard of living considerably higher than that available to Chinese, in 
order to preserve the perceived status of foreigners in Shanghai. Foreign employees also 
received family bonuses (for a wife and up to two children), locomotion allowances to 
heads of department and other staff of sufficient importance to justify the ownership of a 
municipal motorcar, and other allowances typical of the paternalistic employers of the day. 
The great differential in the pay of foreigners and Chinese employees came under 
scrutiny when Chinese members joined the council, though it was not abolished. More 
significantly, as the council implemented a policy of retrenchment in the face of financial 
difficulties in the late 1930s, salaries were frozen. Retention of foreign staff became 
difficult in the Second World War as it had in the First, with men choosing to return home 
to fight for their countries, and the unattractive salaries in comparison with earlier levels of 
pay did not help. The growing gap between pay and the cost of living (due to both rapid 
inflation and the falling exchange rate) became a serious source of discontent for all 
employees and the SMC took on `danwei-like responsibilities for Chinese staff' to try to 
21 Clifford, Spoilt Children of Empire, p. 24. French municipal employees enjoyed the same terms of 
employment as those of the international Settlement, however: five year contracts with nine months' home 
leave. Cornet, `Bumpy End of the French Concession', p. 266. 
22 UI-1-60: Finance Committee, 6 February 1922. 
23 Bickers, Empire Made Me, p. 33. 
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ensure their basic needs were met. 24 Nevertheless, a threatened strike by the Chinese branch 
of the SMP in December 1940 forced the council to address the issue of pay. Deciding that 
the long-delayed salary increase should be applied to all staff, the council went to the 
ratepayers the following January to seek their approval for an increase in rates to fund it. 
But this was 1941 and the Japanese community was keen to flex its muscles as the long 
domination of the Settlement by the British seemed to be about to give way to Japanese 
strength. The Chairman of the Japanese Ratepayers' Association, Yukichi Hayashi (4 
Ä ), tabled an amendment opposing the resolution for increased rates, threatening trouble if 
the amendment were defeated. When it was indeed defeated, the Japanese ratepayers 
approached the platform, which Hayashi re-mounted to fire his revolver at Keswick, the 
chairman, wounding him as well as Japanese councillor Okamoto. 25 Christian Henriot 
suggests that Japanese anger at the increase in rates may have stemmed in part from the 
double burden this community was under as its residents' association also charged its 
members taxes. 26 The popular opposition to the rise had put the Japanese council members 
in a difficult position: while representing the views of Japanese residents, they recognised 
the need to prevent a strike in the SMP that could have threatened the security of the 
Settlement and in fact proposed the measure that was tabled at the special ratepayers 
meeting which ended in disaster. As noted above, Japanese council members had British 
connections that made them sympathetic to the consensus among the other foreign 
members of the council. This time the council got its way: the meeting was rescheduled, the 
24 Bickers, `Settlers and Diplomats', pp. 237-8. 
25 TNA FO 371/27631: British Consul-General, Shanghai to Foreign Office, London, 23 January 1941. 
Hayashi was sent to Nagasaki for trial where he was given a suspended sentence of two years' hard labour. 
For Hayashi's long-standing connections with Japanese nationalism in Shanghai, see Fogel, "'Shanghai- 
Japan"', pp. 927-50. 
26 Henriot, "`Little Japan"'. p. 162. 
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Japanese ratepayers stayed away or abstained, and the motion was passed, enabling an 
approximately 40 per cent increase in salaries to municipal employees. The incident shows 
how municipal staffing and pay could be highly contentious issues in the charged political 
atmosphere of Shanghai. 
Notable individuals 
The Secretary was, by council ruling, the highest paid municipal employee. 27 The top 
position was held by J. 0. P. Bland from 1897 (after joining the council from the Customs 
service the previous year) to 1906. A Malta-born Ulsterman, married to an American, 
Bland had worked in various Chinese treaty ports and in Beijing during his career at the 
Customs service. He typified a particular brand of the British presence in China, moving 
between the spheres of British influence seeking to make that colonial influence a new 
`Raj' in China. 28 He stretched and re-moulded the position of secretary, from a largely 
administrative role to one that defined the council and its stance on key issues of the day. 
Notably, he was instrumental in negotiating the dramatic extension of the Settlement in 
1899, and even after he moved on from Shanghai he wrote to his successor, W. E. Leveson, 
in 1911 urging him to grasp opportunities for further expansion. 29 Stirling Fessenden, 
whom we met above in his capacity as chairman, was Secretary-General for a decade from 
1929, from which position he directed council activities and policies much like Bland. 
These Secretaries were typical council employees in many ways, in terms of their 
27 SMA U1-1-56: Finance Committee, 9 October 1908. 
28 Robert Bickers, `Bland, John Otway Percy', Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 
<http: //www. oxforddnb. c om//view/article/31920>, accessed 13 January 2012. See also Daniel Hopper, 
'Yangzi Raj: J. O. P. Bland and the Struggle for British China' (forthcoming PhD Dissertation, University of 
Bristol, 2012). 
29 Bickers, Scramble for China, p. 362. 
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background (British or Anglophile and middle class) and also, significantly, in the force of 
their personalities and their drive for personal success. They occupied very commanding 
positions for unelected officers and used them to exert their influence over the direction of 
the council and how it angled for maximum advantage in Shanghai vis-ä-vis the consular 
body and the Chinese authorities. Bland and Fessenden were more powerful than the 
chairmen of the council, who rotated more frequently and combined their roles with paid 
positions so had not the undivided time devoted to the council of the Secretary. From the 
1920s committees had increasing power to shape policy, at the expense of the Secretary's 
autonomy, 30 yet, present in all municipal meetings and author of almost all important 
council correspondence, the Secretary remained in a unique position of almost omniscient 
power. 
The Treasurer (Treasurer and Comptroller from 1920) was also a highly significant 
position from its creation in 1909. Attending all committee meetings at which budgetary 
considerations were tabled, the Treasurer exerted considerable influence reining in the 
expenditure of the council and its departments. Edward Franklin Goodale from London (the 
son of a coffee merchant, according to his baptism certificate) held the post from 1909 until 
his death in 1928.31 He joined the council in 1907, and in being appointed Treasurer was 
promoted ahead of E. L. Allen, who was born locally in Shanghai in 1873 and dedicated his 
whole working life from 1889 until 1932 to the SMC, from 1910 as Superintendent or 
Commissioner of Revenue. To commemorate his long service Allen was presented with a 
gift at the ratepayers' meeting in 1922, his heartfelt appreciation of which indicates that he 
was a contented employee: `I need hardly say that the gift will always be one of my most 
30 Bickers, Britain in China, p. 127. 
U1-3-312: Personnel file on Edward Franklin Goodale: baptismal certificate dated 5 September 1878. 
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treasured possessions; and the kind words which accompanied it are more appreciated than 
I can say. '32 In 1929 the Staff Committee recommended Allen be granted an increase in pay, 
noting that in his long years of `excellent' and `faithful' service, he had never raised the 
question of pay, despite receiving what was considered to be a low salary (1,000 taels in 
1929). 33 Goodale was not so content in his post, repeatedly demanding increases which 
caused considerable ill-feeling with the Secretary and in Finance Committee meetings. 34 
Goodale worked tirelessly for the council, driving himself to illness in his later years. His 
doctor told the secretary in 1924 that Goodale was `suffering from neurasthenia and 
nervous debility from overwork and I think he is very likable to have a breakdown if he 
waits another year before going on leave. '35 This was granted, but in 1928 Goodale died at 
sea on his way to England on further sick leave, leaving behind a wife and two children. 36 
The council benefitted from a very dedicated body of employees. 
While other senior officers did not enjoy the same degree of authority as the 
Secretary or Treasurer, heads of departments exercised considerable power in their 
respective fields. The Public Health Department was headed by Arthur Stanley from 1898 
to 1922, during which time he built it up to have a strong impact on the hygiene of the 
Settlement (see pp. 215-19 of this thesis). This work was continued by C. Noel Davis and 
then passed into the capable hands of Ulsterman John Herbert Jordan (known as Jack) in 
32 U1-3-66: Personnel file on E. L. Allen: Allen to A. Brooke Smith, Chairman, 24 April 1922. 
33 U1-3-66: Staff Committee 28 February 1929. 
34 For the most explicit example of these tensions, see exchange between Secretary and Treasurer 9 and 16 
July 1915 in U1-3-312 and the Finance Committee minutes of 2 July and 3 December 1915 in U1-1-58. At 
the latter meeting Goodale revealed that he had sought legal advice about his contract and acknowledged that 
he was not entitled to the increase he had sought. which the committee members noted `with satisfaction'. See 
also exchanges between Goodale and the Secretary in 1922 and other notes in the personnel file. 
35 U1-3-312: Dr Gauntlett to Secretary, 23 April 1925. 
36 U1-3-312: telegram from W. H. Trenchard Davis of the SS Mongolia, Peninsula and Oriental Steam 
Navigation Company, at Suez, 4 May 1928. 
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1930.37 Jordan, who had been born in Beijing but returned from Britain to China when 
recruited by Pook's to be Assistant Health Officer in 1922, quickly proved himself an able 
manager. His appointment at Tls. 700 prompted Dr McKinstry, Assistant Health Officer, to 
demand a reconsideration of his terms of service or repatriation with compensation for he 
and his wife in protest at a more recent appointee being given higher pay and thus seniority 
than his Tls. 545.38 Usually seniority, by length of service, determined rank and pay, but 
Jordan and Dr E. P. Hicks, both appointed as Assistant Commissioners in the Pathological 
Laboratory in 1922 on the same scale, were older and considered to have better 
qualifications and broader experience than McKinstry, who had joined the municipal 
service a year earlier. Pook's had advised the council when appointing McKinstry that 
suitably qualified men had not applied so they had simply appointed the best of the 
candidates, which had prompted the council to subsequently offer the higher salary in order 
to attract men of the calibre of Jordan and Hicks. The Health Committee recommended 
McKinstry's pay be raised, despite the protestations of Fessenden, who chaired the 
committee, the Treasurer and Comptroller who feared the precedent created, and the 
judgement of Davis that McKinstry did `not appear to be the type of man suitable for 
promotion to the senior positions in the department' due to `a certain crudeness, immaturity 
or lack of educational refinement. '39 Men who occupied senior positions in the SMC were 
representatives of the council as much as its members, and there was an expectation that 
37 Davis was prominent in Shanghailander life, being a keen participant in the regular paper hunt (and master 
of the hunt 1925-28) which several members of council also joined or led C. Noel Davis, A History of the 
Shanghai Paper Hunt Club, 1863-1930 (Shanghai: Kelly and Walsh, 1930), pp. 29,40,166. 
33 SMA U1-1-123: Health Committee, 13 July 1922. 
39 Ibid. 
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they should belong to the higher ranks of society. 40 McKinstry clearly fell short of this and 
was destined to remain a mere technician. 41 Jordan, on the other hand, was the son of Sir 
John Jordan, onetime British Minister to Beijing, had studied at Cambridge and had been a 
Major in the Royal Army Medical Corps. 42 Davis had Jordan take his place when he was 
absent, despite this responsibility normally falling to the second in department in terms of 
seniority (McKinstry), which caused controversy in the Health Committee. 43 The difficulty 
in attracting public health officials of a sufficient standard continued to be a problem for the 
SMC. In 1928 Dr R. J. Marshall suggested the causes were the high cost of living in 
Shanghai, the lack of opportunity for promotion except when senior officials retired or died, 
and the political instability at that time. He recommended that Pook's be asked to expand 
their centres for recruitment beyond London, which was endorsed but appears to have made 
no difference to recruitment practices: the SMC looked to London for its senior staff in all 
departments as a matter of course. 
This was not the case, however, for the Industrial Section, established in 1930. In 
contrast to men like Jordan, its chief, Eleanor Hinder, provides a compelling example of the 
kind of transnational individual who worked for the SMC in its later years. An Australian 
who was educated in the sciences at the University of Sydney, Hinder left her career as a 
Biology schoolteacher to take up employment as the Welfare Officer of an industrial 
concern in Sydney. Her first visit to China came in 1923, at the behest of Mary Dingman 
and Evelyn Fox of the YWCA. It was her first journey abroad and it made a deep and 
40 The provision of motorcars was similarly intended in part to maintain the prestige of the senior council staff 
41 McKinstry's social position would have been something akin to that of the fictional Hong Kong 
bacteriologist Walter Fane in W. Somerset Maugham's The Painted Veil (London: Vintage, 2007, first 
rublished 1925). 
2 Information kindly provided by Adam Jordan, relative of Jack Jordan, 12 April 2010. 
43 U1-1-124: Health Committee, 30 October 1925. 
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lasting impression: she later recalled that `a revolution took place within me. '44 Hinder 
returned to China in 1926 with funding from the Rockefeller Foundation, administered by 
the YWCA of China, to help improve industrial conditions in the country. In this capacity 
she employed and trained Chinese who later worked with her for the SMC. 
In 1931 Hinder offered her services to the council to help it carry out its new policy 
of factory inspection, in response to the promulgation of a Factory Law by the Chinese 
government. 
5 Ideally placed for this work as she had advised the Chinese government on 
the practical implementation of the new law, Hinder was employed by the council as 
Director of the new Industrial and Social Section, a post she held until 1942 and which is 
discussed in chapter five. In this capacity she successfully held her own in the patriarchal 
SMC, where women were conspicuous by their absence from political affairs and senior 
positions. At a time when women were entering the British parliament and claiming their 
place in the public sphere'46 no women were ever admitted to the Shanghai Municipal 
Council (although the principle was reluctantly admitted in 1923). 47 In subsequent years 
women did, however, join certain committees on which the council felt they could make a 
contribution, namely the Education, Health, Film Censorship, Library and Orchestra 
Committees. 48 (There was deemed `no point' in admitting women to the Rate Assessment 
44 MLMSS 770/13/8, draft of Hinder's autobiography, chapter 5, p. 3. 
45 SMA: U1-6-111: Eleanor Hinder to E. B. Macnaghten, Chairman of the SMC, 13 December 1931. The 
implementation of the Factory Law within the Settlement was a great source of contention between the SMC 
and the Chinese municipal authorities. See Ma Changlin, `Shanghai zujie nei gongchang jianchaquan de 
zhengduo - 20 shiji 30 niandai yichang kuangri tejiu de jiaoshe' ('The Battle for Factory Inspection Rights 
within the Shanghai Foreign Concessions: the prolonged negotiations of the 1930s'), Xueshu yuekan, (May 
2003), pp. 63-70. 
46 Margaret Bondfield became the first female member of Cabinet in 1929, though not without opposition. 
Brian Harrison, 'Women in a Men's House: the Women M. P. s, 1919-1945', Historical Journal, Vol. 29, No. 
3 (September 1986), p. 629. 
47 Zhang Qian (ed. ), Minutes of SMC, Vol. XXII, 14 March 1923, p. 309. 
4s U1-4-1068: SMC minutes, 1 July 1931; E. T. Nash to Secretary, SMC, 15 April 1935 (notes courtesy of 
Robert Bickers). See also Robert Bickers 'Citizenship by Correspondence in the Shanghai International 
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Committee and evidently the Watch and Finance Committees were considered to be 
appropriately male in nature. ) Hinder nevertheless achieved significant concessions towards 
gender equality in the SMC, such as successfully demanding equal pay for the women 
employed in her department as the men, even though this conflicted with standard practice 
across the council and among contemporary employers in general. 49 
Hinder was a popular figure among many nationalities in Shanghai. One 
Shanghailander told a journalist that `Eleanor Hinder in this city is worth more than a 
thousand posters advertising Australia. ' 50 Her department was also one of the most 
international. The British dominance of senior posts seen in every other department of the 
council was absent: Chinese, Danish, Austrian, Japanese and New Zealander staff 
interacted in this cosmopolitan department, and Hinder attempted to foster comradeship 
between all nationalities. S1 One such employee was Rewi Alley, a New Zealander 
(industrial reform was a somewhat Antipodean business in the Settlement). Alley was 
politically opposed to the very existence of the International Settlement, later describing it 
in his memoirs as a place for `get-rich-quick foreign imperialist adventurers and opium 
traders... to carry on their nefarious business', 52 yet he nevertheless began his career in 
Shanghai working for the SMC, first in the Fire Department and then in the Industrial 
Section. Anne-Marie Brady wrote that Alley's `personal mission in the 1930s was to 
Settlement, 1919-43' in Citadins et Citoyens dons la Chine du XXe siecle, Melanges en l'honneur de Marie- 
Claire Bergare, ed. by Yves Chevrier, Alain Roux et Xiaohong Xiao-Planes (Paris: EHESS/MSH, 2010) p. 
236, n. 42. 
49 Hinder, Life and Labour, p. 24. 
50 State Library of New South Wales, Mitchell Library (hereafter MLMSS) 770/19/13: Eleanor Hinder papers, 
R. C. H. McKie, `Eleanor Hinder: Her Work in the Far East', Sydney Morning Herald, 23 July 1940. 
51 Hinder, Life and Labour, p. 25. Though published in 1944, Hinder wrote this work in 1941, when 
defending the existence of the SMC was still key to the way she anticipated solving labour problems in 
Shanghai. The bias towards the activities of the Division are thus palpable. 
52 Rewi Alley, Travels in China, 1966-71 (Beijing: New World Press, 1973), p. 61. 
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ameliorate the suffering of China's poor', 53 and for the time being he found Hinder's 
department the best place to attempt to pursue this goal. He moved on, however, to help 
found China's Industrial Cooperatives which helped provide a livelihood to thousands of 
refugees in the Chinese hinterland, and in 1949 he chose to stay in the new People's 
Republic. 4 His views were thus antithetical to those of the council members who employed 
him, demonstrating the broad mix of people who were represented among the municipal 
personnel by the council's later years. Hinder herself went on to work for the International 
Labour Organisation and the young United Nations, throwing herself into the new 
international environment established after the Second World War. 
Shigeru Uyehara represents a different kind of internationalism that emerged among 
the municipal staff in the 1930s. Originally from rural Gifu, 150 miles west of Tokyo, and a 
well-to-do family that could trace its roots to samurai of the sixteenth century, he studied at 
Keio University and then joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 55 He left Japan in 1917, 
aged 25, on his first overseas posting, to Singapore, took subsequent billets to South Africa 
and London, and finally joined the council's service in 1930 as the nominee of the Japanese 
53 Anne-Marie Brady, Friend of China: The Myth of Rewi Alley (London: Routledge, 2003), p. 27. 
K Rewi Alley was recently the subject of a multi-part documentary devoted to his life in China on Chinese 
state television, naming him one of the `top ten friends of China' and describing his socialist awakening on 
seeing Communists shot by Guomindang soldiers for trying to organise a trade union and subsequently 
reading Das Kapital. In fact, Anne-Marie Brady points out that his Communist credentials during his years 
living in Shanghai were exaggerated both by him and by his boosters in the post-1949 People's Republic as 
his place as a sympathetic foreigner was secured. What is known is that he was on good terms with such 
prominent left-wing Chinese figures as Song Qingling, Sun Yat-sen's widow, and he had connections with the 
underground Communist Party in Shanghai in the 1930s, which may have extended to harbouring party 
members in his flat and allowing its use for Communist radio broadcasts. No such communist activity by him 
was known to the SMP, however, enabling him to serve the SMC in his capacity as Chief of Factory 
Inspection while engaging with political circles that were antithetical to the free-trading imperialist principles 
under which the British-dominated council operated. Brady, Friend of China, p. 28; `Rewi Alley: Part Two', 
<http: //english. cntv. cn/program/documentary/20110608/100166. shtml>, broadcast on CCTV 9 on 6 August 
2011, accessed 10 October 2011. 
ss Uyehara's university studies included French and he undertook dissertation research on the labour 
movement, when he `began to think about the irrational differences between the rich and the poor. ' Cecil 
Uyehara, `The Uyehara Story: The Tale of Two People: Shigeru Uyehara and Vera Eugenic Foxwell 
Uyehara' (unpublished manuscript lent to me by the author, dated 2009), pp. 1,8,15,18,29-30,33-6. 
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authorities for the position of Deputy Commissioner of Police. He was the ideal man for the 
job, having broad international experience and particularly because he was fluent in English, 
the language of council business. Not only had he studied the language but he had pursued 
a masters degree at the London School of Economics and had met, fallen in love with, and 
married an Englishwoman. 56 Arriving in Shanghai with his wife from London and their 
young son, he was well-placed to negotiate the increasingly conflicting interests of the 
council and its police force with the Japanese community and authorities. 
Uyehara got on well with the Commissioner of Police, Major F. W. Gerrard, who 
was sent to Shanghai on secondment from service in India to investigate and make 
recommendations on the reorganisation of the SMP. 57 Uyehara saw Gerrard as a gentleman 
soldier, trained at Sandhurst, but found the other British officers and men irritatingly 
arrogant, having, in his view, little to justify their arrogance. It chafed when the lower ranks 
failed to salute him as they should, as the racism that characterised the Settlement 
persisted . 
58 His wife, Vera, also had difficulty finding her social position as a middle class 
British woman married to a Japanese, who felt herself to be of superior standing to the 
wives of many of the British police officers. Neither of them would have countenanced 
socialising with Chinese, so their social circle centred on the Japanese diplomatic elite and 
Uyehara increasingly allied himself with the Japanese position as the 1930s wore on. 59 He 
was nevertheless accused by the Japanese community and authorities of failing to put his 
nation's interests first, and his memoirs recall a sense that his first loyalty was to his 
municipal employers rather than the Japanese authorities which had nominated him for the 
56 Uyehara, `The Uyehara Story', pp. 59-67. 
51 U1-1-89: Watch Committee, 6 August and 6 November 1930. 
58 Uyehara, The Uychara Story', p. 86. 
39 Uyehara, 'The Uyehara Story', p. 188. 
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position. 60 When the Japanese Residents' Association presented three candidates for 
election to the SMC in 1934 as a way to increase Japanese representation, Uyehara 
criticised their naivety in believing that the westerners would allow this infringement of 
their dominant position without a fight. Uyehara could see both sides of the increasingly 
tense relationship between the Japanese and Anglo-American communities, and although 
he became more nationalistic in the face of British racism and the turbulence of the period, 
according to his son he remained a life-long Anglophile. 61 While the council's departments 
such as the police force became more diverse in the people they promoted to senior 
positions, sympathy to its fundamentally British roots was an asset. 
Scant sources are available on Chinese municipal employees, but one remarkable 
woman was interviewed in an oral history project in 1990s Beijing and part of her story 
recounted her years working for the SMC. Chen Yongsheng came from a progressive 
family in Changsha, Hunan: she recounted that her father and other male relatives had 
studied abroad and were `inclined to western ideas'. 62 Her feet were not bound, and she was 
sent to school in Changsha and in Beijing when the family moved there. Very much a child 
of the modernising imperative of her generation, at the age of 16 (in 1916) she decided not 
to marry, determined instead to live independently and work in women's physical 
education in order to help build a `strong nation'. 
63 With this end in mind, in 1918 she 
joined the physical education school run by the YWCA in Shanghai, where she participated 
in the May Fourth student movement as part of the Shanghai Students' Union. Later, she 
60 Uyehara, `The Uyehara Story', pp. 90,103-4. 
61 Cecil Uyehara, personal interview, 4 May 2011. 
62 Wang Zheng, Women in the Chinese Enlightenment: Oral and Textual Histories (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1999), p. 260. 
63 Wang Zheng, Women in the Chinese Enlightenment, p. 264. 
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won a scholarship to become the first Chinese student at the Baptist Baylor College of 
Women in Texas, graduating in 1927 with a BA in English. After a stint teaching in Burma, 
becoming the first female school principal in Shandong and then the chief executive of the 
YWCA in Hangzhou, Chen returned to Shanghai to teach physical education in the 
University of Shanghai. When the university was forced to move to a smaller site with no 
room for physical education due to the Japanese occupying the site from 1932, Chen joined 
the staff of the SMC girls' school, benefiting from the expansion of municipal spending on 
Chinese education won by her compatriots on the council. Recalling the ten years during 
which she worked at the school, Chen described it as her `golden age' when she enjoyed `a 
comfortable life' with good working conditions and a higher salary than her previous roles 
or other teaching posts, enabling her to rent a large apartment alone, employ a housekeeper, 
and take taxis with friends to watch movies and eat in restaurants. 64 She also enjoyed being 
given `a free hand' in her teaching, allowing her to initiate physical education programmes 
comparable to those in schools in the USA or Britain, which were forbidden in Chinese-run 
girls' schools. 65 Several of her colleagues at the school had studied overseas and all were 
college graduates, demonstrating the quality of employee the council was able to attract to 
its schools with its generous salaries and the internationalism of its staff. Not all municipal 
employees were perhaps as content as Chen, but her experience suggests that despite the 
inequality systemic in the council's staff, with higher salaries and greater promotion 
64 Wang Zheng, Women in the Chinese Enlightenment, pp. 260-71. 
65 After the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese War, Chen worked in a western school in Shanghai, then paid her 
own way through a Master's degree in special education at Columbia University. In 1949 she opened China's 
first school for disabled children, but was dismissed in 1951, beginning the trials that dogged her through the 
Maoist years as her western experience made her a political target, particularly during the Cultural Revolution. 
Wang Zheng, Women in the Chinese Enlightenment, pp. 271-6. 
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opportunities for foreign employees, Chinese who worked for the council were broadly 
better off than they might have been in comparable work elsewhere in the city. 
Conclusion 
This study of the councillors and staff of the Shanghai Municipal Council reveals the 
British domination but also the international range of people involved in the municipality. 
Showing the intersections and overlaps in the life stories of some prominent individuals 
allows a greater understanding of how and why the council developed its distinct nature, as 
the foreigners who shaped it identified at once with `Home', the empire, and Shanghai and 
China. The SMC was far from democratic, yet it did reflect the attitudes of those whose 
interests it existed to serve, namely the business community of the Settlement. This was 
reflected in the mixture of expatriate and settler council members, many of them directors 
of multinational companies, but also in the Chinese council members from 1928, who were 
all prominent businessmen. The peculiar form that colonialism (that is, intervention by the 
imperial state) assumed in Shanghai is underlined by the varied input of the Foreign Office, 
at times able to influence the council's membership, at others exasperated by the 
recalcitrance of the independent council, most clearly in the 1920s. The importance of the 
staff in the day-to-day running of the Settlement has also begun to become clear, especially 
key individuals such as the Secretary and heads of departments, and will be further 
demonstrated in the following chapters. 
It is evident that the council's nature evolved over time, especially from 1928 when 
the first Chinese council members finally took their seats, although the slow progress on 
this issue illustrates the entrenched prejudice which held back change. Always international 
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in its police and defence forces, the council gradually and reluctantly allowed a more 
diverse range of people into its offices and chambers to influence and implement policy. 
Influence policy they did, from methods of policing and the level of taxation to the 
allocation of funds to education and industrial welfare. Japanese and Chinese council 
members did not enjoy equality with their British and American counterparts, but they were 
able to reach compromises that satisfied, to a greater or lesser extent, all sides. This was 
partly because they had an atypically cosmopolitan background: well-travelled, often 
western-educated or otherwise thoroughly exposed to western ideas, and mixing in the elite 
circles of Shanghai's more cosmopolitan clubs and societies. From the late 1920s and 
particularly the 1930s, a more international range of voices on the council enabled a 
discernable change in the direction of council policies in certain areas, notably Chinese 
education and industrial reform. Meanwhile, Japanese were promoted to positions of higher 
authority, such as Uyehara in the SMP, and more diverse nationalities were represented, as 
in the Industrial Section. The old British grip on the council was loosening slightly, as the 
body which ran the International Settlement finally became a little international itself. 
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Chapter Two: The Finances of the SMC 
'... it should be borne in mind that the cost of defraying the expenses of the Government of 
the Settlement is borne exclusively by the residents within it, and by dues which are levied 
on goods which are landed or shipped within its limits - neither the national authorities of 
the Foreign Residents, nor the local authorities of the Chinese Residents, contributing one 
farthing towards the Budget of expenses... " 
The independence of the Shanghai Municipal Council to manage the internal affairs of the 
International Settlement depended primarily on the fact that it was self-funded. The 
quotation above, from a council statement to ratepayers in support of revisions to the Land 
Regulations in 1866, demonstrates that awareness of this reality informed the council's 
efforts to formalise and extend its powers from its earliest days. By 1900, the council 
benefited from a number of sources of revenue in addition to rates from the Settlement's 
inhabitants and customs duties - debenture loans being the most significant - but it 
remained true that it benefitted from no outside sources of funding and had to meet the 
demands of managing the heart of China's most modern and populous city on its own. 
Note on currencies: the dominant currency of trade in China until around 1920 was the silver Mexican dollar, 
but the standard currency used for trade calculations and formal transactions was the tael, which could vary in 
value between different parts of China. The Shanghai tael, adopted by the foreign community in 1858, had a 
net weight of about 517 grains of pure silver, and it was in this form that local banks stored silver reserves. 
Other currencies were accepted, including European and American coins and notes, and in 1914 the Chinese 
government issued its own dollar, which contained about 369 grains of pure silver. These gradually overtook 
the Mexican dollar as the standard currency, until in 1933 the Nationalist government coined a new dollar, 
worth about 1.7 per cent less than the 1914 dollar. The tael was abolished the same year, so the new Chinese 
dollar became the standard currency for use in trade and formal transactions. Until 1933, therefore, the 
Shanghai Municipal Council recorded its finances in taels, with the exception of dealings with Chinese in 
dollars, and this is reflected in this chapter and throughout the thesis. For more on the Shanghai tael and the 
Chinese dollar, see Frank H. H. King, Money and Monetary Policy in China, 1845-1893 (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1965), pp. 171-81; John Parke Young, 'The Shanghai Tael', American Economic 
Review, Vol. 21, No. 4 (December 1931), pp. 682-684; and Dickson H. Leavens, 'The Silver Clause in 
China', American Economic Review, Vol. 26, No. 4 (December 1936), pp. 650-659. 
Memorandum submitted by a committee of the Shanghai Municipal Council with the revised Land 
Regulations to the Ratepayers' Meeting in March 1866, in Feetham, Report, Vol. II, pp. 55-56. 
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All the activities of the SMC that are considered in this thesis depended on the 
ability of the council to collect sufficient revenues to fund them, and as the role of the 
council expanded, so did its required income. The coffers were filled by rates, paid by 
individuals and businesses with a certain amount of property or wealth, by customs dues, 
by license fees, and by loans, notably the annual municipal debentures. All these sources of 
revenue required strong governance. An ability to secure loans at affordable rates of interest 
is dependent on the debtor's credit rating, and the council had to ensure it maintained the 
trust of its creditors. This was made easier for the SMC by its `gilt-edged' status: the 
presumed backing of the British government for the council gave the impression of 
absolute political stability. Nevertheless, councillors and other members of the 
Shanghailander establishment often voiced the concern that local disturbances would 
damage the creditworthiness of the council. The same sections of the community worried 
that property values would be affected by political uncertainty, 2 but as the period was 
characterised by property booms this fear seems to have been unfounded (see Table 3). 3 A 
fall in property values would have had a direct bearing on the tax revenue available to the 
council, as rates were assessed by the value of property owned, so it had good reason to 
seek to preserve political stability. Tomoko Shiroyama points out that banks and investors 
2 The retrocession of Hankow in 1927, for example, was seen to have caused uncertainty about Shanghai's 
future status and therefore threatened the value of property investments in the settlement. The assessed values 
of foreign and Chinese houses inside the settlement and in the extra-settlement area where the special rate was 
collected show, however, that values continued to rise steadily. See Table 3. 
3 Huge profits were made by the real estate companies which proliferated in Shanghai in the early years of the 
twentieth century, as the price of land in the Settlement increased from Tls. 12,000 of silver per mu in 1903 to 
Tls. 35,000 in 1907. Meng Yue, Shanghai and the Edges of Empires (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2006), pp. 175-6. 
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alike gave credit based on Settlement real estate, assuming it to be secure collateral. 4 The 
SMC was trusted to preserve this. 
Assessed Foreign houses 































Table 3: Assessed property values, 1925-1930. These values show the stability in property values 
within and outside the International Settlement (IS), rising fairly steadily during a volatile period. 
Even more tellingly, the ability of a governing body to exact taxation from its 
populace rests on its legitimacy to do so, and thus to rule, in the eyes of the taxpayers. 
Challenges to the collection of rates and licenses can therefore be seen as a direct attack on 
the right of the SMC to govern the International Settlement. In 1919, Chinese ratepayers 
refused to pay their rates, demanding a greater say in the running of the council 
(consciously reminiscent of the old demand for `no taxation without representation'). As a 
consequence, the Chinese Ratepayers' Association was established the following year to 
campaign for the rights of these elite members of the Chinese community. This body 
4 Tomoko Shiroyama, China During the Great Depression: Market, State, and the World Economy, 1929- 
1937 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2008), p. 71. 
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became a significant voice in the strengthening Chinese nationalist discourse of 1920s 
Shanghai, and had a bearing on many of the areas of council work which are analysed in 
this dissertation. When Chinese residents again refused to pay the rates in 1927, the council 
finally reached an agreement with the CRA on how Chinese representation should be 
achieved, so opposition to taxation was a major catalyst for political change in the 
Settlement. 
This chapter begins with a brief overview of how the council's financial policies 
were formulated and implemented. The major sources of revenue are then explored. Loans 
and their significance are discussed in depth, including who invested in the council and 
how the council spent this revenue, the ways in which the council's ability to borrow at 
affordable rates reflected its own security and conditions in the wider lending markets, as 
well as insights into the culture and processes of the Finance Committee and Department. 
The chapter then moves on to look at taxation in the Settlement, setting out how the system 
operated before focussing on two distinct opposition movements, in 1919 and 1927, and 
their political significance. This enables an evaluation of exactly how robust the perceived 
legitimacy of the Shanghai Municipal Council was, as indicated by its relative success in 
collecting revenues. 
The Finance Committee and Department 
Established in 1897 and initially consisting of three members, the Finance Committee 
increased to four in 1915 with the addition of a Japanese member, five in 1922, six in 1928, 
including for the first time two Chinese committee members, and finally seven members 
from 1930. The committee met and deliberated on financial matters, drawing on 
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information provided by relevant staff (the Treasurer and later the Commissioner of 
Revenues attended meetings, along with the Secretary who kept the minutes and on 
occasion the heads of other departments whose expenditure was under consideration). 5 It 
then made recommendations to the full council; only when approved by the council proper 
was policy decided. 
The decisions made by the Finance Committee were put into practice by its staff in 
the Secretariat, until in 1909 a Finance Department was established under the newly- 
appointed Treasurer. As head of department the Treasurer was responsible to the committee 
for the smooth-running of the council's finances and for balancing the budget each year. 
This was submitted to the ratepayers at their annual meeting for approval, and every last 
penny (or, rather, copper cash) of municipal income and expenditure was accounted for. 
The Treasurer recommended the rate at which municipal loans should be floated and other 
important details of municipal financial policy, which were almost always adopted by the 
committee and then the council. The Taxation Office, under the Superintendent of 
Revenues (Overseer of Taxes from 1918) with responsibility for collecting the rates, was 
kept within the Secretariat as its management called for `little if any improvement' until 
1914, when all financial business was brought under the purview of the Treasurer. 6 
The Municipal budgets were audited professionally from 1902, having hitherto been 
audited internally only, and from 1904 a regular arrangement was made with the local firm 
Burkill and Sons to provide a municipal auditor. 7 In between the general audits, however, 
internal audits were undertaken by the staff of the Finance Department, on the basis that 
5 Again, this was in keeping with English local government practice. Finer, English Local Government, p. 232. 
6 U1-1-65: Finance Committee, 18 November 1909. 
7 U1-1-56: Finance Committee, 11 April 1904. 
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they were more familiar with the workings of the council so could do a more thorough job. 
The Finance Committee referred to this being common practice in `certain Colonial 
Government Services and other civil services', making the case that municipal practice 
should be modelled on these rather than the norms in business with which committee 
members were more familiar. The introduction of independent auditing and the 
establishment of the Finance Department in the first decade of the century signalled a clear 
move towards a more professional footing for the municipal finances. 
Sources of Revenue 
i) Loans 
The finances of the Shanghai Municipal Council were organised on the same lines as all 
modem states. Regular, `ordinary' expenditure on ongoing services was paid for primarily 
from taxation in the form of rates and land tax ('ordinary income'), while the cost of long 
teen capital investment projects such as building works and land procurement was spread 
across many years by floating loans ('extraordinary income'). This is the `fiscal state' 
model which developed in the eighteenth century in western Europe, most successfully in 
Great Britain, in place of the `tax state' which relied on income from direct and indirect 
taxation. 8 The ability to borrow large sums at affordable rates enabled the council to invest 
in the long-term future of the Settlement, indicating the confidence it had that the status quo 
would continue, as well as the confidence of investors that the council would remain 
a M. J. Daunton, Trusting Leviathan: the Politics of Taxation in Britain, 1799-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), p. 5; Richard Bonney, `Introduction', in Richard Bonney (ed. ), The Rise of the Fiscal 
State in Europe, c. 1200-1815 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 3 and passim. Daunton and 
Bonney also agree that the tax state in turn had broadly replaced the `domain state' of medieval Europe, in 
which monarchs relied on the income from their landed domains. 
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sufficiently financially secure to honour its obligations. The Treasurer estimated that public 
works projects lasted, on average, 43 years, and loans were issued with a life of between 
ten and thirty years to spread the cost of this large-scale expenditure, giving debenture- 
holders a stable, long-term investment. 9 The significance of borrowing to the municipal 
revenues is shown in Figure 4. Broadly speaking, as the scale of extraordinary expenditure 
on municipal projects increased, extraordinary income - including borrowing - came to 
provide a significantly higher proportion of municipal revenues. In 1920 extraordinary 
income exceeded taxation revenues for the first time, but the general pattern was for loans 
to provide around one fifth to one quarter of municipal revenues. Extraordinary income 
consisted almost entirely of revenue from loans, with the exception of the years following 
the sale of the Electricity Department in 1929 for 81,000,000 taels, to be paid over five 
years, 1° obviating the need to borrow any funds until 1934. (This explains the spike in 
extraordinary income shown for 1930 in Figure 4. ) In all other years, loans were crucial to 
the municipal revenues. 
9 SMA UI-1-57: Minutes of the Shanghai Municipal Council Finance Committee, meeting held 9 February 
1911. The council kept the option of early redemption open to itself, but normally allowed the loans to extend 
for the full life of the debt, which made them popular with investors seeking long term security. W. A. 
Thomas, Western Capitalism in China: A History of the Shanghai Stock Exchange (Aldershot, Hants: Ashgate, 
2001), p. 61. 
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Figure 4: Comparative chart showing percentage revenue from taxation and extraordinary income, 1910- 
1940.1 1 
The council made its first issue of fixed securities when it found itself in debt in 1872. 
Modest borrowing of around 30,000 taels every few years increased rapidly and by the 
1890s the council was borrowing hundreds of thousands of taels each year. 12 Municipal 
debentures were bought by local and international firms, banks, and wealthy individuals 
seeking a secure investment with a steady return: the council was advised by a 
representative of the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank that most investors bought debentures 
`for purposes of regular income'. 13 It is significant that this, the bankroller of British 
enterprise in East Asia, provided financial advice to the SMC. It was the council's own 
" SMC, Reports for the vears 1910-1940. 
12 Thomas, Western Capitalism, p. 60 
13 SMA Ul-1-56: Finance Committee, 9 May 1910, quoting Mr Saunders of the Hongkong and Shanghai 
Bank. For more on the Bank, see Frank H. H. King, Catherine E. King and David J. S. King, The History of 
the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). 
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bank, and it advised the SMC on aspects of municipal financial policy and issued loans to 
and on behalf of the council. The SMC supplied almost the entire local market for fixed 
interest securities, as shown by the table of local debentures printed in the Weekly Share 
Supplement which accompanied the North-China Herald. 14 The list was dominated by the 
council's annual issues, followed by the utility companies (Waterworks, Gas, Telephone), 
and then local firms (notably the Shanghai Land Investment Company) and establishments 
(such as the Shanghai Club and Race Club). 15 
Applications for municipal debentures were made either directly to the council's 
offices or indirectly though a broker, in which case the council paid a small commission to 
the broker. In 1919 there were 423 foreign investors, mainly based in Shanghai or Hong 
Kong and including many Japanese banks and firms, and 73 Chinese investors. 16 Though 
foreign investors dominated, it is significant that a considerable number of Chinese 
individuals and firms chose to invest in municipal debentures, identifying their business 
interests and financial security with the success of the council. Indeed the council began to 
make a concerted effort to attract Chinese investors in 1919 to make up the shortfall in the 
municipal finances, as only one third of the year's debentures were subscribed (which was 
attributed to the attractive investment possibilities available abroad). 17 Advertisements were 
taken out in the Chinese press, 18 and the Finance Committee appealed to Chinese bankers 
and others such as Song Hancheng (Sung Han-cheng) of the Bank of China and Wu Yiqing 
(Woo Yih-ching), Deputy Postal Commissioner, as well as personal Chinese friends of 
'' The same information appeared in Benjamin & Potts' Shanghai Weekly Share Circular, a supplement to the 
Shanghai Mercury sponsored by a local brokers firm. 
15 See, for example, The NCH, Weekly Share Supplement, 5 July 1919, unnumbered: 2°d page. 
16 SMC, Report for 1919, pp. 31c-32c. At least 14 of the investors of sums over Tls. 10,000 were Japanese, 
indicating the extent to which the council was closely linked to Japanese interests. 
17 NCH, 13 September 1919. 
18 See, for example, Shenbao, 1 July 1919. 
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committee members, on how best to advertise municipal loans to appeal to Chinese 
investors. 19 
The largest foreign investor that year was the Ewo Cotton Spinning and Weaving 
Company, owned by Jardine Matheson and Company, 20 while the largest Chinese investor 
is listed as the Shanghai Benevolent Industrial Institution, 21 both of which invested 100,000 
taels. Thus British hongs and Chinese charitable concerns alike chose to entrust their wealth 
to the SMC. In 1920, the largest investment, an unprecedented 201,000 taels, came from 
the Inspector General of the Chinese Maritime Customs, among 469 foreign investors, 
while of 53 Chinese investors the largest, from the Tung Yih Cotton Mill, was a modest 
13,000 taels. 22 The lion's share of investment in the council still came from the foreign 
community. This was emphasised by the council in 1927 when it published figures for the 
total investment in municipal debentures to that date: 3,000,000 taels had come from 
Chinese government concerns such as the Customs Service and the Post office, a further 
2,600,000 taels had been invested by other Chinese, while the balance of 39,400,000 taels 
had been invested by foreign residents and institutions. 23 The council was seeking to 
illustrate that the wealth of the Settlement was not, as was being claimed by members of the 
Chinese community, built on Chinese investment, but rather was due to foreign investment. 
19 SMA U1-1-59: Finance Committee, 26 June 1919. 
20 For more on Jardine's, see Geoffrey Jones, Merchants to Multinationals: British Trading Companies in the 
Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 32-3 and passim. 
21 The Shanghai Benevolent Industrial Institution was one of the largest Chinese free schools in Shanghai. It 
was a joint Sino-foreign concern, with M. Thomas Zhou, a Chinese educated at the University of Glasgow, as 
its President and Arthur de Carle Sowerby, a British naturalist and pillar of the Shanghailander community, as 
its Chairman. On Sowerby, see R. R. Sowerby, Sowerby of China: Arthur de Carle Sowerby (Kendal: Titus 
Wilson and Son, 1956), pp. 38-41. 
22 SMC, Report for 1920, pp. 37c-38c. On the Customs and its links to British imperial interests, see Brunero, 
Britain's Imperial Cornerstone in China. 
23 Municipal Gazette, 15 July 1927, p. 237. To labour the point, the council pointed out that this meant more 
than 15 times more had been invested by foreigners than by Chinese, and even calculated a per capita average 
for the then residents of the Settlement: 1,313 taels per foreign resident compared to seven taels invested per 
Chinese resident. 
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In arguing this, the council was claiming for itself and its public works projects the role of 
creating the environment in which Shanghai flourished, and in such a reading of history 
there was no room for credit to the city's Chinese entrepreneurs. 
In addition to the regular annual silver loans, in 1906,1920 and 1930 sterling loans 
were floated in London to fund specific municipal liabilities in the British currency (in 
1906 these were the Waterworks Company shares and the infrastructure for the new 
tramway system). 24 Such issues, along with references made to the terms being offered by 
`home governments' - especially Britain, but also the governments of the United States, 
France, 25 and Russia - demonstrate the degree to which the imperial metropole influenced 
municipal fiscal policy. The Finance Committee expressed concern in 1916 that the 
prevailing exchange rate and availability of attractive rates of interest `at home' would 
impact negatively the uptake of municipal loans. 26 Yet local factors could be just as 
significant. The Chinese government was used as an example for financial practices, such 
as in 1911 when the Finance Committee decided to adopt an instalment method of loan 
issues, staggered through the year, as practiced in Beijing. 27 In 1928, the collapse of a 
bubble in the rubber market drove investors to the security of municipal debentures, 
boosting the council's borrowing capacity. 28 
Municipal debentures competed with a limited number of bonds issued by the 
Chinese government and fixed interest stocks in such local companies as were listed in the 
Weekly Share Supplement, but the rates of interest offered by the council were always 
24 SMC, Report for 1906, p. 224. 
zs Note that the example of the French Government was significant for council policy-making, despite the 
independence of the French Concession from the International Settlement. 
26 On the advice of the Treasurer, however, the usual interest rate of six per cent was offered, with preferential 
discounts for investors of large sums of 100,000 taels. SMA U1-1-58: Finance Committee, 3 April 1916. 
27 SMA U1-1-57: Finance Committee, 9 February 1911. 
29 Thomas, Western Capitalism, p. 202. 
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among the lowest on the market as it was seen as a safe investment. For example, in 1926 
municipal debentures were trading near par, while the Chinese Re-organisation Loan issues 
had to trade at just 60 per cent of their face value due to the low credit rating of the national 
government. 29 The SMC could not, however, match the low rates offered by the municipal 
governments of the formal empire such as Calcutta or Bombay, and much less those of 
England where interest rates of just three per cent attracted investors at the turn of the 
century. 30 The members of the Finance Committee debated the interest rate to set in order 
to achieve sufficient investment at as attractive rates as possible for the council, and also 
because they believed it sent a signal to the public about the security of municipal bonds. 
The changing interest rates offered over the period reflect both the changing financial 
security of the council and its response to the wider economic and lending climate. 
Interest rates for municipal loans ranged from a low of five per cent in 1900 to a 
high of eight per cent in 1921 and 1922, with a median of six per cent. The rate was 
increased in 1921 and 1922 due to the failure to achieve a full uptake of the loans at seven 
per cent interest, as a result of the high global demand for, and therefore price of, silver. As 
noted above, the council had no need to borrow from 1929 to 1933 due to the highly 
profitable sale of the Electricity Department, which had demanded an ever higher 
proportion of borrowed revenues since its establishment in 1892. In 1934 the prevailing 
economic climate enabled the council to offer just five per cent interest due to the deflation 
29 NCH, 27 November 1926, referenced in Thomas, Western Capitalism, p. 63. 
30 Thomas, Western Capitalism, pp. 59,62. The French Conseil municipal was able to offer loans at the same 
rates as those of the SMC, and thanks to their secure position, underwritten by the council, municipal utilities 
companies also offered the same rate. 
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in China which resulted from the American silver purchase programme. 31 This and 
subsequent loans offered in 1937 (also carrying five per cent interest) and 1940 (six per 
cent) were issued in the Chinese dollar rather than in silver, following the abolition of the 
tael in 1933 and the abandonment of the silver standard in China in 1935 32 
The system of municipal borrowing was not without its critics: some worried that 
the SMC dominated the investment market to such an extent that local industrial and other 
enterprises would be left short of capital. 33 The council was rather of the opinion that local 
firms should invest in the municipal infrastructure which enabled their businesses to 
flourish. Other concerns echoed frequent accusations that council business was too hidden 
behind closed doors. Two strong proponents of this view were Messrs Holliday and Little 
(Cecil Holliday, Chairman of the council in 1906, and Edward Selby Little, who was also a 
member of council for three years, both British). 34 A special meeting of the Finance 
Committee was called in November 1916 for them to raise their concerns about a lack of 
planning and transparency in the issuing of municipal loans. The committee members 
defended the Treasurer against the barrage of figures recited by Holliday, conceding only 
after he departed that there could be slightly more lucidity in municipal financial reporting. 
The secretary recorded that `as his [Holliday's] observations, owing to quickness and 
occasional lack of clearness, are not easily followed, the members, though aware that there 
is a gap in the reasoning, dispense with analysing it too closely or pressing it too 
31 See Milton Friedman, 'Franklin D. Roosevelt, Silver, and China', Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 100, 
No. 1 (February 1992), pp. 62-83. 
32 SMC, Report for 1940, p. 398. On the Chinese dollar's displacement of the silver tael and the departure 
from the silver standard, see Leavens, 'The Silver Clause', pp. 651,655. 
33 NCH, 28 October 1910, referenced in Thomas, Western Capitalism, p. 60. 
34 Carroll Lunt, The China Who's Who (Shanghai: Kelly and Walsh, 1922), pp. 136,164-5. 
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insistently'. 35 The tone, as with council business in general, implied that ratepayers should 
not try to interfere with council activities of which, in any case, they had little 
understanding. Nevertheless, in response to repeated criticisms of this kind, the trend in the 
1920s was towards greater openness in council business, in finance as well as other areas. 
More details were published in the Municipal Gazette, the council's official weekly news 
outlet, and in SMC annual reports for the consumption of those who cared to read them. 
The same Finance Committee meeting touched on tensions surrounding the 
personality of the Treasurer. According to an unusually frank account in the minutes, 
Holliday explained that he suggested the Treasurer be absent as he thought `it might only 
lead to an argument such as might decline into a sort of altercation'. 36 Although the 
chairman, E. C. Pearce (Edward Charles Pearce, later Sir Edward, a British merchant and 
chairman of the council from 1913 until 1920), said the Treasurer should be present, the 
latter huffily withdrew, `stating that he really is very busy'. The Treasurer, Edward Goodale, 
was the driving force within the Finance Department for two decades. Tensions existed 
between him and the Finance Committee over questions of pay and conditions and over 
aspects of his vision for the department. Yet while the Finance committee was initially 
hostile to Goodale's proposed innovations, it came to accept his ideas as he proved his 
competence in the role. He was behind the design of the new Finance Department, drawn 
up in response to a proposal made by W. V. Drummond at the 1908 annual ratepayers' 
meeting, although he had to reduce the scope of the newly-created role of Treasurer in 
35 SMA U1-1-58: Finance Committee, 17 November 1916. 
36 U1-1-58: Finance Committee, 17 November 1916. 
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response to concerns by the committee that he envisaged a role superior to that of other 
heads of departments. 37 
In September 1919 the council established a Municipal Investment Bank, on 
Goodale's suggestion. This allowed members of the public to deposit savings with the 
council at the beginning of each month, which were converted into debentures twice 
yearly. 38 It also offered debenture holders the option of reinvesting accrued interest on 
municipal loans in the bank. Two years later there were already 760 active depositors, 
putting a total of 1,729,766 taels at the council's disposal. 
39 81 per cent of new debenture 
holders were attracted to invest in municipal loans due to initial interest in the Investment 
Bank, and the bank continued to play an increasing role in the revenues of the council. With 
growing numbers of Shanghai residents and firms tying their capital to the council, 
confidence in its fiscal security was evidently high. 
In addition to building projects - primarily roads - the council invested funds at its 
disposal locally in land, industrial undertakings and local utilities companies. The latter 
enabled it to exert considerable influence to ensure customers received water, gas, 
telephone lines, and (after its privatisation) electricity at favourable terms. The low cost of 
energy ensured by the municipal ownership of the Electricity Department and then 
influence over the Power Company helped fuel the industrial expansion of the city. 40 The 
council also invested in local land investment companies, banks and such establishments as 
the country and race clubs, giving these institutions the municipal seal of approval and 
37 U1-1-58: Finance Committee, 20 September 1909. 
38 SMC, Report for 1921, p. 34c; Municipal Gazette, Vol. XII, No. 650,6 September 1919, p. 303; 
Supplement No. 692,15 May 1920. 
39 SMC, Report for 1921, p. 35c. 
40 For the impact of the council's influence over the Waterworks and other utilities companies, see Chapter 
Four. 
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making a sound investment on behalf of Municipal Investment Bank customers and 
ratepayers. It held silver securities issued by the French Conseil municipal, as the latter held 
SMC debentures in return, tying the fortunes of the two municipalities together. 
Furthermore, the council bought into the war loans of the British, French, Russian and 
American governments during the First World War, to advertise its credentials as standing 
with the Allies, even as the International Settlement remained neutral. In this way the assets 
of the council are as indicative of its financial position as its income. It was an eminently 
confident municipal body, financially secure for the majority of its existence, until the years 
of disruption from the 1930s. 
H) Taxation 
The greatest source of revenue for the council was usually the General Municipal Rate 
(GMR). This was calculated on the value of houses occupied within the Settlement, as 
assessed by periodic investigations by professional surveyors (assessment of land values for 
the land tax was conducted in the same way). Appeals were heard by the Finance 
Committee, and had to be lodged by a certain date, as was the practice in the assessment for 
municipal rates in England. 41 Many appeals were upheld, from both foreign and Chinese 
applicants, 42 suggesting a degree of flexibility on the part of the council. In some cases 
appeals sought higher rather than lower assessments, demonstrating the influence the 
41 SMA U1-1-56: Finance Committee, 20 December 1907. 
42 See, for example, SMA U1-1-58: Finance Committee, 8 February 1917. 
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council's decision had on land values as well as the extent to which property speculators in 
Shanghai were willing to pay more in tax in order to maximise their investments 43 
The rates charged were controlled by Article IX of the Land Regulations, which 
specified that taxes should not exceed one twentieth of one per cent of the gross value of 
land or one per cent of the annual rent of a house. In fact, land tax was kept well below 
this one per cent maximum, rising very gradually over the years from 0.5 per cent in 1900 
45 to 0.8 per cent from October 1939. Meanwhile the GMR was 10 per cent in 1900, and 
reached 18 per cent by 1939. The low rates made the Settlement something of a tax haven, 
free from both Chinese taxation and even the low levels of taxation (compared to the 
imperial metropole) which were found in formal colonies 46 Indeed the Secretary General 
asserted of the municipal taxes in 1939 `Shanghai is one of the lowest rated cities in the 
world. '47 
In addition to the GMR, a Special Rate was charged from 1907 on properties on 
municipal roads outside the Settlement. The council provided services to these residents 
and in return demanded a reduced contribution, initially half the GMR but, from 1920, 
pegged at just two percentage points lower than the full rate. In this way, the council 
extended its influence well beyond the limits of the Settlement itself. The practice was 
43 Appeals seeking higher valuations were not upheld, the Finance Committee declaring that the assessors' 
view was fair. SMA U1-1-59: Finance Committee, 23 November 1920. 
44 Feetham, Report, Vol. I, p. 74. 
45 SMC, Report for 1939, p. 241. From 1940 rates shot up and increasing levels of surcharge were added to all 
forms of taxation in response to rampant inflation. See SMC, Report for 1940, pp. 255,345. 
46 British civil servants in mid-nineteenth century India believed low taxation was key to successful 
government, and although tax levels rose in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, efforts continued to be 
made to keep taxation to a minimum (B. R. Tomlinson, The New Cambridge History of India, Vol. III. The 
Economy of Modern India, 1860-1970 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 149-52. Most 
colonies had imposed an income tax by the early twentieth century, although Hong Kong was an exception. 
Michael Littlewood, Taxation Without Representation: The History of Hong Kong's Troublingly Successful 
Tax System (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2010), p. 25. 
47 TNA T160/1142: Statement to Ambassador by Phillips, enclosed in Keswick to Ambassador, 19 September 
1939. 
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based not on agreement with the Chinese authorities, but on provisions made in the 
Waterworks and Telephone Agreements between the council and the utilities providers. 48 
Like so many of the council's powers, the basis was flimsy but long term precedent meant 
the SMC viewed it as an entitlement. Indeed, members anticipated that at some point these 
areas would be brought formally into an expanded International Settlement. There were 
Chinese public utilities providers, such as the Zhabei Water Company, but the SMC's 
support for the Shanghai Waterworks Company, including ensuring its monopoly within 
the Settlement, helped make alternative providers uncompetitive in the external roads 
areas. 49 Utilities therefore furthered the council's expansionist aims. Indeed, Xing Jianrong 
of the Shanghai Municipal Archives describes utilities as the `sharpest weapon' ('j) in 
the SMC's arsenal. 50 
The residents of these outside roads protested little at paying the special rate for 
many years, accepting the quid pro quo of rates for services, although it was not collected 
with as much success as the GMR. The Chinese authorities first raised objections to the 
policing of external roads in 1907,51 but serious problems only emerged for the SMC in the 
late 1920s as the strengthening Chinese authorities sought to reclaim Chinese autonomy in 
Shanghai. 
While attempting to collect taxes outside the Settlement limits, the council opposed 
the collection of Chinese taxes within its boundaries. It was the Settlement's extraterritorial 
status that enabled its residents to avoid paying Chinese taxes, although this had not always 
48 SMA U1-1-59: Finance Committee, 19 March 1920. 
49 Xing Jianrong, 'Shui dian mei: jindai Shanghai gongyong shye yanjiang ji huayang butong xintai ' ('Water, 
Electricity, Gas: The Different Mentalities of Chinese and Westerners Regarding Public Utilities in Modern 
Shanghai'), Zhongguo jindaishi (April 1994), p. 100. 
so Xing Jianrong, 'Shui than met', p. 101. 
51 Kotenev, `Extra-Settlement Roads', p. 35. 
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been the case. The original Land Regulations of 1845 assumed that the very few Chinese 
residents of the Settlement would remain under Chinese jurisdiction, and even when their 
numbers swelled with the influx of refugees from the Taiping Rebellion, the revised 
Regulations of 1854 in no way exempted them from Chinese jurisdiction. Yet many of 
these new arrivals were wealthy entrepreneurs who enriched the Settlement, so it was in the 
council's interests to ensure their continued investment in the area. Even so, in 1862 the 
SMC initially offered no objection to assisting the Daotai in collecting a local tax on the 
transit of goods collected for defence that came to be known as likin lijin, also known 
as lekin). 52 The British Consul-General, W. H. Medhurst, sought approval from the 
Minister in Beijing as there was no precedent for such taxation, and Sir Frederick Maze 
confirmed that "`The Tao-tai is entitled to levy taxes as he pleases. ,, 53 Yet Medhurst was 
uneasy about Chinese tax collectors operating within the Settlement, and the council came 
to share his view, going against the wishes of Maze (which had been reinforced by the 
British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs) and arresting Chinese tax collectors, bringing 
them before the consuls for fining or imprisonment. A compromise was reached whereby 
the council would collect a higher tax from Chinese residents and pay the balance to the 
Daotai, and in 1864 the tax ceased with the capture of Nanjing by the Imperial Army which 
brought the Taiping Rebellion to a close. Thus the principle that Chinese tax collectors 
could not operate within the Settlement was established, though without any solid legal 
basis, and the council continued to prosecute Chinese tax collectors, with varying success. 
It argued that Chinese residents were subject to imperial taxation but not local taxation, 
32 For more, see Edwin George Beal, The Origin of Likin, 1853-1864 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1958). 
s3 Kotenev, `Chinese Taxation', part II, quoting Sir Frederick Bruce to W. H. Medhurst, 5 November 1862. 
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under which they classed likin, but this view was rejected by the consular body. In 1904 a 
tax office was discovered within the Settlement that had been collecting likin from Chinese 
traders. The SMC took swift action, prosecuting the staff of the office in the Mixed Court. 54 
The problem resurfaced in 1910 and at regular intervals until the Nationalist government 
abolished likin in 1927, by which time there were bigger issues of Chinese intervention in 
the Settlement with which to contend. The Shanghai Chamber of Commerce was more 
concerned about new proposed duties from the Nationalist government on imports, as the 
Guomindang set about modernising the country's system of taxation. 55 The council now 
had to come to terms with being powerless to influence legitimate Chinese taxation from 
the newly assertive government. 
Separate tallies were kept of the income in rates paid by Chinese and `foreign' 
residents, so it is possible to assess the degree to which municipal activities depended on 
the contributions of each group, as shown in Figure 5. The Overseer of Taxes 
acknowledged in 1912 that the influx of Chinese, `notably of the better class', seeking 
security following the 1911 Revolution had had a significant increase in GMR receipts, 
contributing to a 5.6 per cent rise in ordinary income over the previous year. 56 The Chinese 
population grew at a faster rate than the foreign population throughout the period addressed 
by this thesis, yet the Chinese contribution to tax revenues gradually decreased 
proportionately in the 1920s and 1930s, as shown in Figure 5. One factor was the May 
Thirtieth Incident in 1925 and the consequent surge in anti-foreign and specifically anti- 
s4 Kotenev, `Chinese Taxation', pp. 33-36. 
ss Shanghai Mercury, 13 August 1927, p. 6. 
56 SMC, Report for 1912, p. 7c. 
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SMC sentiment in the Chinese population, which made rates harder to collect from Chinese 
ratepayers. 57 
 °ö C"lwiese rates 
 0o Foreign rates 
1910 191 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 
Figure 5. Percentage of SMC rates paid by Chinese and foreign ratepayers. 58 
Similarly, the comparative contribution made by residents of the extra-Settlement roads is 
shown in Figure 6, and it is clear that the income from outside the Settlement limits, though 
highly contentious at times (as seen below), was insignificant in comparison with the 
revenues taken from the General Municipal Rate. 
57 On the May Thirtieth Incident and Movement, see Clifford, Spoilt Children, chapters 6-9 and Rigby, The 
Mav 30 Movement. 
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Figure 6. Municipal income from rates paid inside and outside the Settlement limits 
(figures are for guidance only: totals calculated in both taels and dollars). 59 
It was estimated at the beginning of 1900 that ordinary income for the year would reach 
995,730 taels, exceeding that for 1899 by almost 80,000 taels due to the anticipated rates 
from the newly expanded area of the Settlement and to the re-assessment of land. Of the 
total income for 1900,216,640 taels were anticipated from Land Tax, an increase of more 
than 50 per cent on the previous year. 60 This illustrates the symbiotic relationship between 
the council's need for revenues and its expansionist stance, investigated in the following 
chapter. However, almost half of the increased revenue from land tax was due to the re- 
assessment of the value of land within the previous limits of the Settlement and to the 
registration of new lots by subdividing existing lots, a lucrative exercise for the SMC. Land 
59 SMC, Reports for the Years 1910-1940. 
eo SMC, Report for 1899, p. 368. 
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tax was an important source of income for the municipal council. Figure 7 shows the 
percentage of ordinary municipal income from land tax, rates, license fees, 61 and other 
sources. Rates provided the greatest income, but land tax contributed at least a fifth of 
municipal revenues. Licences fees, wharfage dues, rent from municipal properties, and 
income from municipal undertakings, from quarries to printing by prisoners in the 
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Figure 7. Sources of municipal income, excluding loans (per cent). 62 
As was common practice for foreign organisations in Shanghai, the council had a 
compradore through whom almost all municipal revenues passed into its accounts, and who 
oversaw and guaranteed the shroffs who collected monies owed to the council. He was also 
61 Licence fees were used by the council to attempt to regulate certain industries, from prostitution (discussed 
in Chapter Four) to the rickshaw industry. Tim Wright has provided a thorough investigation of the 
circumstances of the council's failed efforts to reform the rickshaw industry. Tim Wright, 'Shanghai 
Imperialists versus Rickshaw Racketeers: The Defeat of the 1934 Rickshaw Reforms', Modern China, Vol. 
17. No. 1 (January 1991), pp. 76-111. 
62 SMC, Reports for the Years 1910,1920,1930,1940. 
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responsible for paying the salaries and wages of the Chinese municipal staff, for paying 
interest owed to Chinese investors in municipal debentures, and for moving money between 
different municipal departments. In 1936 the salary of the then compradore, Mon Ping Fan, 
was increased to $1,750 per month in recognition of the fact that he no longer received the 
level of commission he had enjoyed prior to the abolition of the tael and the stabilisation of 
the Chinese dollar. The continuance of the post of municipal compradore demonstrates how 
the council was at once modem and metropolitan in its financial practices, particularly in 
the use of revenue from debenture loans, and at the same time perpetuated arcane practices 
peculiar to the foreign semi-colonial presence in China. Mon Ping Fan was entrusted with 
responsibility for large sums of money, but only because he had provided valuable title 
deeds as security. Through the compradore, payments to Chinese were kept separate from 
payments to all foreign employees and investors, highlighting the limits to the 
internationalism of the International Settlement. 
Shroffs were another institution peculiar to the China coast. These debt collectors 
were sent periodically to collect monies owed by individuals as best they could, though 
debtors were notorious for evading payment. 63 The life of a shroff could even be dangerous, 
as for the compradore's office shroff who was robbed of municipal funds to the value of 
$848.56 by armed robbers in 1927.64 Alongside the council's shroffs were the rates coolies, 
(renamed Assistant Shroffs in 1925 when the council finally realised that the term `coolie' 
63 The term `shroff referred to an indigenous banker in India (Rajat Kanta Ray, `Asian Capital in the Age of 
European Domination: The Rise of the Bazaar, 1800-1914', Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 29, No. 3 (July 1995), 
p. 494), but on the China coast it referred simply to Chinese go-betweens, mainly involved in the collection of 
debt. 
64 U1-1-61: Finance Committee, 18 March 1927. 
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was far from politically correct)65 who were responsible for collecting rates and fees from 
Chinese. This was, unsurprisingly, a thankless task, though it provided lucrative 
opportunities for personal gain. The SMC punished such cases that came to its attention 
severely in an effort to cut `squeeze', a matter of pride for the council which considered 
itself an example of incorruptibility, in stark contrast to the surrounding culture of endemic 
corruption as China was perceived by many self-satisfied foreign observers. 66 Many tax 
collectors were members of the Municipal Police on secondment or former constables, 
chosen for their perceived discipline, integrity and authority. Nevertheless, cases of 
corruption were uncovered from time to time, such as the individual who absconded with 
$1,627.05,67 hinting at more widespread practice which did not come to official notice. 
Despite these difficulties, the collection of municipal taxes did not pose significant 
problems for the council for most of its existence. At the turn of the century Chinese who 
lived in the area which was brought into the Settlement proper by the 1898 extension 
reportedly paid rates willingly because they saw them as directly linked to the provision of 
police protection, indeed calling the GMR the `police tax'. 68 Until 1898, Chinese had been 
charged a municipal rate two percentage points higher than that paid by foreigners, based 
on whether the house was a `foreign' or Chinese style house. This was justified by 
reference to the fact that Chinese who owned land within the Settlement which was not 
registered with a consulate were not charged land tax, on the basis that they were 
continuing their land use in the same way as they or their forebears had done prior to the 
establishment of the Settlement. In 1898 foreign ratepayers consented to pay the same rate 
65 U1-1-61: Finance Committee, 14 October 1925. 
66 See, for example, NCH, Vol. 88,5 September 1908, p. 585. 
67 U1-1-61: Finance Committee, 1 December 1927. 
68 Feetham, Report, Vol. I, p. 132. 
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as their Chinese counterparts for the sake of equity, a move which the then Chairman of the 
council, F. Anderson, declared to have been `highly appreciated by the native community' 
and to have `increased their confidence in and respect for our local government. '69 
Anderson used this indication of strong and improving relations with Chinese 
ratepayers in support of his plea for foreign ratepayers' approval for the use of a small 
fraction of municipal funds for Chinese education, as was provided for the education of 
foreign children at the public school. Elite members of the Chinese community had 
approached the council seeking funds for this purpose, and were successful as the 
ratepayers, despite an opposing resolution, passed the motion. Education re-emerged in the 
1920s as a key demand from Chinese seeking greater equality in the use of municipal funds, 
as described below. Another factor which angered Chinese elite ratepayers was their 
exclusion from the growing number of parks and gardens acquired and managed by the 
SMC, starting with the public gardens, but with the addition of the Hongkew (in 1901) and 
Jessfield (in 1920) Parks. 70 The injustice of spending an increasing proportion of municipal 
revenues, to which Chinese contributed on an equal basis as foreigners, on facilities from 
which Chinese were excluded was not lost on those whose social standing gave them a 
sense of entitlement. 
Tax rises and protests 
Increases in taxation were naturally unpopular and residents of the Settlement demanded 
reductions on occasion, as in 1913 when the Treasurer explained that the GMR was raised 
69 Speech given by Anderson at the annual meeting of ratepayers in 1900, quoted in Feetham, Report, Vol. 1, 
136. ýO 
This factor is given significant weight in Feetham's analysis of the political situation in the settlement. 
Feetham, Report, Vol. I, pp. 142-46. 
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initially from 10 to 12 per cent in 1908 due to the surplus in the ordinary municipal 
finances falling significantly below the agreed minimum of 200,000 taels. Until a 
substantial surplus had been maintained he could not sanction a reduction in rates. 71 The 
first organised refusal to pay rates, however, did not come until 1919, when the council put 
up the general municipal and special rates by two per cent. The Finance Committee felt 
there was no other option as the budget for the year showed a deficit due to an increased 
projected expenditure for all departments on previous years, partly because of the expected 
return of foreign staff from war service: as for all organisations, personnel was one of the 
council's greatest expenses. 72 The SMC believed that explaining the reasons for the 
increase in the Chinese press would overcome the initial opposition, but quickly discovered 
that the protesters had wider aims in mind. 73 For the first time, taxation was linked with 
calls for representation on the council. 74 Simmering dissatisfaction with the status quo was 
given an outlet when Chinese residents were asked to increase their contributions to a 
municipal authority which disadvantaged them in its allocation of resources. 
It is no coincidence that this coordinated action came in the broader context of the 
May Fourth Movement in the wake of protests over China's treatment at the Paris Peace 
Conference. 75 Indeed, unofficial representatives of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce who 
called upon the chairman of the SMC, Edward Pearce, to seek a resolution to the problem, 
71 SMA U1-1-57: Finance Committee, 4 December 1913. 
72 SMA U1-1-59: Finance Committee, 28 February 1919. 
73 See, for example, Shenbao, 14 August 1919, p. 17. This explains the procedure of approval of the increase 
at the ratepayers' meeting and the rationale behind the decision. A reminder about the increase and an 
explanation of how it was approved at the ratepayers' meeting was also published the day it came into effect: 
Shenbao, 1 July 1919, p. 4 
74 Zhang Qian (ed. ), Minutes of the SMC, Vol. XX, 16 July 1919, p. 121. 
75 For more on the May Fourth Movement and in Beijing and Shanghai, see Tiina Helena Airaksinen, Love 
Your Country on Nanjing Road: the British and the May Fourth Movement in Shanghai (Helsinki: Renvall 
Institute, 2005). 
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had already been approached by Shanghai's new street associations of shopkeepers. These 
were formed in Shanghai as a direct result of the May Fourth protests, when shops closed in 
solidarity with the student's manifestations, and it is significant that these new political 
bodies were involved in the opposition to the rate increase. The council negotiated, through 
its secretary, with the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, which agreed, apparently quite 
readily, to encourage the payment of the increased rate. They asked simply that the special 
levy, imposed at the same time as the rate increase to provide back-dated pay for municipal 
employees while they were away on war service, be collected quarterly to spread the 
financial burden on ratepayers. Meetings with the shopkeepers' associations were less 
successful, however, as they insisted that no increase should be paid, and the council 
decided it had no option but to enforce the collection of the rate and levy. Collectors met 
fierce resistance, however, especially in the Nanking and Honan Road areas. 76 
The acting chairman of the council, Edward White, was in favour of adopting the 
proposal of Chu Lai Fong (who approached him at the country club on a Tuesday evening 
in August) that he should write to Chu personally stating that the council would not raise 
rates in future without consulting a committee of six representative Chinese. In return, Chu 
would guarantee the payment of rates within a week. The Senior Consul (the British 
Consul-General at the time) agreed that this presented a swift resolution, but the Secretary 
opposed it, arguing that it was unlikely that this concession would satisfy demands for 
Chinese representation, that Chu had little influence over the Chinese community so his 
guarantee was worthless, and, most strongly, that if the council indicated weakness by 
conceding this demand, it would face ever greater demands from Chinese in the future. It 
76 Zhang Qian (ed. ), Minutes of the SMC, Vol. XX, 13 August 1919, p. 136. 
134 
was the secretary's voice that was heeded: the Chinese Chamber of Commerce was 
informed that the rates had to be paid, and while the council was `sympathetic' to calls for a 
way of Chinese views being represented, it must defer action until the ratepayers' meeting 
of 1920. By September the majority of the rates had been collected and the protest over the 
increase had died away for the time being, but it re-emerged and was eventually successful, 
as described in the previous chapter. It is significant that the issue of a rise in taxation 
served as the trigger which produced calls for political change. 
The next major protest the council faced over rates was focused on the special rate 
paid by residents on extra-Settlement roads. This, too, was a political issue, and here the 
council was on far shakier ground as it was acting beyond its own jurisdiction, a weakness 
the strengthening Chinese authorities sought to exploit. In 1926 they encouraged Chinese 
residents on outside roads to refuse to pay the special rate. While in theory the council 
could have arranged to cut the supply of water to those houses which were not making their 
contribution, in practice it was not possible to isolate the supply for houses in large blocks. 
The Commissioner General, Alan Hilton-Johnson, advised the council that only 412 houses 
were failing to pay the rate, of a total 2,300 houses on external roads which were obliged to 
pay it, and of those, perhaps 200 would not have paid anyway. 77 With just one tenth of 
households not paying due to the actions of the Chinese city authorities, the council agreed 
to take no action, especially in view of the Settlement extension that was still anticipated at 
this late juncture (more on which in the next chapter). 
n Zhang Qian (ed. ), mutes of the SMC Vol. XXIII, 21 June 1926, pp. 281-2. 
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The numbers refusing to pay increased, however, and the council was forced to 
write off increasing amounts of revenue from this source. 78 With the establishment of the 
City Government of Greater Shanghai, the Commissioner of Foreign Affairs made repeated 
and strong protests against the collection of all municipal taxation beyond Settlement 
limits. 79 The council responded by making it clear that residents were only charged the 
special rate on signing a written undertaking that they chose to do so in return for police 
protection, electric light and water supplies. It decided that services should be suspended 
after 15 days' notice to the non-paying resident, but deferred implementing this plan until 
the input of the new Chinese council members was received in 1928. ß0 The council 
continued to defer action and the Treasurer learnt to expect little income from these areas. It 
was not only Chinese who were refusing to pay by this point: in 1928 Japanese residents 
too were refusing to pay the special rate on the grounds that their houses were outside the 
barbed wire defences erected during the state of emergency in 1927, and in 1934 issue was 
taken with a Spanish resident of the northern external roads area, Mr E. A. de Garcia, for 
refusal to pay the special rate. 81 The council was losing the ability to demand taxation in 
return for services when it had no other justification for doing so. This is indicative of its 
generally weakening position in the 1930s in the face of Chinese nationalism and Japanese 
imperialism. 
The most significant refusal to pay the General Municipal Rate within the 
Settlement itself came in 1927, a year of tension and conflict as the Guomindang purged 
78 Zhang Qian (ed. ), Minutes of the SMC, Vol. XXIII, 9 February 1927, pp. 31-2. 
79 zhang Qian (ed. ), Minutes of the SMC, Vol. XXIII, 25 May 1927, p. 97; U1-1-61: Finance Committee, 10 
November 1927. 
80 Zhang Qian (ed. ), Minutes of the SMC, Vol. XXIII, 8 June 1927, p. 450; Vol. XXIV, 15 February 1928, p. 
20. 
51 Ul-1.62: Finance Committee, 27 November 1934. 
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members of the Chinese Communist Party, formerly its ally, from its ranks on the bloody 
night of 12 April in Shanghai and subsequently beyond. 82 The Nationalists established 
themselves as the government of a re-centralised China, from the nearby capital of Nanjing, 
and set about asserting greater influence throughout China and particularly in the foreign- 
dominated city of Shanghai. The local Guomindang party actively supported the protest of 
the Shanghainese against another increase in the rates, despite its assurances to the council 
that it opposed their demands. These protests took on a much stronger character than those 
of 1919. This time local associations, including the Chinese Ratepayers' Association and 
the street unions, coordinated plans to refuse to pay any rates when the increase was 
demanded, rather than refusing only the amount represented by the increase as before. The 
21 members of the CRA committee now took an oath `to act in accordance with the 
directions of the Kuomintang Party', and a mass meeting in support of the protest 
concluded with shouts of `Support the Nationalist Government! Long live the Kuomintang 
Party! ', showing how closely the party was involved in opposition to the council. 83 Tile 
Mayor of the city, Huang Fu, praised the protesters, particularly shops which closed rather 
than pay the rate, for being willing to sacrifice their incomes for the greater good. 84 The 
CRA indicated that any efforts to employ force in the collection of rates would result in a 
general strike, the power of which had already been demonstrated during the May Thirtieth 
Movement in 1925. 
62 For more on the purge see C. Martin Wilbur, The Nationalist Revolution in China, 1923-1928 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 99-117. For its consequences for the Communist Party, see Patricia 
Stranahan, Underground: The Shanghai Communist Party and the Politics of Survival, 1927-1937 (Lanham, 
Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998), p. 17 and passim. 
83 Shanghai Mercury, 2 July 1927, p. 6; 4 July 1927, p. 5. 
a Shanghai Mercury, 25 July 1927, p. 6. 
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Rather than the residents of just a few streets taking part in the protest as in 1919, in 
1927 the refusal to pay rates was almost universal. Only forty Chinese households had paid 
the rates a week into July when the payment was due, compared to the 4,000 that would 
normally have been collected by that point. 85 The council took comfort from the few 
Chinese who paid in person at the Revenues Office, refusing to take a receipt for fear of 
discovery by the street unions, seeing them as evidence that the majority of residents were 
not hostile to the council but rather intimidated by the street unions. Given the widespread 
dissatisfaction that had been expressed just two years previously and the attendance of 
1,200 supporters of the protest at a mass meeting in the main hall of the Chamber of 
Commerce on 3 July, 86 however, it is likely that this was an expression of optimistic 
wishful thinking on the part of the council, similar to that of the British in India around the 
same period as described by Andrew Muldoon. 87 This belief did mean that the council 
refrained from using coercive measures to enforce collection of rates for fear of turning 
residents against it, despite urging from the Japanese member, Kimiji Fukushima, that the 
council should use every means at its disposal to enforce collection so as not to show any 
sign of weakness. The council was ready to use force in case of violent protest, as shown by 
the decision to postpone the planned disbandment of the Russian Unit, 88 but would not this 
time be the first to strike. It had learnt from its experiences in 1925. 
The CRA, too, had learnt from the events of that year about the power of mass 
action and attracting the glare of international opinion to Shanghai. It took out 
ss Zhang Qian (ed. ), Minutes of the SMC, Vol. XXIII, 6 July 1927, pp. 464-6. 
Shanghai Mercury, 4 July 1927, p. 5. 
87 Andrew Muldoon, Empire, Politics, and the Creation of the 1933 India Act: The Last Act of the Roj 
(Farnham: Ashgate, 2009). 
88 Zhang Qian (ed. ), Minutes of the SMC, 28 June 1927, pp. 457-9. 
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advertisements in the press, urging residents not to pay their rates and providing the details 
of lawyers who offered legal advice free of charge should the council take coercive 
measures to make them pay. 89 The Mayor reminded members of the CRA that The more 
aggressive the attitude adopted by the Shanghai Municipal Council in this matter, the easier 
it will be to facilitate the rendition of the Settlement in the future, especially when the 
whole affair will have been published to the world. '90 The council was therefore wise to 
refrain from the use of force. It, too, knew the value of appealing to international opinion, 
accepting an offer from the news agency Reuters to cable a memorandum explaining the 
necessity of the increase to America, Europe, Hong Kong, Beijing and Tianjin at a cost of 
$200.91 It also established a committee in England `for the purpose of counter-acting anti- 
Council propaganda', made up of former members of council who returned to Britain. The 
council thus showed both its global linkages as well as the primary importance of London 
in its worldview. 
The terms on which the council engaged in discussions with senior members of the 
Chinese community to find a solution to the protest had changed since 1919. This was 
particularly apparent at a specially convened meeting of the Union Club where leading 
Chinese made the underlying causes of the protest clear to the council's chairman, Stirling 
Fessenden. These were dissatisfaction over the presence of the Defence Force and the 
erection of barricades, and the hope of obtaining representation for Chinese on the council 
in at least equal numbers as foreigners. 92 The council remained steadfast in its refusal to 
negotiate on these terms, however, and in insisting on the need for the increased rate to be 
a9 Shenbao, 5 and 7 July 1927. 
90 Shanghai Mercury, 25 July 1927, p. 6, quoting the China Times. 
91 mang Qian (ed. ), Minutes of the SMC, Vol. XXIII, 16 July 1927, p. 471. 
92 mang Qian (ed. ), Minutes of the SMC, Vol. XXIII, 6 July 1927, pp. 467-9. 
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paid. It took prominent rate-paying concerns, such as the Sincere and Wing On department 
stores and the Chekiang Industrial Bank, to court to make an example of them and 
threatened to cut the electricity supply to Chinese newspapers unless they paid the rates, to 
force them into an embarrassing position if they still wanted to advocate non-payment of 
the rates but paid them themselves in order to continue publishing. 93 It was negotiations 
with members of the Chinese business elite, however, which brought the protest to a close. 
As in 1919, the council was able to end the protest with no more than promises to 
look at the question of giving Chinese a greater say in municipal affairs. The council had 
sought to keep the two issues separate, mainly to avoid appearing to give in to Chinese 
pressure: as Robert Bickers has commented, the British seemed more concerned about 
saving face than anyone else in China. 94 Yu Qiaqing was the leading figure in negotiations 
with the council. He emphasised the financial hardship that the rate increase imposed on the 
poorest third of ratepayers, and asked that their shortfall be permitted to be made up by 
wealthier Shanghainese. Satisfied that the question of Chinese representation was being 
separated from the matter of payment of the rates, the council agreed to address this matter 
again after the protest was concluded. The Commercial Federation duly issued an 
announcement that the increase was for the deficit in the municipal budget and should be 
paid, subject to the council addressing the question of greater Chinese representation before 
the end of the year and undertaking to make no more increases without reference to the 
93 The Shanghai Mercury mocked the newspapers which paid the rates when presented with this press, calling 
the protest a 'teapot tempest'. Shanghai Mercury, 26 July 1927, p. 5. 
94 Robert Bickers, `British Concessions and Chinese Cities, 1910s to 1930s', unpublished paper presented to 
the Chinese University of Hong Kong conference on Urban History and Republican China, September 2010, 
p. 17. 
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Chinese ratepayers. Following the dissemination of this announcement, the council's 
collectors were able to obtain payment and the protest was effectively over. 95 
The nature of the demands made and the confidence with which the Chinese 
Ratepayers' Association manoeuvred opposition to the rate increase in 1927 contrasts 
sharply with the more respectful terms and modest means employed in 1919. This reflected 
the altered political landscape in Shanghai and China more broadly, both following the May 
Thirtieth Incident of 1925, as analysed by Nicholas Clifford, 96 and the newly confident 
position of the local Guomindang. In 1919 the Chinese Chamber of Commerce had 
supported the council and sought to help persuade Chinese residents to pay their rates, but 
in 1927 the Chamber was one of the main backers of the protest, along with the Chinese 
Ratepayers' Association which had been established in the wake of the 1919 protest. 
Nonetheless, the council was still able to benefit from negotiating with members of the 
Chinese elite with more to gain from the continuation of the status quo in Shanghai, where 
the existence of the stable municipality had helped them to amass great wealth, with 
modifications to the council to give them - rather than the mass of Chinese ratepayers -a 
greater say in municipal affairs. 
While the protest movements described and their results indicate clear changes in 
the political context in which the council had to operate, there is a greater lesson to be taken 
from the payment and non-payment of rates in the Settlement. It is significant that for most 
of its existence, the SMC was able to collect rates facing little opposition, and even when it 
raised the level of taxation, controversial in any society, protests were short-lived and 
overcome with only small concessions from the council. This suggests that, despite its 
95 Zhang Qian (ed. ), Minutes of the SMC, Vol. XXIII, 29 August 1927, p. 499. 
96 Clifford, Spoilt Children, pp. 147-58. 
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constitutional weakness, the SMC enjoyed a surprising degree of legitimacy in the eyes of 
the rate-paying public. The clear link between municipal services and the payment of rates, 
as shown most clearly in the payment of the special rate beyond the Settlement limits, 
allowed a foreign-administered council to tax the Chinese population on what remained 
Chinese territory. 
Spending versus tax reduction 
The municipal council sought at all times to keep spending to a minimum. When heads of 
departments presented their budgets each year, the Treasurer invariably found ways of 
cutting their projected spending by removing any items which were considered less than 
essential. Figure 8 shows a breakdown of municipal expenditure on the main council 
departments. The Shanghai Municipal Police was the largest expense every year, followed 
closely by the Public Works Department, which bought land for municipal use and built 
and maintained roads and bridges, bunds and wharfs, and public buildings from hospitals 
and prisons to housing for nurses and the police. These two departments reflect the 
council's raison d'etre: to provide an environment suitable for conducting business, which 
meant the provision of a basic infrastructure and the defence of life and property. The SMC 
developed from the Committee of Roads and Jetties of the original English Settlement, and 
the work of this committee was continued by the PWD. Yet from the days of the Taiping 
Rebellion, the council's driving concern was the protection of life and property, hence the 
largest portion of the budget being spent on policing and defence measures. Other 
departments were given low priority. 
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Expenditure on all areas of municipal activity increased over the period in question, 
but it is particularly notable that the proportion of municipal revenues that was spent on 
health and education grew. These had been considered non-essential, but as the council 
bowed to internal and external pressure, and took more notice of the interests of the 
Settlement's Chinese residents, health and education, and later industrial welfare, took on 
greater significance. Despite such increases, however, the council never lost sight of its 
intention to keep spending and thus taxation at a minimum, and the budget was never in 
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Figure 8: Municipal spending by department (taels). 97 
9' SMC, Reports for the Years 1910-1940. Data for 1935 and 1940. following the abolition of the tael in 1933, 
is converted from Chinese dollars to a tael equivalent, using a rate of 0.72 dollars per tael, the mean of the 
exchange rates 1930-33. Arthur N. Young, China's Nation-Building Effort, 1927-1937 (Stanford.: Stanford 
University Press, 1971), p. 474, using data from the Central Bank of China. Comparisons can therefore only 
be approximate. The education expenditure for these years does not include the special allocation of 2 per 
cent of Chinese GMR spent on Chinese education. . 
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The Treasurer had promised in 1913 that when the municipality could afford it, the rates 
would be reduced. After rises in the levels of taxation and the protests they produced, as 
seen, the rate was sure enough reduced in 1930 from sixteen to fourteen per cent, due to the 
large surplus resulting from the sale of the Electricity Department. This had been intended 
for use for capital projects in lieu of borrowing, but the council bowed to pressure from 
ratepayers for a reduction in their payments. It proved extremely difficult to raise taxes 
again: in view of a potential budget deficit, the Finance Committee agreed a raise was 
needed in December 1931, but due to the Sino-Japanese conflict in the following months 
the council decided against increasing `the burdens on the community' in this way until the 
town had had time to recover. 98 The global depression damaged the municipal finances as 
the price of silver fell drastically, yet the local instability meant there was never a good 
time to restore the higher rate, and only in 1937 was it finally returned to 16 per cent: not in 
time to return the council to its former strong financial footing before the city was once 
again plunged into Sino-Japanese warfare. 
Chinese opposition to higher rates, in the community and among the Chinese 
members of council, was a major reason for the delay. By 1934, the year after the last of the 
five annual instalments of payments from the sale of Electricity Department, which had 
compensated for the reduction in rates, the discussion centred on whether more could be 
spent on Chinese education without raising taxes. Chinese members of the Finance 
Committee such as Xu Xinliu argued for retrenchment in other areas to keep within current 
revenue limits. On the opposite side of the debate, E. F. Harris expressed a very unusual 
98 See the speech of then Chairman, Brigadier-General Macnaghten, to the annual meeting of ratepayers, as 
reported in Municipal Gazette, Vol. XXV, No. 1362,14 April 1932, p. 170. 
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view for a municipality which is generally rightly regarded as a bastion of traditional low- 
tax conservatism, claiming that `It is an accepted fact that a highly taxed city is more 
prosperous than one which is lightly taxed; for this reason he supports the proposal for an 
increase in taxation. ' 99 Nevertheless, an increase in spending on education was 
recommended without the accompanying rise in taxation which the Treasurer cautioned 
was required to fund it. The Shanghai Municipal Council was no longer the liberal free- 
trade, low-government statelet it had long appeared. '00 
Increased municipal expenditure on Chinese education had been a proposal of the 
Federation of Street Unions, one of the council's most vocal opponents and not a body 
from which it was in the habit of taking suggestions. Justice Richard Feetham, whom the 
council invited to investigate how to improve relations between the council and the Chinese, 
endorsed the proposal, however, and it was one of the few aspects of his report which the 
SMC implemented. 101 From 1931 a section of the municipal income from Chinese rates 
was set aside for Chinese secondary education in the Settlement, both directly in council 
schools and indirectly through grants-in-aid to existing Chinese schools. In 1934, the 
Chinese councillors lobbied for the grant to Chinese schools to be increased, and at the 
same time the Japanese members made a similar claim for Japanese schools. 102 The 
chairman, A. D. Bell, responded that, if anything, the spending on education should be 
curtailed due to the current economic difficulties, and the vice-chairman added that as both 
Chinese and Japanese members had fought increases to the rates the previous year, they 
" SMA U1-1-62: Finance Committee, 4 January 1934. 
100 As a point of comparison, see Neil Engichart's recent discussion of the extent to which Burma can be 
considered to have been run on liberal principles. Neil A. Englehart, `Liberal Leviathan or Imperial Outpost? 
J. S. Furnivall on Colonial Rule in Burma', Modem Asian Studies, Vol. 45, No. 4 (June 2011), pp. 759-90. 
1°I Feetham, Report, Vol. II, p. 9. 
102 SMA, UI-1-62: Finance Committee minutes, 4 January 1934. 
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could not now demand higher expenditure. A compromise was nonetheless reached that 
increased the grant to both Chinese and Japanese schools, though by less than was 
demanded. Clashes with existing practice by educational authorities outside the Settlement 
had to be overcome, but this policy went a little way to assuage Chinese opposition to the 
council. Judicious municipal spending in this way was an important tool in improving the 
council's relationship with the Chinese community. 
When the council's financial position worsened further and its usual sources of 
loans were exhausted it turned for help to the foreign powers, its financial independence 
from which had been a long-held source of pride. In 1939, the Secretary General, Godfrey 
Phillips, asked the British and American Senior Consuls to approach their respective home 
governments with a request for a loan of £1 million each, or half that sum if only that were 
possible. The American referred it to Washington, D. C., but warned that he saw `no 
prospect whatsoever of any money being voted by Congress for this purpose. ' 103 His 
British counterpart also referred the request to London, adding that if the British 
government could guarantee a bank loan to the council this would also address its current 
predicament. The presumed gilt-edged status of the council's bonds was now being put to 
the test. Phillips described the impossibility of increasing receipts from taxation as the 
Japanese now constituted a sufficiently large number of ratepayers to block any attempt to 
pass a resolution to raise the rates, which he said was now a greater problem than Chinese 
opposition to increased taxes. But the plea for a government loan was not met, neither by 
the American authorities who had little sympathy for the council's position, nor by the 
British government which had just declared war on Germany so had more pressing calls on 
103 TNA T160/1142: Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, Ambassador, to Foreign Office, 3 October 1939. 
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its budget. The diplomats did, however, negotiate a loan for the council from the Hongkong 
and Shanghai Bank, but not enough to prevent it from sliding deeper into debt. The SMC 
had lost its ability to fund itself from affordable loans and taxation, and at the moment of 
crisis discovered that it could not after all rely on assistance from the imperial metropole. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown how the Shanghai Municipal Council was able to collect revenues 
from a variety of sources, predominantly in the form of taxation and through floating loans, 
in order to fund its activities and retain its independence from any higher authority. It 
guarded its right to tax the population of the International Settlement jealously, protesting 
strongly at attempts by the Chinese authorities to collect taxes from which, by practice 
rather than by right, the residents of the Settlement were exempt. It was only in later years 
that the Settlement's majority Chinese population was able to exert any influence over rates 
of taxation or how taxes were spent, when Chinese councillors were finally able to 
contribute to the municipal decision-making process. 
There was a surprising degree of acceptance of this inequality, taxation being linked 
in the minds of most residents not to representation but to the delivery of services, 
especially police protection and defence. It should be remembered that the majority of 
foreign residents also had no say in the setting of rates or the allocation of resources, most 
failing to qualify for a vote. The council had a degree of legitimacy to govern the 
Settlement in the eyes of most residents, despite its unrepresentative nature, as it fulfilled its 
primary function of providing infrastructure and defence to the Settlement. These priorities 
were reflected in its allocation of funds, though other areas grew in importance. From 1930, 
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moreover, members of the Chinese business elite were able to influence how municipal 
funds were spent in a way that benefited the mass of the population, notably through 
education. 
The finances of the council reflect its strength through most of this period. It was 
able to float loans at affordable rates of interest, which were, in most years, oversubscribed. 
It could tax its residents and met only occasionally with major protest. The municipal 
finances also reflect the changing politics of the period. As Chinese nationalism and the 
strength of the Nationalist government grew in the late 1920s, the council was forced to 
take more account of the residents who provided the majority of its revenues. The council's 
cash-flow was also affected by external factors such as fluctuations in currency exchange 
rates, war in China and overseas, and the general weakness of the Chinese state. By 1939, 
the fragility of the council's position was reflected in its unprecedented insolvency. The 
SMC's financial practices were borrowed primarily from municipal governments in 
England, but were also influenced by local and global factors. Perhaps more importantly, 
financial matters could act as a catalyst for change, most notably when, in 1919, tax rises 
due to deficits in the municipal finances produced protest movements which resulted in 
political change in the Settlement. 
As noted in the introduction to this chapter, all the activities of the council depended 
on its fiscal integrity. The next chapter examines one of the greatest drains on the municipal 











Chapter Three: Expansion and Defence 
`[The Shanghai Municipal Council] has not only the moral but also the unquestionable 
legal right to defend, by force if necessary, the political and territorial integrity of the 
Settlement against military or mob aggression on the part of any political or military party 
or faction. 
The source of this legal right lies in the unique political status of Shanghai as a 
municipality, which has no exact counterpart in the whole world. " 
The Shanghai Municipal Council was originally formed at a time of external threat and 
resulting internal disorder. The Committee of Roads and Jetties was reconstituted as the 
SMC in 1854 after the Chinese part of the city was seized by rebels the previous year, 
causing the residents of the English and American Settlements to organise protection in the 
form of a police force and a volunteer defence corps under the auspices of the council. 2 
Overseeing the defence of what would become the International Settlement was one of the 
council's primary functions, and the area it defended grew dramatically during the 
nineteenth century. From a small area established in 1843 where it was anticipated that 
British traders would settle on a temporary basis in order to conduct trade, it expanded in 
1848,1863 (when the English Settlement combined with its American neighbour to form 
the International Settlement), 1893, and 1899, to 5,583 acres: almost forty times its original 
size. The SMC was not satisfied with this territory, however, and continued for decades to 
seek fiuther expansion of the Settlement limits. Meanwhile, it also quietly increased the 
area under its control by building municipal roads external to the Settlement and providing 
services such as policing to their residents in return for the payment of rates. 
I Extract from Chairman's speech to the Annual Meeting of Ratepayers, 14 April 1927, SMC, Report for 
1927, p. 80. 
2 Bickers, 'Shanghailanders', pp. 165-6. 
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In addition to these expansionary efforts, the council ensured that the Settlement 
would be protected by two defence bodies, a quasi-military police force like those that 
defended Britain's colonies and a local volunteer militia, comparable in some ways to 
Britain's Volunteer Force. 3 The police acted to protect the Settlement's autonomy from 
Chinese authorities in every sphere from the collection of taxes to political and military 
activity, while the Volunteers and police alike were called upon to defend the Settlement 
militarily when it was threatened either from within, by protestors, or from without, by 
rebellions and civil warfare. At such times of external threat, the council erected barricades 
at the entrances to the Settlement in an attempt to protect its residents by physically walling 
out the rest of Shanghai and China. For the defence of the Settlement, the council could 
also call on foreign military forces, notably the British, through the relevant consuls-general 
and their diplomatic superiors, demonstrating Shanghai's position within the British 
imperial web. 
This chapter presents the ways in which the SMC behaved like an aggressive and 
militarised state, despite its lack of formal authority in law, in trying to expand and protect 
its borders. It argues that conflict was inherent in the International Settlement's position, 
surrounded as it was by increasingly hostile Chinese administrations. Furthermore, it is 
clear that the council was a far more important actor on the local stage than has often been 
apparent from the existing literature on Shanghai in this period 4I begin with an overview 
3 See Hugh Cunningham, The Volunteer Force: A Social and Political History, 1859-1908 (London: Croom 
Helm, 1975). 
4 Nicholas Clifford's Spoilt Children of Empire is one of the few works to treat the SMC as a significant actor, 
and his tight focus on the 1920s and preoccupation with the tense relationship of the American and British 
consuls and governments with the council lead him to present just one facet of its nature, as a bellicose 
collection of imperialists (accurate though this may be) fighting against London and Washington, D. C. Robert 
Bickers has also brought the SMC into his accounts of British colonialism in China, but few others have 
afforded it much importance in the history of the period. 
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of the nature of the Settlement's borders, which recur as a motif throughout the chapter, 
exploring how the council gained for the Settlement greater autonomy from Chinese 
jurisdiction than it had a right to claim and focusing on its opposition to Chinese policing 
and the collection of certain Chinese taxes within its borders. Next, the nature of the 
Shanghai Municipal Police and the Shanghai Volunteer Corps is discussed more broadly in 
relation to the defence of the Settlement. The chapter then turns to how the council itself 
succeeded in both policing and collecting taxation beyond the boundaries of the Settlement, 
and the ways in which this extended the area that was effectively under its authority. 
Finally, I focus on key flashpoints in the twentieth-century history of the Settlement: the 
Mixed Court Riots of 1905, the council's attempt to seize Zhabei in 1913, the defence of 
Shanghai in 1924 and 1927, the Sino-Japanese hostilities of 1932, and the ultimate 
Japanese takeover of the Settlement. These examples demonstrate the centrality of 
expansion and defence in the International Settlement, countering assumptions that it 
remained static during this period and illuminating the bellicose nature of the colonial 
presence in China as it was manifest in the Shanghai Municipal Council. It will become 
clear that the Settlement was not part of an informal empire existing solely for the conduct 
of free trade, 5 but a semi-colony run by a council that constantly sought to further entrench 
and expand its territory as an end in itself. 
Defending administrative borders 
Though the Settlement remained Chinese territory at all times, its boundaries marked the 
edges of what was treated by the British who lived there and who dominated the Shanghai 
Gallagher and Robinson, `The Imperialism of Free Trade', pp. 1-15. 
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Municipal Council as a British colony, peopled by Chinese `native' subjects. 6 The first 
article of the Land Regulations detailed the precise borders of the Settlement as the bounds 
of municipal control. The Regulations provided for the outer edges of the Settlement, where 
not delineated by creeks and rivers, to be indicated by boundary stones (such as that on 
display in the Shanghai Municipal History Museum; see Figure 9), to be laid in the 
presence of representatives of the Chinese authorities and the Senior Consul; otherwise, its 
borders with its Chinese and French neighbours were unmarked and unremarkable. 7 But as 
early as the Taiping Rebellion, Shanghai's foreign residents, like those of other treaty ports 
throughout China, felt the need to erect gates and barriers to keep out danger. 8 The 
protection they offered was a major part of the attraction of the Settlement as a safe haven, 
which enabled its rapid development and enrichment. Barriers were erected in times of 
stress throughout the history of the Settlement and these physical barriers proved to be great 
sources of contention. Foreign nervousness about the dangers of being in China were 
intensified following the Boxer Uprising and, barely more than a decade later, worries 
about the upheaval that accompanied the Xinhai Revolution again made Shanghai's foreign 
population feel vulnerable. 9 To reassure the residents as much as to provide real protection, 
the Shanghai Municipal Council closed barriers at the borders to the north in 1911. 
6 Bickers, Britain in China, p. 128. 
7 1899 Land Regulations, printed in Feetham, Report, Vol. 1, p. 63; SMA U1-1-1247: A. M. Kotenev, `Extra- 
Settlement Roads, 1853-1930', memorandum submitted to SMC 1 December 1930, p. 86; A. M. Kotenev, 
Shanghai: Its Mixed Court and Council, p. 557. 
8 Bickers, `British Concessions and Chinese Cities', p. 16. 
9 Bickers, Scramble for China, p. 349. 
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Figure 9: Boundary stone on display in Shanghai Municipal History Museum. 
In normal years, however, it was the administrative borders of the Settlement that 
the SMC was anxious to defend. The council jealously guarded its independence from 
Chinese authority. Although the extraterritoriality granted by the Treaty of Nanjing only 
extended to foreigners, while Chinese residents of the Settlement remained subject to 
Chinese law, the council established a precedent that the latter should not be subject to local 
taxation beyond that charged by the council itself, as seen in the previous chapter (pp. 128- 
9). The SMC was not always successful in enforcing this: the consular body overruled the 
155 
objections raised by the SMC in 1919 and 1920 to allowing the Chinese authorities to 
collect a stamp tax in the Settlement. 10 The council's refusal to cooperate in its collection, 
however, meant the matter fell into abeyance until the new Shanghai Municipal 
Government took it up in 1927. The latter proposed to the SMC that the council should aid 
it in collecting the tax in return for half of the resulting revenues. The SMC refused, averse 
to setting such a precedent. Sharp hikes in import taxes followed, which the council was 
powerless to oppose. 
The SMC did take a strong stance, however, on Stirling Fessenden's urging, against 
a tax that was equivalent to two months' rent on Chinese living in the foreign settlements in 
support of the Anti-Northern Punitive Expedition of the Nationalist Government, declaring 
the tax illegal and collectors liable to arrest and punishment `without leniency. ' 11 The 
Shanghai Municipal Police were alerted and in July 1928 they reported the existence of six 
separate Chinese municipal government bureaux operating within the Settlement for the 
purpose of collecting taxes. An office of the Intelligence Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs was also found operating within the Settlement. The council demanded the closure 
of all these offices (against the wishes of its new Chinese members, who supported the 
Municipal Government) but to no avail. It was not simply the attempt to collect taxes 
within the Settlement that so affronted the foreign members of the council, but also the 
accompanying presence of Chinese government officials and police to enforce the 
collection of the taxes. A compromise was therefore finally reached in 1930 that the stamp 
tax, and no other Chinese tax, could be collected within the Settlement, provided no police 
10 U1-1-1246: Kotenev, `Chinese Taxation', p. 50. 
11 NCDN, 28 June 1927. 
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or tax collectors from an outside authority operated there. 12 This was a small but significant 
concession from the council (the first of many) which had so long guarded its exclusive 
right to tax the residents of the Settlement, in return for the greater prize of maintaining the 
exclusion of Chinese police and officials from within its borders. 13 
The council consistently resisted efforts by police other than the municipal force to 
exercise authority within the Settlement. In 1904 a public security bureau (gong'an ju'z 
)) operating within the limits was given less than a week to remove its business and staff 
beyond the limits. 14 A year later a police station operating in the north of the Settlement 
came to municipal notice after it sent two arrested soldiers for trial at the Mixed Court. The 
station's men were told to leave within five days or face arrest themselves. " Such cases 
continued to appear sporadically and the council's hostility to outside policing on 
municipal ground only intensified with the arrival of the Shanghai Municipal Government 
and its efforts to assert Chinese sovereignty within the Settlement. As Frederic Wakeman 
asserted, the two police forces had good reason to compete, but had no hope of success in 
fighting crime if they did not cooperate. 16 It is clear, however, that the SMP was valued 
more for its military strength to defend the Settlement than its capacity to apprehend 
criminals. 
12 Kotenev, `Chinese Taxation', p. 87. 
13 On the resentment of the Chinese authorities at this denial of their right to police the Settlement, see 
Wakeman, Policing Shanghai, pp. 75-76. 
14 SMA U1-1-82: Watch Committee, 5 July 1904. 
13 U1-1-82: Watch Committee, 1 May 1904. 
16 Wakeman, Policing Shanghai, pp. 60-77. Wakeman's thorough treatment of the relationship between the 
two authorities in matters of policing in this period requires no further development here. 
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Weapons of Defence: the SMP and SVC 
The Shanghai Municipal Council had two of its own organisations to call on for purposes 
of defence, the Shanghai Municipal Police and the Shanghai Volunteer Corps, and when 
required it could also turn to the armed forces of the foreign powers: the gunboat diplomacy 
that underpinned the European position in China from the nineteenth century. The Watch 
Committee stated explicitly that `the Shanghai Municipal Police forms the first line of 
defence and is quasi-military in nature'. 17 In this, it was akin to the colonial police forces 
found in Africa and India. 18 The SMP was the largest department under the council's 
purview and often appeared to Shanghai's inhabitants to operate outside the municipal 
structure, though in fact its actions were overseen by the Watch Committee and its staffing 
issues were subject to the deliberations of the Staff Committee. This was an international 
force, with `foreign' (essentially British), Chinese, Indian and Japanese branches. 19 The 
first recruits were Britons obtained from Hong Kong in 1854, for defence rather than 
traditional policing in the first instance. In the twentieth century recruits were obtained 
directly from Britain. Many of the more senior posts were occupied by men with a 
background in the Royal Irish Constabulary, a militarised gendarmerie, or in other colonial 
forces (such as Captain E. I. M. Barrett, seconded and then appointed permanently from the 
"U1-1-86: Watch Committee, 4 July 1918. The committee was discussing the reintroduction of badges of 
rank for senior police officers, and noted that the Hong Kong police considered it a useful practice. 
18 The main contributors to the literature on colonial policing remain David Killingray and David Anderson. 
See the contributions to their pair of edited volumes on the subject: David M. Anderson and David Killingray 
(eds. ), Policing the Empire: Government, Authority and Control, 1830-1940 (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1991); David M. Anderson and David Killingray (eds. ), Policing and Decolonization: 
Politics, Nationalism and the Police, 1917-65 (Manchester. Manchester University Press, 1992). 
19 On the Shanghai Municipal Police, see Robert Bickers, `Who were the Shanghai Municipal Police, and 
Why Were They There? The British Recruits of 1919', in New Frontiers, ed. by Bickers and, pp. 170-91; 
`Ordering Shanghai: Policing a Treaty Port 1854-1900', in Maritime Empires: British Imperial Maritime 
Trade in the Nineteenth Century, ed. by David Killingray, Margarette Lincoln and Nigel Rigby (Aldershot: 
Boydell and Brewer, 2004), pp. 173-194; and Empire Made Me, pp. 64-94. 
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Malay States Guides). 20 Others had a military background, such as Captain (later Major) 
Alan Hilton-Johnson, who joined in 1907 on the recommendation of the Captain 
Superintendent, who had seen his capabilities in the Weihaiwei Regiment, and later became 
Deputy Commissioner, Acting Commissioner and finally Commissioner General of the 
force. 21 Like colonial police forces around the globe, the men were housed in barracks and 
organised by military rank. Foreign members of the SMP were trained in musketry and the 
use of revolvers, and by 1916 the whole force was armed -a clear deviation from the 
Metropolitan Police model towards the colonial approach of exercising control through 
force. 22 The Chinese branch was by far the largest, typically ten times the size of the 
foreign branch, and was tasked primarily with patrolling duties and everyday policing. It 
was not well-trusted and the foreign branch was intended to provide supervision of the 
Chinese and other branches. In fact, immediately before the Mixed Court riots of 1905, the 
Watch Committee entertained the idea of dismissing the Chinese branch entirely, its duties 
to be performed by a much enlarged Indian branch. 23 
The Indian Section comprised mostly of Sikhs, who were prized throughout the 
British world for their imposing stature, military prowess and bravery in battle. 24 Sikhs 
20 U1-1-82: Watch Committee, 5 February 1907. Charles Jeffries promoted the long-held view that the RIC 
was the model for colonial policing throughout the British empire, and while this has been challenged, 
notably by Richard Hawkins, the influence of the RIC was certainly apparent in many police forces around 
the world and the SMP was no exception. Charles Jeffries, The Colonial Police (London: M. Parrish, 1952); 
Richard Hawkins. `The `Irish Model' and the Empire: a Case for Reassessment', in Policing the Empire, ed. 
by Anderson and Killingray, p. 24. 
21 Ul-1-82: Watch Committee, 19 September 1907. 
22 U1-1-85: Watch Committee, 31 May and 12 July 1915; 17 October 1916. Obtaining sufficient ammunition 
for the Police Annual Musketry Course was considered a priority despite the shortage of supplies during the 
First World War, so when supplies from Britain fell short, the Watch Committee directed the Commandant of 
the SVC to explore the possibility of supplementing them with ammunition from Hong Kong, Manila or the 
USA. 
23 U1-1-82: Watch Committee, 5 December 1905. 
24 Isabella Jackson, `The Raj on Nanjing Road: Sikh Policemen in Treaty-Port Shanghai', Modern Asian 
Studies, (`First Access' published online 29 February 2012), pp. 11-12. 
159 
were first brought over from India in 1884 in response to fears from foreign residents on 
council-built roads external to the Settlement about the impact of the Sino-French war at 
that time. They could be paid considerably less than European police officers yet helped 
counter the much larger Chinese branch, which, due to the racial prejudices of the council 
and foreign community of the Settlement, was never held in high regard. The Sikhs in their 
striking red turbans became a great source of prestige for the British community, displaying 
the exotic splendour and power of the British Raj to the western and Chinese residents of 
Shanghai. Yet they increased Chinese resentment of the SMP: in 1913 the American consul 
warned E. C. Pearce, chairman of the SMC, that young Chinese involved with the YMCA, 
`really excellent fellows, say that they will endure Chinese or foreigners to safeguard the 
[Northern] district but they will resist the "Black slaves". ' 25 Despite such Chinese 
animosity towards the Sikhs, the council had sought to increase their number to 1,000 for 
mobilisation against unruly crowds following the Mixed Court riots of 1905, but was 
prevented by concerns from the British consul general and minister that this would 
constitute a standing army. In the wake of the May Thirtieth Movement the SMP also 
established a Reserve Unit, again mainly made up of Sikhs, which was modelled partly on 
anti-riot units in the Indian police. This was a small, disciplined armed force that could 
provide a rapid response to labour unrest or riots, as well as fires. It also provided back-up 
for police operations against armed robbers and criminal gangs. 26 
The Japanese branch was established in 1916, due to a combination of pressure 
from the Japanese community and an acute shortage of European recruits during the First 
25 U1-2-437/1840: American consul to Pearce, 29 July 1913. 
26 Bickers, Empire Made Me, pp. 192-3; E. W. Peters, Shanghai Policeman, ed by Hugh Barnes (London: 
Rich & Cowan, 1937), p. 70. 
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World War. Impressed by the discipline of the branch and the economy achieved by their 
lower salaries and shorter passage from home compared with their British counterparts, the 
council expanded the branch and promoted its officers, like Shigeru Uyehara, in the 
following years, though never to the most senior levels. As tensions between the Chinese 
and Japanese communities deepened, the SMP was affected: a clash between the Chinese 
and Japanese branches of the SMP in 1918 resulted in a Chinese constable fatally shooting 
a Japanese colleague. 27 The Watch Committee considered an expansion of the Japanese 
branch from 30 to 50 helpful in controlling `the rowdy Japanese element' and as a way of 
countering Japanese attempts to `usurp' the SMP's exclusive right to police the Settlement 
through the use of Japanese consular police in Hongkou. 
When the May Fourth protests which swept the country in 1919 following the 
Treaty of Versailles erupted into student marches and strikes in Shanghai, the SMC ordered 
the police to escort any gatherings of students (though being careful to avoid clashing with 
them) and take particular care to prevent any anti-Japanese disturbances. The Japanese 
Consul-General was asked to warn Japanese residents to keep indoors at night and 
`everything possible would be done to protect Japanese property from damage. '28 While the 
SMC was seeking to preserve order, its apparent alliance with the Japanese against the 
Chinese protestors caused some of the students to question whether their anger should in 
fact be directed more widely against foreign imperialism in general, instead of against only 
the Japanese. The May Fourth protests represented a novel source of disorder for the SMC, 
r U1-1-86: Watch Committee, 7 October 1918. The minutes record the view that `a section of the Japanese 
community' did not understand the status of the Settlement and were `apparently under the impression that 
the municipality is to all intents and purposes a separate country' upon which they were `entitled to make 
demands, ignorant of the fact that they are in fact themselves members of the municipality' [emphasis added]. 
28 U1-1-86: Watch Committee, 5 June 1919. 
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and it immediately put the SVC and SMP on alert. 29 The eight-day general strike from 5 
June caused massive disruption to business, industry and transport, and despite efforts by 
the Students' Union to keep the protest peaceful, dozens of arrests were made by the police 
forces of all three authorities in the city. Clashes between the SMP and protesters were 
sometimes violent, though nothing on the scale that would be seen later. The SMP was thus 
the main force at the disposal of the SMC for the preservation of peace as well as more 
aggressive measures for defence and expansion. 
In addition to general policing and literal defence of the Settlement in times of 
danger, the SMC also turned to the police to defend its autonomy and interests against the 
Chinese authorities. The SMP arrested eight Chinese soldiers who entered the Settlement 
without a permit in 1901, and regularly enforced the exclusion of Chinese police or military 
authorities. 30 This became more of an issue following the establishment of the Chinese 
municipal government, as described below, and again the SMP was on the front line of 
defending the Settlement from any encroachment from Chinese authorities. For example, it 
was the Commissioner of Police who drew council attention to the presence of Chinese 
Stamp Tax collection bureaux in the Settlement in 1928, which he was ordered to close 
down. 31 The SMP was also engaged in intelligence gathering, through the Criminal 
Investigation Department Intelligence Office, later renamed the Special Branch, and in 
cooperation with the intelligence organs of the foreign powers and the Nationalist 
29 Chen, May Fourth Movement in Shanghai, p. 118. 
30 U1-1-82: Watch Committee, 10 April 1901. The Senior Consul queried the arrests, concerned about the 
offence caused to the Chinese authorities, but the Watch Committee declared that the SMP's action `was 
wholly in accordance with the Council's arrangements as notified to the consular body in August 1899. ' 
31 Kotenev, `Chinese Taxation', p. 60. 
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government, targeting Communists and other threats to imperial interests. 32 Transnational 
linkages in the gathering of intelligence cemented ties between the SMC and other political 
authorities and ensured its status alongside national governments in the fight against 
security threats. 
In this way the SMP guarded the Settlement on behalf of the council in both a literal 
and metaphorical sense. Chinese opposition to increases in the strength of the force in 1927 
was based on both resistance to the necessary increase in rates and a conviction that the 
SMP served foreign rather than Chinese interests. 33 Popular criticism of the outlay on 
policing was justified: the SMP was an expensive force (costing around three million taels 
to maintain), 34 mainly because of the large numbers of foreign personnel, monopolising 
between a third and half of the council's expenditure (see Figure 8, p. 147). It was rivalled 
only by the Public Works Department, whose land purchases and road-building projects 
also served the council's expansionist ambitions. The SVC, on the other hand, provided 
defence on the cheap as the single largest expense, salaries, was not required for volunteers. 
The Shanghai Volunteer Corps was formed in 1853 (one year prior to the 
establishment of the SMC) to defend the Settlement against feared Qing encroachment 
during the Taiping Rebellion and cut its teeth the following year in the Battle of the Muddy 
Flat. 35 It was reconstituted under the authority of the council in 1870 and organised into 
companies by nationality: in later years the British were joined by American, German, 
32 Bickers, Empire Made Me, pp. 172-74; `Incubator City: Shanghai and the Crises of Empires', Journal of 
Urban History (Forthcoming, March 2013), pp. 31-33,39-40. 
33 Shenbao, 28 June 1927, p. 12; 3 July 1927, p. 13; 7 July 1927, p. 14; 11 July 1927 p. 13; 27 August 1927, p. 
14. 
34 Wakeman, Policing Shanghai, p. 70. 
35 The Battle of "Muddy Flat, " 1854: being an historical sketch of that famous occurrence, written specially 
for the jubilee commemoration thereof at Shanghai, April 1904 (Shanghai: North China Herald, 1904). Robert 
Bickers describes how this battle came to hold symbolic status as the `founding date' of the International 
Settlement for Shanghailanders: Bickers, Britain in China, p. 40; `Shanghailanders', p. 199. 
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Austrian, Japanese and even Chinese companies. 36 This internationalism gives some 
indication of why the Chinese name for the Corps was Wanguo shangtuan ()j M gff ®, 
roughly `the Militia of the Merchants of Many Nations'); indeed Zhuang Zhiling compares 
it to the Eight Nation Army which formed to fight the Boxer War in 1900.37 There was, 
however, a strict racial hierarchy at work: `A' Company was exclusively white and British 
- Eurasians were demoted to `B' Company, while `C' Company was for Chinese 
volunteers. There were also at various times Italian, Portuguese, Jewish and Filipino units, 
and a unit for employees of the Chinese Maritime Customs Service. Volunteering was seen 
as a civic duty and the major firms were all supposed to encourage their men to volunteer, 
although they often begrudged the days it demanded their employees to be absent from the 
office. One third of eligible British residents belonged to the SVC in 1928, reflecting the 
anxiety over the security of the Settlement at that time and the concomitant sense of duty to 
protect it. 38 The volunteers wore uniforms to reflect the armies of their home countries, 
from the kilts of the Scottish Highlanders to the cavalry-style uniform of the American 
company. But in the twentieth century they were commanded by an officer seconded from 
the British Army, armed with British Army weapons, and supplied with ammunition from 
the British colony of Hong Kong. All the companies drilled and practised at the rifle range 
in Hongkou, honing skills that could be and were used in open battle, as seen below. The 
new SVC Armoury, erected in 1903, was right in the centre of the Settlement, near the 
Central Police Station and opposite the Health Department, so if the Settlement were 
36 I. I. Kounin, Eighty Five Years of the Shanghai Volunteer Corps (Shanghai: Cosmopolitan Press, 1938). 
37 Zhuang Zhiling, `Shanghai gonggong zujie zhong de "duoguo budui" - wanguo shangtuan', ('The 
Multinational Militia of the Shanghai International Settlement - the Shanghai Volunteer Corps') Dang 'an yu 
shi xue (April 1997), pp. 72-4. 
38 Bickers, Britain in China, p. 84. 
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attacked the weapons would be safely at the heart of the defended area and easily accessible 
to both volunteers and police. 39 
The Corps expanded greatly over the decades, particularly at each successive 
moment of stress. In 1900 the SVC stood guard in case of disturbances in connection with 
the Boxer Uprising, and the Major Commanding the Corps and his Adjudant attended a 
meeting of the SMC's Watch Committee to outline the defence scheme, which included 
specified centres for assembling the volunteers, a system of patrols and a method for 
sounding the alarm. 40 The foreign community was extremely nervous, the North-China 
Herald later claiming that `the settlement was in actual danger of annihilation'. 41 It was 
expected that at such times the SMP would be at the disposal of the Commandant of the 
SVC for defence purposes, and he recommended that the reserves of ammunition at each 
police station be increased. A Chinese company formed in 1906 after the Mixed Court 
Riots, which from 1913 was permitted to bear arms on the same basis as the other 
volunteers, a concession which the North-China Herald welcomed patronisingly as `an 
indication of appreciation of their services. '42 It is significant that Chinese residents wanted 
to defend the Settlement under the authority of the British Commandant and the SMC. 43 
Members of the Chinese company were given certification for attaining a certain level of 
military training to help boost the professionalism of the force. 44 A company of Swiss, 
39 U1-1-82: Watch Committee, 27 January 1903. 
40 U1-1-82: Watch Committee, 15 June 1900. 
41 NCH, 23 January 1901, p. 142. 
42 NCH, 6 September 1913, p. 698. 
43 The Chinese Company of the SVC held its own annual meetings, where it decided its priorities within the 
parameters set by the Commandant. #&®* t*$ 1VsE (Shangtuan huadui nianhuiji, `Account of the 
Annual Meeting of the Chinese Company of the Shanghai Volunteer Corps), Shenbao, 5 November 1924, p. 
14. 
44 Shenbao, 20 March 1924, p. 13. 
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Dutch and Scandinavians was formed in 1924, further diversifying the Corps. 45 There was a 
Philippine company under American command, demonstrating that not only British but 
also American imperialism characterised the International Settlement. A salaried Russian 
Unit was added in 1927, essentially providing the council with the standing army that it had 
been denied when the large expansion to the Sikh branch of the SMP was blocked twenty 
years earlier (especially in view of the fact it was renamed the `Russian Regiment' in 1932 
when the Russian Volunteers were incorporated with the salaried men). 46 
A Russian unit was first proposed in 1922 by officers of the former Russian 
Imperial Army who settled in Shanghai. The Commandant suggested a Russian platoon 
might be attached to `B' Company (the Eurasian Company) as the presence of a keen 
platoon `would probably stimulate keenness in the lower ranks... or make them so ashamed 
that they would resign. ' In his view the company should either "`get on" or "get out"', 47 
reflecting the prejudice against Eurasians that was typical of the time. 48 Membership of the 
platoon would be limited to `the law-abiding class of Russians', he said, and might help in 
the event of trouble with `undesirable Russians', but the Watch Committee was 
unconvinced and decided to defer the decision `until there is a stable Russian Government'. 
Instead, it was the imperatives of defence that dictated the formation of the Unit, as Chinese 
armies clashed around Shanghai, rumours circulated that Chinese students were going to 
form an army 5,000 strong in the Settlement as the May Thirtieth Movement escalated, and 
London threatened to remove the British Defence Force because it was undermining Sino- 
45 Clifford Spoilt Children of Empire, p. 81. 
46 Kounin, Eighty Five Years of the Shanghai Volunteer Corps, pp. 129-32. 47 U1-1-87: Watch Committee, 17 July 1922. 
43 Bickers, Britain in China, pp. 71-2. 
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British relations. 9 Despite all this, a recruitment drive to increase the number of volunteers 
was deemed to have failed, as public confidence in the SMC plummeted. A paid Russian 
Unit seemed the only way to ensure adequate defence of the Settlement, and it ensured that 
the business of Shanghai need not be interrupted by mobilising the volunteers `except in 
cases of very widespread civil disturbance or external aggression'. 50 In 1937 it guarded 
gates and blockhouses to try to keep the Sino-Japanese hostilities beyond the Settlement's 
limits, and was mobilised 16 times to crush riots. 5 ' Against these internal and external 
threats the SMC now had at its disposal a paid force of over 100 permanently employed 
soldiers, supplemented by almost 300 Russian Volunteers at the core of a force of over 
2,000 fighting men. By arming itself with a force that increasingly resembled an army, the 
SMC was behaving as if had a statelet to defend. 
Moving beyond borders 
Despite its fierce opposition to Chinese public security bureau personnel functioning within 
the Settlement, the council had no qualms about sending its own municipal police beyond 
the Settlement limits. In the nineteenth century the council had built a number of roads 
external to its current Settlement borders in anticipation of including these areas in 
subsequent expansions, which proved founded. As soon as the largest expansion was 
formalised in 1898, the council embarked on even more ambitious land purchase and road- 
building plans, based on the same assumption that this land would soon be brought into the 
49 U1-1-89: Watch Committee, 21 June 1928. 
50 Kounin, Eighty Five Years of the Shanghai Volunteer Corps, p. 132. Despite their utility to the council, 
Russians were held in low regard in the SVC hierarchy. For example, the council defrayed the costs of 
accommodation in the General Hospital for members of the Corps: at first class rates for officers of all 
companies and second class for the men, with the exception of the Russian Unit whose officers and men were 
entitled only to second and third class rates respectively. Ul-1-88: Watch Committee, 22 April 1927. 
51 Kounin, Eighty Five Years of the Shanghai Volunteer Corps, p. 133. 
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Settlement proper, but this time there would be no further expansions. 52 The council argued 
against objections from both the consular body and Qing officials that its extra-Settlement 
roads were justified by the 1866 and 1898 revisions of the Land Regulations. The Public 
Works Department built roads to reach amenities, from the municipal granite quarry at 
Pingqiao to the promised cool relief of `the hills' owned by Jesuits ten miles from the city 
(see Figure 10 for the areas covered by external road-building). As foreigners populated 
these roads alongside Chinese, the council saw a need to protect them and their property, as 
well as its own investments in the form of amenities, so included these roads in the beats of 
the Shanghai Municipal Police. Indeed, it was the protection of residents on Bubbling Well 
Road, external to the Settlement, which was the immediate cause for the recruitment of the 
first Sikh police in 1884.53 The council claimed its extraterritorial rights extended to the 
external roads as they were foreign property, highlighting again the way in which 
extraterrioritality underpinned the council's expansionism. 
52 Kotenev, `Extra-Settlement Roads'. 





Figure 10: Plan showing External Roads areas. 54 
14 Feetham, Report, Vol. III, facing p. viii, image from 
<http: //www. virtualshanghai. net/Asset/Preview/vcMap_lD-403_No-0. jpeg>, accessed 5 February 2012. 
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Between one quarter and one third of the council's budget was set aside for land 
purchases and road-building projects, forming the vast majority of extraordinary municipal 
expenditure (that intended to benefit future generations of ratepayers), as well as the 
building and maintenance of amenities beyond the Settlement limits. To the north and west 
of the Settlement lay Hongkou, the southern part of which was included in the Settlement 
while the northern area lay beyond the boundary. This did not stop the council from 
purchasing 39 acres in northern Hongkou in 1896 for a rifle range for the use of the 
Shanghai Volunteer Corps and the forces of the foreign powers. A decade later tennis 
courts, a swimming pool, a bowling green and a golf course had been added to what was to 
become known as the Hongkew Park or Recreation Ground. The council intended that this 
area should later be included within the boundaries of the Settlement, but in the meantime 
the simple purchase of land enabled it to exercise foreign domination over the landscape. 55 
This kind of expansion was not justified by strict adherence to the council's stated objective 
of providing an environment conducive to foreign business. Rather, it indicates that the 
SMC saw the International Settlement much like a colony or an independent state, with its 
own internal imperative to expand for the sake of future generations of residents in what 
was expected to be perpetuity. 
As a corollary to policing external roads, the council believed that the police forces 
of the Chinese authorities should be excluded not only from the Settlement but from the 
external roads areas as well, on the logic that two authorities should not try to exercise 
jurisdiction in the same area. It challenged the patrolling of Cemetery Road by the Daotai's 
police in 1898 and responded to a `case of ruffianism' by police in Pudong in 1900 with a 
55 U1-1-56: Finance Committee, 9 October 1908. 
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call to exercise municipal police control of the area `with a view to furthering the future 
extension of the Settlement in this direction'. 56 The council argued that the Chinese 
authorities were not policing these areas effectively, so in the interests of law and order it 
had no choice but to act. This stance was supported by property developers such as the 
Shanghai Land Investment Company, which wrote to the council in 1906 drawing its 
attention to the large number of new Chinese houses in the part of Hongkou that lay beyond 
the Settlement and pointing out the inadequacy of the local policing there. 57 In this way the 
council's expansionist ambitions neatly intersected with those of Shanghai's capitalist elites. 
Jurisdictional authority follows the power to police, as arrested criminals require 
prosecution and conviction, and the SMC and consular body increasingly exerted their 
influence over the Mixed Court in which cases involving Chinese in the Settlement were 
heard. The council sent members of the SMP, usually Sikhs, to stand in court, 
demonstrating the presence of municipal authority (as depicted in dioramas in the Shanghai 
Municipal History Museum today). The Foreign Assessor represented western views on 
cases, including those involving Chinese only even though this was beyond his purview. 
Prisoners were sent to the municipal rather than a Chinese gaol. 58 A crisis of foreign 
jurisdiction over Chinese resulted in the first major public disturbance of the twentieth 
century in Shanghai and `the most violent antiforeign protest since the opening of the treaty 
port': the Mixed Court riot of 1905.59 Smouldering resentment during the course of the year 
over the council's interference in Chinese cases erupted when a widow returning to her 
w U1-1-82: Watch Committee, 20 June 1898 and 27 March 1900. 
s' U1-1-82: Watch Committee, 13 November 1906. 
58 Bryna Goodman, Native Place, City and Nation: Regional Networks and Identities in Shanghai, 1853-1937 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), p. 187, n. 25. 
9 Goodman, `The Locality as Microcosm of the Nation? ', p. 399. 
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native place of Guangdong with her late husband's coffin and 15 servant girls was arrested 
by the SMP on suspicion of kidnapping and transporting girls for sale. The Chinese 
Magistrate ruled that she should be placed in the Mixed Court gaol, but the foreign 
Assessor ordered the municipal police to incarcerate her in the newly built municipal gaol, 
even though he had no legal right to do so. 60 The SMP followed the Assessor's orders after 
fighting with the Magistrate's runners, injuring several of them and a Chinese official in the 
process. Public anger at the police brutality was expressed at open meetings of hundreds 
and, in one case, thousands of people. 61 The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the 
foreign diplomatic body responded with pressure on the SMC to release the widow, but by 
the time it did the protest had gathered even greater momentum and expanded to include 
demands for Chinese representation on the council. 62 When the SMC refused to negotiate, a 
crowd of thousands of protestors attacked and set fire to police stations and the town hall. 
Inspector Wilson in charge of Louza (Laozha) station disarmed his men on the orders of the 
Captain Superintendent, but as the crowd grew in force it was able to loot the station's 
bayonets and carbines and burn down the station. The SMC called on the full force of the 
municipal police and Volunteers, as well as the Royal Navy and Marines from men-of-war 
in the harbour, to restore order. Surprisingly, 100 Chinese sailors were offered by Rear 
Admiral Sah to help maintain order and were detailed by the Watch Committee to bolster 
the River Police in the defence of Pudong, beyond the Settlement limits. 63 This 
60 Goodman, Native Place, City and Nation, p. 188. 
61 Goodman, Native Place, City and Nation, pp. 189-90. 
62 Kotenev attributed the nationalist turn of the protest to a combination of the influence of returned overseas 
Chinese students, anger over the recent Chinese Exclusion Act in the USA and the impact of the recent 
Japanese victory over Russia. Kotenev, Shanghai: Its Mixed Court and Council, p. 128. On the anti-American 
protests of 1905 see Karl Gerth, China Made: Consumer Culture and the Creation of the Nation (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003), pp. 127-31. 
63 U1-1-82: Watch Committee, 18 December 1905. 
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demonstrates that the right of the SMC to enforce order both within the Settlement and in 
the surrounding area was accepted by the Chinese military authorities to the extent that they 
were willing to contribute forces under foreign direction. 
An inquiry by the Watch Committee concluded that police inspectors should have 
been given wider discretion in defending their stations and that the order to disarm had 
been mistaken, setting out the line that would contribute to the violent response to the 
protestors of 30 May 1925. Nevertheless, the committee recorded the view that the 
regrettable loss of property was more than compensated by `the avoidance of sacrifice of 
innocent lives of residents in the immediate vicinity' and the restraint shown by the police 
under attack `[could not] fail to produce a generally good effect on native feeling'. 64 In fact, 
the violence of the crackdown elsewhere, particular at the town hall - the defence forces 
killed at least 15 protestors and injured many more - did nothing to improve relations 
between the council and Chinese residents or local authorities. 65 But it certainly 
demonstrated the SMC's willingness to resort to force to defend its buildings and authority 
and the readiness of foreign armed forces to come to its aid. 
This was not the last encroachment of the municipal authorities into the 
independence of the Mixed Court: during the 1911 Revolution the SMP marched into the 
court, took possession of its buildings and records and dismissed the court runners and 
other `hangers-on'. 66 From then until 1926, it was run by the municipal council on behalf of 
the consular body, demonstrating another significant area (in addition to defence) in which 
foreign interests were allied between the consular body and the council. The fees charged 
64 U1-1-82: Watch Committee, 21 December 1905. 
65 Goodman, Native Place, City and Nation, p. 192. 
66 Stephens, Order and Discipline in China, p. 50. 
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for hearing cases went to the council to contribute to the extraordinary expenditure of the 
SMP. 67 Thomas Stephens argued that the `prompt, summary, and decisive' hearings of the 
Mixed Court, closely following jurisdictional procedures in western nations, allowed the 
council to maintain much higher standards of orderliness than was found beyond the 
Settlement limits. 68 Yet Eileen Scully and others have highlighted the ingrained inequality 
that was epitomised in the court and the `pre-trial preemption and post-verdict 
maneuverings' in which the SMC engaged behind the scenes. 69 As Chinese nationalism 
grew, however, the rendition of the Mixed Court in 1926 signalled an early erosion of semi- 
colonial power in the Settlement. 70 The Shishi xinbao (94*; , China Times) argued in 
1930 that the establishment of an independent Chinese court in the Settlement and the 
disbanding of the SMP were two immediately necessary precursors to the recovery of the 
International Settlement, which, the paper said, should be a priority for the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. 71 The Chinese recovery of legal jurisdiction in the Settlement certainly 
curtailed foreign freedom to exert control in the Settlement. 72 
67 U1-1-60: Finance Committee, 14 March 1921. 
68 Stephens, Order and Discipline in China, p. 103; Wang Limin makes a similar argument: Wang Limin, 
`Zhongguo de zujie yu fazhi xiandaihua - yi Shanghai, Tianjin he Hankou wei Ii' ('China's Concessions and 
the Modernisation of the Legal System - using the examples of the concessions at Shanghai, Tianjin and 
Hankou'), Zhongguo faxue, (March 2008). 
69 Scully, Bargaining with the State from Afar, p. 17. 
70 On the rendition and its terms, see A. M. Kotenev, Shanghai: Its Municipality and the Chinese (Shanghai: 
North China Daily News and Herald, 1927), pp. 171-88; Gu Xiaoshui, `1926 nian Shanghai gonggong zujie 
huishen gongxie shouhui jiaoshe shuping' ('Commentary on the Negotiations for the Rendition of the 
Shanghai International Settlement Mixed Court in 1926'), Lishi dang'an (February 2007), pp. 97-109. 
71 Shishi xinbao, 21 May 1930. 
72 For one example of the use of the Mixed Court to support anti-imperial protests, see Zhiwei Xiao's account 
of the Mixed Court's verdict on the Sinophobic film Welcome Danger in 1930, which banned the film 
throughout the country and demanded that both the American ambassador and the film's director issue formal 
apologies to China. Zhiwci Xiao, `Anti-Imperialism and Film Censorship During the Nanjing Decade, 1927- 
1937', in Transnational Chinese Cinemas, ed. by Sheldon Hsiao-peng Lu, pp. 35-57. 
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Aggressive expansionism 
The extensions of the council's authority in taxation, policing and utilities beyond the 
Settlement limits signalled efforts towards the eventual inclusion of such areas within its 
boundaries. One area that was particularly targeted was the district of Zhabei, to the north 
of the Settlement. Almost before the ink was dry on the Land Regulations which approved 
the final borders of the Settlement, the council was already seeking ways to expand into 
Zhabei. It had in fact sought to include the district within the borders agreed in 1898, but 
this effort was resisted by the Chinese authorities. As Robert Bickers has shown, maps 
produced of the Settlement included foreign property in Zhabei, coloured imperial red. 73 A 
plan submitted to the China Association in 1908 showed two proposed expansions, one 
which was needed `as an urgent matter' and a second, much wider line indicating a 
boundary which would satisfy the council's ambitions `for many years'. 74 Again, the 
assumption was that the Settlement would inevitably continue to expand for the foreseeable 
future. The extension considered immediately necessary was by no means modest, 
including Zhabei, the Hongkew Recreation Ground and surrounding area, a sufficient 
extension to the west to include Edinburgh and Jessfield Roads ('which district it is 
understood from the native press is about to be policed under native organisation', policing 
again being seen as the sign of governmental authority) and `so much of Pootung [Pudong] 
as will bring under taxation the wharves and godowns which at present unfairly compete 
with similar undertakings within Settlement limits'. The larger, long-term proposed 
extension included a much greater area to the west, and included the French Concession, 
73 Bickers, Scramble for China, p. 364. 
74 U1-1-56: Finance Committee, 9 October 1908. The plans were not realised, but were clearly considered 
achievable in 1908. 
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the hope being that negotiations in London and Paris might incorporate the latter into the 
International Settlement as originally hoped in the 1860s. The council's expansionism was 
therefore not confined to Chinese parts of Shanghai and its environs. 
While negotiations with the Chinese authorities failed to win the council any 
territorial gains, it simply embarked on a road-building project in 1903, taxing and policing 
the residents as described above. Small incidents were seized upon as excuses for seeking 
an extension to the Settlement, such as the assault in May 1908 of Police Constable Sinclair 
by Chinese police in Zhabei, beyond the Settlement. In the eyes of the council, the fact that 
the constable was beyond the Settlement limits in no way restricted his right to operate 
there freely. This incident, coupled with `the present conditions under which the northern 
boundary of the Settlement has become obliterated by roads construction and buildings ... 
such as may at any time give rise to serious disturbance, ' justified in the minds of council 
members an appeal to the consular authorities to seek to bring the area as far as the 
Shanghai-Nanjing railway line under formal municipal control. 75 Subsequently the Senior 
Consul requested the Daotai to remove `native' police from this area pending the resolution 
of the boundary question - clearly on the assumption that it would be settled in the SMC's 
favour. This illustrates how closely the police jurisdiction of an area was linked to attempts 
at formal expansion of the borders of the Settlement. Furthermore, it is worth noting that 
police functions extended beyond the simple preservation of law and order. Members of the 
SMP were responsible, for example, for the enforcement of licensing regulations, which 
were imposed beyond the Settlement from 1909. Licenses were charged for and issued on 
premises in Zhabei and elsewhere in the same way as businesses operating within the 
75 Zhang Qian (ed. ), Minutes of the SMC, Vol. XVII, 27 May 1908, p. 90. 
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Settlement limits had to pay licence fees in accordance with various bye-laws, again on the 
justification that residents on the external roads were entitled to the security this offered of 
basic standards in hygiene and other areas. 
Negotiations rumbled on but the consular and diplomatic bodies made no headway 
in convincing the Chinese government that the council should be granted its sought-for 
extension. Then, in July 1913, an opportunity arose to try to seize Zhabei by military 
occupation instead of relying on this frustrating diplomacy. A revolt led by the 
Guomindang against President Yuan Shikai erupted in Shanghai, surrounding the 
Settlement with gunfire. 76 The council, dominated by expatriates and thus ever anxious to 
preserve peace and stability in the interests of good business, wanted the government forces 
to win a swift victory while maintaining a neutral buffer-zone between the open hostilities 
and the Settlement. The neutral zone was overly-ambitious: even the North-China Herald, 
that die-hard advocate of foreign imperialism in China, recognised that it would not be 
practical. 77 But when the revolutionaries took control of Zhabei, right on the Settlement's 
border, in order to launch an attack on the government arsenal, the secretary to the council, 
W. E. Leveson, urged that this was the moment to seize the district. Just like his 
predecessor, J. 0. P. Bland (who was encouraging him to use force in 1913), Leveson was 
at the forefront of calls to expand the Settlement. The moment had been anticipated: the 
finance committee had allowed for the expansion of the SMP in March 1913 in order to 
meet potential need in Zhabei. 78 But the council members were thinking primarily in terms 
of defence: it was staff like Leveson and the heads of the police and volunteers who saw 
76 Bickers, Scramble for China, pp. 365-6. 
n NCH, 2 August 1913, p. 313. 
78 U 1-1-57: Finance Committee, 21 March 1913. 
177 
disorder as an opportunity to expand in Zhabei, though the council members who 
ultimately bore responsibility for the decision were readily persuadable. This stance chimed 
with popular Shanghailander opinion. According to the Herald, the presence of rebels north 
of Shanghai meant it was only a matter of time before the fighting was brought right into 
Zhabei, `a district so closely interwoven with the Settlement. '79 It was therefore necessary 
for the council, with its responsibility `for the safety of thousands of innocent lives, ' to 
order the occupation of the district: a military expansion into Zhabei was being cast as a 
duty for the council. 
Captain Superintendent of Police C. D. Bruce reported marching into northern 
Zhabei on the morning of Sunday 27 July after Commandant Barnes had paraded the Light 
Horse and SVC Artillery companies on the orders of the Captain. go Ile SVC was 
subordinate to the SMP in this operation, perhaps because the stated aim was to bring the 
district under municipal police control, though it may have simply been a function of 
Colonel Bruce's superior rank to Lieutenant Colonel Barnes's. 81 Barnes reported to Bruce 
that he used all companies of the SVC equally in the operation, highlighting the roles 
played by the Light Horse, Japanese and Portuguese companies, before the duty of 
occupying the district was handed over to the Chinese company, presumably to reduce 
friction with Chinese residents and authorities. 82 Bruce thanked both the SVC and the 
Criminal Investigation Department of the SMP, which he said had provided assistance 
" NCH, 2 August 1913, p. 313. 
80 U 1-2-673: Captain Superintendent to Secretary, 30 July 1920. 
B1 Barnes, formerly of the Weihaiwei Regiment, was a Major in the British Army but received a step up to the 
rank of Lieutenant Colonel by the War Office at the council's request. When his successor, Major Trueman, 
asked for a similar step up in his own status in 1915, however, the council felt that to ask the War Office 
would do `little more than draw attention to the unofficial and unrecognised character of the Council's 
commission', showing the tenuous nature of the Corps' military status. U1-1-82: Watch Committee, 12 July 
1915. 
82 U1-2-673/2555: Barnes to Bruce, 28 July 1913. 
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which enabled the occupation of Zhabei to be `so simple': the C. I. D. 's work thus extended 
far beyond traditional policing. Evidently the expansionist ambitions of the SMC were 
served by an international cross-section of men from both the SMP and SVC. The North- 
China Herald claimed that the occupation was achieved with success, but Robert Bickers 
points out that Bruce's triumphal march of the SVC faltered somewhat when it was not met 
by the Chinese deputation which he anticipated would hand control of the policing of the 
district to him. 83 Nevertheless, the SMP policed the area and the SVC's Chinese company 
stood guard. The Superintendent of Chinese Police in Zhabei wrote complaining primarily 
about the use of Sikhs and the use of force to seize the weapons of his own police. 84 The 
Superintendent and others argued that the council had overstepped its rights in employing 
force to disarm the rebels and Chinese police outside the Settlement, but the Herald argued 
that this action was `as inevitable as if they had been found within the borders of the 
Settlement. '85 The council and consular body had successfully established the principle that 
the Settlement was neutral territory, to be free from any conflict that may affect 
surrounding China, and now this neutrality was being extended to areas on its border. The 
next logical step was the permanent inclusion of Zhabei in the protected zone of the 
Settlement. 
Yet this was not to be: two days after the occupation was initiated, a counter-attack 
initially targeting the Sikh police (the rebels shot at Captain Barrett, who led the branch) 
forced the SVC `to withdraw to the Settlement boundary', followed by the municipal police 
who were stationed there. Barnes was at pains to emphasise that the rebels opened fire first 
83 Bickers, Scramble for China, p. 366. 
84 U1-2427/1863: Translation of letter from Superintendent Moh of the Chinese Police to the Red Cross 
Society, 30 July 1913. 
85 NCH, 2 August 1913, p. 316. 
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and the SVC exercised `patience and forbearance' in not retaliating for some time before 
returning fire. 86 Bruce reported that he believed on 29 July that he was following the orders 
of the Japanese Admiral `to enter Chapei, to rescue any foreign lives or persons then in 
danger and to retire'. 87 Any mention of Japanese involvement was suppressed from the 
public records as it did not suit the council's claims of autonomy, but it shows that the 
foreign naval protection enjoyed by the Settlement came with an expectation that the 
SMC's own forces would cooperate with their aims. Nevertheless, the council failed to 
expand its boundaries and the Zhabei police resumed their duties. A combination of 
Chinese outrage and consular criticism had shown the council that its position there was 
untenable, at least for the time being. The council, however, continued to expect the 
expansion of the Settlement boundaries in the near future. In the meantime, the Yuan Shikai 
government was highly respectful of foreign sensibilities in Shanghai, no doubt partly in 
return for the backing of the council which helped it crush the Guomindang rebellion. It 
asked the permission of the Diplomatic Corps in Beijing to take troops through both Zhabei 
and the Settlement, indicating that it accepted the council's claim that the level of foreign 
interests in Zhabei and its proximity to the Settlement allowed some foreign control over 
the district-88 The diplomats, on the other hand, decided to allow the passage of troops 
through Zhabei but not through the Settlement, demonstrating their stricter adherence to the 
existing boundaries as the outer edges of foreign-controlled Shanghai. 
Despite this failure in 1913, the council's ambitions for expansion of the Settlement 
remained undaunted and it resorted to the same tactics as it had employed before, building 
86 Barnes to Bruce, 31 July 1913. 
8' Bruce to Chairman, SMC, 2 August 1913. 
81 NCH, 16 August 1913, p. 507. 
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up its presence on extra-Settlement roads. It also entered into negotiations with Beijing in 
1914-15, floating the possibility of Chinese representation on the council or the rendition of 
the Mixed Court in return for the desired extension of the Settlement limits. 89 In 1917 the 
Captain Superintendent of Police suggested that recent agitation in Pudong offered an 
opportunity to obtain municipal police control over all foreign property on the east of the 
river. 90 Again, staff rather than councillors advocated aggressive expansionism. The Watch 
Committee decided to defer (though not dismiss) the idea due to an impasse with the local 
Chinese authorities over China's measures against Germans and Austrians in the Settlement. 
Even though the council consisted entirely of Allied nationals, the preservation of the 
neutrality of the Settlement trumped wartime allegiances, so Chinese authorities could not 
be permitted to take action against Germans and Austrians within the Settlement. A 
compromise was reached whereby these nationalities would be required to obtain permits 
and men would have to report weekly to SMP stations, but Chinese authorities would not 
be permitted to enforce these measures-91 The council continued to anticipate extensions to 
the Settlement right into the 1920s, without success. It finally quietly abandoned these 
ambitions with the arrival on the scene of the Shanghai Municipal Government at the end 
of 1927, following which its efforts were concentrated increasingly on defence rather than 
expansion. 
89 Feetham, Report, Vol. 1, p. 124; Manley O. Hudson, `The Rendition of the International Mixed Court at 
Shanghai', American Journal of International Law, Vol. 21, No. 3 (July 1927), p. 459. 
90 U1-1-86: Watch Committee, 14 September 1917. 
91 U1-1-86: Watch Committee, 8 October 1917. 
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Defence in difficult times 
From September to October 1924 the Jiangsu-Zhejiang war raged between rival `warlords' 
in the area surrounding Shanghai. 92 Storm clouds had been gathering for many months, 
although the Chinese and foreign authorities - chambers of commerce, guilds, diplomats, 
and the SMC - combined to negotiate a guarantee respecting Shanghai's neutrality from the 
commanders of the two forces, Qi Xieyuan and Lu Longxiang, in 1923.93 It should be noted 
that it was not only the International Settlement that claimed neutrality in conflict, but it 
was far more successful than the Chinese authorities in defending it. 94 When the neutrality 
was first threatened in January 1924, the SVC issued a public notice warning of its 
intention to fire artillery from Suzhou Creek if provoked. 95 It also expanded the Chinese 
company of volunteers. 96 The fighting erupted on 3 September and the council declared a 
state of emergency on 9 September, a necessary step for the landing of naval forces. 97 In 
fact, the council had no right in the Land Regulations or other agreement to declare a state 
of emergency, but its authority to do so was never challenged. 98 1,600 sailors duly came 
ashore to defend the International and French Settlements. The SVC erected a 16-mile 
cordon incorporating the Settlement and some of the external roads areas, although there 
was no serious threat of the fighting entering the Settlement itself, the military commanders 
92 Arthur Waldron, From War to Nationalism: China's Turning Point, 1924-1925 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), pp. 73-90. 
93 Waldron, From War to Nationalism, p. 41. 
94 The Chinese authorities had little hope of keeping the rival armies away from the economic prize of 
controlling Shanghai, nor its valuable arsenal. 
95 Shenbao, 18 January 1924. 
96 Shenbao, 4 March 1924, p. 14. The French concession had reconstituted its Compagnie franGaise de 
volontaires the previous year, but it was a small force of only 120 men and could not provide protection alone. 
Clifford, Spoilt Children of Empire, p. 81. 
97 The French concession declared a state of emergency the same day. Clifford, Spoilt Children of Empire, pp. 
84-85. 
92 F2953/156/10 John Pratt, acting British Consul-General, minute of 22 March 1927, cited in Clifford, Spoilt 
Children of Empire, p. 297, n. 8. 
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having nothing to gain from engaging the foreign powers in warfare. The Zhabei authorities, 
with more cause for concern, asked the SMC to extend the cordon around the whole of the 
district, and Chinese business groups even asked for municipal protection of a much larger 
area encompassing most of the city west of the Huangpu, in return for support in extending 
the Settlement boundaries. Tempting though the offer was, no such undertaken could be 
given in writing, so the council and consuls agreed against accepting it. 99 Given the 
widespread animosity towards the council prompted by the May Thirtieth Incident a few 
months later, the Chinese request seems surprising, but the council held out a promise of 
security which was the primary concern for businesses, Chinese and foreign alike. This 
attitude contrasted with that expressed in Shenbao, which argued that the maintenance of 
fortifications beyond the boundaries of the Settlement after the immediate threat had passed 
in November was an affront to Chinese sovereignty. 100 It was a view that would become 
commonplace by the following summer. 
The main problem for the SMC that autumn had been logistical rather than 
defensive: how to cope with the influx of refugees. But in January 1925 the fighting 
resumed and came right into the western suburbs on the borders of the Settlement, and even 
briefly broke the defence lines of the French Concession. 101 The SMC and other 
representatives of the foreign community such as the China Association called for foreign 
troops to defend the Settlement, but London and Washington were more reluctant than 
previously to antagonise the Chinese government to defend foreign interests. On the advice 
of military commanders who argued the council's own forces were sufficient, the British 
" Clifford, Spoilt Children of Empire, p. 89. 
100 Shenbao, 5 November 1924, p. 14. 
101 Clifford, Spoilt Children of Empire, p. 86. 
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and American governments refused the calls for help, leaving the Settlement more 
dependent than ever on the SMP and SVC for defence. They were fine on their own, the 
borders of the Settlement never being breached by the warlords' armies. 
The May Thirtieth Movement has been comprehensively studied by historians, and 
it lies beyond the scope of this thesis to attempt to add new insights to the existing 
scholarship. 102 The protesters' anger when the SMP was perceived to be favouring Japanese 
employers rather than strikers was hardened into a general revulsion of the police, the 
council, the Settlement and the foreign presence when twelve protesters were killed by the 
SMP on 30 May 1925. Police and Volunteers tried to restore order to the streets, but this 
time the council's defences were to its own detriment, merely confirming its image as an 
aggressive, imperialist authority. This turning point in Chinese perceptions of the council 
and foreign, particularly British, views of Shanghailanders, had implications for the future 
defence of the Settlement. London and Washington were more cautious about defending 
Shanghailander interests, which were so damaging to their own national relations with 
China, and the Chinese population and authorities were now united in hostility to any 
action that hinted of expansionism. Thereafter, the SMC was more defensive than 
expansionist. 
Communist insurrections against the government provided the first threat to the 
security of the Settlements after May Thirtieth, in October 1926 and February 1927, raising 
the spectre of a Communist takeover of China along the lines of Russia's Bolshevik 
revolution. The Guomindang was seen as a Bolshevik threat almost as serious as that posed 
102 Nicholas Clifford, Shanghai, 1925 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Centre for Chinese Studies, 1979, 
Rigby, The May 30 Movement; Clifford, Spoilt Children of Empire, pp. 97-112; Smith, Like Cattle and 
Horses, pp. 168-89. 
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by the Communist Party, due to its links to the Soviet Union. An arrest warrant taken out 
by the SMP for Chiang Kai-shek shows the danger he was felt to pose to municipal security 
and the council's willingness to interfere in Chinese politics, despite claiming neutrality for 
the Settlement. 103 Chiang Kai-shek was not, of course, arrested, but the SMP redoubled 
surveillance efforts against suspected communists in Shanghai and the SVC expanded 
recruitment and established the Russian unit. The Chairman and Commissioner General 
held a meeting with major employers explaining the importance of supporting the Corps by 
encouraging their employees to volunteer, with success in boosting numbers. 104 British 
troops were also on hand in Hong Kong to arrive to reinforce the Settlement's defences if 
necessary, but this time they would not land in Shanghai unless it was under direct threat. 
In contrast to 1924, the decision of whether or not to send an Indian Mixed Brigade directly 
to Shanghai in anticipation of trouble or to land them in Hong Kong in the hope that they 
would not be required was taken not in Shanghai or even Hong Kong but by the cabinet at 
Westminster: if action were to be taken to protect the Settlement, it would be directed from 
London, not the council's offices. 105 The decision in fact featured in the King's Speech 
opening parliament on 8 February, demonstrating the importance attached to Shanghai. 
Defence was not the only consideration in the discussion, however. Miles Lampson, 
the British Minister in Beijing, had suggested that the sending of troops could be used as a 
`bargaining counter' with the Chinese authorities. If assurances were given that `anti- 
British agitation', including the boycott of British goods still in place following May 
Thirtieth 1925, would cease, the British would refrain from sending the Indian troops on 
'°3 Clifford, Spoilt Children of Empire, p. 176. 
104 U1-1-88: Watch Committee, 29 October 1926. 
105 TNA, CAB 23/54: cabinet meeting 7 February 1927. 
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from Hong Kong. Yet British representatives in Shanghai disagreed: the British Consul- 
General and the naval Commander-in-Chief argued that one brigade and three battalions 
must be landed in Shanghai `at all costs' to guarantee the port's security, claiming that `any 
weakening relative to the landing of troops at Shanghai would be disastrous. ' Austen 
Chamberlain, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, anxious to limit the damage done to 
Sino-British relations by the SMC, pointed out that troops were sent to Shanghai as a 
precaution and to prevent the loss of life, so any attempt to use them to gain advantage vis- 
ä-vis the Chinese authorities was `a misapprehension of British policy'. Opinion in 
Shanghai was divided. The American and Japanese authorities were keen to maintain the 
neutrality of the Settlement by avoiding the deployment of foreign troops there, keeping 
defence of the Settlement in the hands of municipal forces. Yet the SMC, dominated as it 
was by Britons, was anxious to ensure maximum British military protection. The municipal 
position was explicitly referenced in the cabinet meeting and council member Brigadier- 
General Macnaghten's professional military opinion that three brigades were necessary was 
quoted. After three and a half hours of discussion (with a one-and-a-half hour break for 
lunch) the cabinet concluded that the decision of whether the Indian Mixed Brigade should 
be sent straight to Shanghai or landed in Hong Kong should be taken by those `on the spot', 
meaning the consulate and military officers in Shanghai, so long as it was in keeping with 
British policy that troops were for the preservation of British life rather than any political 
purpose 106 The naval Commander-in-Chief deemed it necessary to bring the Indian Mixed 
Brigade directly to Shanghai, so the stronger defence option was enforced. These troops 
106 On the role of Britain's `men on the spot', see Pelcovits, Old China Hands and the Foreign Ofice, and 
Hirata Koji, `Britain's Men on the Spot in China: John Jordan, Yuan Shikai and the Reorganisation Loan, 
1912-1914', Modern Asian Studies (Forthcoming 2012). 
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were to be confined to the Settlement `except in case of grave emergency. ' 107 The SMC 
was subordinate to the British consular and military authorities in these decisions, revealing 
the way in which it depended on colonial assistance when the SVC was not a sufficient 
defence force. 
As Chiang Kai-shek's Northern Expedition neared Shanghai, the SMC prepared for 
it to besiege or attack the Settlement, but also for internal disorder. It was a general strike 
on 21 March 1927, encouraging fears of `Bolshevism', which prompted the council to 
declare a state of emergency, mobilise the SVC and SMP and call the naval forces to its 
defence. 108 The combined force helped defend the Settlement as the Nationalists seized the 
rest of the city except Zhabei, where fighting continued. Briefly, the next day, British and 
Chinese exchanged fire, killing around 25 Chinese, while more died when repelled from the 
safety of the Settlement to the guns of the Nationalists. 109 By the end of the day, Chiang 
Kai-shek's troops were victorious and the streets were silent. Foreign residents attributed 
the safety of the Settlement to the council, for its own defensive measures and for taking 
the decision to enlist the help of the foreign powers. The annual meeting of ratepayers the 
following month passed unanimously a resolution expressing `heartfelt gratitude for the 
measures taken by the Municipal Council in the first instance and afterwards by the 
Foreign Powers for the protection of all residents of this Settlement [emphasis added]. ' No 
doubt gratified by the emphasis placed on the initial response taken by the SMC ahead of 
107 TNA, CAB 23/54, telegraph to Sir Miles Lampson, 10 February 1927, appendix to cabinet meeting 
minutes, same date. 
108 Clifford, Spoilt Children ofEmpire, p. 217. 
'°9 Clifford, Spoilt Children ofEmpire, p. 219. 
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the foreign powers, Fessenden forwarded the resolution to the consular body. 110 The 
Chinese response was more muted, Shenbao welcoming the lifting of the state of 
emergency (aptly jieyanling `martial law', in Chinese) in the Settlement on 10 
May 1927 and highlighting the negative impact the measure had had on business. )11 
The SVC had again erected defensive barbed wire barricades, walls, gates, and 
concrete blockhouses, including barbed wire defences right across the Sinza and Markham 
Road bridges into the Settlement, obstructing all traffic. As the threat subsided the council 
had the barricades removed from the sidewalks of the bridges, but kept the roads blocked, 
resulting in fierce criticism from the Chinese Ratepayers' Association on behalf of 
businesses whose trade was suffering. 112 Stirling Fessenden, Secretary General of the 
council, argued that the barricades were still required due `to the intensive campaign of 
anti-foreign publicity which is being conducted in Chinese territory outside the limits of the 
Settlement, apparently under the auspices of the local Nationalist authorities ... [which he 
considered to be] deliberately calculated to arouse the worst passions in the ignorant 
masses. ' These barbed wire barricades, erected as a military defence against the forces of 
war, became a protective barrier against political opposition. More than civil war, it was the 
supposedly marauding masses of Chinese anti-imperialism that Fessenden and his 
colleagues feared most keenly in the years following the May Thirtieth Movement. 
11° NARA RG 84/1686: Fessenden to Consul-General, 20 April 1927. The British consul would have been 
just as gratified by the next paragraph of the resolution: `There is abundant evidence from what has happened 
elsewhere and what has been attempted here, that if it had not been for the prompt action of the Powers, 
especially Great Britain, this Settlement would have run the greatest risk of being dominated by the forces of 
disorder [emphasis added]. ' 
111 Shenbao, 11 May 1927, p. 9. 
112 Exchange of correspondence between the Senior Consul ad interim, the Commissioner of Foreign Affairs, 
and the Secretary of the SMC, printed in Municipal Gazette, Vol. XX, No. 1083,24 June 1927, pp. 222-3. 
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Nevertheless, bowing to public and consular pressure, the barricades were removed a 
month later and replaced with gates: a more permeable barrier. 
The barricades were highly valued by many of the Settlement's residents as a source 
of security. Their importance was illustrated when Y. C. Poon of 106 Wusong Road 
requested that his tax contribution be reduced from the General Municipal Rate to the 
Special Rate, which was two percentage points lower. Poon's claim was based on the fact 
that his property, though within the boundaries of the Settlement, was on the outside of the 
barriers when they were erected, leaving him unprotected. 113 His request was approved, a 
recognition that the protection of the lives and property of residents was a primary role of 
the council, as indeed it had been from its earliest days. Conversely, a protest at a higher 
assessment of the value of a property on the borders of the Settlement for the payment of 
rates, on similar grounds that it was beyond the gates so in times of emergency was `as 
unsafe as Chinese territory' and therefore commanded lower rents, was rejected in 1933.114 
The argument was not considered unfounded, however: the Finance Committee simply 
noted that the location of the property on the edge of the Settlement had been taken into 
account when assessing its value. The barriers thus formed a more real administrative 
boundary to the Settlement than the official perimeter established in 1899. 
The greatest test for the council's ability to protect the Settlement from outside 
threats came when the Japanese were no longer content with the limited role they enjoyed 
alongside their longer-standing western counterparts in China. Chinese nationalist 
resentment of foreign transgressions focussed on Japanese imperialism and found powerful 
expression in an effective boycott of Japanese goods. The existing antagonism only 
113 U1-1-61: Finance Committee, 17 June 1927. 
IU U1-1-62: Finance Committee, 26 May 1933. 
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increased as Japan's ambitions crystallised in the occupation of Manchuria from September 
1931. As the year drew to a close, an approaching conflict between Japan and China in 
Shanghai seemed inevitable. In response, chairman Brigadier-General Macnaghten 
convened a meeting of the Shanghai Defence Committee in December, which brought 
together the Commandant of the Shanghai Volunteer Corps, the Commander of the 
Shanghai Municipal Police, the Commandant of the troops of the French Concession, the 
Garrison Commanders and staff officers of all the foreign forces present in the city, and the 
Secretary General of the council. They agreed to a defence scheme that, in the event of the 
SMC declaring a state of emergency, would divide the Settlement into sectors, each the 
responsibility of a different force (the defence sectors planned in 1935, shown in Figure 11, 
followed the same boundaries). ' 15 According to the scheme, each force would protect the 
inhabitants of its sector regardless of nationality, and confine its activities to that sector 
alone. The SMC was directing the entire combined foreign force from its chambers, and its 
role in deciding when and if to declare a state of emergency made it central to the defence 
of the Settlement. 
113 SMA U1-1-1251: A. M. Kotenev, `Memorandum on Sino-Japanese Armed Conflict', pp. 3-8. This 
meeting was reported in the Chinese press, but the details were not known. Shenbao, 22 January 1932, p. 9. 
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Figure 11: Map of distribution of foreign forces and defences in Shanghai, 1935. ' 16 
116 TNA WO106/5334, <http: //www. virtualshanghai. net/Image. php>, accessed 19 November 2011. 
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Following a bomb explosion on the morning of 28 January 1932, the council 
declared a state of emergency to take effect from four o'clock that afternoon, on the 
recommendation of the Defence Committee. 117 Each force rushed to prepare to defend its 
sector. The Japanese sector included, on the insistence of Admiral K6ichi Shiozawa, not 
only Hongkou within the Settlement, but also part of Zhabei, where he claimed 
hyperbolically that 6,000 Japanese residents had pleaded for protection against 600,000 
hostile Chinese troops. 18 But the Chinese were not informed that this was the official 
plan. ' 19 The Japanese naval troops took their positions within the Settlement in time for the 
start of the State of Emergency at four o'clock, but waited until nearly midnight to move 
into Zhabei. This was therefore taken by Chinese forces as an act of war and they opened 
fire, precipitating the outbreak of warfare and ushering in the Japanese occupation of the 
district that would last until 1945. The fighting was intense and bloody, especially on the 
Chinese side: the best estimates are almost 12,000 casualties among Chinese soldiers and 
2,500 among Japanese soldiers. 120 Momentarily, Chinese public opinion as expressed in the 
press sided with the SMC's attempts to increase the area under its control, recognising that 
this would be at the expense of Japanese aggression. 121 Shenbao reported favourably on the 
Watch Committee's condemnation of Japanese aggression and highlighted the role of the 
"" Jordan, China's Trial by Fire, pp. 32-33. 
118 Hallett Abend, My Life in China, 1926-1941 (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1943), p. 187. Abend 
was a correspondent of the New York Times. 
119 Shenbao reported the SMC's preparations for conflict earlier that day, but not the all-important extent of 
the Japanese defence plans. Shenbao, 28 January 1932, pp. 13-14. 
120 Jordan, China's Trial by Fire, pp. 187-88; Christian Henriot, `Beyond Glory: Civilians, Combatants and 
society During the Battle of Shanghai', War & Society (Forthcoming 2012).. Atrocities abounded: to add one 
to the many documented by Donald Jordan and others, J. H. Jordan described `deliberate shooting at [the] 
windows of [the] Mental Hospital. ' U1-16-10-216: J. H. Jordan, `Diary of State of Emergency', 29 January 
1932. 
121 Shenbao, 30 January 1932, p. 2; 31 January 1932, p. 2. 
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SVC as the protector of the Settlement. 122 Yet as the council's powerlessness to curb 
Japanese militarism became clear, the newspaper added its voice to international criticism 
of the SMC's neutral stance. 123 Where the council had failed in annexing Zhabei, the 
Japanese had succeeded. More importantly, the council had failed dramatically in its self- 
appointed role of maintaining the neutrality of this neighbouring district. Its own defence 
scheme and declaration of a state of emergency were the catalysts which led to an open 
exchange of fire on the night of 28 January. Without them, the Sino-Japanese hostilities 
would still have erupted, but the council's role should not be overlooked. 
Crucial to keeping the conflict outside the main areas of the Settlement (except for 
Hongkou, the Japanese section) were defences of barbed wire and steel gates. The Defence 
Committee recommended the barbed wire barricades be erected just days before the 
emergency, as the likelihood of conflict increased. On the evening of 28th January, the night 
when the hostilities erupted, the SVC prevented 100 Japanese bluejackets from passing 
through the gates on North Hunan Road, which were major defensive structures flanked by 
blockhouses. 124 However, when the Japanese Commander indicated that he planned to take 
his troops through this gate five days later to launch a counter-attack on Chinese troops, the 
Defence Committee decided that all the SVC could do to prevent this was to place barbed 
wire and other obstacles on the approach to the gates: under no circumstances were the 
volunteers to fire on the Japanese forces. 125 This policy was in the interests of preserving 
the municipality's self-proclaimed neutrality, which it otherwise manifestly failed to do 
during the conflict as the northern section of the Settlement was successfully used by the 
1 22 Shenbao, 4 February 1932, p. 3; 13 February 1932, p. 2. 
123 Shenbao, 11 February 1932, p. 2; 12 February 1932, p. 2. 
124 Kotenev, `Memorandum on Sino-Japanese Armed Conflict', p. 21. 
125 Kotenev, `Memorandum on Sino-Japanese Armed Conflict', p. 28. 
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Japanese as a base for their military operations. Given this policy, however, the gates and 
barriers were of even greater significance, as they enabled the SMP and SVC to defend the 
Settlement without resorting to the force of arms. 
With the benefit of hindsight it is easy to see the subsequent Japanese occupation of 
Shanghai from 1937 as inevitable, but following the war of 1932 the council continued to 
try to contain Japanese ambitions in the Settlement in an effort to preserve the status quo. 
Measured increases to the Japanese branch of the SMP and the promotion of its officers 
were permitted (see pp. 105-107 and 164-5 of this thesis) but not the wholesale Japanese 
control of Hongkou that Japanese councillors desired. But on 13 August 1937 war broke 
out on the streets of the Settlement. J. H. Jordan, Commissioner of Public Health, kept a 
vivid diary of events as they unfurled. Beginning with a few shots audible from the Dixwell 
Road Police Station at 9: 35, heavy gunfire moved into the Settlement. 126 The following day 
came the first aerial bombing, which caused the SMC Administration Building to 
reverberate for two minutes. This was followed by the noise of anti-aircraft fire and late in 
the afternoon a shell burst over the Administration Building, shrapnel `pattering down' on 
the roof and acrid fumes encircling the municipal staff as they responded to the crisis. 
Bombs were dropped on the Bund, the heart of the Settlement, contributing to a death toll 
of over 1,000 in one day and shattering the carefully nurtured neutrality of the Settlement. 
The Public Works Department oversaw some of the digging of trenches by charity 
organisations to help dispose of the dead bodies that lay strewn in the streets, while the 
Public Health Department provided kerosene to the Japanese authorities to assist in the 
126 U1-16-10-217: J. H. Jordan, `State of Emergency 1937: Diary of Events', 13 August 1937. 
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cremation of corpses in Hongkou. 127 Shanghai fell in late October, after the loss of 300,000 
Chinese. 128 Nanjing followed, and by December the Settlement was rendered an `isolated 
island' (gudao AA) in occupied China. 
Gates and barriers at the perimeter of the Settlement served a new purpose from 
1937 as the Japanese occupied the rest of Shanghai. Passes were required to cross the 
boundary between the municipalities, with specific reasons given and approved by a 
recognised authority, such as the Shanghai Municipal Council. Many council employees 
were among those in need of passes to continue to perform their everyday functions. 
Applications from Chinese required passport photographs; the applicant's name, sex and 
nativity; the names of his relatives; his occupation, police district and address; a certificate 
of cholera inoculation; and, for chauffeurs, a driving permit. 129 If successful, the passes 
issued would be valid for between two and twelve months. But many were not eligible for 
passes or had their applications refused. Japanese sentries checked passes at the entrances 
to the Settlement on roads and bridges, and accounts of rough treatment of staff of the 
council's Public Health Department by the sentries show that this was not a simple 
formality. 130 By the late 1930s, therefore, the boundaries of the Settlement were very real 
barriers in the daily working lives of its inhabitants. 
From then on the council no longer ran the whole of the Settlement, Hongkou and 
Yangtzepoo being under solely Japanese control. The SMP no longer policed these districts 
and other council functions such as the provision of public health were severely 
127 Jordan, `State of Emergency', 17 August and 1 September 1927. 
128 Wen-hsin Yeh `Prologue', in Wartime Shanghai (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 2. See the rest of this 
edited volume for more on Shanghai during the Sino-Japanese war. 
129 SMA UI-16-9-202: Municipal Orders, 17 July 1939. 
130SMA U1-16-9-206: 28 February 1939, Dr S. T. Hsiu, Gaol Medical Officer, to Dr R. W. Johnston, 
Superintendent of Hospitals. 
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restricted. 131 Yet when the fighting finished in Shanghai, a degree of normality returned, 
and the neutrality of the Settlement, with the exception of the northern and western districts, 
was restored. The council continued to try to defend its borders, though now the 
undesirable element was the refugees who flooded in from Japanese-occupied areas. The 
French Concession authorities went so far as to try to hold back the tide of refugees by 
closing the steel gates along its borders, but the attempt was futile. 132 The biggest problem 
for the SMP was now trying to combat the criminality that saturated Shanghai's streets, 
centred on the `badlands' west of the Settlement that had so long been semi-controlled by 
the council according to its policy of policing the outside roads. ' 33 Now, however, the SMC 
was barely able to maintain control within the Settlement limits, and it concentrated on its 
administrative rather than expansionist and military functions. With military power now 
firmly in Japanese rather than western hands, the SMC's position was fatally 
compromised. 134 
Following the attack on Pearl Harbour on 7 December 1941, Allied members of the 
SMC were asked to resign in January, effectively putting the council and Settlement under 
Japanese control. Once again, the Settlement's neutrality crumbled, and this time it would 
not be recovered. The SVC was abolished in September 1942, its colours placed 
131 SMA U1-1-63: Joint Health and Finance Committee meeting, 31 March 1939. 
132 `Four Months at War', (Shanghai: North China Daily News, 1938), p. 127, cited in Diana Lary, The 
Chinese People at War: Human Suffering and Social Transformation, 1937-1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), p. 27. The French concession authorities had indeed closed the gates around the 
concession at the beginning of the hostilities in July 1937 and had erected a wall on its southern border to 
protect it from the fighting, but it was harder to keep refugees out. 
133 Frederic Wakeman, Jr., The Shanghai Badlands: Wartime Terrorism and Urban Crime. 1937-1941 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
134 See Robert W. Barnett, Economic Shanghai: Hostage to Politics 1937-1941 (New York: Institute for 
Pacific Relations, 1941), pp. 3-41; Bickers, `Settlers and Diplomats', pp. 234-5. 
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ceremonially in the council chamber. 135 Yet it served Japanese interests to maintain the 
existing boundaries of the Settlement and council affairs for a further year, until abolishing 
it in August 1943. For what was seen as the temporary border to an administrative area with 
but flimsy foundations, the limits of the Settlement agreed in 1898 had proved remarkably 
durable. 
Conclusion 
The bellicose attitude displayed repeatedly by the Shanghai Municipal Council, most 
strikingly in 1913, and its expansionist tendencies in bringing areas well beyond the 
Settlement limits under its jurisdiction, reflect the conviction of its members and those 
whom it represented that it had not only a right to exist but an imperative to expand. Instead 
of providing the bare minimum necessary for the foreign residents to conduct their business, 
as initially envisaged, the council saw the defence and continued expansion of the 
Settlement as an end in itself, much like a colony or independent state with expansionist 
ambitions. The SMC was very effective at defending the Settlement borders, using every 
means at its disposal from bargaining over extending limited rights to representation or 
handing control of the courts to the Chinese in return for an expansion to exercising the full 
force of the Shanghai Volunteers Corps and Shanghai Municipal Police. The council's role 
of defending the residents of the Settlement often took the form of the protection of its 
borders from the encroachment of Chinese authorities, which it had in fact little legal 
entitlement to do, the Settlement remaining at all times Chinese territory. This weakness of 
the council's semi-colonial position led it to act in a more strident and aggressive manner. 
135 Bickers, Empire Made Me, p. 16. 
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Increasingly, however, defence was needed against military threats, and the SMC 
deployed its police and volunteers effectively. It was a significant player in the growing 
Sino-Japanese tensions which broke out into open warfare in 1932 and 1937, and its 
declarations of states of emergency were instrumental in accelerating tensions and in 
bringing foreign naval forces onto Chinese shores. The SMC managed to preserve the 
neutrality of the Settlement in the face of successive threats of mounting military strength, 
even as it itself was far from neutral in its interference in Chinese politics. Conflict was 
inherent in the council's position as an antagonistic presence at the heart of Shanghai and 
the fact that it drew on foreign, primarily British, military backing reflected its status as a 
British-dominated expression of foreign imperialism in China. As an aggressive, expansive 
statelet its successes came in the nineteenth century, although it continued successfully to 
expand its influence on the growing network of extra-Settlement roads up to the 1930s. But 
as a militarised force it strengthened in the twentieth century, only falling in the face of the 
might of Japan, and then only when the western Allies entered the Pacific War. The 
significance of the Shanghai Municipal Council as an actor on the political stage in China 
should not, therefore, be underestimated. Moreover, it is evident that parts of the informal 
empire were no less likely to engage in military conflict than formal colonies. 
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Chapter Four: 
Health within Limits: The Public Health Department 
`[Criticism of the health provision in the International Settlement] serve[s] to defeat 
the very aims we have in view by weakening the morals of our own health workers 
and tax payers, and by causing the Chinese outside to deprecate the health 
organisation under foreign control (assuming that we have any influence in either 
direction). 
`During the past ten years I have travelled in fifteen of the eighteen provinces of 
China, and have visited every large port in Asia as far as Bombay (with the exception 
of Colombo). It is always with a feeling of relief, pleasure and pride that I return to 
the International Settlement. " 
David Arnold has claimed that understanding disease and medicine are central to the study 
of colonial rule, as the prevention and treatment of disease formed a source of contact, 
conflict and sometimes eventual convergence between the coloniser and the colonised. 2 
Disease was a key element in the ideological and political framework of empire, as western 
confidence in science produced a growing sense of cultural superiority, as expressed in the 
opening quotation. 3 Colonial medicine also throws light on internal divisions within 
colonial authorities, as decisions concerning the allocation of scarce resources revealed 
conflicting priorities. This chapter is therefore devoted to the development of public health 
provision in the International Settlement, as a case study of how the semi-colonial Shanghai 
' SMA U1-16-9-198: Letter from W. W. Peters, MD, Director of the Council on Health Education, to H. 
Holgate, President of the Rotary Club of Shanghai, 19 March 1925. See p. 9 for more on the Council on 
Health Education. 
2 David Arnold, `Introduction', in Imperial Medicine and Indigenous Societies, ed. by David Arnold 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988), p. 2. 
3 David Arnold, Science, Technology and Medicine in Colonial India (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000), pp. 15-17. 
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Municipal Council functioned in practice and how effective it was in managing the 
Settlement. 
The broader themes of the thesis are all in evidence here: the similarities to 
experience in formal British colonies, but also subtle differences from them due to the 
semi-colonial nature of Shanghai; the transnational influences at work in Shanghai, notably 
the League of Nations Health Organisation and the Rockefeller Foundation, yet also the 
limits of transnationalism within the Settlement due to racial tensions between the western- 
dominated council and Chinese residents and authorities; and the challenges facing the 
council in the form of the financial limitations of a tight budget, the geographical 
limitations of the Settlement boundaries, and the legal limitations of the Land Regulations 
and Byelaws. The work of the SMC's Public Health Department (PHD) is approached from 
the perspective of these limitations, while the significance of the council's semi-colonial 
and transnational nature and context is highlighted throughout. 
The Shanghai Municipal Council was charged by the Land Regulations with 
providing an environment and infrastructure conducive to business. This included, by 
implication and as council activities developed, the implementation of a public health 
policy to provide a safer living and working environment for its residents - safer, that is, 
than the surrounding Chinese City; as was true in many colonial contexts, `lines of hygiene 
were boundaries of rule'. The SMC often appeared to prefer to see the Settlement as an 
isolated island, doing its best to ignore the other political authorities in the city and beyond. 
But as the demands of public health grew, this became impossible. The widely accepted 
4 Alison Bashford, Imperial Hygiene: A Critical History of Colonialism. Nationalism and Public Health 
(London: Palgrave, 2004), p. 1. 
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maxim that `prevention is better than cure's dictated that large-scale measures be taken to 
improve the health of the general population as the best defence against outbreaks of 
serious disease. Such measures would be rendered somewhat ineffective if confined to the 
8.66 square miles of the Settlement, especially as these were exceptionally porous 
boundaries, through which the city's inhabitants crossed daily as they often lived, worked 
and enjoyed their leisure hours in parts of the city under different jurisdictions. Cooperation 
with the neighbouring authorities was therefore crucial and unavoidable, although, as this 
chapter will demonstrate, the different sides viewed each other with suspicion and 
cooperation was far from smooth. 
Political borders were not the only limits on the work of the PHD. As seen above, 
the perennial problem of funding was particularly acute in laissez-faire Shanghai, where the 
council and ratepayers were largely allied in a desire to keep spending and thus taxation to 
a minimum. That minimum was often confined largely to the needs of the foreign 
population, especially prior to 1928 when the first Chinese council members were finally 
brought into the decision-making process. Public health provision in the early decades of 
the twentieth century was therefore driven by the concerns of the foreign residents, with 
disease prevention within the Chinese population motivated to an extent by the desire to 
protect foreigners from infection. Health officers with the best of intentions were forced to 
scale down their public health programmes in the face of budgetary constraints. They were 
also limited in what they could achieve by the peculiar legal basis of the council's authority, 
! That this phrase was already in common currency in Victorian England is evidenced by the publication of 
books including it in their title, including Sarah Ellis, Prevention Better than Cure, or, The Moral Wants of 
the World We Live in (London: Appleton, 1847); R. B. Richmond, "Prevention Better than Cure ": Practical 
Remarks on the Prevention of Cholera and Removal of other Troublesome States of the Bowels (London: 
Nissen and Parker, 1849); unknown author, What is Cholera? Or, Prevention Better than Cure, by a Bengal 
Doctor (London: G. Purkess, 1860). 
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which rested on the Land Regulations and supplementary byelaws, the changing of which 
was no easy task. In addition, particularly in the earlier years of this period, there was the 
suspicion of many Chinese towards western medical methods to overcome, and the 
corresponding lack of cultural understanding on the part of the council's health personnel. 
Both were common features of colonial societies throughout the world. 
This chapter begins with an overview of the development of the council's public 
health provision from the late nineteenth century, before examining in depth how the health 
department functioned and the ways in which it sought to maximise its impact despite 
budgetary and legal limitations. This included everyday public health work as well as 
moments when the council attempted far-reaching intervention in the daily lives of Chinese 
residents, such as during the plague epidemic of 1910. In this way the reaction of 
Shanghainese to such measures is explored as indicative of the council's relationship with 
the population of the Settlement. In addition, the municipal laboratory is analysed in terms 
of its practical and symbolic role in the council's claim to scientific modernity. 
Next, the chapter turns to the rivalrous relationship between the council and the 
French Concession authorities in relation to public health, which oscillated between 
cooperation and resentment. The two foreign authorities had to reconcile differences of 
opinion on all areas of public health, including such contentious touch-points as the 
treatment of venereal diseases and the insane. The nature of the relationship between the 
council and the Chinese Municipal Government of Shanghai, formed in 1927, is then 
considered. While health officers on both sides were keen to improve public health 
provision, there was little appetite for compromise on points of difference, and areas of 
public health policy were exploited for political gain. Yet despite frequent failure to 
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cooperate with the authorities beyond the limits of the International Settlement, the PHD 
was able to achieve marked improvements in certain areas of public health in the 
Republican period. Where cooperation was achieved, the progress made was all the greater, 
and it appears that such cooperation was attempted more frequently and with increasing 
success in the years following 1927. Finally, the degree to which the department can be 
considered to have had a positive impact on the public health of the Settlement is assessed 
by analysing mortality rates through the period. Through this study, new light is shed on the 
shifting patterns of power in Shanghai in this period as they were played out in the field of 
public health. 
Laying the groundwork: the infrastructure of public health 
Kerrie MacPherson has traced the early history of public health in the international 
Settlement and the process which led the initially highly laissez-faire council to take on a 
growing role in this area through the course of the latter half of the nineteenth century. 6 
This change came as a result of the growth of the perceived need for action on public health 
in Shanghai, as in urban centres in Europe and the USA, which grew out of a greater 
understanding of the causes of disease. The cholera epidemics which ravaged much of 
Europe from 1830 to 1847 led to a concerted international effort to tackle public health 
problems 7 This in turn influenced European colonial societies as governments were soon 
held to be responsible for the provision of basic disease prevention measures. Similarly, the 
first large outbreak of cholera in Shanghai in 1862-3 prompted the Shanghai Municipal 
6 MacPherson, A Wilderness of Marshes, p. 99. 
Sunil Amrith, Decolonizing International Health: India and South East Asia, 1930-65 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 5. 
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Council to expand its role into this area, entailing an increase in its powers. European 
colonisers were chauvinistic in their confidence that western medical practice was the sole 
route to improved public health and could therefore be draconian in imposing sweeping 
legislation to effect change in the standards of public hygiene. More often, however, they 
were held back by a lack of power or will to expand their authority in this way. As Sunil 
Amrith explains, the `desire to know, to classify and to quantify did not correspond to the 
will or the ability to intervene. ' s This was certainly true of Shanghai's International 
Settlement. Moreover, MacPherson stresses that progress in Shanghai was only possible 
with cooperation between westerners and Chinese, which meant reconciling widely 
differing views of health and disease. 9 Thus cooperation on public health was key 
throughout the entire treaty port period. 
In 1870 the Watch Committee identified the need for a formal sanitary department 
to oversee medical work, markets and what was called the `nuisance department', which 
sought to ensure the removal of ordure and waste, an issue that caused problems throughout 
the existence of the council. The Committee presented a memo on the subject to the council 
which resulted in the appointment of Dr Edward Henderson as the first Medical Officer of 
Health (part time) in 1871.10 The decades following Henderson's appointment saw the 
establishment of municipal markets and a municipal abattoir, which maintained a certain 
standard of hygiene, and the compulsory licensing of butchers and dairies. " A municipal 
e Amrith, Decolonizing International Health, p. 22. 
9 MacPherson, Wilderness of Marshes, pp. vii-vii. 
10 U1-16-9-198: J. H. Jordan and C. Noel Davis, `A Brief History of the Public Health Department', 1 August 
1930. The Watch Committee continued to be responsible for the department until 1918, when a separate 
Health Committee was established. 
11 Jordan and Noel Davis, `Brief History'. 
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laboratory was established in 1896 and became one of the major producers of vaccines in 
China as well as conducting numerous tests, as described below. 
The most significant nineteenth-century achievement was the establishment of a 
clean water supply, in keeping with concurrent developments in London, Paris and New 
York. The main supply of water in Shanghai had long been the polluted Huangpu River, 
which, like the Seine and the Thames, was teeming with waterborne diseases (though to a 
lesser extent than the rivers of the major European capitals). The council was blamed by 
many contemporaries for having allowed land developments which filled in drains, and for 
replacing efficient Chinese drainage systems with sewers which bore waste directly into the 
waterways. 12 It finally entered into negotiations with the Shanghai Waterworks Company in 
1880, having decided a private venture was preferable to public ownership, and a state-of- 
the-art network of mains and hydrants was fully operational by 1883. The waterworks 
underpinned the public health of the city for many decades, although, unlike the French 
Conseil municipal, the SMC did not pay for Chinese to have free access to water hydrants, 
so Chinese uptake of the comparatively expensive clean water supply was incomplete. 13 
Care for the Settlement's poorer Chinese residents was not considered as important as 
ensuring the foreign community could access unpolluted water. 14 
12 MacPherson, Wilderness of Marshes, pp. 78-80. 
13 In 1932 the Health Committee considered a suggestion that free water should be supplied to the poor 
through water hydrants near `beggar villages'. The members approved the idea in principle but recommended 
no action be taken, on the basis that five to ten per cent of Chinese chose to use water from wells despite 
access to Waterworks water, and other factors were more significant than water supply in the prevention of 
cholera. U1-1-124: Health Committee, 30 June 1932. 
14 Chinese were suspicious of piped water so slow uptake was not solely based on economic factors. See 
Hanchao Lu for an account of the kinds of concerns residents of Shanghai in the 1880s shared with those of 
Chengdu in the 1950s when piped water was first introduced. Hanchao Lu, `The Significance of the 
Insignificant: Reconstructing the Daily Life of the Common People in China', China: An Interdisciplinary 
Journal, Vol. 1, No. I (Spring 2003), pp. 145-8. 
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The quality of the water was, however, subject to doubt: the Health Committee was 
informed in 1918 that the water was `of fair quality' but `could not be considered a really 
good water' as compared to that provided in cities such as Manchester, London or 
Calcutta. 15 Significantly, the points of reference for council activities were metropolitan 
Britain and that exemplar of the British Empire: India. Although the supply of safe water 
undoubtedly underpinned the fundamental health of the residents of the Settlement, it was 
nevertheless considered inferior to that which the British and other foreign communities 
would have expected in the municipalities of their home countries or even in the formal 
British empire. In the constant comparisons foreigners made between Shanghai and `Home', 
`Home' represented an almost mythologized ideal, to which the SMC aspired but which it 
was not in reality expected to attain. 
Expectations for what could and should be provided in Shanghai were lower than 
those in Europeans cities of comparable size and prominence, or in Indian cities such as 
Calcutta, owing to assumptions about the nature of the Settlement. John Carroll has 
identified an attitude that remained prevalent in Hong Kong until much later in the 
twentieth century, that Chinese had come to the colony voluntarily and therefore `neither 
expected nor deserved much from the colonial government. ' 16 Quoting G. B. Endacott, he 
notes that "`the unspoken assumption was that Asians, and in particular the Chinese, were 
not forced to come to Hong Kong, and if they did so that was their own affair and they must 
accept conditions as they found them. "' 17 In the case of Shanghai, particularly prior to the 
15 U1-1-123: Health Committee, 17 June 1918. 
16 John Carroll, 'A National Custom: Debating Female Servitude in Late Nineteenth-Century Hong Kong', 
ModernAsian Studies, Vol. 43, No. 6 (November 2009), pp. 1492-3. 
17 G. B. Endacott, Hong Kong Eclipse, ed. by Alan Birch (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 320, 
quoted in Carroll, `A National Custom', p. 1493. 
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1920s, such an assumption went beyond Asians to encompass all poorer residents of 
Shanghai: the council did not consider itself duty-bound to provide welfare for anybody, 
Chinese or European, as all had come to the Settlement of their own volition to benefit 
from the commercial opportunities the city afforded. The council's role was simply to 
promote those opportunities. Indeed, as late as 1939 the Treasurer reiterated to the Finance 
Committee the council's position of assuming no responsibility for poor relief 18 
Illustrating this point, the Secretary to the council, in correspondence with the 
Health Officer in 1905, corrected a misapprehension that the SMC's motivation in its 
negotiations with the Waterworks Company was based on concern for the public health, 
saying `The Waterworks Agreement, except in the one particular which I have referred to 
you, is by no means a public health matter; its details are purely financial, engineering and 
commercial. ' 19 The `one particular' in question was whether the agreement should include 
provision for a minimum standard for the bacterial purity of the water, which was set by the 
Health Officer, Arthur Stanley. The negotiations over this agreement, which revised the 
original terms for the Waterworks Company, betray the priorities of the council and the 
way these restricted public health provision: the municipal finances came first in this city of 
commerce. Stanley could only grasp opportunities where he could to achieve public health 
benefits without placing too much of a burden on the public purse. 
Although the Shanghai Waterworks was a private company, the SMC regulated 
prices for water as it did for other public utilities, keeping costs low for the benefit of both 
businesses and consumers. As was common practice in Great Britain, water bills were paid 
by landlords and no restriction was imposed on the consumption of water, again benefitting 
18 U1-1-63: Finance Committee, 5 July 1939. 
19 U1-1-306: Secretary, J. O. P. Bland, to Health Officer, Arthur Stanley, 1 February 1905, emphasis added. 
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residents. 20 The council's involvement in the companies could, however, be detrimental to 
customers: Xing Jianrong argues that the council always supported the utilities 
companies, 2' including the waterworks, and their interests were tied to the extent that the 
SMC was a major shareholder in such firms. 22 In support of Xing's argument, the SMC 
pursued a long-term strategy to gain control of the Shanghai Waterworks Company. In 
1916 it bought the entire new issue of shares in the Company, and its holdings were 
sufficient to nominate two members to the board of the company. 23 Then in 1924 the SMC 
sought to buy out the company and run it as a municipal concern to resolve long-running 
disputes over its perceived neglect of consumer interests. When a price could not be agreed, 
the council pressed for a revision of the terms of the company's agreement, which had last 
been settled in 1905, and emphasised the need `to substitute the interests of the consumer 
for those of the shareholder as the chief incentive for the affairs of the Company being 
conducted on the most economical lines. '24 In keeping with the council's preoccupation 
with economy, this provision was listed third in a letter from the acting secretary to the 
manager of the company, beneath the priorities of aligning the company's and the council's 
interests and of ensuring adequate returns for shareholders. But it still demonstrates that the 
council was concerned about residents as well as returns. 
20 U1-1-56: Finance Committee, 11 June 1903. 
21 Xing Jianrong, `Shui, dian, mei', p. 100. Xing Jianrong is Director of Research at the Shanghai Municipal 
Archives, so benefits from extensive access to archival materials but naturally adheres strictly to the officially 
accepted historical standpoint as the occupier of such a senior position. 
22 The SMC was able to negotiate favourable terms for the purchase of shares in the Waterworks Company, 
and by 1913 its holdings were worth £28,700. UI-1-57: Finance Committee, 24 June 1913. As noted in 
Chapter Two, the expansion of public utilities provision beyond the limits of the settlement was accompanied 
by demands for taxation by the SMC, and when such special rates were unpaid, companies were ordered to 
halt supply. When Chinese firms attempted to compete with the municipally-supported monopolies, they were 
effectively opposed by the International and French councils. 
23 UI-1-58: Finance Committee, 9 November 1916; UI-1-59: Finance Committee, 8 October 1920. 
24 Memo attached to E. S. B. Rowe, Acting Secretary to Council, to F. B. Pitcairn, Engineer-in-Chief & 
Manager, Shanghai Waterworks Co., 3 April 1924, published in Municipal Gazette, 8 April 1924, pp. 145-6. 
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Assuming greater responsibility for public health 
Whereas in the earlier days of the Settlement the council considered its responsibilities in 
regard to public health to be confined to the provision of rudimentary infrastructure and 
control of infectious diseases through limited use of quarantine, from the turn of the century 
it took on an increasing role in providing health services. These developments came under 
Dr Arthur Stanley during his tenure as the council's first full-time Health Officer from 1898 
until 1922. The council then added to the existing private charitable hospitals by 
establishing municipal isolation hospitals for Chinese in 1900 and for foreigners in 1904. 
These provided for the treatment of infectious diseases under the direction of the council. 
More markets were built and powers of inspection were extended, though efforts to secure 
much greater powers through amendments to the byelaws failed in 1903 and in subsequent 
years. Measures were taken to reduce the breeding grounds of flies and mosquitoes, 
focusing on raising public awareness of the issue due to the lack of powers to order the 
compulsory filling in of pools of stagnant water. 25 The link between mosquitoes and 
malaria had only been conclusively established by Ronald Ross in India in 1897 (earning 
him the Nobel Prize for Medicine in 1902). 26 Stanley was thus deploying the latest 
developments in medical science in attempting to limit the breeding grounds of the 
parasites. There was popular opposition to some of these measures, but letters sent to the 
council in later years from Chinese complaining about unsanitary conditions in shops and 
u This echoed work done by Americans in Panama targeting mosquito breeding grounds in a crusade against 
yellow fever, following experiments by American doctors in Cuba which established the link between 
mosquitoes and the disease. Alexandra Minna Stern, `Yellow Fever Crusade: US Colonialism, Tropical 
Medicine, and the International Politics of Mosquito Control, 1900-1920', in Medicine at the Border: Disease, 
Globalization and Security, 1850 to the Present, ed. by Alison Bashford (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2006), pp. 41-59. 
zs Gordon Harrison, Mosquitoes, Malaria, and Man: A History of the Hostilities since 1880 (London: John 
Murray, 1978), pp. 73-77,107-108. 
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demanding action by PHD health inspectors suggest a more favourable public reception of 
these efforts, at least among the literate classes. 27 
The most significant structural change to the PHD came in 1912 when branch health 
offices (BHOs) were established in sixteen newly designated districts, to increase direct 
interaction between the council's health personnel and the Chinese in the Settlement. The 
council made a virtue of the fact that they existed almost solely to serve the Chinese 
community, 28 even though foreigners were indirectly served by any reduction in disease 
among their Chinese neighbours. BHOs operated annual vaccination drives and promoted 
general hygienic practices through disseminating literature and holding public lectures. 
SMC campaigns promoting proper waste disposal and against spitting in the street, for 
example, were enacted mainly through the BHOs. These campaigns, as well as the success 
of vaccination drives, were reported in Shenbao and other newspapers, suggesting a degree 
of public awareness among the consumers of print media. 29 The SMC was not the only 
body to promote public health education: the YMCA was particularly active in producing 
awareness-raising literature on hygiene issues for public consumption, and was taken as a 
model by the Chinese Government of Greater Shanghai in its campaigns from 1928 30 In 
1916 the YMCA cooperated with the Chinese Medical Missionary Association and the 
National Medical Association to form the Council on Health Education, which 
27 SMA U1-16-12-268. Complaints were received, however, from shopkeepers protesting at the regulations. 
U1-1-89: Watch Committee, 9 March 1928. 
28 Feetham, Report, Vol. II, p. 50. 
29 See, for example, `2pIiPl il 'Lh t flti3 [iEZj' (Gongbuju weishengju zhangtie jingzhi 
suidi tutan, bingzhi tanyu, `The Public Health Department of the SMC is issuing handbills prohibiting casual 
spitting and promoting the use of spittoons'), Shenbao, 1 April 1924, p. 11; `2öISf * MAc3OR ffItfo 
ffltl'La' (Gongbuju weishengju bugao quid ren)i gingdao iaji, 'The Public Health Department of the SMC 
has issued prohibition of the arbitrary dumping of waste'), Shenbao, 30 April 1924, p. 13; `$$ADE1=1' 
(Zujie renkou stwang la, `The Death Rate in the Settlement'), Shenbao, 14 January 1932, p. 15. 
Chieko Nakajima, `Health and Hygiene in Mass Mobilization: Hygiene Campaigns in Shanghai, 1920- 
1945', Twentieth-Century China, Vol. 34, No. 1(November 2004), pp. 45-7. 
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disseminated information through posters such as that in Figure 12 and through other 
means. The SMC was one of a number of sources of public health information for residents 
of Shanghai, but was the most consistent supplier of such information over the period under 
study. 
Figure 12. Example of poster promoting smallpox vaccination, produced by the Council on 
Hygiene Education (Zhonghua weisheng jiaoyuhui). 31 
The branch health offices formed the face of the PHD to the public and it seems that 
in general the public responded well, attending the regular health lectures and queuing at 
BHOs for free smallpox vaccinations in their thousands (58,213 were vaccinated by the 
SMC in 1929, for example, of whom over 56,000 were Chinese). 32 Not all these were 
residents of the Settlement: investigation in 1928 found that half the recipients of free 
vaccinations in a northern sub-district of the Settlement lived in Zhabei, north of the 
31 The Rotarian (September 1926), p. 42. 
32 Jordan and Davis, 'A Brief History'. 
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Settlement, where doctors were said to over-charge and use old and ineffective vaccines. 33 
The BHOs continued to promote vaccination, however, and the policy had a significant 
impact: by 1930 just 46 cases were admitted to the municipal Chinese Isolation Hospital, of 
whom 13 died. Many of those who survived were young adults who had been vaccinated 
and so contracted a less severe form of the disease. 34 Increasing the uptake of vaccinations 
had meant overcoming strong suspicion of the vaccination on the part of the majority of 
Chinese in earlier decades, 35 and what was reported to be a widespread preference for the 
traditional method of inoculation against smallpox. 36 The council claimed that it was its 
own campaigns which had achieved this change in attitude. 37 These and other campaigns by 
such organisations as the Council on Public Education were arguably, however, simply a 
contributing factor in the broader picture of the acceptance of western medical practice in 
urban centres in China as part of the process of modernisation, as traced by Ruth Rogaski. 38 
Whatever the role of council propaganda in promoting vaccination, the SMC was a pioneer 
in the provision of free vaccinations in Shanghai, decades ahead of such provision being 
possible for the Chinese municipality. This suited the council's self-perception as the sole 
provider of adequate modern public health measures, in contrast with the perceived lack of 
33 SMA U1-16-9-200, V. Ribbons, Inspector, 4'b Northern Sub-district, 'Report on Investigation of Free 
Vaccines in Chapei', 11 December 1928. The rising rates of uptake of the free vaccines and falling number of 
cases have been carefully documented by Luo Suwen: Jindai Shanghai, p. 38. There were also concerns that 
not all the recipients of free vaccination were deserving: some were thought to find it easier to visit their local 
BHO rather than make an appointment to see a private doctor, even though they could afford to pay. SMA 
U1-1-126: Health Committee, 21 November 1938. 
34 SMA U1-16-9-199. 
33 There was corresponding opposition to vaccination in Britain. Nadja Durbach, Bodily Matters: The Anti- 
Vaccination Movement in England, 1853-1907 (Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 2005). 
36 This involved nasal inhalation of skin cells from diseased pox, and had a mortality rate of up to two per 
cent (preferable to the 30 per cent mortality rate of smallpox) as well as rendering the inoculated individual 
infectious to others. Alan D. T. Barrett and Lawrence R. Stanberry, Vaccines for Biodefence and Emerging 
and Neglected Diseases (London: Academic Press, 2009), p. 696. 
37 The council advertised the availability of free vaccinations in the press as well as posters. For example, see 
the leading piece of the Municipal Gazette, Vol. XXIV, No. 1330,9 October 1931, p. 427. 
38 Rogaski, Hygienic Modernity, pp. 225-253. 
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provision by the Chinese authorities. The high uptake of the free vaccinations, moreover, 
suggests that the BHOs were successful in implementing PHD goals in the local 
community. But SMC claims to be ahead of the rest of China in this area were somewhat 
exaggerated, Canton and Tianjin, for example, both enjoying vaccination programmes at 
similar periods 39 
Dr C. Noel Davis succeeded Stanley as Commissioner of Public Health and held the 
post for the rest of the 1920s. Six divisions within the department - Administration, 
Laboratories, Hospitals, Food, Sanitation, and the School Medical Service - operated from 
a combined budget of, in 1930,848,040 taels, of a total municipal budget of 12.7 million 
taels for ordinary expenditure . 
40 As shown in Figure 13, this compared with 5.4 million 
taels budgeted for the Shanghai Municipal Police and 3.8 million for the Public Works 
Department, so health was far from top of the municipal priorities. In this, as in so many 
other areas, the SMC was very much like colonial governments: Megan Vaughan has 
demonstrated the extent to which British colonial authorities in Nyasaland were 
uninterested in investing in public health, devoting just four pence per head to public health 
provision in 1921.41 Financial constraints were ever-present for the public health 
department, although its budget increased significantly in later years as municipal 
expenditure rose, and also increased somewhat as a percentage of total municipal 
expenditure, as shown in Table 4. 
39 Vaccination was introduced by American missionary doctors to Canton. Guangqiu Xu, American Doctors 
in Canton: Modernization in China, 1835-1935 (New Brunswick, N. J.: Transaction, 2011), p. 246. In Tianjin, 
free vaccination was offered in the late nineteenth century in a clinic established by a Chinese salt merchant 
with no foreign involvement. Rogaski, Hygienic Modernity, pp. 71-72. 
1 SMC, Report for 1930. 
41 Megan Vaughan, `Health and hegemony: representation of disease and the creation of the colonial subject 
in Nyasaland', in Shula Marks and Dagmar Engels (eds. ), Contesting Colonial Hegemony: State and Society 








  Police (5.4m taels, 43%) 
  Public Works (3.8m taels, 30%) 
  Health (0.9m taels, 7%) 
Figure 13: Comparative budgets of three departments of the SMC for 1930.42 
1910 1920 1930 
Public Health Department 
expenditure (to nearest 10,000) Tls. 160,000 TIs. 39,000 TIs. 1,340,000 
PHD expenditure as percentage of 
total municipal expenditure 7.3% 8.2% 10.0% 
Table 4: Public Health Department expenditure. "' 
Many decisions concerning public health were taken for economic reasons. In 1908 
the Watch Committee recommended that Stanley's report on the prevalence of plague 
among rats and the first confirmed human case in the Settlement should not be published 
because it would affect the trade of the port. 44 A glass roof was installed in a municipal 
market because it would increase the number of sellers working there and thus boost the 
department's revenues from license fees. 45 When discussing whether or not to move the 
location of the foreign isolation hospital, S. J. Halse, a member of the Health Committee, 
42 SMC, Report for 1930. 
43 SMC, Reports for 1910,1920 and 1930. 
44 U1-1-82: Watch Committee, 21 December 1908. 
45 U1-1-123: Health Committee, 4 August 1923. 
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urged that it be decided on the basis that it was `a good business proposition', as the sites of 
the old isolation hospital and Victoria Nursing Home could be sold for considerable sums, 
rather than thinking of it being for the good of patients. 46 Stanley was praised for `his very 
economical administration of the health department' and a report was submitted by his 
successor, Davis, on `the increased earning power of the Health Department', in terms of 
license fees and charges for laboratory and other services. 47 
Yet under Dr J. H. Jordan, Davis's successor as Commissioner of Public Health, 
there is evidence of a shift away from this preoccupation with economy, as spending by the 
department increased more and more in real terms and as a proportion of municipal 
expenditure. In disputes with the Treasurer over the allocation of resources, Jordan 
sometimes prevailed, such as in 1936 when he insisted that the milk supplied to the council 
for consumption in its hospitals be Grade A T. T. (tuberculin tested) milk, even though this 
would cost 4,310 dollars more than the standard Grade A quality. He argued that the 
council must take a lead in encouraging the members of the community to buy the safest 
milk on the market, which was available precisely because his department had pushed local 
dairies for its production. 48 This was the same year that the matter of T. T. milk was first 
raised in the House of Commons in London, when Mr James de Rothschild enquired of the 
Under-Secretary of State for War whether the milk supplied to soldiers in the British Army 
was of this quality. 
49 The SMC was keeping pace with developments in Britain. Despite 
I U1-1-123: Health Committee, 14 June 1920. 
47 U1-1-123: Health Committee, 12 August 1921 and 9 February 1922. 
48 U1-1-62: Finance Committee, 28 October 1936. 
49 Hansard HC debate 10 March 1936, Vol. 309, 
http: //hansard. millbanksystems. com/commons/1936/mar/10/milk- 
supply#S5CV0309PO_19360310_HOC_157, accessed 14 January 2011. 
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PP. 1053-54, 
such concessions, however, the commissioners of health constantly came up against the 
wall of limited finances. 
Limited powers 
In addition to budgetary constraints, the Public Health Department was restricted in its 
work by the legal limitations on the council's powers to enforce compliance with public 
health regulations. The council's authority rested on the Land Regulations, effectively a 
constitution for the International Settlement. They were first drawn up by the Chinese 
authorities in 1845 to govern the newly established English Settlement, and later revised to 
expand the council's authority in consultation between the SMC and the consular body in 
Shanghai and approved by the diplomatic body in Peking in 1854,1869, and finally in 
1899.50 Each revision had to be passed by a vote of the ratepayers, and also required the 
approval of the Chinese authorities in Shanghai (represented in the person of the Daotai or 
intendant) and Beijing, though this step was overlooked in 1869.51 The difficulty posed by 
this complex process of seeking approval from so many layers of authority, coupled with 
growing Chinese dissatisfaction with the foreign presence, meant it was never possible in 
the twentieth century to make any further changes to the regulations. Efforts therefore 
concentrated instead on adding or adapting byelaws which could give the council certain 
extensions to powers already conferred by the Land Regulations. Byelaws required only 
local approval, by the consular body and the ratepayers, though the latter were conservative 
50 See Godfrey E. P. Hertslet (ed. ), Hertslet's China Treaties: Treaties etc.. between Great Britain and China; 
and between China and foreign powers ... (3d ed., London: HM 
Stationary Office, 1908), Vol. II, pp. 664.. 
687,746-9. The confirmation of the 1899 Regulations included the previous Land Regulations of 1869, which 
had never been formally agreed by the Chinese authorities, as well as three additional powers for the Council. 51 Feetham, Report, Vol. I, p. 59. The Chinese magistrates of Shanghai's Mixed Court appeared to assume 
that the Daotai's proclamation upholding the authority of the Land Regulations in 1855 would apply to may 
such regulations. 
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by inclination and disengaged by nature: on several occasions they either rejected proposed 
new byelaws or simply failed to turn up in sufficient numbers for the meeting to reach the 
quorum of one third of qualified voters. 
The prevention of infectious diseases was one area in which stronger measures than 
those provided for in the Land Regulations and existing byelaws were needed. An attempt 
to add new byelaws enforcing preventive measures failed in 1903 and again in 1906, due to 
the lack of a quorum at special ratepayers' meetings both years, but when plague threatened 
the Settlement strong action was taken. The first human case of plague was confirmed in 
1908 and early the following year Stanley implemented preventive measures based on the 
latest aetiology: rats were trapped by PHD staff wherever possible; notices were posted in 
Chinese promoting cat ownership; Chinese houses were lime-washed after the owners were 
notified; and the department offered a rat-proofing service for the homes of Chinese and 
foreigners at the home-owners' expense. 52 The way in which rats and their fleas acted as 
carriers of plague was only established in 1908, thanks in part to work by colonial doctors 
in India, so Stanley was again implementing the most up-to-date scientific methods in 
Shanghai. 53 Complaints were received from Chinese residents, however, about the forceful 
manner in which their houses were being disinfected and rendered rat-proof. 54 The Health 
Officer reiterated the need for tact and attributed the majority of complaints to the inability 
of one member of his staff to communicate with the householders directly in Chinese, 
therefore having to use a Chinese foreman as a translator and leaving room for 
misunderstanding. Study of the Shanghai dialect had been made compulsory in the 
52 Feetham, Report, Vol. 1, p. 59. 
53 David Arnold, Colonizing the Body: State Medicine and Epidemic Disease in Nineteenth-Century India 
(Berkeley. University of California Press, 1993), p. 210. 
SMA, U1-1-83, Watch Committee, 20 April 1909. 
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department in 1906,55 and had evidently yet to take full effect. The Watch Committee 
observed that no proof had been found to support allegations of extortion, but the fact that 
such accusations were made demonstrates the deep unpopularity of the enforcers of 
measures for the prevention of plague. The council was failing to take Chinese opposition 
to the plague prevention measures sufficiently seriously in its zeal to combat plague in 
accordance with the latest methods. 
Amrith notes that `colonial states only mobilised their medical police at moments of 
crisis and emergency, and particularly in response to epidemic disease', 56 and semi-colonial 
Shanghai followed the same pattern. In 1910 fear enveloped Shanghai as plague spreading 
from Mongolia devastated much of China. 57 The Watch Committee was called to a special 
meeting in October to discuss the action to take after a Chinese victim of plague died in the 
northern district of the Settlement. The members emphasised that prevention measures must 
be taken with `tact and discretion' towards Chinese, but laid out steps which anticipate the 
animosity to follow: police assistance was to be employed if Dr Moore, the acting Health 
Officer, found it necessary in enforcing preventive measures; segregation would be 
voluntary `in the first place' but with the clear expectation that enforced quarantine could 
follow. 58 The committee asserted that no action should be taken beyond Settlement limits 
`for the present', which again implies that such interference could occur later on. Indeed, 
they authorised a letter to the consular body requesting the senior consul to inform the 
Daotai of the council's plague prevention measures and advising `that the work of the 
55 Jordan and Davis, `A Brief History'. 
56 Amrith, Decolonizing International Health, p. 22. 
37 See Carol Benedict, Bubonic Plague in Nineteenth-century China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1996), pp. 155-159. 
58 U1-1-83, Watch Committee, 27 October 1910. 
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Department be not impeded by the authorities in Chapei'. 59 The council did not see the 
Settlement's limits as the limits of its sphere of influence, and public health was certainly 
no exception. 
Opposition to the council's invasive methods was fierce. The Mixed Court 
Magistrate, Pao Yi, wrote to the British Ambassador advising that riots could follow if the 
council's actions were not accompanied by greater caution and leniency. 60 Sure enough, the 
day after he wrote street protests broke out. David Landale, Chairman of the council, 
replied via the Senior Consul that while he appreciated the need for tact in handling the 
situation, the experience of other cities warned `that an exodus of residents and a 
consequent serious depression of trade is one of the certain effects of this devastating 
malady. ' He went on: 
The prosperity of this, the principal port of the Far East, is entirely dependent upon 
uninterrupted commerce. When its continuity is jeopardised by an imminent danger 
such as this, it becomes the imperative duty of the Council, and the community in 
its own interests, to leave no precaution untried in order to arrest it. 61 
Once more, the principal role of the council of creating an environment conducive to 
business is emphasised. The council therefore proposed new byelaws for more extensive 
plague prevention measures, adapted and scaled back from those drawn up but not 
implemented in 1903. The new proposals met with objection from local guilds and others 
59 U1-1-83, Watch Committee, 27 October 1910. 
60 Pao Yi to British Ambassador, 10 November 1910, as published in Municipal Gazette, 18 November 1910. 
61 David Landale to Sir Pelham Warren, 16 November 1910, as published in Municipal Gazette, 18 November 
1910. 
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as too far-reaching in their powers. 62 The ratepayers agreed with these objections and 
passed a resolution tabled by a ratepayer to limit the application of the powers to combating 
plague alone rather than including other infectious diseases. 63 Landale therefore replied to 
the guilds that their request had been met and accepting their offer of cooperation, inviting 
them to nominate a committee to consult with the council on its next step. 64 The council 
thus had better success cooperating with Chinese commercial elites than with the Daotai, 
who wrote criticising the new byelaws. He deprecated the introduction of measures hitherto 
unknown in China, including the reporting of cases of infectious diseases to the Health 
Officer (which Stanley and his fellow medical doctors regarded as crucial), the obligation 
to remove articles belonging to infected persons for fumigation, and setting a minimum 
space requirement in residences of 40 square feet per person. 65 The power to demolish the 
houses which were declared dangerous by the Health Officer owing to the presence of 
plague victims was naturally deeply resented by residents and came in for strong censure 
from the Daotai. 
Similar strong measures against plague in the Cape Colony a few years earlier, 
stressing the need for physical changes in the living environment of non-whites to prevent 
disease, have been used by Maynard Swanson and others after him to demonstrate the 
hardening of racial attitudes in pre-Apartheid South Africa. 66 That the SMC attempted 
similar tactics illustrates the racism that informed its policy decisions, and this is certainly 
62 Representatives of Shanghai guilds and other bodies to the Chairman of the Council, 13 November 1910, 
Municipal Gazelle, 18 November 1910. 
63 Municipal Gazette, 18 November 1910. 
64 Landale to Chow Tsing-Piao, the members of the Shanghai Guilds and other signatories, 17 November 
1910, Municipal Gazette, 18 November 1910. 
65 Translation of letter from Daotai Liu Yen-Yi To to Sir Pelham Warren, 13 November 1910, in Municipal 
Gazette, 18 November 1910. 
66 Maynard W. Swanson, `The Sanitation Syndrome: Bubonic Plague and Urban Native Policy in the Cape 
Colony, 1900-1909'. Journal of African History, Vol. 18, No. 3 (1977), pp. 387-410. 
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the conclusion that Hu Cheng (Mho, Professor of History at the University of Nanjing) has 
drawn. 67 Yet later measures to prevent the spread of disease by the Nationalist government 
in Shanghai, particularly during the New Life Movement from 1934, were also highly 
intrusive. 68 Vaccination drives involved teams of health workers stopping rickshaw pullers, 
demanding evidence of vaccination against cholera, and if none could be produced, forcing 
them to undergo vaccination-69 The SMC's response to plague was draconian and based 
largely on racist ideas of `unsanitary Chinese', but the council was not unique in taking 
heavy-handed action in the name of public health, and for justifying such action by 
claiming superior understanding of public health needs to the ignorant masses. David 
Arnold describes how the colonial government in India was under international pressure, 
particularly from London, to try to prevent the spread of plague beyond India and therefore 
acted against it with unprecedented interventionism, until, as in Shanghai, popular protest 
forced the authorities to end the most coercive measures of house and body searches, 
compulsory segregation and hospitalisation, and the use of troops. 70 Arnold argues that by 
1900 `it became axiomatic that force was counter-productive', but unfortunately the 
authorities in Shanghai and elsewhere did not heed this lesson from India and had to learn 
from their own mistakes 71 
The Daotai, like the SMC, saw the protesting Shanghainese as ignorant, but used 
this to urge caution on the part of the council for fear that they could be easily whipped up 
67 Hu Cheng, `The Image of the "Unsanitary Chinese"", pp. 1-43; `Quarantine, Race and Politics in the 
International Settlement', pp. 74-90. 
68 It is also worth noting that there was precedent for the use of intrusive inspection measures in the attempts 
to improve the sexual health of prostitutes, as discussed on pp. 33-4. 
69 Nakajima, `Health and Hygiene', p. 68. 
70 Arnold, Colonizing the Body, pp. 203-206,211-234. 
71 Arnold, Colonizing the Body, p. 236. 
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into a fury. He knew how to frame his criticism of the council's proposals to best effect in 
light of the SMC's primary purpose of facilitating trade: he threatened that if the council 
persisted in its plans, `the Chinese will have to leave the Settlement with their businesses, 
with very serious effect on Chinese and foreign trade. '72 But he differed from the council 
on a fundamental principle by arguing that municipal byelaws could not be binding on 
Chinese citizens: a denial of the extraterritorial rights that lay at the heart of the existence of 
the Settlement. In response, Landale wrote to the Senior Consul that Pao Yi appeared to 
misunderstand the basis of the council's legislative powers. The Daotai's objections were 
based on an assumption that the new plague measures would be simple municipal 
regulations such as those issued from time to time for police and other matters. In fact, 
byelaws when approved by the ratepayers and consular authorities would carry the full 
weight of the legal rights conferred by treaty with the foreign powers and would therefore 
be legally binding on all residents, foreign and Chinese. 73 The Daotai would have rejected 
this broad claim to jurisdiction, but the vagaries of the Settlement's legal status left it open 
to interpretation on both sides. 
While the objections raised by the Daotai were rejected by the council, the 
ratepayers responded to the petitions published by the Chinese guilds and associations of 
the Settlement, and the byelaws they passed were more limited in scope than Stanley and 
the council had hoped. The emphasis therefore continued to be on education and persuasion, 
with, in the health commissioners' own words, only `occasional acts of "benevolent 
despotism"'. 74 The PHD set up a plague barrier on the northern border of the Settlement, in 
72 Daotai Liu to Sir Pelham Warren, 13 November 1910. 
73 Landale to Pelham Warren, 16 November 1910, in Municipal Gazette, 18 November 1910. 
74 Jordan and Davis, `A Brief History'. 
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keeping with efforts in Australia and elsewhere to contain infection within physical borders. 
In 1911 residents of Haining Road petitioned for the removal of this plague barrier, citing 
damage to their businesses. Stanley believed they had been inspired in their petition by the 
authorities in Zhabei and the Watch Committee decided to leave the barrier in place at least 
until the Chinese authorities admitted the council's right to police half the road. 75 The fact 
that Stanley thought the barrier should remain as an effective public health measure was of 
secondary importance to the assertion of the council's political position. When plague again 
threatened the Settlement in 1918, the byelaws were found to be insufficient as, due to the 
revision tabled at the ratepayers' meeting, they applied only to bubonic plague, whereas the 
threat was from pneumonic plague, and they provided only for the isolation of actual cases, 
not of contacts as was needed to prevent plague identified at Nanjing from reaching 
Shanghai. 76 The council's limited ability to legislate due to its ambiguous legal status was a 
long-term problem for the public health department, but one which it circumvented by 
insisting on the powers the council had established and on its claim to a higher scientific 
rationale for its actions. 
73 U1-1-83: Watch Committee, 16 October 1911. 
76 U1-1-123: Health Committee, 20 March 1918. 
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The Municipal Laboratory and medical research 
Warwick Anderson has described the colonial medical laboratory as `a delibidinized place 
of white coats, hand washing, strict hierarchy, correct training, isolation, inscription - in 
short, a place of semantic control and closure, organized around the avoidance of 
contamination', and thus `the exemplary locus of colonial modernity. '" This overstates the 
case, yet in the present study of the nature of semi-colonial authority in Shanghai it is 
appropriate to investigate the role of concepts of science and modernity in the image and 
self-perception of the SMC and its departments, employees and rate-paying community. 
The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were the heyday of western scientific self- 
confidence, as medical science in particular made significant progress and great faith was 
placed in rationality. David Arnold has traced the way in which developments such as the 
contributions of Louis Pasteur and Robert Koch to the new field of bacteriology from the 
1860s to the 1880s ushered in a new age of what David Arnold calls `curative 
confidence'. 78 In a colonial context, as such developments came from Europe, this 
confidence corresponded to European medical chauvinism. 
Stanley described the municipal laboratory as `the brain ... of the Public Health 
organism'. 79 In doing so, he was proudly proclaiming the modem, scientific nature of his 
department, which was part of a broader effort to raise its profile in the hope of gaining 
ratepayers' support for an increase in its staff and budget. In 1909, when he wrote these 
words for the council's annual report, the PHD was working hard to prevent the spread of 
n Warwick Anderson, `Excremental Colonialism: Public Health and the Poetics of Pollution', Critical Inquiry, 
Vol. 21, No. 3 (Spring 1995), p. 652. 
78 Arnold, `Introduction', p. 12 and p. 12, n. 53. Alison Bashford cautions, however, that this development is 
better described as characterised by `diagnostic confidence' only. Alison Bashford, comments given privately, 
12 November 2011. 
n Arthur Stanley, `Health Officer's Report', in SMC, Report for 1909, p. 107. 
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plague from rats to humans in the Settlement. The laboratory tested no fewer than 17,364 
rats, of which 187 were found to be infected with plague. 80 These were spread throughout 
the Settlement, but were particularly concentrated in the northern area near the border with 
Zhabei (see Figure 14). Stanley therefore attributed the blame to a lack of action by the 
Chinese authorities, a problem which could only be solved, he argued, by an extension of 
the Settlement .81 Fear of plague was thus exploited 
in support of political aims and to 
bolster the scientific image of the public health department with a view to encouraging 









Figure 14: Chart showing the distribution of plague-infected rats found in the International 
Settlement. Zhabei is the area to the north-west of the settlement boundary. 82 
S0 Stanley, 'Health Officer's Report', in SMC, Report for 1909, p. 123. 
81 Bickers, Scramble for China, pp. 364-5. 
82 SMC. Report for 1909, p. 125. 
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The SMC and its ratepayers valued the laboratory work of its PHD very highly. In 
1917 Edward Little wrote to the Watch Committee to advocate a large expenditure on 
scientific research, as the mark of a world-class health department, to which Stanley 
responded by providing a detailed summary of the scientific work his department had 
performed in the preceding sixteen years. 83 The committee agreed that such work was 
important, but replied to Little that no further budgetary allowance should be made for it 
before the end of the (First World) War and the completion of the new central offices which 
would provide more accommodation for laboratories. The principle that a modern public 
health department required the latest in medical laboratories was not in question and from 
Little's letter it appears that ratepayers were in accord with the PHD on this. Laboratory 
work was used in the promotion of the health department, reassuring the public that their 
health was being protected with the best scientific techniques. The Municipal Gazette and 
Shenbao alike reported the data provided in the SMC's annual report for 1920 concerning 
the increased number of rats captured and tested for plague, and emphasising the horrors of 
the disease to press home the important nature of the laboratory's work. 84 The laboratory 
was thus an important element in the public relations of the council and its Public Health 
Department. 
On the completion of the council's new central offices, the department boasted both 
a pathological and a chemical laboratory. Their work included the examination of water, 
milk and ice-cream for sale in the Settlement to check their safety for consumption, as well 
as testing to determine cases of infection, including the testing of rats for plague, dogs for 
rabies, and human samples for the diagnosis of myriad diseases. Such samples were sent to 
83 U1-1-86: Watch Committee, 8 October 1917. 
84 For example, Municipal Gazette, 19 March 1920, p. 84; Shenbao, 10 March 1921, p. 10. 
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them from private medical practitioners and hospitals in Shanghai as well as municipal 
institutions. This was far from unique to the settlement at Shanghai: Anderson highlights 
the more than 7,000 faecal specimens examined in Manila in 1909, rising to 126,000 in 
1914 due to a cholera outbreak. 85 The SMC did not keep separate data on faecal specimens, 
but its laboratories performed between 18,000 and 20,000 examinations per year in this 
period (Shanghai suffered from no corresponding cholera outbreak), showing the municipal 
laboratories were at least keeping their own with Manila. 86 Where council laboratories were 
more unusual in the scope of their activities was in the production of vaccines, particularly 
for smallpox and rabies, for use throughout China in smaller treaty ports and by 
missionaries inland, and even further afield in east Asia. 87 Such vaccines were also 
obtainable from elsewhere in China, such as the Peking Union Medical College in later 
years, but the SMC remained a significant provider throughout the existence of the 
laboratory. 
Anderson's characterisation of the Philippines in the early twentieth century seems 
an extreme case of the typical colonial drive to control the physical environment, although 
the extent to which this was possible in practice is very much open to question. He links the 
colonial celebration of the ultimate sanitary environment of the laboratory to his broader 
thesis that colonial authorities in the Philippines were obsessed with trying to eradicate the 
pollution that was linked in the minds of the colonisers with the indigenous population, as 
was manifest in a preoccupation with the hygienic disposal of human waste. This was 
certainly evident in Shanghai, where in the annual report for 1909, Stanley describes in 
85 Anderson, `Excremental Colonialism', p. 647. 
86 SMC, Reports for 1909-14. 
97 J. H. Jordan, `Report' for R. Feetham, 5 May 1930. 
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some detail the different ways in which house refuse was removed from the Settlement 88 
Such interest is hardly surprising, however, in a city where untreated refuse constituted a 
major source of infection, and this work remained important as the activities of the 
department increased dramatically over subsequent years. The modernity of the Settlement, 
claimed and celebrated by the council and residents, required that basic sanitation was 
adequately managed. 
The expansion of the research performed by the department sometimes led to 
criticism of its expense. Justice Feetham, during his investigations in Shanghai, put to 
Jordan the suggestion by the Chinese health minister Dr Heng Liu that the SMC was 
wasteful in its spending on laboratories. 89 Jordan bristled at the suggestion, arguing that his 
laboratories were in fact more economical than comparable centres in the USA, where tests 
were performed by unqualified laboratory technicians, and the UK, where, as in Shanghai, 
doctors carried out such tests. He claimed that his department performed the most rigorous 
tests available and emphasised that their services were, with the exception of examinations 
for venereal disease, free of charge to those who had paid for them through rates (in the 
Settlement) or contributions (in the French concession), and inexpensive to other users. 90 
This defence was more than the natural desire for a (then acting) head of department to 
protect his budget: Jordan believed passionately in the importance of employing the latest 
scientific methods in public health, and laboratory work was key to this. His early work for 
the council focused on laboratory research due to specialist training he had undertaken 
88 SMC, Report for 1909, p. 108. The preferred manner was the collection of night soil for use as fertiliser, a 
method which was rejected as unsanitary in the Philippines. Anderson, `Excremental Colonialism'. p. 662. 89 Dr J. Heng Liu held the post of Health Minister from 1929 to 1937, after training at Harvard Medical 
School and working in the Peking Union Medical College. Ka-Che Yip, `Health and Nationalist 
Reconstruction: Rural Health in Nationalist China, 1928-1937', Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 26, No. 2 (1992), 
399. ýO 
U1-16-9-198, Jordan to Feetham, 30 July 1930. 
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before arriving in Shanghai, and in 1925 he was appointed Chief Pathologist, " ' so the 
emphasis on the laboratories during his tenure as Commissioner of Public Health is 
unsurprising. 
Jordan's interest in medical research was not unusual among colonial health officers: 
David Arnold, in his work on the Indian Medical Service, found that the opportunity to 
research tropical medicine was offered as `bait' to potential recruits, although Douglas 
Haynes cautions that for most the attraction of imperial service was rather that often no 
additional training or specialism was required. 92 It remained true, however, that men like 
Jordan (and Patrick Manson, the `father' of the study of tropical medicine who began his 
career working as a medical officer to the Chinese Imperial Maritime Customs in Taiwan) 
were aware that they would have more chance of making their mark and progressing in 
their careers if they took such opportunities than if they stayed in the more comfortable 
medical practices of Britain. 93 The opportunities for research in Shanghai extended to 
experimentation with prisoners of the notorious Ward Road Gaol, mainly in the form of 
adjustments to their diet to prevent tuberculosis, beriberi and scurvy, 94 but including the use 
of new drugs such as the treatment of trachoma in the eyes of prisoners with 
sulphanilamide. 95 This is an additional facet to the control over the bodies of the colonised 
91 U1-1-124: Health Committee, 30 October 1925. 
92 Arnold, Science, Technology and Medicine, p. 198; Douglas Haynes, Imperial Medicine: Patrick Manson 
and the Conquest of Tropical Disease (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001), p. 155. On the 
experimental work of other medical researchers in the British Empire, see Mark Harrison, Medicine in an Age 
of Commerce and Empire: Britain and its Tropical Colonies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 
147-70. 
93 Haynes, Imperial Medicine, pp. 15-18. 
94 In the years 1919-21 investigations were made into the diet of Chinese prisoners and adjustments made 
which reduced the high incidence of tuberculosis from 69 to 42 per 1000. Jordan and Davis, `Brief History'. 
In 1938 Drs E. Vio and S. T. Hsiu of the Gaol Hospital found that an injection of Redoxon or the 
consumption of oranges and raw turnips prevented scurvy among inmates. SMA U1-16-10-229: 13 June 1938, 
S. T. Hsiu to W. R. Johnston, Superintendent of Hospitals. 
9s UI-1-126: Health Committee, 17 March 1941. 
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which Arnold described taking place in India, 96 although such experimentation would have 
been equally permissible in gaols in Europe at the time. Inasmuch as these experiments 
benefited the health of the prisoners, albeit without the consent of their subjects, they 
indicate a shift from an earlier attitude to Chinese inmates which prioritised making their 
period of imprisonment as unpleasant as possible to avoid conditions inside gaol being 
preferable to life outside, with minimal consideration for their health needs. In 1908 
Stanley had to intervene in a Watch Committee meeting to advise that a proposed reduction 
in the diet of prisoners, based on a comparison with gaol conditions in Hong Kong, was not 
advisable until their health was beyond doubt. 97 Stanley was successful despite the dual 
force of economy and example from Hong Kong, indicating some room for humanitarian 
concern in municipal public health policy-making. 
Experimentation and research contributed to the PHD's reputation for scientific 
modernity locally and overseas. Increasingly, senior health officers of the SMC published 
their research in leading medical journals. The results of the measures taken to reduce 
scurvy were published by Drs Vio and Hsiu in Caduceus, published by the University of 
Hong Kong, and they both produced other similar publications. Dr W. R. Johnston, 
Superintendent of Hospitals, published an article recounting `A Unique case of foreign 
bodies in the intestinal tract' -a case of sixteen fruit stones swallowed as a child suddenly 
causing health problems in a 24-year-old Chinese convict - in the prestigious British 
Medical Journal. He also authored or co-authored several articles in the local Journal of 
Clinical Medicine, including one about a rare fatal case of Wallenberg's Syndrome in an 
Indian policeman and another on the results of a treatment for pulmonary tuberculosis. 
% Arnold, Colonizing the Body. 
m U1-1-82: Watch Committee, 12 February 1908. 
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Jordan published his observations on the prognosis of rabies, and, with members of his staff, 
the results of the treatment of cerebrospinal fever by a new drug, in the leading journal The 
Lancet. 98 These publications served to demonstrate the world-class nature of work being 
carried out in Shanghai and the engagement of SMC employees, including senior Chinese 
staff like Hsiu, with medical research in the west. Jordan was even credited by Time 
magazine with correctly predicting the high rate of cholera in China in 1932,99 
demonstrating both the extent of his understanding of Chinese public health and the reach 
and international impact of his work. The scientific modernity of the municipal laboratory 
and staff brought the PHD onto the world stage, boosting its prestige locally and 
internationally. 
A transnational Public Health Department 
The Public Health Department was a well-developed department by the international 
standards of the time. The council's British health officers enjoyed the best training 
available in London in public health management, including courses for health inspectors at 
the Royal Sanitary Institute. The Commissioners of Public Health attended international 
conferences as SMC delegates, keeping abreast with the latest developments in disease 
prevention at events such as the International Rabies Conference. Jordan made use of 
periods of long leave to investigate how authorities in Europe and America tackled 
problems faced by his own department, such as a tour he made in 1930 inspecting the best 
U1-16-10-229. 
997Yme, 10 October 1932, 
<bttp: //www. time. com/timelmagazine/article(0,9171,744572, OO. html#ixzzOjBTSt4WJ>, accessed 2 February 
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waste incinerators in use around the world. 100 His notes from a visit to Liverpool in 1937 
show he was unimpressed by its abattoir, which he felt was dirty, dangerous and 
`disgracefully run. ' Denmark fared no better, where he described dairies in Copenhagen 
ranging from, at best, equivalent only to a grade B dairy in Shanghai, and at worst `slovenly 
in the extreme. ' 101 Jordan was in no doubt that his department was one of the best in the 
world. 
Dr Ludwik Rajchman, the Medical Director of the League of Nations Health 
Organisation (LNHO), suggested to Jordan that he should make more of these visits, 
particularly within China, but Jordan replied tersely that the burden of his work and the 
limited leave that it was possible for him to take made frequent investigatory trips 
impossible. 102 There was no love lost between the two doctors: Rajchman was known for 
his leftwing political views and the western powers believed he was too sympathetic to 
China's plight as a victim of semi-colonial encroachment. 103 Needless to say, this did not 
endear him to the SMC. 
China was a major focus of LNHO attention and one of the few places in which 
`technical' activity took place under its direction. Jürgen Osterhammel noted in 1979 that 
the prevailing dismal view of the League of Nations required qualification, at least in 
relation to its technical support for China in the early 1930s, and scholarship in the last 
twenty years has contributed to a revisionist history of the League, focusing on its Health 
100 UI-1-124, Health Committee, 25 February 1930. 
101 U1-16-10-215, Jordan, `Diary Made During Commissioner's Leave' (n. d. ). 
102 U1-16-9-199: Jordan's notes on interview between himself and Rajchman, 19 January 1931. 
103 Jurgen Osterhammel, "`Technical Co-operation" Between the League of Nations and China', Modern 
Asian Studies, Vol. 13, No. 4 (1979), p. 664; Martin David Dubin, 'The League of Nations Health 
Organisation', in International Health Organisations and Movements, 1918-1939, ed. by Paul Weindling 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 62,66-72. 
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Organisation. 104 The LNHO was a major proponent of international cooperation in the field 
of public health, and while in many regions the rhetoric was not accompanied by 
substantial internationally cooperative action, in China real operational cooperation was 
attempted. The SMC's health department embraced opportunities to play its part on the 
international stage, primarily by sharing statistical information with the Eastern Bureau of 
the Health Organisation, established in 1925 in Singapore after prompting from Japan. 105 
The SMC gathered data on communicable diseases and the rate and causes of deaths to 
send in weekly reports to the Bureau by telegram, both from the Settlement and as provided 
by the French municipality. 106 Such engagement enabled the PHD to present itself as a 
leading health authority in the region. 
However, Jordan was intolerant of suggestions by the League that the council did 
not serve the Chinese community sufficiently and failed to cooperate fully with the Chinese 
authorities. Judge Feetham put to Jordan the allegation made by Rajchman that the SMC 
made the wellbeing of the foreign community its first public health priority, to which 
Jordan responded at length, listing the ways in which his department served the 
Settlement's Chinese residents. This included the more than 1.5 million free vaccinations 
that had been administered by the department to date, the vast majority of which went to 
Chinese, as well as building hospitals for Chinese and providing local services: he argued 
that eleven of the fourteen branch health offices and ten of the fourteen municipal markets 
104 Osterhammel, "Technical Co-operation""; Susan Pedersen, Review Essay: `Back to the League of 
Nations', American Historical Review, Vol. 112, No. 4 (October 1997), pp. 1091-1117. 
105 Osterhammel, "`Technical Co-operation", p. 663; Lenore Manderson. `Wireless Wars in the Eastern 
Arena: Epidemiological Surveillance, Disease Prevention and the Work of the Eastern Bureau of the League 
of Nations Health Organisation, 1925-42, in International Health Organisations, ed. by Weindling, pp. 109- 
133. 
106 Ul-1-124: Health Committee, 10 November 1926. 
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were used exclusively by Chinese. 107 Feetham was apparently convinced by Jordan's 
arguments, inserting them almost verbatim into his final report. 108 Jordan failed, however, 
to address Rajchman's implication that the council's motivation for attempting to improve 
the public health of Chinese in the Settlement was in large part for the benefit this brought 
to the foreign community by removing potential sources of infection. This was no doubt 
true, yet it is not an adequate explanation for the work of the PHD: the council's desire to 
maintain its international reputation was also a strong motivating factor, while medical 
practitioners simply did a professional job in serving the community. Successive attempts 
to increase provision for Chinese residents suggest that there was also a genuine desire to 
improve Chinese health for its own sake. Nonetheless, the council clearly only wanted to do 
so on its own terms and had a paternalistic conviction that it knew best how to provide for 
Chinese public health. 
Rajchman told Jordan that the council should meet the minimum demand made by 
Chinese associations in Shanghai of appointing a Chinese Deputy Commissioner to the 
PHD, arguing that there were many local Chinese doctors who were fit for such a post. 
Jordan disagreed, saying pointedly that the local view differed from the international view, 
that he was not willing to tell his staff who had moved to Shanghai `in good faith' that their 
chances of promotion had been closed, and nor could he remove the current deputy 
commissioner from his post to suit `political emergencies'. 109 Jordan added his belief that 
all staff should be able to move up in the service regardless of nationality. This belied the 
reality that foreign, particularly British, staff were much favoured for higher positions, and 
107 U1-16-9-199: Jordan to Feetham, 15 January 1931. 
108 Feetham, Report, Vol. II, p. 50. 
109 U1-16-9-199: Jordan's notes on interview between himself and Rajchman, 19 January 1931. 
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illustrates the slowness of the council to respond to the changed political environment in 
Republican China, where Chinese were demanding a greater role in the running of 
administrations on Chinese soil. 
The SMC cooperated with the LNHO at a regional and international level, such as 
by contributing to the work of the Eastern Bureau, because it served its aim of prominence 
on the international stage. But the council rejected Health Organisation efforts at a local 
level when Rajchman or others questioned the superior understanding of local conditions 
that SMC staff assumed for themselves. The League focussed most of its work in China on 
improving health conditions in the poor rural majority of the country, so its impact on 
Shanghai was limited. The other major western player in Chinese public health was the 
Rockefeller Foundation, which also maintained a largely rural focus, although it too 
received a degree of cooperation from the SMC. The council was more receptive to the 
Rockefeller Foundation's capitalist ethos of improving the health of the working population 
for the general benefit to the economy. The Foundation began its public health work with a 
programme which aimed to eradicate hookworm in the American South to produce more 
productive workers, and as it expanded its operations overseas it continued to promote the 
goal of strong, healthy workers. ' 10 This emphasis on commercial justifications for public 
health provision sat much better with the council's foreign businessmen than the League's 
underlying ideology of self-determinism and anti-imperialism. 
The SMC's involvement with the Rockefeller Foundation exemplifies the kinds of 
transnational networks which connected public health administrations around the world in 
the early twentieth century. For example, the SMC's Deputy Secretary visited the 
uo E Richard Brown, `Public Health in Imperialism: Early Rockefeller Programs at Home and Abroad', 
American Journal ofPublic Health, Vol. 66, No. 9 (September 1976), pp. 898-99. 
235 
headquarters of the Rockefeller Medical Foundation in New York to study how their 
record-keeping methods could be applied to the health administration in the International 
Settlement in 1932.111 The council was asked to provide the Rockefeller library in New 
York with copies of its annual reports, and in Shanghai it received a specialist from the 
Foundation during her 'global tour investigating child welfare. 112 Such reciprocal 
connections were of the webbed nature described by scholars such as Tony Ballantyne and 
Thomas Metcalf, rather than emanating from a metropolitan centre. 113 
Semi-colonialism in public health 
Despite the broad transnational influences from bodies such as the LNHO and the 
Rockefeller Foundation, the strongest outside influence on SMC public health policy 
undoubtedly came from Britain and the British empire. Prominent figures including Stanley, 
Davis and Jordan were all recruited directly from Britain to Shanghai, while health 
inspectors were trained in London and health officers attended conferences in Britain. In 
1928 Davis represented the International Settlement at the Inaugural Congress of the Royal 
Institute of Public Health, held in Dublin, and was invited to give an address as a 
`distinguished visitor'. He said, to the undoubtedly receptive ears at the congress: 
An essential element in the development of this Department has been the example 
of, and the inspiration drawn from great Health Departments throughout the world, 
111 U1-16-12-257: Jordan to Geo. V. Allen, Vice Consul in charge of the Passport Office, American Consulate, 
22 August 1932. 
112 U1-16-12-257: Jordan to Dr J. C. Lawney, 27 September 1932. 
113 Tony Ballantyne, Orientalism and Race: Aryanism in the British Empire (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), 
especially pp. 3-16; Thomas R. Metcalf, Imperial Connections: India in the Indian Ocean Arena, 1860-1920 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), especially pp. 1-14. 
236 
and the stimulus of great Congresses, such as this present one, from which new 
ideas and fresh encouragement radiate to the uttermost parts of the world. 114 
Davis and those he mixed with at the congress were very much alive to the potential of 
transnational interaction, though for these individuals the networks in which they 
participated were in practice overwhelmingly British and colonial in nature. 
In addition to networks of individuals and organisations, Shanghai was linked to the 
formal organs of government in London. The SMC took instructions from the British War 
Office, or anticipated their desires, in their special treatment of the health of British military 
personnel stationed in the Settlement: in 1919 the British armed forces in Shanghai were 
given free inoculations by the PHD; concern for the health of British troops in Shanghai led 
to efforts by the PHD to improve the sanitary conditions of their barracks in 1927; and in 
1931 the department waived the fee for laboratory examinations for the British Army. ' 15 
The example set in Britain and its colonies was followed in various matters from the 
regulations for plague prevention to those governing the sale of poisons (which were based, 
in 1940, on those in operation in England). 116 Connections with different parts of the 
British empire were equally important, and here the SMC was influenced by practice 
elsewhere and acted as a source of influence for other administrations. Shanghai followed 
the precedent set in Hong Kong in plague prevention, as seen, yet also gave advice on 
114 U1-3-229, Personnel File for Dr C. Noel Davis. Text of address given by Davis at Congress of Royal 
Institute of Public Health, Dublin, 1 August 1928. 
11' U1-1-123: Health Committee, 31 January 1919; U1-1-124: Health Committee, 20 April 1927 and 3 
February 1931. Similar benefits were not necessarily extended to other Allied armies. 
116 U1-1-126: Health Committee, 30 June 1940. 
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public health literature to the International Settlement authorities at Gulangyu. 17 Health 
policy was decided in an environment of inter-colonial exchange. 
Shanghai was also included in public health drives directed from the imperial 
metropole, such as the work of the Far Eastern Commission on Venereal Diseases, which 
was established under the auspices of the Ministry of Health, the Colonial and Foreign 
Offices, and the Treasury. 118 The Commission targeted Hong Kong, Singapore and 
Shanghai as port cities in particular need of support in the empire-wide campaign against 
venereal diseases. Shanghai was the first port of call for the commission in December 
1920.119 The timing was excellent as the SMC was then under pressure to act on the 
recommendations contained in the report of the specially formed `Vice Committee', which 
brought the extent of the public health problems caused by prostitution into the glare of the 
public eye. 120 In a special joint meeting of the Health and Watch Committees, Dr Rupert 
Hallam, the Medical Commissioner, made detailed recommendations concerning the 
provision of a venereal disease clinic and free testing and treatment. 121 Despite the usual 
desire for economy, the SMC acted immediately to begin implementing his 
recommendations, and consulted with him in the selection of the new Assistant Health 
Officer with expertise in venereal diseases who was to be appointed in response to the 
117 SMA U1-16-11-248: Jordan to C. H. Holleman, Medical Officer of Health, Gulangyu Municipal Council, 
17 June 1940. 
118 Kerrie L. MacPherson, `Health and Empire: Britain's National Campaign to Combat Venereal Disease in 
Shanghai, Hong Kong and Singapore', in Roger Davidson and Lesley A. Hall (eds. ), Sex, Sin and Suffering: 
Venereal Disease and European Society since 1870 (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 173. 
119 There had been logistical problems with the planned first call to Hong Kong. MacPherson, `Health and 
Empire', p. 178. 
120 Philippa Levine, Prostitution, Race and Politics: Policing Venereal Disease in the British Empire (New 
York: Routledge, 2003), pp. 237-9. 
121 SMA U1-1-87: Minutes of the Watch Committee, joint meeting with Health Committee, 21 December 
1920. 
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commission's report. 122 There is more on the treatment of venereal disease by the PHD 
below, but it is clear that in 1920 the combination of local pressure from ratepayers and 
pressure from the imperial metropole was sufficient to force action from the SMC. 
Entente cordiale? Relations with the French Conseil municipal 
Despite these leanings towards the British imperial world, the SMC had to function in the 
unique environment of Shanghai alongside its neighbouring French and Chinese 
administrations. Cooperation between the two foreign concessions was often uneasy, and 
public health matters were no exception. Each council was always reluctant to provide 
services, such as hospital treatment, which would be of benefit to both concessions without 
securing financial support from the other, often resulting in inactivity or delay. 
Representatives of the two councils sat together on the board of governors of the Country 
Hospital for foreigners, which was presented to the community by a private individual in 
1926. But the SMC was responsible for guaranteeing any deficit in the hospital's accounts, 
and resented that the Conseil municipal did not share this burden. 123 In addition, the council 
repeatedly complained that residents in the French concession were treated in municipal 
hospitals in the Settlement without adequate compensation from the Conseil municipal. The 
SMC approached the French authorities seeking a greater contribution in view of the high 
numbers of Russian refugees who were resident in the French concession but were being 
treated at the General Hospital at the expense of ratepayers in the International 
Settlement. 124 The French riposted that they made no charge for treating residents of the 
iu U1-1-123: Health Committee, 12 August 1921. 
SMA U1-1-60: Finance Committee, 25 January 1923. 
124 U1-1-124: Health Committee, 30 October 1925. 
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International Settlement in the Ste. Marie Hospital, and the matter was temporarily allowed 
to drop, only to be raised again in subsequent years. 
In some areas the Conseil municipal paid a fee to the SMC to use its services, such 
as the municipal laboratory, rather than duplicate them. In others, the council observed 
practices which proved effective in the concession and applied them to the Settlement, from 
methods of treating cattle plague, 125 to the tight control of the pork that could be sold, 
which would prove highly contentious with the Chinese authorities (see below). The two 
councils operated a scheme of reciprocal licensing and dual inspection of food vendors, 
such as that attempted with the Chinese authorities without success. 126 They also shared 
information on infectious diseases, including the weekly bulletins from the League of 
Nations Health Station, though Jordan grumbled that `owing to the incompleteness of 
organisation of the Public Health Department of the French Administration the information 
proceeds mainly from one side'. 127 He bemoaned the French lack of a system for 
notification of infectious diseases as was in place in the Settlement, the poor and 
incomplete statistics and the lack of an isolation hospital or full time medical officer. 
Nevertheless, the French covered half the cost of the telegrams sent each week back to 
Singapore on the local health situation, and it was the French Municipal Wireless Station 
that received and re-broadcast the reports on regional public health that came from the 
Bureau, including warnings of localities where, or individual ships on which, 
communicable diseases had broken out. The SMC and Conseil municipal therefore had a 
125 U1-1-82: Watch Committee, 8 July 1907. 
126 Although it had been in operation for over a decade, however, the system did not receive official approval 
until 1935. SMA U1-1-124: Health Committee, 5 November 1935. 
127 SM U1-16-9-198. 
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relationship of give and take, with each council anxious to ensure it was not giving more 
than the other. 
The balance of financial contributions was not the only source of tension between 
the settlements. According to Arnold, this was an `era of competitive imperialism', not least 
in the field of public health, 128 and the British and the French were the staunchest of 
imperial rivals. On the whole, cooperation seems to have been more prevalent than 
competition between the two foreign concessions, but tensions remained. When Stanley 
complained that the French municipality lacked a direct counterpart to his position, and 
when Jordan criticised the record-keeping in the French concession, they were setting their 
own administration above the French in practical and moral terms. Public Health had an 
aura of public service which gave it greater moral weight than most council activities, so 
superiority in public health provision boosted the prestige of the council on a moral as well 
as an administrative level. However, entering the realm of morality brought its own 
difficulties. 
Cooperation with the French was required in the most contentious areas of public 
health: venereal disease and the treatment of the insane. Health authorities throughout 
history have struggled with how best to tackle the issue of prostitution and its 
accompanying diseases, and perhaps nowhere was this problem more pressing than in the 
infamous port city of early twentieth-century Shanghai, where fractured sovereignty limited 
the efficacy of attempted regulation. Christian Henriot has shown how the two foreign 
municipalities, the Chinese and foreign residents, and the Chinese authorities, all had 
128 Arnold, Imperial Medicine, p. 14. 
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differing views on whether and how best to attempt to regulate and control prostitution. 129 
Calls from the League of Nations for the three municipalities to cooperate in this area fell 
on deaf ears due to the different cultural perspectives from which they viewed the problem. 
The different approaches favoured by the two foreign councils reflected the dominant forms 
of regulation that were established in Britain and France. France is considered the 
originator of the regulationist approach to prostitution which came to dominate practice in 
most of continental Europe and the European colonies. Reglementation involved a system 
of licensed brothels which were regularly inspected for venereal disease, with prostitutes 
treated at a network of dispensaries as necessary or incarcerated in hospitals if deemed a 
threat to their clients' health. Britain developed a similar form of regulation domestically 
and in its colonies, registering known and tolerated prostitutes though stopping short of 
formally endorsing them with a license, inspecting them and isolating cases of diseases. But 
Philip Howell describes as `half-hearted' Britain's commitment to regulationism in the 
metropole, as the Contagious Diseases Acts of 1864-86 were only in force for twenty years 
and only in certain military stations rather than across the country. 130 London's concern was 
primarily with the health of the armed forces, and it was in military and imperial contexts 
that regulationism was more widely accepted. 
In Shanghai, the preferred route of the Conseil municipal was to try to create 
revenue from what they saw as an inevitable trade. The SMC, on the other hand, sought to 
distance itself from the problem, favouring medical inspection only of Chinese prostitutes 
visited by foreign customers in an attempt to curb the rates of venereal disease among 
129 Henriot, Prostitution and Sexuality in Shanghai, pp. 273-333. 
130 Philip Howell, Geographies of Regulation: Policing Prostitution in Nineteenth-century Britain and the 
Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 3-4,7-8,14-15 
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sailors and the council's own staff. This policy, emphasising the preservation of sexual 
health within the armed forces and as a secondary concern the preservation of a productive 
municipal workforce, reflected pressure from the British military for port cities to reduce 
the rates of infection among military men. 131 The council was once more looking to 
colonial practice in Hong Kong as an example, where the regulationist approach was 
implemented most consistently. 132 Yet the SMC deviated from practice in Hong Kong and 
bowed to moral pressure from the ratepayers to attempt to eliminate prostitution, a result in 
large part of pressure from missionaries and others who were influenced by the dominant 
Christian moral discourse in the United States in the 1910s and 1920s. The council 
abandoned regulationism only reluctantly and against the better judgement of its own 
medical personnel and other practitioners in the Settlement. 133 Chinese were, according to 
Henriot, less likely to see the issue in moral terms, emphasising instead practical 
concerns, 134 but this contrasted more with popular sentiment among the foreign 
communities than the pragmatism preferred by the councils. Significantly, foreign residents, 
councils and home governments were particularly concerned about the damage done to 
perceptions of white racial superiority by the presence of white prostitutes in Shanghai, as 
was true in colonial societies throughout the world. 
135 None, however, found an effective 
way to solve this problem. 
Mental health was a no less contentious area of public health work (though for 
different reasons) and this was especially true in a colonial or semi-colonial setting. The 
131 Levine, Prostitution, Race and Politics, p. 145. 
132 Howell, Geographies of Regulation, 188-218. 
133 Levine, Prostitution, Race and Politics, p. 237. 
134 Henriot, Prostitution and Sexuality, pp. 309-310. 
135 See, for example, Eileen P. Scully, 'Prostitution as Privilege: The "American Girl" of Treaty-Port 
Shanghai, 1860-1937', International History Review, Vol. 20, No. 4 (December 1998), pp. 855-6. 
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image of white racial superiority was compromised as much by the presence of insane 
foreigners as by white prostitutes. The SMC shared with colonial India and Africa the 
practice of shipping long-term mental patients back to their country of origin where 
possible, both to relieve the municipality of the cost of their care and to avoid the local 
population witnessing such `defective human material, ' in the words of Arthur Stanley. ' 36 
Those without funds would be repatriated at the cost of their consulate or national societies, 
as confirmed with the consular body in 1907 and 1912, and it fell to charitable institutions 
to fill in any gaps: this accorded with the well-established policy that the council should 
accept no responsibility for poor relief. 
137 The strict colour bar applied as much for the 
insane as for the general population, and the Watch Committee ruled in 1907 that all 
`Orientals' should be excluded from the mental ward, including Japanese. 138 The council 
began to admit some liability in the case of the white `mentally deficient who are Shanghai- 
born' in 1919. This was the unanimous view of the Health Committee, despite assurances 
from Stanley, ever mindful of the need for economy, that the existing mental ward at the 
Victoria Nursing Home (which charged six taels per day to patients attended by their own 
doctors or to the relevant consular authority for `paupers') was sufficient. ' 39 The shift 
reflected the growing significance for the council of the Shanghailander mentality, whereby 
increasing numbers of Britons and Americans in particular identified Shanghai as a 
permanent home. 140 
136 U1-1-123: Health Committee, 14 November 1918. For the treatment of the European insane in India, see 
Waltraud Ernst, `The European Insane in British India, 1800-1858: a Case-study in Psychiatry and Colonial 
Rule', in Imperial Medicine, ed. by Arnold, pp. 27-44; and Waltraud Ernst, Mad Tales from the Raj. " 
European Insane in British India, 1800-58 (London: Routledge, 2004). 
137 U1-1-123: Health Committee, 14 November 1918. 
138 U1-1-83: Watch Committee, 8 July 1907. 
139 U1-1-123: Health Committee, 31 January and 7 June 1919. 
140 See Bickers, `Shanghailanders', pp. 161-211. 
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The policy of refusing responsibility for incomers was increasingly difficult to 
enforce in Shanghai, however, as the stateless population grew with successive waves of 
refugees, first Russians following the 1917 October Revolution, and later Jews fleeing Nazi 
Europe. The SMC approached the Chinese authorities in 1923 with a request that they 
assume financial responsibility for a Russian mental patient as the latter had accepted 
consular jurisdiction over stateless Russians, 141 but in general the council paid for such 
cases. The two foreign municipalities also provided increasingly generous funding for 
institutions like the Shanghai Hospital for the Insane, which was exempted from half of the 
general municipal rate as it assisted the council in providing for the insane in the absence of 
a municipal mental hospital. 142 This absence was felt increasingly, and when the Health 
Commission's work was under discussion in 1930, Liu Hongsheng made the first minuted 
contribution by a Chinese member of the Health Committee, arguing that `all modern 
municipalities provide an asylum for the Insane and deprecating the fact that Shanghai has 
no such institution'. 143 Although those present agreed with Liu, it was not until 1935 that 
the SMC, in conjunction with the French and Chinese municipal authorities, funded the 
construction of a new Mercy Hospital for the insane outside the city, under the auspices of 
Catholic missionaries. The three authorities all contributed to its maintenance, though 
suspicions that the others were not paying their share persisted. 144 The SMC made increases 
in its contribution dependent on increases from the Conseil municipal right up until the 
141 U1-1-123: Health Committee, 27 December 1923. 
142 This was the recommendation of Xu Xinliu when asked by the Chairman of the Finance Committee, A. D. 
Bell, to comment on the worth of this hospital, based on Xu's personal acquaintance with Dr Woo who 
managed the hospital. U1-1-63: Finance Committee, 22 September 1933. 
143 U1-1-124: Health Committee, 30 September 1939, emphasis added. 
144 At a joint meeting of the Health and Finance Committees in 1936, Dr Tongu expressed the opinion `that 
most mental cases occur among the Russians in the French Concession, and that the French Authorities have 
therefore a greater financial responsibility for the undertaking than the Council. ' SMA U1-1-26: Finance 
Committee, 2 March 1936. 
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demise of the treaty port system, making a promised additional grant of $3,500 to the 
hospital conditional on the French providing $7,500 on top of their existing (lower) 
contribution in 1940.145 Later that year, the council's payment to the hospital of $2 per 
patient (foreign or Chinese) per day was increased to $4 to reflect the rampant inflation, 
again on the condition that the French municipality matched the rise. 146 
Cooperation between the different municipal authorities increased over the period, 
as shown by the example of provision for mental health, but the foreign municipal 
authorities were most anxious to collaborate in times of emergency. In the face of the threat 
of an outbreak of pneumonic plague in Nanjing spreading to Shanghai in 1918,147 the 
Acting French Consul-General attended an emergency meeting of the Health Committee in 
his capacity as chairman of the Conseil municipal to discuss a joint strategy to prevent the 
disease reaching Shanghai. No Chinese were invited to the meeting, reflecting the 
consensus among the international authorities at the time that concerted action would come 
from the foreign community alone. When Sino-Japanese hostilities broke out in January 
1932, Jordan turned to his French counterparts for assistance. The French provided hospital 
beds in the Ste. Marie Hospital for patients evacuated from the municipal Isolation Hospital, 
and the SMC provided them with extra staff and equipment to do so. 148 When presented 
with an emergency, the councils instinctively turned to each other for help, putting aside 
petty grievances. In 1936, Dr Rabaute, the French Director of Public Hygiene, wrote to 
145 U1-1-63: Finance Committee, 25 May 1940. 
146 U1-1-63: Finance Committee, 12 October 1940. Council contributions to the National Leprosarium, 
situated outside Shanghai, were also contingent on those made by the French and Chinese municipal 
authorities. UI-1-26: Finance Committee, joint meeting with Health Committee, 2 March 1936. 147 U1-1-123: Health Committee, 20 March 1918. 
148 SMA U1-16-9-216. 
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Jordan that in public health 'il n'y a pas de frontieres. ' 149 This was a recognition of practical 
if not political realities. 
A new neighbour: the Municipal Government of Greater Shanghai 
Cooperation between the SMC and local Chinese authorities on public health, where 
attempted, was hindered by the often weak and transitory nature of those authorities and 
indeed by the lack of a health department before 1926. Dr Ding Wenjiang (V. K. Ting TX 
'C) began in that year to set about establishing a new, `modern' municipal infrastructure on 
behalf of Sun Chuanfang (*W5), the military governor of Fujian who has reclaimed 
authority over Shanghai in October 1925.150 Ding's innovations included the establishment 
of the Shanghai Bureau of Public Health (weisheng ju) and he sought and was given 
information about the nature of the council's Public Health Department as he planned a 
similar structure. 151 The Guomindang's victory over Sun's forces in 1927 resulted in Ding's 
dismissal and Chiang Kai-shek appointed Huang Fu (j *R) as the first Mayor of Greater 
Shanghai after declaring the city a Special Municipality in 1927. Huang continued the 
development of the Bureau of Public Health as part of the new municipal government. In 
July 1927 the municipal government announced the Greater Shanghai Plan, which was 
intended to raise the infrastructure of the municipality to match that of the foreign 
concessions, which were taken as a model for development. 152 Public health was also to be 
thus improved: Nakajima Chieko argues that the Guomindang derived its legitimacy in part 
+9 SMA Ul-16-12: Rabaute to Jordan, 3 August 1936. 
1S0 Henriot, Shanghai 1927-1937, p. 18. 
Jordan, `Report'. 
152 Kerrie L. MacPherson, 'Designing China's Urban Future: The Greater Shanghai Plan, 1927-1937', 
Planning Perspectives, Vol. 5, No. 1 (January 1990), pp. 39,43. 
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from its concern for the welfare of the population, so public health provision was crucial to 
maintaining such legitimacy. 153 Shanghai was a priority for the Nanjing government, a 
location in which it planned to showcase its success to the world. As demonstrated above, 
the SMC's Public Health Department was trying to keep up with the most modem trends in 
the field, so it was not a bad model for the Greater Shanghai government to take. This 
policy also fitted with the national government's plans concerning social medicine. 154 
Cooperation with the SMC was therefore planned from the establishment of the Special 
Municipality. 
The new Commissioner for Health of the Municipal Government of Shanghai, Dr 
Hu Hou-ki (Hu Hongji), was introduced to Commissioner Davis of the SMC by Dr John 
Grant, the Rockefeller Foundation International Health Board's representative to China, in 
1926. Davis invited Hu to visit the PHD to see how it ran its operations. 155 No doubt he was 
proud to show off his department in all its `hygienic modernity'. 156 Ruth Rogaski has 
demonstrated how modernity was closely bound up with western notions of hygiene and 
public health for Chinese elites in Tianjin, and the same was true in Shanghai. But Hu had 
already had ample exposure to the most modern of western public health developments 
during his training at the Johns Hopkins School of Hygiene and Public Health from 1922, 
153 Nakajima, `Health and Hygiene in Mass Mobilization', p. 44. For a recent detailed, though un-nuanced, 
perspective on Chinese public health in this period see Zhang Daqing, Zhongguo fndai jibing shehui shi (A 
Social History of Diseases in Modern China, 1912-1937) (Jinan: Shandong jiaoyu chubanshe, 2006). 
134 In 1933 the Chinese government welcomed Andrija Stampar of the League of Nations Health Organisation 
to conduct an investigation into rural public health in China. Over three years he visited the entire country 
from the north-west to Fujian, and concluded that successful health work was impossible where basic living 
standards were intolerable, so the first task in China was to raise living standards. Although action on this was 
somewhat slow, the Guomindang was receptive to his recommendations. Andrija Stampar, 'Health and Social 
Conditions in China', Quarterly Bulletin of the Health Organisation of the League of Nations, No. 5 (1936), 
1090-126, referenced in Amrith, Decolonizing International Health, pp. 26-27. 
5 Jordan, 'Report'. 
156 Rogaski, Hygienic Modernity. 
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and in his subsequent period as Chief of the Division of Vital Statistics at the Health 
Demonstration Station at Beijing under John Grant. 157 Thus while Davis and Jordan looked 
down on their Chinese counterpart, Hu's experience and qualifications were certainly at 
least as `modern' and up-to-date as their own. 158 Hu was in some ways a product of the 
transnational developments in public health. 159 The Rockefeller Foundation, which funded 
Hu's training at the Johns Hopkins School (he was the first Chinese recipient of a 
Rockefeller Foundation International Health Board fellowship) and supported the Health 
Station where he had worked, was arguably the most significant organisation promoting 
public health on the international stage in this period. 160 It was the time of a dramatic shift 
in the nature of public health across Asia, as improvements in basic sanitation and nutrition 
were championed and large gains made throughout the region. Moreover, as noted above, 
representatives of the League of Nations worked hard to effect cooperation between the 
different authorities of the city on health issues, but the relationship between the Chinese 
and Settlement administrations was plagued by mistrust. 
Insignificant as it may seem, the issue of licensing and inspecting bakeries and 
dairies provided a catalyst for a deterioration in the relationship between the two councils 
on health matters. In 1927 Hu Hongji suggested to Davis that, provided the license 
conditions of both areas met the same standards, they should be mutually recognised. An 
SMC inspection in early 1928, however, found bakeries licensed by Hu to be unsanitary, so 
Davis decided to withhold reciprocity on licensing until standards improved. This marked 
'17 Mary Brown Bullock, An American Transplant: The Rockefeller Foundation and Peking Union Medical 
College (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), p. 147. 
'56 Jordan, by way of comparison, had qualified at Cambridge University in 1913. 
'59 Amrith, Decolonizing International Health, pp. 4-8,25-27. 
160 Amrith, Decolonizing International Health, p. 25. 
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the beginning of an antagonistic relationship between the two public health commissioners: 
Davis claimed that from then on Hu was hostile and `carried on a persistent campaign of 
calumny and obstruction'. 161 Hu then proposed reciprocity on pork inspection, but the two 
councils refused to recognise the quality of the other's inspectorate. When the SMC 
introduced a system of inspecting pigs for Chinese consumption within the Settlement, 
therefore, all pigs in the Chinese City bearing the municipal stamp were confiscated. 
Relations reached their low-point the following year over the disposal of human waste. The 
ever-increasing population of the Settlement meant previous solutions to the problem were 
no longer sufficient, and in 1929 the council agreed a contract to use a site in Greater 
Shanghai already in use by the Chinese and French authorities. In order to allow it to 
proceed, however, Hu demanded concessions from the council on areas of contention from 
the reciprocal licensing of food outlets to the Shanghai Municipal Police arresting students 
in uniform. Jordan declared that this was `a deplorable instance of an attempt to sacrifice 
the public health and welfare to the attainment of political ends', but in the unequal world 
of the treaty ports it is unsurprising that the Chinese authorities should have seized 
opportunities to obtain concessions from the foreign authorities they were hoping to 
supersede. Jordan's objections were in fact based largely on Hu's perceived lack of respect 
for the council. He claimed Hu `adopted a manner of studied insolence' during a meeting 
with the Commissioner of Public Works over the issue. 162 The council and its employees 
were having trouble adjusting to a newly confident and ambitious Chinese authority. 
Deploring the `refractory and short-sighted obstructiveness of the local authorities', Jordan 
161 Jordan, `Report'. 
162 Jordan complained that Hu choosing to speak only through a clerical assistant even though he spoke 
perfect English. 
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recommended the council install incinerators to deal with the problem of waste disposal, 
which it duly did. ' 63 Cooperation had failed. 
There were not always alternative options if cooperation was found to be difficult, 
and sometimes concessions had to be made. Diseases do not respect political borders, and 
the fight against cholera was one area in which the three municipalities in Shanghai made a 
concerted effort to cooperate, following the League of Nations mission. The SMC, French 
Conseil municipal and Chinese municipal government all contributed funds and materials 
to annual anti-cholera campaigns from 1929, which aimed, for example, to inoculate 
200,000 persons in 1930.164 The Public Health Bureau in the Chinese municipality had 
already developed a laboratory with a large capacity: the SMC planned to use 200,000 
vaccines produced in its own laboratories and purchase further supplies from the Bureau. 
However, the minutes of the conference held in May 1930 to plan that year's campaign, led 
by Hu Hongji and attended by representatives of all three administrations and of the League 
of Nations, reveal the deep tensions that existed between those involved. The most serious 
area of disagreement was over the strength of the inoculation to be administered. The 
Chinese doctors were concerned that if too high a dose were given, patients would have 
such a severe reaction that people would be unwilling to undergo the inoculation. Fearing 
that they would be the only authority whose inoculation produced the severe reaction, the 
council agreed to a compromise dose much lower than that they thought advisable, but 
from comments made at the meeting Jordan suspected that Hu would proceed with the even 
lower dose he had planned. Jordan's personal dislike of Hu was again apparent and he 
noted his disgust at the discussion in the margin of his copy of the minutes: `the whole 
163 Jordan and Davis, `Brief History'; U1-1-124, Health Committee, 25 February 1930. 
1" Jordan, `Report'. 
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thing is eye-wash'. 165 He also criticised Hu's inoculation of schoolchildren who Jordan 
believed were at low risk of contracting cholera anyway: he evidently did not believe Hu 
was basing his work on a sound scientific basis. Cooperation between the council and the 
Chinese authorities was fraught with such differences of opinion. Yet the annual campaigns 
continued and the approach to the prevention of cholera was one of partnership. The 
council contributed funds to other campaigns run by the municipal government to increase 
uptake of vaccinations and improve general hygiene standards, and city-wide campaigns 
were thought to achieve a greater impact than if they had been confined to the limits of the 
Settlement. 
In other areas of public health management, the SMC was forced into a position of 
keeping up with the rapid improvements being effected in the neighbouring Chinese 
municipality. In December 1933 the Health Committee recommended that action be taken 
on school medical inspection. This had been suggested many times since Stanley first 
reported on the subject in 1920, but the council ruled in 1925 that `the responsibility for 
attending to the health of School Children is properly a matter for parents' and therefore 
should not fall on the public purse. 166 In later years as the culture of the SMC gradually 
changed and it took on greater responsibilities, such as the provision of education for 
Chinese due to the influence of Chinese members of council, medical inspection in schools 
was still not given priority due to calls for financial stringency. All that had altered in 1933 
was that the Chinese municipal government had implemented a programme of school 
medical inspection, and the SMC could not appear to fall behind, as stated explicitly in the 
165 Jordan, `Report'. 
166 Zhang Qian (ed. ), Minutes ofthe SMC, Vol. XXIII, 2 July 1925. 
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Health Committee minutes. 167 Due to pressure from the Treasurer to keep costs low, the 
council initially employed the services of Dr Ward to investigate the need for such a service. 
She reported in March 1934 that children in municipal schools were suffering from a high 
number of preventable eye and skin infections, and advocated the establishment of a school 
medical inspection service without delay. Work began in Chinese municipal primary 
schools in accordance with advice from Chinese members of the SMC Education Board on 
how the service should proceed, based on practice in the Greater Shanghai municipality. 
This episode reflects both a shift in dynamic as the council followed the example set by the 
Chinese municipality, and the positive impact made by Chinese representatives on the 
council as it was they who prompted the decision. The achievements of the Greater Chinese 
municipal authority in this and other areas of public health work contribute to the growing 
literature which rehabilitates the Nationalist government more broadly, redressing a long- 
held belief that it was doomed to fail from the Outset. 168 The SMC had a powerful new 
neighbour in the Greater Shanghai municipal government, and in public health the two 
administrations learned to cooperate despite their mutual mistrust. 
Conclusion 
Despite these improvements in the council's relations with its neighbours and all the 
increased activities of the Public Health Department described in this chapter, there is no 
evidence that it was successful in significantly reducing mortality rates in the Settlement 
among foreigners or Chinese. Figure 15 shows the death rates per thousand from 1902, the 
167 U1-1-124, Health Committee, 7 December 1933. 
168 Julia C. Strauss, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities: State Building in Republican China, 1927-1940 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998); various contributors to `Special Issue: Reappraising Republican China', 
China Quarterly, No. 150 (June 1997), pp. 255-458. 
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first year in which statistics were kept by the council for the Chinese community, until 
1937 when Sino-Japanese hostilities dramatically increased the numbers of Chinese deaths: 
the most common causes of death that year were violence and accidents, even though the 
figures only applied to the year up until August. The graph shows how death rates varied 
within this period from a high of 30.9 per thousand in 1902 (10,801 deaths were recorded 
that year) to a low of 10.3 per thousand in the Chinese population in 1923 (when 8,436 
deaths were recorded), but without a discernable trend of a decline in mortality. Similarly, 
the death rate among foreigners, far fewer in total population, ranged from 11.2 per 
thousand in 1905 (129 deaths) to 20.7 in 1917 (410 deaths), with no general decline in 
mortality. 169 
MacPherson argues that foreigners in Shanghai enjoyed lower mortality rates than 
their counterparts elsewhere in East Asia, 170 but the failure of the PHD to make a positive 
impact on the rate of deaths over a period of such increased activity and investment as has 
been described requires explanation. The department operated in an environment with high 
levels of poverty, especially among the Chinese population, but also among some foreign 
groups, particularly Russian emigres. Over-crowding as refugees fled to the Settlement 
with limited resources posed new public health dangers and containing these was a growing 
struggle for the PHD. That the death rate was kept relatively stable in the face of over- 
crowding can therefore be seen as an achievement in itself, but even so the department was 
falling short of its aims, born of faith in scientific progress. The most striking sign of the 
SMC's failure to address poverty as the underlying cause of mortality was the numbers of 
169 SMC Reports for the years 1905-193 7. This would appear to lend credence to the argument that public 
health measures had less impact on global decreasing mortality rates in the nineteeth and twentieth centuries 
than other, mainly economic, factors. 
170 MacPherson, Wilderness of Marshes, p. 268. 
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'exposed corpses' which were cleared from the streets of the city on a daily basis: these 
were listed separately in municipal annual reports from 1930, when 5,783 such bodies were 
collected in the Settlement, representing 37.4 per cent of the total number of deaths. 1" This 
phenomenon increased through the decade until it reached a high of 20,796 in 1937, or 59 
per cent of the total figure for deaths that year. 
72 It was a mark of shame in a city with the 
wealth of Shanghai that such extreme poverty should be in such stark evidence, contrasting 
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Figure 15: Death rates per thousand of the foreign and Chinese communities of the 
International Settlement. 173 
This chapter provides a case study of how the Shanghai Municipal Council 
functioned by examining how it formed and implemented policies in the field of public 
"' SMC, Report for 1930, p. 132. For a detailed study of the phenomenon of exposed corpses on the streets of 
Shanghai. see Christian I lenriot, -Invisible Deaths. Silent Deaths": "Bodies without Masters" in Republican 
Shanghai', Journal of Social History, Vol. 43, No. 2 (Winter 2009), pp. 407-437. 
12 SMC, Report for 1937, p. 121. 
173 SMC, Reports for the years 1905-1937. 
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health. Further work from the perspectives of the Chinese and French municipal authorities 
would reveal new facets to these relationships, while research into the impact of public 
health policies on the lives of Shanghai's inhabitants would lead to a much fuller 
understanding of public health and its limits in this period. It is clear from this study, 
however, that the practical work of public health provision was shaped, enhanced and 
hampered in practical ways by the unique status of the International Settlement. 
The council and its committees juggled the growing demand for public health 
services with the ever-present concern for economy, yet over the decades there is clear 
evidence of increased public health provision and a greater sense of responsibility for the 
care of Chinese residents in the Settlement. Public health provision was never a priority for 
the laissez-faire council, so the commissioners of public health did well to expand the work 
of their department to such an extent over the years. They also had to contend with the 
constraints on council powers caused by the limited Land Regulations and the inability to 
alter them after 1899, coupled with the difficulty in securing ratepayer approval for changes 
to the byelaws, which prevented the council from taking the kind of action in the field of 
public health that was possible in other parts of the world. The PHD was able to circumvent 
this limitation by emphasising the work it could do within the existing legal structure of the 
Settlement. This meant shifting from attempting to force a change in the living conditions 
and practices of, in the main, Chinese residents, by enforcing draconian byelaws such as 
those introduced in 1910 to prevent the spread of plague, towards efforts through publicity 
and especially the work of the branch health offices to achieve improvements in public 
health. This coincided with the emergence of a concern among Chinese elites to embody 
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`hygienic modernity' and increased awareness globally of the role of public hygiene in 
preventing the spread of disease. 
The council also pursued its public health goals in the rarefied environment of the 
laboratory, conducting research which positioned the PHD at the forefront of international 
public health work. The SMC was subject to international influences from around the world 
in an age in which newly emergent transnational bodies such as the League of Nations 
Health Organisation and the Rockefeller Foundation were beginning to have a significant 
impact. The International Settlement was also positioned squarely in the `British world 9 9174 
through the professional circuits of its staff and by maintaining close links with public 
health training and measures in Britain and its overseas territories and spheres of influence, 
including but not confined to Hong Kong and the China coast. Locally, too, the SMC had to 
interact with different political actors, notably the French Concession authorities and the 
Chinese administration of Greater Shanghai. The Settlement limits, which were of 
apparently little import to Shanghai's inhabitants who crossed them in the course of their 
daily lives, were real barriers to concerted public health work, but over time cooperation 
became more prevalent than conflict. 
The public health activities of the Shanghai Municipal Council, therefore, reflect in 
practical terms the realities of how it functioned as a semi-colonial body in relation to local 
and transnational influences. The pride of the council and many residents of the Settlement 
in its comparative modernity was due in no small part to its provisions for public health, as 
indicated by the chapter's opening quotation. The fact that mortality rates in the Settlement 
remained effectively stagnant despite all the efforts of the PHD may appear to counter these 
174 Carl Bridge and Kent Fedorowich (eds. ), The British World: Diaspora, Culture and Identity (London: 
Frank Cass, 2003). 
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claims, but given the increased population pressures in the Settlement this in itself was an 
achievement. Yet despite the myriad activities of the PHD, poverty remained a barrier to 
significant improvements in public health, rendering the efforts of the department to 
exemplify scientific modernity somewhat futile. 
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Chapter Five: Industrial Reform 
`Except the Bund ... Shanghai has nothing to show the visitor, - unless he comes to see 
Missions or cotton-mills. " 
`It is no light task to try to prevent a city from blowing up! '2 
Shanghai was the centre of light industry in China from the dawn of the twentieth century. 
The Treaty of Shimonoseki which concluded the First Sino-Japanese War in April 1895 
granted Japan and therefore, through Most Favoured Nation clauses in other treaties, all the 
other foreign powers, the right for the first time to open factories and engage in industries 
and manufacturing in China. 3 There followed a rapid expansion in industry in the main 
treaty ports, especially Shanghai and Tianjin, from foreign investors and, to a lesser extent, 
from a new wave of Chinese industrialists. The latter were responding in part to the 
measures taken by the Qing government to boost industry following the disastrous First 
Sino-Japanese and Boxer wars, such as the creation of a Ministry of Commerce in 1903 and 
the promulgation of a Company Law in 1904 a In Shanghai the main industry was cotton 
manufacturing. The region had been a centre of cotton production and processing since the 
thirteenth century, but it was only with the relaxation of the laws restricting foreign 
industry in 1895 that the industry took off with the establishment of foreign-style mills and 
the adoption of western technologies. The heyday of the cotton industry subsequently came 
Samuel Couling, Encyclopaedia Sinica (Shanghai: Kelly and Walsh, 1917), p. 521. 
2 MLMSS 770/1/2: E. M. Hinder to her mother, 5 May 1936. 
3 Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, `Late Ch'ing foreign relations, 1866-1905'. in The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 
II, Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911, Part 2, ed. by John K. Fairbank and Kwang-Ching Liu (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1980), p. 108. 
Albert Feuerwerker, 'Economic trends in the late Ch'ing empire, 1870-1911', in Cambridge History of 
China, Vol. II, ed. by Fairbank and Liu, p. 33. For the nineteenth-century industrialisation of Shanghai, see 
also Bergbre, Shanghai: China's Gateway to Modernity, pp. 59-63. 
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during the First World War due to the fall in overseas competition and the concurrent 
global rise in demands The scale of the growth in the textile industry was similar to that 
seen in the English industrial revolution, but over the course of just three decades. For 
example, the number of cotton spindles and looms in operation roughly doubled between 
1913 and 1920, from 484,192 spindles and 2,016 looms to 842,894 and 4,310 respectively. 6 
The cotton mills which the English missionary Samuel Couling noted dominated the 
Shanghai cityscape in the quotation that opens this chapter were the source of much of both 
the city's wealth and its inhabitants' suffering. Shanghai thus earned a reputation for 
industrial exploitation alongside the other vices for which it was known. 
The Shanghai Municipal Council followed a long tradition of laissez-faire 
governance and was slow to respond to concerns over the welfare of industrial workers in 
the International Settlement. Change in this area only came with a combination of pressures 
from local and international institutions and welfare groups, predominantly directed or 
promoted by women, and from the Chinese government when it took action to instigate 
industrial reform. The council was arrogantly proud of the modernity of Shanghai, 
attributing this to the activities of foreigners in the International Settlement and in no small 
part to the specific role played by the SMC itself. Industry was a key component of 
modernity in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, through the mechanisation of 
traditional practices, the sociological impact of bringing workers together in the close 
confines of factory employment, and the cultural effect of the new consumption of 
manufactured goods: the growing significance of the `things modern' which Frank Dikötter 
s Bergire, Golden Age, pp. 64-83. 
6 Berglire, Golden Age, p. 71. 
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has analysed. 7 With such wide-reaching implications for society, industry lay at the heart of 
Shanghai's celebrated status as the most modern city of East Asia. As the SMC claimed 
much of the credit for creating the environment in which modernity flourished, it was also 
staking its reputation on the quality of the industry in the International Settlement. When, 
therefore, criticism of industrial working conditions there began to trickle and later pour in 
from London, Geneva and Sydney, not to mention Nanjing, the council reluctantly had to 
act to salvage this reputation by promoting industrial reforms as best it could. 
This final chapter provides a case study of how the policies pursued by the Shanghai 
Municipal Council were influenced by local, national and international forces, focusing on 
the realm of industrial reform. This area, peripheral to municipal activities until the late 
1930s, provides a revealing example of how the nature of the council and its priorities 
changed over time. Many of the facets of the SMC which have been drawn out in the 
preceding chapters are further in evidence in its activities in industrial reform, including the 
imperial and transnational networks within which it functioned and the degree to which it 
shaped the city of Shanghai, including the form and conception of the city's modernity. 
Municipal efforts to regulate industrial conditions were frustrated by the council's lack of 
legal authority to pass and enforce laws in the Settlement, so they centred on the use of 
byelaws and other creative ways around the constraints of the Land Regulations. In this 
way, in the area of industrial reform, as in public health and more literally in matters of 
defence, the council continued to pursue its policy of seeking to expand its powers and 
authority by whatever means it could. Politically-active Chinese were sensible to this and 
opposed attempts by the council to extend its powers into areas not specifically provided 
7 Dikötter, Things Modern. 
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for in the Land Regulations, further complicating efforts to improve industrial conditions. 
This chapter therefore addresses the council's relationship with Chinese nationalism as it 
grew in the 1930s. It also engages with the growing literature which reassesses the 
Guomindang government's efforts to develop China, as legislative initiatives from Nanjing 
influenced and were influenced by municipal activities in the realm of industrial reform, 
perhaps more than in any other area of governance. 8 
One important new aspect of the council's nature becomes apparent over the 
following pages: its place within the development of a global women's movement in the 
inter-war years, largely through the dynamic figure of Eleanor Hinder, who ran the 
council's Industrial Division. As Emily Honig has shown, industrial conditions in Shanghai 
were to a great extent a women's issue, as the majority of the exploited textile workers 
were women-9 The suffering of women and particularly children in Shanghai's factories 
prompted women's groups to appeal to the council for action. It was appropriate, therefore, 
that the SMC should appoint a woman to direct industrial reform. This chapter thus sees a 
more gendered approach to the history of the council than is possible or appropriate in the 
rest of the thesis. 
The chapter follows a broadly chronological approach to the council's industrial 
activities. It briefly addresses the council's limited concern with industrial conditions in the 
fast decades of the twentieth century, before turning to the first serious attempts to regulate 
industry in the Settlement in the mid-1920s, in response to public pressure to control the 
B For some early examples of this development in the literature, see China Quarterly, No. 150, Special Issue: 
Reappraising Republican China (June 1997). More recent work in this vein includes Felix Boecking, 
`Unmaking the Chinese Nationalist State: Administrative Reform among Fiscal Collapse, 1937-1945', 
Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 45, No. 2 (2011), pp. 227-301, and other contributions to this special issue of the 
Journal. 
Honig, Sisters and Strangers. 
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use of child labour. The promulgation of the Factory Act by the Nanjing government in 
1929 precipitated more wide-reaching reforms in the Settlement and the establishment of 
the council's Industrial Division, which is analysed in some detail. Finally, the activities of 
this Division during the Second Sino-Japanese War are assessed, as they represent a 
microcosm of how the council and its functionality was affected by the war and the 
Japanese occupation. 
Early municipal concern over industrial conditions 
Prior to the establishment of a specific division to address industrial conditions, scant 
attention was paid by the SMC to such issues. When they did arise, they fell under the 
purview of the Watch Committee, inasmuch as the public order of the Settlement was 
affected. The first reference in the minutes of the committee to such disorder came in June 
1910 when the Captain Superintendent of Police reported that women workers at silk 
filatures in western Hongkou had created a public disturbance due to their employers 
withholding their pay as security for their work. 10 The committee determined that a letter 
should be addressed to the managers of the ten filatures involved, instructing them to avoid 
the practice as it was likely to create breaches of public order by the workers. " The 
factories were later told that if they employed practices which were found to be behind 
public disturbances they would be liable to prosecution. 12 The council took action, therefore, 
not out of concern for workers' welfare but for the sake of public order, in keeping with its 
conviction that its primary function was to provide an environment conducive to business. 
10 This was common practice in Shanghai's factories and is related to the system of contract labour that Honig 
describes. Honig, Sisters and Strangers, pp. 94.115. 
11 U1-1-83: Watch Committee, 13 June 1910. 
is U1-1-83: Watch Committee, 3 October 1910. 
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The general strike of June 1919 during the May Fourth Movement represented the 
first major industrial action in the city, but the protest was political rather than arising from 
poor working conditions. It nonetheless warned the council of the power of strike action to 
damage public order and business and industrial interests, as well as inconvenience the 
foreign community. 13 In 1922, the Hong Kong government's heavy-handed response to a 
strike by the Seamen's Union, including the killing of five strikers by the police, escalated 
the dispute to a general strike almost paralysing Hong Kong. 14 Following this, the Deputy 
Commissioner of the SMP, Alan Hilton-Johnson, argued that the SMC should `urge 
businesses to treat labour demands sympathetically, ... support conciliation, and ... avoid 
"bombastic utterances in official proclamations"'. '5 This was fairly progressive rhetoric for 
its time in Shanghai (though of course the SMP would fail to learn the lesson from the 
Seamen's Strike when faced with its own crisis on 30 May 1925) but the stress was still 
very much on the preservation of public order rather than improving the lot of Shanghai's 
workers. The same was true of discussions about building regulations: these were revised in 
1922 to encourage (though not insist on) the installation of water sprinkler systems in 
cotton mills where loose cotton constituted a serious fire hazard. The Chief Fire Officer and 
Commissioner of Public Works were in agreement on the benefits of the measures, in part 
for the safety of workers within the mills, but primarily for the prevention of fire which 
could spread to nearby buildings. 16 The members of the Watch Committee were 
nonetheless reluctant to take any action, arguing that such precautions should be adopted 
due to incentives offered by insurance companies rather than regulations. They cited 
13 Chen, The May Fourth Movement, pp. 144-8. 
14 Steve Tsang, A Modern History of Hong Kong (London: I. B. Tauris, 2007), pp. 88-9. 
15 Bickers, Empire Made Me, p. 168. 
16 U1-1-87: Watch Committee, 19 June 1922. 
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favourably the absence of such legislation in English cities, though noted that public places 
such as theatres in the United States were required to install sprinkler and drencher systems. 
This reinforces the point that municipal responsibilities were seen in the light of practice 
globally, predominantly in the Anglo-Saxon world (or what James Belich calls the 
Angloworld) 17 but most particularly in Great Britain, with a preference on the part of the 
council for examples that supported minimal municipal involvement or action. But by the 
1920s, outside expectations of the council's responsibilities were growing. 
Part XHI of the Treaty of Versailles included a provision which established the 
International Labour Conference and its Office at Geneva, under the auspices of the League 
of Nations. All the founding member states of the League, including China, were 
automatically members of the Conference, and at the Washington Conference later in 1919 
Germany and Austria, despite their status as defeated powers at Versailles, were also 
admitted with the same rights and obligations as the other members. 18 The desire was for 
universal application of the principles for which the Conference stood around the globe. 
Particular attention was paid to China from the beginning, due to its size and the scale of its 
industrial problems. The Commission of Special Countries at the Washington Conference 
proposed that China be asked specifically to adhere to the principle of protection of labour 
by factory legislation, recommending regulating a maximum ten-hour day or 60-hour week 
for adults, with shorter hours for those under 15 years, and a weekly rest clay. 19 This was 
indeed enacted by the national government under the precarious presidency of Li Yuanhong 
'7 James Belich, Replenishing the Earth: The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Angloworld, 1783-1939 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
's International Labour Office, The International Labour Organisation: The First Decade (London: George 
Allen & Unwin, 1931), pp. 36-37. 
19 Fang Fu-an, Chinese Labour: An Economic and Statistical Survey of the Labour Conditions and Labour 
Movements in China (Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh, 1931), pp. 130-131. 
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in March 1923, with further stipulations that boys under ten and girls under twelve were not 
to be employed, while older minors were to be employed only in light work and not at night. 
Employers were also to ensure that primary education and basic health care were provided 
for all - very far-reaching goals by the standards of the day. This demonstrates that, even 
prior to the stronger government established by Chiang Kai-Shek in 1927, attempts were 
being made at better governance in the new republic. Similar laws were passed by the 
colonial government of Hong Kong, following the recommendations given by its own 
commission on child labour in October 1921.20 But the Chinese government regulations 
included no measures for enforcement and thus had no real impact, Beijing being too weak 
to impose its will on the nation. Similar laws passed by provincial governments, such as the 
Jiangsu Governor's ruling that the working day should be no more than nine hours and that 
workers should be given Sunday as a day of rest, were also not enforced . 
21 The Shanghai 
Municipal Council, therefore, saw no need to enforce such measures in the Settlement 
alone, nor to introduce similar restrictions on labour practices which would place 
employers in the Settlement at a disadvantage vis-ä-vis their counterparts beyond the reach 
of municipal control. It would take considerable and sustained pressure for it to change in 
this regard. 
20 NCH, 30 September 1922, p. 928. 
21 Jean Chesneaux, The Chinese Labor Movement, 1919-1927, trans. by H. M. Wright (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1968; first published in French in 1962 as Le mouvement ouvrier chinois de 1919 a 1927), p, 
228. Jiangsu bordered Shanghai so it is particularly noteworthy that its governor was forward-thinking in 
industrial reform, even though his aims were not realised. 
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The Child Labour Commission 
It was women's groups that took up the issue of child labour in Shanghai seriously. After a 
series of letters were exchanged in the North-China Daily News (NCDN), the most widely- 
read English-language daily in China, a Joint Committee of Women's Groups (later 
Organizations) met in November 1921 to decide how best to go about ending the practice 
of employing children in industrial work. 22 They decided that legislation would be the most 
effective weapon and, with this in mind, targeted the Shanghai Municipal Council. The 
Joint Committee included the Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA) as well as 
American, British, German and Chinese women's groups based in the city, but the YWCA 
took the lead initially. 23 One of the only studies of industrial reform in China in this period, 
by Robin Porter, finds that it was Christian groups and the Shanghai Municipal Council 
which provided the impetus for reform in this area, attributing influence to statements made 
by the Church of England and other churches in Britain and the United States that more 
must be done to improve the conditions of labour around the world. 24 Porter's emphasis on 
the council's role, however, gives it too much credit for action which it took only 
reluctantly and denies agency to Chinese who campaigned for change both within the 
structures of the YWCA and the SMC, and from within the Guomindang government, as 
shall be seen below. Missionaries and other Christian groups were certainly vocal 
supporters of industrial reform, however, especially the YWCA in this early stage. 
22 State Library of New South Wales, Mitchell Library (hereafter ML) MSS 770/20/2: Joint Committee of 
Shanghai Women's Organizations, Bulletin No. 1: `Toward the Regulation of Child Labour in Shanghai', 
compiled by E. M. Hinder (May 1927), p. 6. 
23 The YMCA was also calling for industrial reform in China in this period, though it was less involved in the 
high-profile campaign against child labour. See Porter, Industrial Reformers in Republican China , pp. 
48-61. 
Peter Zarrow emphasises the importance of the YWCA, describing it as the sole autonomous organisation 
providing forums for women workers outside the Guomindang's control at this time. Peter Arrow, China in 
War and Revolution, 1895-1949 (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 261. 
24 Porter, Industrial Reformers, p. 98. 
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Agatha Harrison, who had been appointed by the YWCA to investigate industrial 
conditions in China after holding the first academic post in Britain concerned with 
industrial welfare (at the London School of Economics), visited the chairman of the SMC, 
H. G. Simms, to discuss the introduction of a municipal byelaw to regulate conditions in 
factories in the International Settlement. 25 They had `a lengthy interview' in which she 
persuaded him that the council should take action on child labour, despite him listing the 
difficulties the council would face in attempting to do so. 26 When it subsequently discussed 
what could be done, however, the council concluded that results would only be achieved if 
Chinese and foreign factory and mill owners inside and outside the Settlement could be 
brought to unanimous agreement, which seemed highly unlikely. Further, council members 
argued that the fault was not with such owners for employing children but with the parents 
for sending them out to work. The practice could therefore be ended only `by a process of 
gradual education and by improvement of the labourers' lot. ' This was tantamount to 
stating that nothing could be done at the municipal level. The only action the council 
recommended was to refer the question to the Employers' Federation for their consideration. 
The Federation reported back that it and the Cotton Mill Owners' Association had 
discussed the subject and communicated with the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce, 
and informed the council of the Chinese government's plans to legislate against the 
employment of children. 27 The council would happily have let the matter rest there, but the 
Joint Committee wrote to the chairman publically calling for the appointment of a 
25 Geoffrey Carnall, `Harrison, Agatha Mary (1885-1954)', in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, eds. 
H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (2004) <http: //www. oxforddnb. com/view/articlet47749>, accessed 22 
August 2011. 
26 Zhang Qian (ed. ), Minutes of the SMC, Vol. XXII, 15 November 1922, p. 211. 27 Zhang Qian (ed. ), Minutes of the SMC, Vol. XXII, 24 January 1923, p. 16. 
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commission to investigate child labour. Divided on the subject, the council finally and 
reluctantly agreed and the commission was endorsed by the ratepayers at their annual 
meeting. 28 The women had achieved their first small victory by raising the public profile of 
the issue of child labour. Significantly, the precedent set in 1921 when the Hong Kong 
government appointed its own commission on child labour had been discussed in the 
English-language press and increased the likelihood of similar action in Shanghai: in many 
areas of policy, where colonial Hong Kong laid the path, semi-colonial Shanghai followed. 
Agatha Harrison and the Secretary of the Joint Committee, Song Meiling (one of 
the famous Song family, sister of T. V. Soong [Song Ziwen], the Minister of Finance, and 
the future Madame Chiang Kai-Shek) were among the members appointed to the 
commission by the council. 29 They were joined by Dr Mary Stone (Shi Meiyu) who was the 
first Chinese woman to earn a medical degree from an American university. 30 Alongside 
these prominent women on the commission were representatives of industrial and business 
concerns such as R. J. McNicol, Manager of Jardine, Matheson and Company, which had 
always had close ties to the council and had recently declared its intention to prohibit the 
employment of boys under ten and girls under twelve in its mills. The praise which this 
limited measure elicited indicates the extent of employment of very young children in 
industrial Shanghai. Simms informed the members of the commission at their first meeting 
that the council believed the best route forward would be to follow the regulations recently 
promulgated by the Chinese government and to work out how best to implement them 
n Zhang Qian (ed. ), Minutes of the SMC, Vol. XXII, 28 March 1923, pp. 316-17; Municipal Gazette, 16 April 
1923. 
29 A recent thorough popular biography of Soong Meiling is Hannah Pakula, The Last Empress: Madame 
Chiang Kai-Shek and the Birth of Modern China (London: Orion, 2010). Pakula points out that Soong's 
ýVpomtment to the Child Labour Commission was her first political role (p. 71). 
3°Daniel H. Bays, A New History of Christianity in China (Chichester Wiley, 2012), p. 115. 
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uniformly across Shanghai. Simms was confident, he said, that the French Municipal 
Council would cooperate with whatever proposals the SMC put forward . 
3'Clearly he, at 
least, was sure of the council's status in the driving seat of change in Shanghai. The North- 
China Herald, the weekly digest of the NCDN, agreed, welcoming the commission as `an 
illustration of how very far Shanghai has travelled'. Harrison had successfully won the 
paper over to her cause and it was now a champion of child labour legislation, a significant 
boon to the women's groups. It coupled its support with congratulations to the SMC: 
the Municipal Council, which a comparatively little time ago was considered hardly 
more than a glorified ways and means organization, has set its hand to a great piece 
of social legislation in respect of which it may blaze a trail for all China to follow. 32 
The journalist was accurate in noting the vast expansion of the council's activities from 
being simply a `ways and means organization' to attempting to legislate for social reform. 
Yet, in keeping with the blinkered view typical of the NCH, he neglected to note the 
chairman's recognition that it was Chinese legislation that was being taken as the model for 
the commission's recommendations. The foreign residents of the `Model Settlement' liked 
to enhance its self-perception as a beacon for enlightened governance in China, but in the 
area of industrial legislation it was behind the Chinese government in terms of ambition for 
change - though enforcement of such ambitious legislation was, of course, another matter. 
In the Shanghailander world-view, the International Settlement was necessarily the most 
advanced place in China, regardless of what laws were passed in Beijing or, later, Nanjing. 
The Commission was later augmented by Dame Adelaide Anderson, formerly the 
Chief Lady Inspector of Factories in Britain, during her visit to China in 1924, when she 
31 Report of meeting held 22 June 1923, NCH, 7 July 1923, p. 63. 32 NCH114 July 1923. 
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also met and advised Chinese officials in Beijing and elsewhere. 33 The links between the 
International Settlement and both China more widely and Great Britain were thus again 
apparent, as was the critical part played by women. While the Commission investigated the 
conditions of child labour in Shanghai, the women's groups kept up their pressure for 
reform. Harrison had appealed to the international committee of the YWCA to send their 
own delegation to look into the question, so Mary Dingman and Evelyn Fox, both 
Americans, visited China in 1923. After an initial consultation with the national committee 
of the YWCA, they travelled on to Australia where they met Eleanor Hinder, who was 
persuaded to go back with them to see the factories of Hong Kong, Canton and Shanghai. 34 
Harrison encouraged Hinder to move to Shanghai and work for the YWCA, investigating 
industrial working conditions and campaigning for reform. Sarah Paddle has discussed the 
ways in which a critical mass of western women in Shanghai including Hinder, Anderson, 
Harrison and Dingman self-consciously identified themselves as `world women' or 
international feminists and worked together in a mutually supportive network aimed at 
raising the position of Chinese women. 
35 The YWCA was the key organisation that linked 
these campaigners and Hinder's work for the YWCA connected her to all them. It also 
brought her into contact for the first time with the Shanghai Municipal Council, whose 
33 Anderson made her visit to China in what was intended to be a short diversion on an extended visit to study 
labour conditions in Australia and India. She was then invited to join the SMC's Child Labour Commission, 
so extended her stay in Shanghai. Her perspective on the progress made by the Child Labour Commission is 
surprisingly positive about the SMC, due presumably to the welcome she was given in the Settlement. 
Adelaide Mary Anderson, Humanity and Labour in China: An Industrial Visit and its Sequel (1923 to 1926) 
(London: Student Christian Movement, 1928), pp. 32,125-62. 
34 MLMSS 770/13/8: draft of uncompleted autobiography of Eleanor Hinder, chapter 5, p. 2. Hinder spoke at 
Dingman's service of remembrance in New York in 1961, recalling that `1 owe a great deal personally to 
Mary Dingman' and indeed that she had lead the life she had due to meeting Dingman in Sydney in 1923. 
MLMSS 770/9/1: Order of Service for Mary Dingman's Service of Thanksgiving. 
35 Sarah Paddle, "`For the China of the Future": Western Feminists, Colonisation and International 
Citizenship in China in the Inter-war Years', Australian Feminist Studies, Vol. 16, No. 36 (2001), p. 326. 
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members, representing as they did the business interests of the Settlement, she found 
obstructive and unreceptive to what they saw as `interference ... 
from well-meaning social 
workers. 36 
The Child Labour Commission submitted its findings and recommendations to the 
council in August 1924, to much fanfare in the NCH, which called the report `easily one of 
the most significant documents published in this country. '37 In general, the report focused 
on the poor health of children in Shanghai compared to those in rural China, due to 
cramped conditions, long, arduous and dangerous working conditions, and extreme 
poverty. 38 They found that conditions were worst in the silk filatures, where almost the 
entire workforce was female, with approximately one child for every two adult workers. 
Children worked the same hours and shifts (typically twelve hours, including night shifts) 
as adult workers, for around half the wages. There was no consideration for even basic fire 
precautions. Cotton factories were considered only marginally better, but conditions in 
tobacco factories were less appalling, as the shifts were limited to nine to ten hours of 
comparatively light work which could be done while seated. Match factory workers were 
even given a day of rest each week. The match industry, however, was beset with safety 
problems, including the continued use of phosphorous (banned in most western countries in 
1908), which led to phosphorous poisoning. Working conditions in general, not just for 
children, were thus badly in need of regulation and improvement. 
The members of the commission had found that little interest was taken in their 
work and that witnesses were slow and reluctant to come forward, but they succeeded in 
36 MLMSS 770/19/8, A. Constance Duncan, `Women in Pioneering Jobs', No. 1: Eleanor Hinder: Talk to be 
broadcast over 3. L. O. on 9 March 1938(? ), based on interviews with and observation of Hinder in Shanghai. 
37 NCH, 9 August 1924, p. 203. 
38 `Report of the Child Labour Commission', Municipal Gazette, 19 July 1924. 
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producing the first serious investigation into labour conditions in Shanghai. The 
commission's report included the comment that legislative solutions would be difficult in 
view of the lack of central government in China, in line with the council's own objections 
to municipal action on the question. Nevertheless, the commission recommended a 
minimum age, maximum working hours and other measures in line with those 
recommended by the ILO and legislated by the Chinese government in 1923.39 It also 
looked to best practice within China and Asia, pointing to the safety procedures followed in 
a Chinese silk filature in Hangzhou and in common use in Japan whereby the boiling room 
was kept separate from the cocoon reeling room, and cocoons were cooled before being 
peeled. It is significant that regional, national and international precedents were taken as 
models by the self-proclaimed model settlement. 
The council drafted a byelaw based on the Commission's report for submission to 
the ratepayers at a special meeting in 1925. The press was flooded with letters over the 
proposals, both in support of the legislation, many of which were written by women in the 
various organisations that were involved in the campaign, and in vocal criticism of it. 
Critics who wrote to the editor of the North-China Daily News ranged from such foreigners 
as the writer who adopted the penname `Shanghailander' to Chinese like Waung Mau. The 
latter warned that girls deprived of an honest living would find an alternative in the brothel 
and quoted the defence of the continuance of child labour given to the council by the 
Chinese Cotton Mill Owners' Association that attempts to eliminate it were unsuccessful 
`owing to the pitiful requests of the parents of the children. '40 A change in employment 
practices would not be easily won. But many employers signalled their support for 
39 Ibid. 
40 NCH, 4 April 1925, p. 31. 
273 
legislation, as evidenced in a letter signed by prominent British, American, Chinese and 
Japanese companies and published in the NCH. 41 The tide of popular opinion was shifting 
in the direction of municipal intervention to improve social conditions, as the perception of 
the role of a modem government expanded to encompass basic welfare legislation. 
Yet, despite increased support for the proposed new byelaw, when it came to the 
special meeting to approve it, a quorum was not obtained. 399 ratepayers turned out for the 
meeting, representing between them 622 votes, significantly short of the one third of 
ratepayers' votes (which equated to 924 in 1925) required for the quorum. The Herald 
mourned this lost opportunity and the signal it sent to the world that Shanghai did not care, 
`as if, perhaps, the attractions of a fine day and a game of golf were too much to be resisted, 
even for a matter of profound humanity and vital importance' - terms that presaged Arthur 
Ransome's damning description of the `Shanghai Mind'. 42 This was strong criticism of 
Shanghailanders from the organ which was usually their staunchest ally. Some blamed the 
Japanese community for staying away, partly it was thought because many of them could 
not follow business presented solely in English and the council had dismissed a suggestion 
to provide a simultaneous translation because it would set a precedent: Anglo-American 
interests still utterly dominated the council at this stage. But the NCH journalist pointed out 
that the Japanese ratepayers represented only 266 of the total and many of them were in fact 
present, so they could not be blamed for the failure to reach a quorum. Apathy, 
conservatism and a strong aversion to anything that might entail a cost to businesses on the 
part of the majority of voting ratepayers were the major blocks to socially progressive 
41 NCH, 11 April 1925, p. 56. 
42 NCH, 18 April 1925, p. 88. Arthur Ransome published his articles, including `The Shanghai Mind', written 
for the Manchester Guardian during his stay in China in 1926-27, as The Chinese Puzzle. See Bickers, Britain 
in China, pp. 51-52. 
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policies throughout the existence of the International Settlement, coupled with the 
inadequate and dated procedures laid down by the Land Regulations. The need to call a 
special meeting to approve new byelaws was less of a problem in the nineteenth century 
when there were fewer distractions for ratepayers, but by the 1920s Shanghai offered many 
more enticing ways to pass the time that sitting in the town hall. The attempt to reduce the 
incidence of child labour suffered from this: public opinion had shifted towards greater 
municipal control of working conditions, but not enough to achieve legislative change. 
Political events then obstructed further efforts to unite Chinese and foreign groups 
in support of municipal action on child labour, as the May Thirtieth Movement (itself one 
of the biggest labour movements in Chinese history, with a 119-day strike)43 made it 
impossible for Chinese to support the SMC and any action it promoted in any way. The 
second attempt to pass the byelaw at another special meeting was made just three days after 
the infamous shooting of twelve Chinese protesters by the SMP. Despite a higher turnout - 
514 ratepayers were present - the number of votes represented at the meeting still fell short 
of the quorum by 177-44 In addition to the groundswell of anti-SMC feeling that followed 
the incident, it did not help the campaigners that the child labour byelaw was being tabled 
with other municipal regulations that were unpopular with Chinese residents, including one 
that would restrict the freedom of the press. Even without this complication, nationalists 
held that regardless of the merits of the legislation, the SMC had no right to be legislating 
on Chinese soil. Although Chinese ratepayers were still not eligible to vote in 1925, the 
support that had been obtained from Chinese firms and groups had been a strong element of 
43 Smith, Like Cattle and Horses, p. 185. While the motive for the May Thirtieth Movement was political, 
expressing anger at foreign imperialism in China, it was tensions in Japanese factories over working 
conditions that sparked the initial strikes earlier in May 1925. 
44 Joint Committee, Bulletin No. 1, pp. 20-23. 
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the women's campaign. Eleanor Hinder later recalled that `Foreign voters were not willing 
to force a measure providing purely for Chinese social welfare in the teeth of Chinese 
opposition. '45 The Chinese women's organisations withdrew their support from the child 
labour byelaw and the council made no further attempts to regulate child labour through 
legislation, choosing to await action by the Chinese government on the issue. 
International Pressure on the SMC 
In addition to its (reluctant) response to criticism in Shanghai, the SMC was not immune to 
censure from abroad, although Shanghailanders tended to bluster that those in Europe and 
America had no idea what it was like `in the East', ' while the SMC resisted efforts by the 
consular body and Foreign Office in London to exert any control over it. The report of the 
Child Labour Commission was read widely both in China and overseas, and received 
responses from diverse groups. The Manchester Chamber of Commerce, for example, 
wrote to the SMC calling on it to adopt the measures recommended by the commission, as 
reported in the Manchester Guardian. The NCH reported this support for child labour 
legislation from Britain's industrial heartland in terms of Manchester calling on Shanghai's 
foreigners to lead the way to industrial reform in China. Following the publication of the 
report, the British government made it its business to investigate the conditions in British- 
owned factories in China and how they compared to other industrial concerns, appointing 
the Liberal MP Donald Maclean to report following a request from the Ministry of Labour 
to the Foreign Office in 1924.7 Maclean concluded that conditions in British factories were 
45 Hinder, Life and Labour, p. 6. 
46 NCH, 21 February 1925, p. 305. 
47 NCH, 4 July 1925, p. 508. 
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in fact better than most, the main concern in Westminster seemingly to be to avoid 
international embarrassment rather than seek an improvement in Chinese working 
conditions. International interest in the question was not confined to Britain. The 
commission's report reached Sydney and was even briefly taken up by an element within 
the union movement there as indicative of the exploitative nature of British imperialism to 
which Australian workers were also subjected. 48 
But in the 1920s there were new players on the international stage, particularly the 
League of Nations, which had a strong interest in industrial welfare. 49 Indeed, it was 
concern over the conditions of employment of children in factories that first brought a 
delegation from the League to Shanghai. Albert Thomas, the first director of the League's 
International Labour Office (ILO), led the mission in 1924, helping to attract international 
attention to the issue of industrial conditions in China. 
50 Yet Jean Chesneaux, in his seminal 
work on the emergence of the Chinese labour movement between 4 May 1919 and the 
establishment of the Nationalist government at Nanjing, was dismissive of the impact of the 
ILO in China. He described the 1924 visit as `a mission that had no mandate and no powers, 
and whose report the organization prudently refrained from publishing. '" He argued that 
the attitude of the ILO towards China suffered `from the congenital defect of being meekly 
in line with the League of Nations attitude on colonial questions, ' a reference to the 
' Sophie Loy-Wilson, "`Liberating' Asia: Strikes and Protest in Sydney and Shanghai, 1920-39', History 
Workshop Journal, (Advance access: published online 23 August 2011). 
49 Introductions to the work of the ILO for general consumption made an explicit link between improving 
labour conditions and the League of Nations' broader aims to promote world peace: `people living under bad 
conditions, working far too long every day... will always probably be ready to make war'. Kathleen E. Inns, 
The League of Nations and the World's Workers: An Introduction to the Work of the International Labour 
Organisation (London: Hogarth Press, 1927), p. 9. 
S0 On Albert Thomas and his work at the ILO, see B. W. Schaper, Albert Thomas: trente ans de rtsformisme 
sociale (Paris: Presses universaires de France, 1959). 
51 Chesneaux, Chinese Labor Movement, p. 385. 
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League's dominance by and support for colonial powers. Chesneaux noted the statement 
made at the Organisation's inaugural meeting that China was a special case to which 
western norms could not apply, including expectations about the standard of industrial 
working conditions. He also damned the ILO for its refusal to engage with the trade unions 
and communists who, he argued, represented the true nature of the labour movement in 
China. Some of these criticisms are fair and the ILO's impact on China was certainly 
limited, but the Chinese government chose to involve the ILO in its industrial reform 
efforts and the Organisation was far from insignificant in the British world to which the 
SMC belonged. 
The ILO delegation raised international, specifically British, awareness of the 
conditions prevailing in factories in Shanghai in particular, training greater attention on the 
report of the Child Labour Commission when it was published, as letters appeared in The 
Times prompting questions to be asked in Parliament. Quoting the Commission's report, 
the Secretary for Foreign Affairs was asked by the Member of Parliament for Tynemouth 
`whether he is aware that children under ten years old work in British-owned mills in 
Shanghai; what action His Majesty's Government have taken; what action they propose to 
take; and will Papers be laid? '52 E. F. Mackay, a former vice-chairman of the Shanghai 
Municipal Council, defended British factory owners against the criticism appearing in the 
letters pages, and was himself quoted doing so in answer to Russell's question, but many in 
52 Mr West Russell, HC Deb 18 June 1925, vol. 185, p. 800, 
<http: //bansard. millbanksystems. com/commons/1925/jun/18/british-mills-shanghai-child- 
labour#S5CV0185P0_19250618_HOC_206>, accessed 30 April 2009. 
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England were horrified by the description of child labour in British-owned factories in 
Shanghai. 53 
Chinese newspapers also reported the activities and findings of the ILO in China, 
seizing on statements made by Thomas during his next mission to China in 1929, which 
were critical of foreign administrations in Shanghai. The Times China Correspondent 
relayed his comments back to Britain as indicative of a stance at odds with the interests of 
the treaty powers, an accusation that was repeated in other media across Europe and which 
Thomas took pains to deny publically. 54 The ILO, like Ludwik Rajchman's Health 
Organisation described in the previous chapter, was seen by Shanghailanders as too left 
wing and supportive of Chinese objections to the foreign presence in China, in contrast to 
Chesneaux's objection that it was in hock to those same powers. In reality the ILO was 
doing what it could to affect change, working with both the Chinese and foreign authorities 
to this end and using all the tools at its disposal, not least by raising international awareness 
of labour issues. The British government could do no more than call on the Shanghai 
Municipal Council to address the industrial conditions in the International Settlement, 
having no jurisdiction to exert its authority more forcefully. Yet sensitivity to criticism `at 
home', encompassing questions raised in parliament, ILO dossiers and, most importantly, 
comment in the press, contributed to the SMC's willingness to introduce a byelaw 
restricting child labour. It may have been one reason why a higher proportion of British 
53 See, for example, the letter from the philanthropist Charles Roden Buxton to the editor of The Times, 3 July 
1925, p. 12. 
s' See The Times, 22 February 1929, p. 10 for Thomas' denial of the article printed on 2 January and 26 April 
1929, p. 12 for the China Correspondent's defence of his article. 
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employers (50 per cent) turned out to the ratepayers' meetings where it was proposed than 
other national groups. 55 
After letting industrial matters rest following the failure of the child labour byelaw 
during the turbulent years of the May Thirtieth Movement and the entry of Guomindang 
troops into Shanghai in early 1927 during the Northern Expedition (1926-28), the SMC 
returned to the question of industrial reform. 56 Learning from its failure to pass a byelaw 
restricting the employment of child labour, the SMC confined its efforts to control 
industrial conditions to its existing powers, which included regulations governing the 
licensing of buildings. These were therefore tightened to improve basic health and safety 
standards in factories. Key to the enforcement of these regulations was factory inspection 
(as stipulated in Article 427 of the Treaty of Versailles) and Eleanor Hinder was appointed 
Chief of the Industrial Section. 57 This Section gradually took over responsibility for factory. 
inspection from the Fire Department, which had inspected premises for basic provisions 
against fire hazards. Hinder's Chief of Factory Inspection, Rewi Alley, formally of the Fire 
Department, was a committed humanitarian. He and Hinder were both dedicated to the 
betterment of labour conditions in China and shared a conviction in the 1930s that this 
could best be achieved by service for the Shanghai Municipal Council. Despite its less than 
impressive record in this field, there was consensus among many foreigners that the council 
55 Porter, Industrial Reformers, p. 111. 
56 On the Northern Expedition, see Hans van de Ven, War and Nationalism in China, 1925-1945 (London: 
Routledge, 2003), pp. 94-130; Zarrow, China in War and Revolution, pp. 230-36. 
57 Article 427 of the Treaty of Versailles stipulated nine general principles of basic standards of employment, 
the ninth of which enshrined the need for a system of factory inspection to ensure that laws and regulations 
for the protection of workers were enforced. It specifically stated that women should be involved in factory 
inspection to help safeguard female workers, so in appointing Eleanor Hinder the SMC was (probably 
unwittingly) adhering to this principle. The Labour Party, International Regulation of Women's Work: History 
of the Work for Women Accomplished by the International Labour Organisation (London: Pelican Press, 
1930). 
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had more will and power to realise industrial reforms than. the Nationalist Government, 
locally in Shanghai or nationally, beset as it was by myriad problems in seeking to unify 
and govern China in this period. Hinder and Alley both facilitated the exchanges that were 
increasingly taking place between the council and international bodies and Chinese 
authorities in the field of industrial reform in this period, by raising the awareness of key 
figures in Geneva, London and North America (notably in New York, Washington, D. C. 
and Ottawa), and by building relations with Chinese operating at every level of the 
industrial reform process, as described below. First, we turn to the implementation of the 
Factory Law at Nanjing and its impact in Shanghai. 
The Factory Law: Chinese initiative and the council's reaction 
The Guomindang made it a priority to secure popular support in the cities after its split 
from the Communist Party, and one way to achieve this was to improve industrial 
conditions. This was not only a method for appealing to the proletariat, the urban core of 
Communist support, and of seeking stability in this volatile section of the urban population, 
but it also exemplified the Guomindang's programme of achieving a strong nation through 
scientific and technical modernity, to which rapid industrialisation was key. 58 When Chiang 
Kai-shek claimed control of China in 1927, the design and implementation of a factory law 
was therefore high on the agenda in Nanjing. Among a raft of new laws drafted in the early 
years of the Nanjing government, the Factory Law was one of the first, enacted as it was in 
Se William C. Kirby, `Engineering China: Birth of the Developmental State, 1928-1937', in Becoming 
Chinese: Passages to Modernity and Beyond, ed. by Wen-hsin Yeh (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2000), pp. 137-9. 
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1929.59 It was officially promulgated on 1 August 1931 and on the same day, so as not to 
appear tardy in industrial reform - either to those who had long clamoured for municipal 
action in the Settlement or to international observers - the Shanghai Municipal Council 
issued its own statement endorsing the principle of industrial regulation and indicating its 
intention to work towards safe working conditions. 60 Following the law's promulgation, 
inspectors appointed by the City Government undertook initial surveys of conditions in 
factories throughout Shanghai in consultation with Dr Chen Da of Tsinghua University in 
Beiping and Eleanor Hinder. In the Settlement these inspectors were sometimes 
accompanied by employees of the municipal fire department, but often they visited 
unaccompanied on the invitation of Chinese factory owners as the municipal government 
took the initiative to carry out inspections in the absence of an agreement on the issue with 
the SMC6' As a result of the investigations, it was agreed that most factories were so far 
from operating under the conditions required by the Factory Act that it would be impossible 
for all of its ambitions to be met at once, so certain aspects of the legislation were given 
priority for immediate application, while longer would be allowed to work towards 
realising the full implications of the law. The city government's Bureau of Social Affairs 
declared 17 clauses of the law impracticable, but after consultation between Dr Chen and 
Hinder, those measures which they considered the most desirable and achievable were 
59 New legislation included the new constitution that was enshrined in the series of Organic Laws passed in 
the late 1920s and early 1930s, the civil code of 1929-31 that, inter alia, enfranchised women and gave them 
far greater rights, and the less liberal censorship law of 1930. Julia Strauss, `The Evolution of Republican 
Government', China Quarterly, No. 150, Special Issue: Reappraising Republican China (June 1997), p. 343; 
Zarrow, China in War and Nationalism, pp. 261,264; For an argument that the organic laws were significant 
despite their limited application, see Suisheng Zhao, Power by Design: Constitution-making in Nationalist 
China (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1996). For more on the Nanjing government's of forts at state- 
building, see the rest of Strauss's article and Zarrow, China in War and Nationalism, pp. 251-4. 
60 Hinder, Life and Labour, p. 7. 
61 Report of Camille Pone. 
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published for the information of factory owners. 62 All credit for the recommendations was 
publically attributed to Chen, as foreign influence in the form of Hinder, even though she 
did not yet represent the SMC, would have made their advice less palatable. 63 
The limited application of the law reflected current practice in Shanghai's factories: 
article 15, for example, was among those earmarked for immediate implementation, as it 
called for a day of rest each week, which many employers were already allowing. Articles 
41-43, specifying minimum safety provisions against fire and injury from machinery, the 
provision of good light and ventilation, adequate toilet facilities, and training for the 
prevention of accidents, were also to be enforced with immediate effect as they were 
considered among the most important measures that could be taken to improve industrial 
safety. But clauses such as article 37, requiring factories to provide women with eight 
weeks of paid maternity leave, were suspended as placing an impossible burden on factory 
owners and as they were considered less important-64 All parties - the ILO with its 
representatives in China, the Chinese government nationally and in Shanghai, the councils 
of the International Settlement and the French Concession (though as the latter had virtually 
no factories the French Conseil municipal had little input in the negotiations), and the 
bodies such as the Employers' Federation which represented the interests of factory owners 
- agreed that the legislation must be confined to achievable limits. The SMC had long cited 
the impossibility of enforcing the provisions of the Factory Law as an excuse for its own 
62 Shenbao, 12 November 1931. 
63 U1-6-111: the Secretaries of the Employers' Federation to the Secretary of the SMC (Fessenden), 24 July 
1931. 
64 U1-6-111: Chen Da and E. M. Hinder, `Summary note on Inspection of Factories', 17 November 1931. In 
this instance, eight weeks was considered to be far longer than necessary for maternity leave. 
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inaction, but now there was an achievable set of objectives the council had to demonstrate 
that it was genuine in its desire to seek industrial reform. 
The next step was for the council to enter negotiations with the Chinese authorities 
on the issue of factory inspection, which was to become a decade-long barrier to effective 
industrial legislation in Shanghai. The Chinese position was put by 0. K. Yui, Secretary 
General of the Shanghai City Government, while his counterpart, Stirling Fessenden, 
represented the SMC in negotiations. The two held intractable opposing positions: Yui 
insisting that City Government inspectors must be allowed to inspect factories in the 
International Settlement as in the rest of the city to ensure equitable enforcement of the 
Factory Law; Fessenden equally adamant that this would be an infringement of the 
principle of extraterritoriality and thus a violation of the treaty rights of the foreign powers. 
Fessenden argued that factory inspections in the Settlement could only be undertaken by 
the council's own employees and could only enforce legislation agreed by the ratepayers. 65 
At stake was the autonomy of the Settlement, which the British consular body in China was 
equally determined to defend: Sir Miles Lampson at the British sub-legation in Nanjing (the 
legation remained in Beiping even after the capital moved south) used the simile coined by 
members of the council, that `one ship could not have two captains. ' This echoed the view 
of the British Government as contained in a White Paper, Labour Conditions in China, 
which was published in 1924. But Westminster had also repeatedly made clear its 
condemnation of the SMC's tolerance of poor working conditions, as in an impassioned 
65 SMA U1-6-112: S. Fessenden to E. Cunningham, recalling the negotiations, 18 October 1933. 
66 Ul-6-112: Minutes of meeting between SMC and Waijiaobu officials, 12 October 1933, enclosed in letter 
from Miles Lampson, British sub-legation in Nanjing, to J. Davidson, Acting British Consul-General in 
Shanghai, 13 October 1933. 
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debate of 1927.67 In seeking to maintain support in London, the SMC had to find a way in 
which the measures of the Factory Law could be implemented in the Settlement without 
infringing the principles of extraterritoriality and the autonomy which was claimed in its 
name. This would in fact bring it into conflict with the consular body, charged with 
representing British interests in China. 
Initial efforts to reach a compromise were led by the ILO. Adelaide Anderson and 
Camille Pone were sent to Shanghai in response to an invitation from the Chinese 
Government extended by Dr K. H. Kung, Minister for Industries, to mediate between the 
two sides. In his report to the ILO, Pone emphasised the necessity of focusing on the 
practical matter of how to organise a factory inspection service to the satisfaction of both 
sides, to avoid being seen to have a political agenda. 68 After dragging its feet for so many 
years, the council now listened to the reports of Anderson and Pone on the dangerous 
conditions prevailing in factories and investigated how it could proceed. Its own Municipal 
Advocate, R. T. Bryan, advised that under the conditions of the Mixed Court Rendition 
Agreement of 1927, Chinese laws were applicable within the Settlement as long as they did 
not conflict with the Land Regulations, and would be enforced in the courts (primarily the 
Shanghai Provisional Court which replaced the Mixed Court) 69 Bryan advocated the strong 
enforcement of the Factory Law in the Settlement, citing a fire in the Sung Sing Cotton 
Mill in which six women died due to the fire doors being locked. This was illegal under 
Article 24 of the Factory Law, so had it been followed the deaths would not have occurred. 
67 HC Deb 10 February 1927, Vol. 202, Cc. 310-426. 
<http: //hansard. millbanksystems. com/commons/1927/feb/10/sir-a-chamberlains-statement, accessed 30 
October 2011. 
68 U1-6-111: Report of Camille Pone, Head of Diplomatic Section, International Labour Organisation, 
Geneva, January 1932. 
69 U1-6-111: R. T. Bryan to Stirling Fessenden, 24 October 1931. 
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The Employers' Federation, though less enthusiastic about factory regulation, also agreed 
that premises should be inspected to enforce the basic provisions of the Factory Law, 
though it insisted that inspection should be kept strictly in the council's control. All advice 
to the council thus concurred that the key provisions of the law should be implemented. The 
talks with the Chinese authorities progressed and an agreement appeared to have been 
reached whereby regulations identical to those aspects of the Factory Law which were 
being applied would be enforced within the Settlement by Chinese-trained inspectors 
reporting to the municipal councils. Satisfied that their work was done, Pone and Anderson 
returned to Europe. 70 Yet this accord broke down almost as soon as they left, due to the 
council's suspicions that the Chinese intention was to gain control of the Settlement: Ernest 
Macnaghten, the council chairman, warned the American Consul-General, Edward 
Cunningham, that `the local Chinese authorities persist in their ceaseless efforts to establish 
Chinese bureaucratic administration within the Settlement. ' 71 It was thus the defensive 
character of the council, identified in chapter three, which made it so hostile to efforts to 
enforce the Factory Law in the Settlement. 
Nonetheless, the council's public commitment to industrial regulation prompted 
Eleanor Hinder to write offering her services to organise an inspectorate to make this 
happen. 72 Her experience at the YWCA and advising the Chinese government made her 
well-placed for the task and the council, recognising that it would be unlikely to find 
another equally well-qualified candidate, accepted her offer. The outbreak of Sino-Japanese 
70 C. Pone, 'Towards the Establishment of a Factory Inspectorate in China', International Labour Review, 
Vol. 25, No. 5 (May 1932), p. 604. The details of the agreement reached are laid out in this article, along with 
Pone's agreement with the points raised by the Nationalist Government concerning the difficulty posed by 
extraterritoriality. 
71 U1-6-111: E. B. Macnaghten to Edward Cunningham, 14 May 1931. 
72 U1-6-111: E. M. Hinder to Chairman, SMC, 13 December 1931. 
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hostilities in January 1932 postponed efforts by the council and the Chinese authorities to 
implement industrial reforms in Shanghai and it was not until a year later than Hinder was 
appointed Chief of the newly created Industrial Section of the SMC, initially under the 
Secretariat. In early 1933 the council moved to pass its own byelaw to permit licensing of 
industrial premises (as it already enjoyed in a variety of concerns with a bearing on public 
health, as seen in the previous chapter). This enabled it to appear to be taking action on the 
issue but retaining complete jurisdiction of control over factories in the Settlement, which 
was sure to rankle with the Chinese authorities. Moreover, following the rendition of the 
Mixed Court, any infringements of the new byelaw in factories under Chinese ownership 
would have to be prosecuted in the new First Special District Court, which was unlikely to 
co-operate with the council's attempt to circumvent the national Factory Law. Hinder, new 
in post, tried and failed to dissuade the council from taking this unilateral action and 
alienating the Chinese authorities and factory owners. Unlike the efforts to change the 
byelaws in the 1920s, this time the council was able to secure a quorum at a special meeting 
of the ratepayers and the byelaw was passed and then ratified by the consular and 
diplomatic authorities, who adhered to the British position that extraterritorial privileges 
should be preserved, even at the expense of souring relations with the Chinese authorities. 73 
Despite this victory, the council did not invoke its new right to license factory premises, 
fearing the Chinese reaction, so Hinder's Industrial Section operated by means of 
persuasion and education rather than inspection and prosecution. 
Following this provocation by the council, it is unsurprising that the second round 
of negotiations over the implementation of the Factory Law stalled in 1933. The Chinese 
» Municipal Gazette, 20 April 1933. 
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proposed a joint inspectorate for all industrial premises in Shanghai, which would report to 
all three municipal authorities. But the SMC rejected the notion that it should share 
jurisdiction in the Settlement, and instead reiterated its position that separate inspectorates 
should enforce legislation similar to but distinct from the Chinese Factory Law. A stalemate 
ensued and international observers despaired at the inaction of both the Settlement and 
Chinese authorities. 74 Finally in 1936 an attempt to find a compromise succeeded. The 
SMC relented to the enforcement of the Factory Act itself in the Settlement, rather than 
municipal byelaws, on condition that the Chinese government delegated authority for this 
to its own staff, removing the contentious element of inspectors under Chinese employ 
operating within the Settlement. Again, the council was subject to increasing international 
pressure, especially as the Nationalist government had strengthened its position in the ILO, 
holding a seat on its Governing Body from 1934.75 This time it was the consular body that 
blocked progress, holding fast to the principle that Chinese law could not be applied to 
factories owned by foreigners who enjoyed extraterritorial privileges. For once, the council. 
was not the most conservative foreign voice in Shanghai. The outbreak of the Sino. 
Japanese War the following year put paid to any further efforts to enforce the Factory Law 
" J. R., `Shanghai Lagging in Factory Control', Far Eastern Survey 
(published by the US-based Institute of 
Pacific Relations), Vol. 4, No. 23 (20 November 1935), pp. 186-7. 
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in the Settlement, so the council and consular body were successful in preventing Chinese 
infringement of the autonomy of the Settlement. 76 
The work of the Industrial Section: the power of persuasion 
Eleanor Hinder was determined that the absence of municipal legislation governing 
industry would be no barrier to improvements in working conditions in the Settlement. The 
first task was to compile data about the existing situation so she and her staff knew 
precisely what problems they were dealing with and in order to present an accurate picture 
of the realities in Shanghai's factories to the media and other influential voices. Much has 
been written about the propensity of colonial governments, from the British in India to the 
Japanese in Taiwan, to compile statistics on the territory under their control, and the SMC 
was no different. 77 Data was collected on industrial accidents in the Settlement from the 
beginning of 1933, initially just those incidents which were reported to the fire, ambulance 
and police services, but Hinder became increasingly successful in persuading hospitals and 
factory managers to inform her department of accidents. All the data obtained was carefully 
tabulated and recorded in the SMC's annual reports, providing a public declaration of the 
76 The ILO passed a resolution tabled by delegates from China, Belgium, Japan and India, declaring support 
of Chinese labour legislation being enforced equally in the foreign concessions and settlements in 1937, so 
international pressure on the council was still mounting as the Sino-Japanese War legitimated shelving the 
issue. `The Twenty-Third Session of the International Labour Conference', International Labour Review, Vol. 
36, No. 3 (September 1937), pp. 359-60. 
77 Zoe Laidlaw, Colonial Connections, 1815-45: Patronage, the Information Revolution and Colonial 
Government (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005); Tony Ballantyne, `Empire, Knowledge and 
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council's intended capacity to understand and therefore control the industry of the 
Settlement. 
Just one month after Hinder took up her post in January 1933, one of the worst 
industrial accidents of Republican Shanghai occurred in a rubber shoe factory, killing 81 
women who were trapped on the upper floor when petrol fumes caught alight, causing an 
explosion that forced out the walls, bringing the roof crashing down. With no safety exits, 
the women had no escape from the fire. Tragic though the accident was, it gave Hinder's 
infant section a public relations opportunity to focus popular attention on the dangerous 
conditions tolerated in the Settlement's factories. Hinder argued that all 26 remaining 
rubber shoe factories in the Settlement had similar risks and made it an early priority to 
close the most dangerous premises and bring about significant improvements in others. In 
July 1933, she reported that six had been ordered to close by the council's building 
inspectors, of which two had done so. Another had closed by order of the courts, five 
required considerable alterations to operate safely, and ten would need somewhat fewer 
alterations to meet minimum standards. 78 Hinder and the inspectors put repeated pressure 
on the factories to improve, and achieved some success, but the absence of broader 
legislative powers hindered their work. Only in one instance was the council able to bring a 
legal case against a factory considered highly dangerous, using its powers under existing 
byelaws against nuisances and hazardous or dangerous trades. Hinder wrote personally to O. 
K. Yui, Secretary General of the City Government, explaining this action by the council so 
he wouldn't `hear about this first in the press': an effort to placate him after the protracted 
and unsuccessful negotiations between Yui and Fessenden to find an agreement on the 
n SMA U1-6-116: E. M. Hinder to Fessenden, 8 July 1933. 
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implementation of the Factory Law in the Settlement. 79 Hinder took pains to stress that she 
was hoping to prevent a Japanese factory from opening with dangerous conditions to 
demonstrate that it was not just Chinese factories which were being targeted, even though 
all 26 rubber shoe factories were Chinese-owned. Diplomacy was a major part of Hinder's 
role at the council, and one that had not been served well prior to her arrival. 
In 1935 the Industrial Section received reports of 2,301 industrial accidents, 
compared with 1,788 reported in 1934. The rise was interpreted as evidence of increased 
cooperation on the part of employers, hospitals, and police and ambulance services, 
volunteering the information at the council's request. Hinder reported that in 1,292 cases, 
when staff were available and where it was thought that they could exert influence for the 
better, members of the Industrial Section visited the premises on which accidents had 
occurred to offer advice for how to prevent any repetition-80 They increasingly found that 
preventive measures had already been taken and, where they advised the adoption of 
particular measures, repeat visits usually showed that efforts had been made in the right 
direction. Employers were most likely to respond to such advice when it could be directly 
related to their recent experience of an accident. The data collected on industrial accidents 
highlighted the particular hazards in each industry, age-groups and other sections of the 
work force most likely to be victims of accidents, and seasonal variations. One third of 
accidents happened to those aged under 20, contributing to the ongoing concern over the 
safety of young workers dating to the Child Labour Commission. Electrical accidents were 
found to occur more frequently during the wetter summer months, so employers were 
advised to ensure the working environment was kept drier. The council also made contact 
" U1-6-116: E. M. Hinder to O. K. Yui, 17 June 1933. 
80 SMC, Report for 1935, p. 38. 
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with local manufacturers and urged the adoption of safer designs and materials such as 
Bakelite. Four types of machinery were identified as the most dangerous, the worst of 
which was transmission machinery such as belts, pulleys and gearing; Hinder and her staff 
therefore urged upon employers the need to provide proper guards and other safety 
measures with such machines. They also bought items of machinery and fitted guards to 
them to demonstrate to employers how such measures could be implemented, inviting 
owners and managers to see them whenever accidents were reported in their factories 
which such guards might have prevented. 8' Such invitations were generally accepted, 
indicating at least an openness to the council's promotion of modem safety measures. 
Particular attention was paid to the textile industry as it played such a prominent 
role in Shanghai's economy, and several mills allowed a member of the section's staff to 
study conditions with the mill engineer to work out exactly what preventive steps could be 
taken. Workers were also targeted by the section by, for example, showing them 
illustrations of the value of wearing tighter fitting clothing to avoid garments from 
becoming caught in machinery and causing an accident. Hinder was a strong believer in 
visual messages: photographs of good practice were taken and shown to employers, and she 
even had managers of five tobacco factories which kept their exits obstructed driven to the 
site of a fire caused by such a hazard at another factory, to see for themselves the possible 
consequences. Through these efforts, she claimed to have had a significant impact on 
practice in many establishments, but the Industrial Section had no recourse when managers 
were unreceptive, and Hinder bemoaned the preventable accidents that occurred in 
premises where her staff had warned of dangerous conditions. 
81 SMC, Report for 1935, pp. 44-5. 
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The collection of data went beyond industrial accidents. In June 1935, a sixteen- 
month survey of factories in the International Settlement by staff attached to the Public 
Works Department was completed. For the PWD, information was collected that would be 
helpful in the planning of sewerage and other works, such as the numbers working in 
factories and what chemicals they used and disposed of. 82 This was also valuable 
information for the Industrial Section, to which the three researchers were transferred on 
the completion of the survey to deploy their specialist knowledge of various industries in 
the further regular inspection of factories. The data collected from these inspections 
enabled Hinder and her colleagues to discern certain risk factors, such as the faulty 
construction of boilers and other pressure vessels, and to use this information to educate 
factory owners on the need to improve standards. Insurance companies could also use the 
data to impose safety requirements on their industrial customers to minimise risk. 83 Small 
improvements in working conditions were therefore achieved without the need for 
legislation. 
The main problem identified from the inspection of factories was the unsuitability 
of the premises. The majority were in converted houses, so lacked proper ventilation, 
sufficient sanitary provision, or exits, among other basic safety features. This allowed 
Hinder to deploy municipal building regulations to demand improvements. The byelaws 
already required plans to be submitted to the council for approval prior to the erection of 
new buildings or the conversion of existing buildings into dwellings, so it was possible to 
82 SMC, Report for 1935, p. 38. 
83 porter, Industrial Reformers, p. 118. 
293 
extend the existing rules to cover conversions of houses to industrial purposes. 84 Staff of 
the PWD could then oversee the building or conversion to ensure compliance with the 
regulations. Yet enforcing compliance was not easy. in September 1933, following the 
rubber factory fire disaster, the 15 factories which were found by inspectors to need safety 
improvements were visited repeatedly by Rewi Alley, demanding plans be shown for the 
improvements to be made, but in most cases none were forthcoming. In only one case did 
Alley report that he `Found hazards greatly reduced by steps taken as required. '85 Where 
court cases were not possible, it was only the pressure the staff of the Section could bring to 
bear by repeated visits that could affect change. 
Where building regulations did not apply because premises were neither new nor 
being used for a new purpose, the council could only inspect premises with the permission 
of the owners. Rewi Alley's team of Chinese and foreign factory inspectors were 
surprisingly successful in persuading factory owners to allow them into their premises to 
observe the health and safety measures in place. Their first approach was `to make friends' 
with the factory owners, and they earned a reputation for expertise making their advice 
welcome with most Chinese factory owners. 86 Foreign owners were more often hostile to 
what was seen as `government interference' and were very aware that the Section staff 
lacked powers of enforcement. 87 Hinder reported that `Japanese employers were punctilious 
in installing safety devices suggested' and were generally willing to meet standards 
84 U1-6-112: Harpur, Commissioner of Public Works, to Fessenden, Secretary-General, SMC, 28 September 
1933. The definition of a new building was based on the British Public Health Act of 1875, British precedent 
providing the blueprint as usual for council legislation. 
s U1-6-116: Table enclosed in Hinder to Fessenden, 25 September 1933. 
s4 Hinder, Life and Labour, p. 25. 
87 Hinder, Life and Labour, p. 26. Note the description of the SMC as a `government'. 
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obtaining in Japan, provided their factories were only inspected by Japanese. 88 Inspectors 
then sought to persuade employers that taking steps to improve conditions for workers 
would be in their own interests. Hinder reported that a combination of appealing to the 
better nature of employers and the `nuisance factor' of repeated visits by inspectors 
generally achieved the desired improvements. 89 She tried different tactics: using foreign 
staff where Chinese had failed and vice versa; sending a women when a man was not 
heeded -'the eloquence of a Chinese woman, to which no mere Chinese man can stand up' 
apparently achieved results 90 There was no appetite, however, for reducing working hours, 
despite the concerns of the Section's staff. A further problem was ensuring that safety 
standards, once achieved, were maintained. For example, extraction fans to clean the air or 
remove flammable fumes were costly to run so were often simply turned off when 
inspectors were not present. With few staff in the early days, the Section had to focus its 
efforts on particular industries (rubber and cotton) and on specific problems within them 
(such as fire safety). 
Not only were the powers of the Industrial Section extremely limited when Hinder 
began in her new post, its staff was tiny. Hinder began with just two members of staff: a 
temporary assistant, Zhu Yubao, who had worked with her at the YWCA, a Chinese clerk, 
and the services of Rewi Alley on loan from the Fire Department. In 1934 she persuaded 
the Staff committee to recommend confirming these individuals as Industrial Section staff 
and recruited three further building inspectors, who were initially appointed under the 
88 Hinder, Life and Labour, p. 26. 
89 Hinder, Social and Industrial Problems, p. 16. 
90 Hinder, Life and Labour, p. 26. 
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PWD. 91 Gradually, Hinder's track record and increasing influence within the council 
enabled her to persuade the staff committee, secretary and chairman to allow the expansion 
of her section. It divorced from the Secretariat in October 1940 to become a separate 
Division with its own committee to formulate policy and oversee its operations, an 
indication that the department was well-established. By this point the new Industrial and 
Social Affairs Committee was responsible for over fifty staff, and while this was still 
dwarfed by the scores and hundreds of municipal employees in other departments, the 
impact of the Division was disproportionate to its size or status. Most of the staff were 
Chinese and Chinese inspectors could front the work in Chinese factories, while Japanese 
staff did the same in Japanese factories, and western staff inspected western-owned 
factories, reducing the possibility for friction between different national groups. 
Internationalism 
Hinder was alive to the international dimension of industrial regulation in Shanghai and 
ILO influence was felt throughout the existence of the Industrial Division. Hinder kept up a 
regular correspondence with Albert Thomas and his British successor as Director of the 
ILO, Harold Butler, reporting progress in industrial reform in Shanghai and China more 
broadly. They discussed exchanges of staff members between the SMC Industrial Division 
and the ILO, Hinder pondering which Chinese member of her staff could be spared, 
although it is not clear whether the plan was implemented. 92 Harold Butler had planned to 
91 SMA U1-6-115: Staff Committee Agenda, 25 June 1934. 
92 SMA U1-10-4: E. M. Hinder to Harold Butler, Director, ILO., 3 October 1938. 
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visit Shanghai in 1937, but was prevented by the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war. 93 Part 
of Hinder's motivation for her ongoing contact with the ILO was political: in reporting on 
her attendance at the ILO's conference in Geneva in 1938, she stated that her main object 
was `to counteract the impression generally given by Chinese delegates in their speeches 
that the Council was not assuming its full responsibilities in the matter of industrial 
regulation. ' She felt that by making the work of her Division more widely known in 
Geneva she `should be establishing the fact that the Council was indeed aware of its 
responsibilities and fulfilling them to the best of its abilities. '94 She had, however, no status 
at the three-week conference as membership, granting the right to speak in plenary 
meetings, was limited to sovereign states, which, of course, the International Settlement 
could not claim to be among. 
Hinder's sex would have put her at a further disadvantage: of the 416 individuals 
who attended the ILO conference, just 15 were women. 95 China sent twelve representatives, 
despite the ongoing Sino-Japanese War, and Hinder commented that she was careful to 
remain on good terms with them. In the contested world of treaty-port China, every area of 
municipal activity was heavily politicised, and industrial regulation was no different. 
Hinder was well aware of the need to give international observers a positive impression of 
the council to counteract increasing pressure, from within China and from around the world, 
for the retrocession of the International Settlement to Chinese control. Hinder later 
indicated that she was ambivalent about the council's position, recognising the Chinese 
93 U1-10-4: E. M. Hinder, `The I. L. O. Conference, Geneva, 1938', report submitted to SMC, 22 September 
1938. 
94 UI-10-4: Hinder, `I. L. O. Conference'. 
95 `The Twenty-Fourth Session of the International Labour Conference', International Labour Review, Vol. 
38, No. 3 (September 1938), p. 302. 
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right to enjoy political control over its territory and population, to the extent that she wrote 
of her `great satisfaction' on hearing that the British and American governments had signed 
a treaty in January 1943 renouncing extraterritoriality and the right of foreigners to 
administer the treaty ports. 96 Yet in the 1930s she was aware of the reality that she and 
Rewi Alley were best able to effect change for the benefit of Shanghai's workers within the 
existing political apparatus of the Settlement, and she came to identify her goals with those 
of the SMC as she sought to reshape from within the council to which in the 1920s she had 
been openly hostile. Hinder therefore served council interests by presenting its industrial 
work in the best possible light at the ILO conference, though her motivation for seeking to 
counter negative views of it was to enable her to continue expanding the work of the 
Industrial Section. At the same time, the importance Hinder attached to maintaining good 
relations with the Chinese delegates at the conference reflects the degree to which she was 
keen to allow room for fruitful interactions between her department and the Chinese 
authorities. 
Hinder used her visit to Geneva to meet with senior figures in the ILO whom she 
hoped would influence the Chinese government in the interests of her department. She met 
with Harold Butler and his successor, the American John Winant, as well as Camille Pone 
who had visited Shanghai in 1931. Hinder expressed the hope that these men would exert 
their influence to help resolve the stalemate reached with the Chinese government over the 
implementation of the Chinese Labour Law and specifically the conflicting views of the 
council and the Chinese government over the jurisdiction of factory inspectors within the 
International Settlement. The ILO's China Branch, established in 1930, claimed that all the 
MLMSS 770/13/8: Eleanor Hinder, Unpublished Autobiography, p. 28g. 
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laws introduced by the Chinese Government concerning industrial conditions followed 
directly on ILO recommendations, from the banning of the use of white phosphorous in the 
manufacture of matches in 1925, reiterated in 1929, to the formation of Factory Safety and 
Health Inspection Regulations in 1933.97 Indeed, the ILO provided technical assistance for 
the latter. It is hard to assess to what extent the Nationalist government would have 
introduced such legislation without the ILO's influence, and clearly the ILO's own China 
Branch had an interest in emphasising the importance of its parent body, but it seems clear 
that the Organisation had a real impact on Chinese legislation and practice in industrial 
regulation, which in turn shaped to a large extent the response of the SMC. 
During her trip to Geneva Hinder also met with Edouard de Haller, the Director of 
the League's Mandates section which had responsibility for slavery. She met him in her 
capacity as Protector of Mui Tsai, a title she gained in addition to her position as head of 
the Industrial Section in 1937. The council sought in making this appointment to 
demonstrate its responsiveness to pressure from the League Slavery Committee to curb the 
practice of poor Chinese parents selling daughters to wealthy families to become mui tsai or 
`younger sisters' (mei zai #bjcff, also known as pei nu). 98 This was another example of the 
League's impact on SMC policy, though significantly in this case Hinder used the powers 
the new title gave her to seek improvements in child welfare far more broadly than 
anticipated by either the council or the League. In Geneva, Hinder was again seeking to 
represent the SMC's position - in this case, that the mui tsai question `must be seen in 
perspective'. By this, Hinder and the council meant that cultural sensitivity was needed 
97 ILO China Branch, 'China and the International Labour Organisation', n. p. 
98 SMA UI-1-91: Watch Committee, 9 February and 29 April 1937; MLMSS 770/3/4: 'The Place of 
Administration in Child Care in Shanghai: Some Methods and Principles of Action', author unknown, n. d., 
n. p. 
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with regard to local practices (of which they claimed a greater understanding than the 
League's Slavery Committee due to their experience working with Chinese in the city) and 
that there were more serious concerns regarding children that should be prioritised over the 
practice of mui tsai. International pressure was thus very important, but local actors had 
more influence on SMC practice. 
Hinder concluded from her meeting with de Haller, however, that staff members 
such as he had less influence than she had thought, and her efforts were better placed 
raising the council's profile with committee members. With this in mind, she travelled on 
from Geneva to London, where she met a number of key figures including Sir George 
Maxwell, Vice-chairman of the Slavery Committee, Irene Ward, Conservative member of 
the House of Commons and a member of the League of Nations' Social Questions 
Committee, and Edith Picton Turbervill, former Labour member, feminist and author of a 
League report on mui tsai in Hong Kong. ' Hinder went on to Ottawa where she met 
Charlotte Whitton, another feminist humanitarian who was the founding director of the 
Canadian Council on Child Welfare, which by 1938 had become the Canadian National 
Welfare Council, and long-term Canadian representative to the League's Advisory 
Committee on Social Questions. Whitton gave her approval to Hinder's approach to the mui 
tsai issue in Shanghai. The League of Nations linked these different activists together in 
such a way that Hinder could meet them to discuss issues relevant in the International 
" Edith Picton-Turbervill, `Minority Report' (1937), cited in David M. Pomfret, `"Child Slavery" in British 
and French Far Eastern Colonies 1880-1945', Past and Present, No. 201 (November 2008), p. 181, n. 13. 
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Settlement and bring an international perspective to local problems. With these women, 
moreover, Hinder was mixing in the elite of global feminist humanitarian circles. 100 
Hinder's travels were not confined to Europe and North America. She also went to 
Japan in March 1936 where she visited the Tokyo mill of Dai Nippon, which also owned 
two mills in Shanghai. Conditions in the Tokyo mill impressed her greatly, as she reported 
that it operated just two shifts of eight and a half hours per day and that workers were 
allowed five days free per month. Safety standards were also much higher than those in 
Shanghai, Hinder noting particularly such features as guards and emergency stop buttons. 
Other factories in Japan were less impressive, such as the Takagi Ironworks factory with its 
lack of safety devices: Hinder reported it exhibited `no difference from similar works in 
Shanghai. ' 101 Yet even here Hinder was struck by the absence of child workers as education 
was compulsory in Japan (as the League advocated and had optimistically encouraged the 
SMC to enforce in 1925), 102 so work that in Shanghai was performed by young boys was 
being done in Tokyo by women instead. Hinder may have been writing hoping to prove to 
foreign members of the council that poor working conditions were not a necessary feature 
of Asian societies, as some had tried to argue in the 1920s. Or she may have had in mind 
the increasingly influential Japanese members of the council, attempting to persuade them 
of the importance of industrial reform by using examples from their homeland. In any case, 
it is significant that western nations were not the sole point of reference or source of 
international influence in this field. Hinder maintained connections with Japan following 
her visit, sending Zhu Yubao to tour Japanese factories when she took leave in 1937 and 
100 See Leila J. Rupp, `Constructing Internationalism: The Case of Transnational Women's Organizations, 
1888-1945', American Historical Review, Vol. 99, No. 5 (December 1994), pp. 1571-600. 
101 U1-10-4: E. M. Hinder, `My Visit to Japan, March 1936. ' 
t02 Zhang Qian (ed. ), Minutes of the SMC, Vol. XXIII, 8 April 1925, p. 27. 
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welcoming Japanese visitors who in turn wished to inspect industrial concerns in the 
International Settlement. 103 It was largely through I. Ayusawa, the Director of the 
International Labour Office in Japan, that these connections were forged and maintained, so 
the ILO's influence was apparent quite apart from its European heartland. 
Hinder wrote to John Winant in 1940, after he had moved the ILO from Geneva to 
Montreal to escape war-torn Europe, commenting that the China Branch of the ILO, based 
in Shanghai and headed by Chen Haifeng (Cheng Hai Fong), was an invaluable resource 
for her department due to its unrivalled repository of material concerning labour. 104 Winant 
replied that he had just authorised Chen to go to Chongqing to renew his contacts with the 
Nationalist government, given the difficulties of communication during the Japanese 
occupation, demonstrating the closeness of the relationship between the ILO and the 
Nationalist Government. 105 Chen made this visit in early 1941, taking with him letters of 
recommendation from Hinder to meet Chinese and foreign contacts including Song Meiling 
(by now known as Madame Chiang Kai-Shek) who had served on the Child Labour 
Commission nearly twenty years previously. 106 Hinder's praise for and familiarity with 
Chen's work is indicative of a strong working relationship between them as well as the 
prominent role played by the ILO China Branch. The importance of the ILO should not, 
therefore, be discounted as quickly as Jean Chesneaux argued, although its direct impact on 
the SMC was limited. Action taken by the Chinese authorities, however, made a dramatic 
difference to the environment in which the municipal Industrial Division operated. 
103 U1-10-4: E. M. Hinder to 1. Ayusawa, 12 June 1937, and his reply 9 July 1937. 
104 U1-10-4: E. M. Hinder to John Winant, McGill University, Montreal, 17 October 1940. 
1°5 U1-10-4: John Winant to E. M. Hinder, 29 November 1940. 
1°6 U1-10-4: E. M. Hinder to Madame Chiang Kai-shek, 20 March 1941. 
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Towards Constructive Interaction between the SMC and the Chinese authorities 
Responsibility for industrial matters in the City Government of Greater Shanghai, including 
the implementation of the new Factory Act, fell to its Bureau of Social Affairs. This body, 
just like the Shanghai Municipal Council, understood that power comes with knowledge, 
and set about as a first priority gathering data on the incidence of industrial disputes in the 
city. 107 T. Y. Tsia, Chief of the Statistical Division of the Bureau of Social Affairs within 
the City Government of Greater Shanghai, specifically thanked Albert Thomas of the ILO, 
alongside the Nanjing government, members of Chinese universities and a representative of 
the US Department of Labor, for their contribution to the first major survey of strikes and 
lockouts in the city. 108 The Nationalist Government had made good use of the ILO as a 
platform for raising its international profile as a progressive government, in opposition to 
and hindered by the colonial powers and specifically the persistence of extraterritoriality. 109 
Tsia's preface is consistent with the general promotion of the importance of the 
work of his own bureau and the wider party-state in industrial reform. He boasts that the 
party made resolutions about the need for improved labour conditions as early as 1924 and 
took the first action in China to undertake systematic surveys of the numbers of workers in 
different industries in Shanghai and elsewhere in 1927. `The communists have been purged 
and outlawed in this country, ' he noted, `but it has been the consistent party policy of the 
Kuomingtang [sic] to protect workers' interests and to promote their welfare. ' 10 It is 
107 On the tendency of Chinese authorities to conduct social surveys to gather data for the emergent nation- 
state in this period, see Tong Lam, A Passion for Facts: Social Surveys and the Construction of the Chinese 
Nation State, 1900-1949 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011). 
108 Bureau of Social Affairs, City Government of Greater Shanghai, Strikes and Lockouts, Greater Shanghai, 
1929 (Shanghai: Bureau of Social Affairs, 1930), p. ii. 
109 See, for example, U1-10-4: ILO China Branch, `China and the International Labour Organisation' (n. d. ), 
ng. 
11 Bureau of Social Affairs, Strikes and Lockouts, p. 26. 
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noteworthy that the Guomindang's efforts in the collection of data on industrial disputes 
came before those of the SMC. Tsia's survey of the strikes and lockouts in Greater 
Shanghai was the first of its kind in China, though it was not as comprehensive as he 
claimed it to be: as Porter notes of other Chinese industrial statistics, in reality information 
was collected almost solely from Chinese-owned factories. "' The survey found that 111 
industrial disputes occurred in 1929 - three lock-outs and 108 strikes - compared to 120 
strikes in 1928: the Bureau emphasised to its international readers the progress being made 
as the May 30th Movement died away and the suppression of the Communist Party 
continued. 
The survey investigated the grievances of the workers and found the most important 
factors to be the conditions of employment, including disputes over wages, hours, or the 
treatment of workers, and `trade unionism'. The Guomindang had banned independent 
unions and was seeking to reorganise them under its own control, free from Communist 
influence. ' 12 The report noted that of the four complaints about workers being beaten, three 
emerged from foreign-owned factories: the Bureau constantly sought to reiterate the 
problems posed by foreign imperialists employing Chinese workers on Chinese soil. 
Chinese nationalism was clearly apparent in such government publications on labour 
throughout the 1930s, whether for domestic or international consumption. The survey also 
included an assessment of the success of mediation in resolving labour disputes. In total 93 
of the disputes had gone to mediation, of which 65 involved the Bureau. ' 13 The Bureau 
was providing a mediation service of which workers made use and was taking the initiative 
1 Porter, Industrial Reformers, p. 18. 
112 For more, see Elizabeth J. Perry, Shanghai on Strike: the Politics of Chinese Labor (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1993), p. 92 if. 
113 Bureau of Social Affairs, Strikes and Lockouts, p. 28. 
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in this area where the SMC was slow to act. Indeed, Hinder reported that foreign 
industrialists who were among the most vociferous defenders of the SMC's exclusive right 
to monitor industrial conditions within the Settlement turned to the Bureau's mediation 
service in the absence of an equivalent at the SMC. 114 
Tsia's Statistical Division continued to monitor the rate and causes of strikes and 
lockouts in the 1930s and also compiled data on the cost of living, which fluctuated greatly 
in the 1930s due largely to activity in the global silver markets. Information showing 
inflation could be used by workers to support their claims for higher pay in response to 
higher prices, but similarly when China faced deflation due to the American silver purchase 
programme of 1933, employers could turn to the cost of living indices to justify keeping 
wages low. The most comprehensive study of the cost and standard of living of Shanghai 
workers was made by employees of the Bureau who made daily visits to 305 families 
between April 1929 and March 1930.115 The data collected was useful not only to the 
bureau itself, but also employers in Shanghai and other interested parties, including the 
SMC. Hinder compared the average annual income of these families ($416.51) with the 
average expenditure ($454.38) to show that working families were typically unable to cover 
their basic needs without borrowing money or seeking supplementary income from other 
sources. The figures from this study were also taken as the basis of comparison for showing 
how the cost of living shot up during the Sino-Japanese War, as shown below. The sharing 
of data was the first area in which the Industrial Section benefitted from its relationship 
with the Bureau. 
14 Hinder, Life and Labour, p. 11. 
' Eleanor Hinder, Social and Industrial Problems of Shanghai, with Special Reference to the Administrative 
and Regulatory Work of the Shanghai Municipal Council (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1942), p. 
23. 
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The interactions between the City Government and the SMC on industrial matters, 
as on other municipal affairs, were tense. Despite an ostensibly shared interest in improving 
working conditions throughout the city, the SMC's first priority was preserving its 
autonomy and the extraterritorial rights of its foreign residents, while the Chinese 
authorities were equally adamant that the Chinese right to implement national laws such as 
the Factory Law should apply to all Chinese territory including the foreign settlements. 
Successive series of negotiations broke down over the problems of what laws and 
regulations should apply in the Settlement, who should monitor their implementation, and 
under what judicial authority they could be enforced in the myriad of court systems in 
operation in Shanghai. Nonetheless, Hinder's relationship with officials at the Bureau of 
Social Affairs was more constructive than that between their parent bodies: she even 
described it later as 'cordial'. ' 16 At a meeting between herself and Tien Ho Ching, Chief of 
the Inspection Branch of the Bureau of Social Affairs, in November 1933 (when resolution 
to the issue of factory inspection still seemed achievable) Hinder successfully persuaded 
him to follow the proposal agreed with Camille Pone during his visit, that the first focus 
should be improving health and safety conditions rather than trying to eliminate child 
labour. Relations between the two could not be described as `cordial': when Tien declared 
his intention to begin inspecting factories in the Settlement within a few months, Hinder 
`ignored this remark. ' But they at least appeared to enjoy a constructive working 
relationship. Hinder became responsible in her new role at the council for seeking solutions 
to the impasse on factory inspection and conveying the council's position to the Chinese 
authorities. Her existing relationship with Dr Chen Da, with whom she had conducted a 
116 Hinder, Life and Labour, p. 10. 
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study on factory conditions to advise the Nanjing government prior to its enactment of the 
Factory Act, aided her relations with Chinese in the field: he introduced her to the new head 
of the China Branch of the ILO in 1934, Chen Haifeng, who was implementing some of the 
recommendations she and Chen Da had made. 117 Although the goodwill she created with 
her counterparts did not lead to a solution to the problem of factory inspection, it allowed 
her to expand the work of the council in this area without further worsening the SMC's 
relations with its neighbours, something Jordan was unable to do. 
It is significant that there was movement of staff between the industrial branches of 
the council and the City Government. T. Y. Tsia, the onetime head of the Bureau of Social 
Affairs' Statistical Division, was given office space in the SMC Industrial Division in 1938 
to continue his work collecting data on industrial conditions using funds he raised himself, 
though he was restricted by the Japanese occupation of Shanghai to studying factories 
within the International Settlement alone, instead of the whole of Greater Shanghai. " 8 Two 
years later he formally joined the staff of the Division. Few would have foreseen that a 
senior figure within the Nationalist City Government, who had made his opposition to the 
foreign administrations in Shanghai clear, would be able and willing to work for the 
Shanghai Municipal Council in the service of improving labour conditions. The antagonism 
that had existed in the late 1920s and early 1930s had subsided in response to Japanese 
occupation and the shared goals of industrial reform. At the same time, Rewi Alley, the 
Chief of Factory Inspection, resigned from the SMC in early 1938 to work for the wartime 
Nationalist Government in Chongqing, advising the government about labour regulations 
"" SMA U1-6-113: Hinder to Fessenden, 20 August 1934. 
"a U1-10-4: Hinder to Butler, 3 October 1938. 
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and helping to organise small scale industrial co-operatives. T 19 Alley's left-wing politics (he 
chose to remain in the new People's Republic following the Communist victory in 1949) 
mean he was probably hostile to the imperialism of the SMC, and once he could serve 
Chinese workers' interests better elsewhere, he did. But again, it is significant that the 
GMD government was willing to accept a former SMC employee in order to benefit from 
his expertise. War brought about huge changes in the realm of industrial conditions and the 
activities of the Industrial Section expanded accordingly. 
The Industrial Section in Wartime Shanghai 
The outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937 had a dramatic impact on the work of the 
Industrial Section, as it did on all areas of council activity, but for most of the war the 
council continued to perform its functions, including in industrial and social work, with as 
close a semblance to normality as possible. Robert Bickers has described the British 
conviction that if the Settlement must eventually be left, it should be left in good order, and 
Hinder certainly subscribed to this rationale. 120 By this point Hinder had established her 
department as a strong force on the industrial stage in Shanghai, despite the failure to 
secure much legal footing for its work or to resolve the issue of factory inspection. The war 
prevented much of the interaction that existed between the council and international bodies 
such as the ILO, especially following the bombing of Pearl Harbour. Yet one result of the 
war and the abolition of the Chinese city government was the removal of a long source of 
frustration to some of the council's aims in industrial work. Hinder's department could now 
expand its work without fear of offending the neighbouring authorities, as long as Japanese 
19 U1-1o-4: Hinder to Butler, 3 October 1938. 
120 Bickers, 'Settlers and Diplomats', pp. 233-5. 
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interests were not harmed. The new Division was divided into four sections: the Industrial 
Section continued the work of seeking improvements in industrial safety and working 
conditions; the Statistical Section compiled and published cost of living data and advised 
employers on giving employees' allowances based upon it; the Industrial Relations Section 
offered mediation in industrial disputes; and the Welfare Section cared for the living 
standards of workers, including housing, nutrition and health, as well as taking special 
responsibility for child protection. 
Japanese bombing destroyed almost all industrial concerns outside the International 
Settlement in 1937, so workers flooded in looking for employment while industrialists set 
up makeshift workshops in any building that could be used for the purpose, however 
unsuitable. 12 1 The work of factory inspectors therefore increased dramatically, but their task 
was made harder than ever as conditions deteriorated and the swelled pool of labour 
reduced the bargaining position of workers. The Industrial Section expanded its work to 
encompass care for the urban population in general, rather than only industrial workers. 
This included the ranks of the unemployed, due to both the closure of factories and the 
increased number of workers in the Settlement. 122 By the end of 1937,95,777 refugees 
were living in 173 camps, unable to find work and unable to afford housing at the 
dramatically inflated prices which the increased demand produced. 123 Charities provided 
for them but the SMC could not ignore the scale of the humanitarian crisis in its midst. 
As the war continued rampant inflation caused the cost of living to rise far ahead of 
wages, causing a new source of hardship for industrial workers. As noted above, the Bureau 
121 On the scale of the destruction, see Christian Henriot, `Shanghai Industries under Japanese Occupation: 
Bombs, Boom, and Bust (1937-1945) in In the Shadow of the Rising Sun, ed. by Henriot and Yeh, pp. 20-25. 
122 MLMSS 770/13/8: Hinder, draft autobiography, p. 18g. 
123 SMA U1-16-10-224: Chief Health Inspector to Commissioner of Public Health, 31 August 1939. 
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of Social Affairs had compiled and published cost of living indices, but after its officials 
fled inland in 1937 the bureau closed. 124 On Hinder's initiative, and with the expertise of T. 
Y. Tsia, the Industrial Section took over the business of compiling statistics on the rising 
prices of basic commodities for the information of employers. The Shanghai Municipal 
Council, itself a large employer, was among the firms that used these figures to calculate 
cost of living allowances in addition to salaried income for its employees. The rate of 
inflation is illustrated by the rises in the allowance for municipal staff in 1940: from 30 to 
55 per cent of salary in May, rising to 60 then 85 per cent by October. 125 The allowance 
was one of the costs of the declining value of the Chinese dollar, squeezing municipal 
resources so a rise in rates was necessary in 1940.126 Many other employers, Chinese, 
Japanese, British, American and others, used the data, so it was of real benefit to many 
thousands of workers. J. S. Barr informed her colleagues on the Industrial and Social 
Affairs Committee that the cost of living indices were forwarded to the USA for employers 
there to calculate fair allowances for their staff in Shanghai. 127 Hinder considered the 
measurement of the cost of living to be one of the most important functions of her 
department. 
Hinder also concerned herself with the procurement and distribution of rice for 
Shanghai. Cut off from its rural hinterland, the city was running short of basic foodstuffs, 
as research for the cost of living indices made clear. Hinder persuaded the council to import 
rice from Indo-China via Hong Kong to ensure supply at affordable levels. The profits from 
the sales were ring-fenced for the future purchase of `military rice', that is, rice bought 
124 porter, Industrial Reformers, p. 123. 
'u U1-1-63: Finance Committee, 24 May and 12 October 1940. 
'26 UI-1-63: Finance Committee, 7 March 1940. 
127 SMA UI-6-009-195: Industrial and Social Affairs Committee, 24 October 1941. 
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from the Japanese military, when it was no longer possible for the SMC to source its 
own. 128 This involved the council in unprecedented high risk investment (there was a strong 
chance of the cargo being lost in hostile waters) for the sake of public welfare, far removed 
from the laissez-faire approach of earlier years. Hinder's interest in nutrition went beyond 
the availability of rice to public health interventions: experiments she conducted in 1937 in 
collaboration with the Henry Lester Institute of Medical Research and in consultation with 
the Public Health Department with 75 boys in light-bulb factories demonstrated that 
beriberi could be eliminated among them if their rice were simply de-husked shortly before 
cooking to preserve its vitamin B content. 129 The outbreak of war prevented her from 
attempting to convert the findings into widespread practice, but the experiment shows the 
breadth in which she conceived her role and the appropriate activities of the council. 
The expansion of the Industrial Section's work into technical education was a 
similar indication of how Hinder took the SMC far beyond its basic functions. The Division 
established a night school in 1941, using the laboratories of the Henry Lester Institute of 
Technical Education, with funding from the SMC Education Department. It offered training 
for mechanics and electricians to improve safety and, in order to increase the appeal of its 
graduates to employers, efficiency. Courses were intense and demanding, the three-year 
syllabus of technical training for skilled mechanics including mathematics, physics, English 
workshop teams, mechanical drawing and design, machine shop materials and practice, and 
machinery and electrical installation. 
130 Admission to the courses required a primary 
128 SMA U1-1-63: Finance Committee, 23 March and 23 April 1942. 
129 MLMSS 770/3/4: E. M. Hinder, `The Place of Administration in Child Care in Shanghai: Some Methods 
and Principles of Action'. n. d., n. p. 
130 SMA U1-1-1200: Hinder to N. W. B. Clarke, Director of the Engineering Society of China in Shanghai, 30 
December 1940. 
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education, which had the intended consequence of indirectly increasing the age at which 
young people would begin employment as machine shop workers: typically those enrolled 
were aged 16-21 and had between three and six years of education. 13 1 Teachers in the 
technical schools developed their own teaching materials in the absence of text books in 
Chinese. 132 The work of the technical education schools continued into 1943, when Y. T. 
Chen, the head of section, reported that a total of 519 students were enrolled in the various 
courses on offer, up from 404 the previous year. 133 The impact of the schools was thus 
growing up until the abolition of the council. 
Just as the Industrial Section took over the compilation of data on the cost of living 
from the Bureau of Social Affairs, so did it take on the latter's mediation function. 
Widespread strikes broke out in 1939 and 1940 as workers bore the brunt of the worsening 
economic situation. 134 Judging from the way Hinder described the role of mediation in 
industrial disputes, she appears to have laid greater emphasis on prioritising the workers' 
interests than had the Bureau. If approached by the management rather than the workers for 
mediation in the first instance, the Industrial Division would wait for several days trying to 
persuade the workers to seek its services as well before stepping in. 135 In its sympathetic 
approach, the Division differed from the SMP which, much like the Bureau of Social 
Affairs, prioritised the maintenance of public order over workers' welfare. Hinder claimed 
that as the reputation of the Division grew, its advice on matters such as wages and factory 
rules was increasingly sought before disputes escalated into strikes, suggesting that the 
131 Hinder, `The Place of Administration in Child Care', n. p.; SMA UI-1-1299, trade apprentice application 
forms. 
132 MLMSS 770/3/18 (vii). 
133 MLMSS 770/3/18 (ix): Social Welfare Department Reports for 1943, p. 173. 
t34 Hinder, Life and Labour, p. 14. 
135 Hinder, Life and Labour, p. 75. 
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Industrial Relations section was successful in its work. 136 Just seven disputes were referred 
to the council for mediation in 1938, compared to 111 in 1940, of which strikes were 
prevented in 56 cases. 137 Strikes continued, however, as the economic hardship brought by 
war worsened, and the council's limited powers of mitigation were tested to the limit. 
Child protection, the original focus of demands for a greater welfare role for the 
council, also expanded during the Sino-Japanese War. From an unpromising beginning, 
when she was appointed Protector of Mui Tsai in reluctant acquiescence to pressure from 
the League of Nations and the British Government, Hinder was able to establish a Child 
Protection Service with a much broader remit. As in the resolution of industrial disputes, 
child protection involved considerable cooperation with the municipal police, such as 
efforts to reduce the exploitation of young children by beggars to gain sympathy and 
donations, which increased greatly with the presence of so many refugees from 1937. It was 
agreed that, although the council could not refer such cases to the courts, the police could 
act in a purely `administrative' function by detaining infants exploited in this way and 
entrusting them to the care of the Shanghai Refugees Babies' Nursery, a charity supported 
in part by a municipal grant-in-aid. "' The power of the council was thus harnessed for 
child protection within its existing powers and at minimal cost to the municipal purse. The 
SMC was, however, also increasingly willing to fund child protection work, appointing its 
first full time social worker in 1937. As chief of the Child Protection Service, Hinder 
recommended in 1940 that the council increase its grants-in-aid to charities which took in 
1M MLMSS 770/3/4: E. M. Hinder, `The Organisation and Functions of the Industrial and Social Division', 
n. d. 
137 Porter, Industrial Reformers, p. 124. 
138 SMA U1-1-92: Watch Committee, 4 July 1939. 
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abandoned children found by the SMP. 139 Despite opposition from the Treasurer, anxious 
as ever to curtail expenditure, Hinder's requests were granted. 140 The following year, when 
the grants-in-aid were again under review, the Treasurer cited the old principle that the 
council accepted no responsibility for poor relief. But the Chairman, Secretary and 
members of the committee all supported Hinder and her recommendations were approved: 
the council had, it was acknowledged, now accepted responsibility for child protection. '41 
Despite this, Hinder made little headway towards the long-held goal of eliminating child 
labour from Shanghai's factories, the council's reliance on voluntary cooperation on the 
part of employers in the absence of legislative powers proving an insurmountable obstacle. 
Hinder recalled that on the morning following the bombing of Pearl Harbour on 7 
December 1941, the Japanese Consul General invited the Chairman of the SMC and the 
most senior American and Dutch members of council to meet him and asked them to carry 
on in their current roles. He promised that although the Japanese were occupying British 
and American enterprises, they had `no intention of disturbing the international make-up of 
the Council. ' 142 The chairman agreed, in the interests of the residents of the Settlement, on 
the understanding that he and his colleagues would do nothing that compromised their 
loyalty to their own countries. Yet three weeks later, all the Allied council members were 
required to resign, leaving Allied national staff such as Hinder in a difficult position. Yet 
Hinder continued, convinced that she was helping Chinese in the Settlement, particularly in 
the distribution of staple foods. She also persuaded the Japanese authorities to contribute 
139 These included the Door of Hope, for more on which see Sue Gronewold, `Encountering Hope: The Door 
of Hope Mission in Shanghai and Taipei, 1900-1976', PhD Dissertation, Columbia University, 1996. 
140 U1-1-63: Finance Committee, 7 March 1940. 
141 U1-1-63: Finance Committee, 10 April 1941. 
142 Hinder, `Shanghai 1942, Philadelphia 1944, Sydney 1945'. 
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towards the cost of third class travel to those returning to their native place to reduce 
overpopulation, an opportunity which she estimated that many thousands seized. 143 By 
1942, however, there were growing opportunities for skilled workers in Japanese factories, 
no longer able to source their employment needs in Japan due to the war. The Industrial 
Section established an employment exchange to help unite employers with openings to 
those seeking work. 144 Hinder had repeatedly been asked by the Japanese to aid in this, but 
refused on the basis that she should not be required to do anything that directly aided the 
Japanese war effort, which helping Japanese industry certain constituted. The mounting 
pressure contributed to her decision to quit Shanghai. Hinder left the Division in the hands 
of her Japanese deputy, T. Fukuda, who continued to ensure the Japanese-controlled SMC 
committed funds to industrial welfare in its last days, such as in the proposed establishment 
of a hospital for industrial workers. 145 Industrial welfare had become a core function of the 
council, due to international pressure and the dedicated work of Eleanor Hinder. 
Conclusion 
The Shanghai Municipal Council came to adopt a much stronger stance on industrial 
reform in the 1930s in response to outside pressure from women's groups, from the 
International Labour Organisation and other international organisations, and from the 
action that was being taken by the Nationalist Government at Nanjing. The council's 
priorities changed over time as it was no longer tenable to remain laissez-faire in the face of 
143 MLMSS 770/13/14: E. M. Hinder, address to The Australia Institute of International Affairs, Melbourne, 
18 April 1945: `Shanghai 1942, Philadelphia 1944, Sydney 1945'. 
144 U1-6-009-195: Industrial and Social Affairs Committee, 1 September 1942. 
145 U1-6-009-195: Industrial and Social Affairs Committee, 25 June 1943. This was the last meeting of the 
committee. 
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human suffering. Cooperation was necessary for the achievement of its goals, but was not 
always forthcoming. Hinder was successful in cooperating with other departments within 
the council, such as Public Works in factory inspection and the SMP in child protection. 
Cooperation with the Chinese authorities was much more difficult, but towards the end of 
the 1930s significant progress was being made. The clashes between the SMC and the 
Chinese authorities over factory inspection reflect the fact that both were attempting to 
engage in state-building activities in the same urban space, each seeking to claim greater 
capacity to control industry, and thus, symbolically, modernity, in the contested city of 
Shanghai. Moreover, the dramatic expansion of the role of the Industrial and Social 
Division from 1937 in the absence of the constraining force of the Chinese City 
government further demonstrates the state-building tendencies of the council. It was both 
increasing its responsibility for the welfare of the population and increasing its 
governmental functions, behaving much more like the national governments of European 
states than the laissez-faire authority of nineteenth century Shanghai. 
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Conclusion 
This dissertation began with a number of questions in mind: what was the Shanghai 
Municipal Council? How did it function? How did it evolve over the course of the 
twentieth century? And why does this history matter? Over the foregoing chapters I have 
addressed these questions, establishing for the first time the precise nature of the SMC, 
exploring the people who shaped it, its workings through the municipal committees and 
staff, how its activities were funded, and how it functioned in the realms of expansion and 
defence, public health and industrial reform. This has shown how the council affected the 
lives of those who lived and worked in the Settlement, bringing the analysis of semi- 
colonialism down from the heights of inter-state politics to the everyday experience of 
semi-colonial authority. It is thus clear that the SMC met Matthew Brown's condition that 
`The tentacles of informal empire must be found on the ground and in the mind... Informal 
empire must be lived, and known, if it is to exist. " 
My research has revealed the ways in which the council altered in this period, and I 
have argued that it was not a static, unchanging institution, but developed from a laissez- 
faire governing body, constantly striving to keep municipal spending to the minimum 
required to support an environment conducive to foreign business, to one which gradually 
took on greater responsibility for social conditions and responded to the opinions of a 
somewhat broader section of the population of the Settlement, notably the Chinese business 
community. It also changed in its international interactions, both in the colonial context and 
increasingly in its relations with transnational movements including the reformist agenda of 
the League of Nations and international feminist networks. It is clear from all that has been 
Brown, `Introduction', p. 21. 
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discussed and explored that the SMC was a highly significant actor on the political stage in 
Shanghai and China, worthy of greater understanding in its own right. Yet it has also 
emerged that an appreciation of the nature of the council has wider implications for the 
study of colonialism, both within China and globally. Over these final pages I will gather 
the various strands of these arguments together, reinforcing the conclusions that have been 
reached and exploring their implications. 
The initial study of how the council was constituted through the election and 
selection of council members contributes significantly to a new understanding of the nature 
of the SMC. The predominantly expatriate status of those who stood as British and 
American candidates and were then elected by the eligible ratepayers ensured the council's 
priorities lay with the interests of big business, which centred on low taxation and the 
preservation of law and order, and indeed the preservation of the Settlement itself. These 
priorities are evident in the budgets of the council, the majority of which were dedicated to 
policing and infrastructure, with only a small (though growing) allowance for the social 
responsibilities of government. Military backgrounds were common among both council 
members (such as Brigadier-General Macnaghten) and Commissioners of Police (including 
Major Hilton-Johnson and Major Gerrard), which was both a result of and contributed to 
the priority given to defence. 
Such emphasis on the protection of the Settlement against outside threats is perhaps 
unsurprising for the body responsible for a community in a foreign country, far from the 
securities of home, but the continuous stress on the need for expansion requires further 
explanation. The dramatic extensions to the Settlement's boundaries secured 
in the 
nineteenth century were justified by the substantial growth in its population, 
foreign but 
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especially Chinese. This growth continued exponentially in the twentieth century, so the 
same logic could have applied. But in reality it was the council's building of external roads 
and their settlement by foreign (though still mostly Chinese) residents, whom the SMC 
believed should be incorporated into the protection of the Settlement proper, which led to 
the expectation that it would continue to expand. The council's activities, providing 
services and collecting taxes to pay for them, which it did on the external roads as inside 
the Settlement, became a self-perpetuating inevitability. Right into the 1920s the SMC had 
every expectation that it would continue to manage the Settlement for the foreseeable future, 
not accepting that Chinese authorities would be able to administer their own territory to the 
same advantage to business. Even following the establishment in 1927 of the Nationalist 
Nanjing and Shanghai Municipal Governments, the council jealously guarded its authority 
and independence from outside jurisdiction. Expansion and defence were thus integral to 
the nature of the SMC. 
The study of the people involved in the council also allows a development from the 
valuable work done by David Lambert and Alan Lester on the imperial networks in which 
the men and women who constructed and maintained the British empire circulated. Council 
members and employees were greatly influenced by their experience and knowledge of 
colonial practice in Hong Kong and elsewhere. Ede, Simms, Beith, and Arnhold were 
among the many council members with ties to Hong Kong, many of them through the 
trading houses to which they belonged. Captain Barrett brought experience of leading men 
in a colonial setting in the Malay States Guides with him to the SMP, while Major Gerrard 
drew on his experience of India to make recommendations on the reorganisation of the 
SMP. Shanghai thus belonged to the `sub-imperial' sphere of influence exercised by British 
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India, described by Thomas Metcalf and Robert Blyth. 2 Blyth concentrates on India's 
`western sphere' from the Persian Gulf to eastern Africa - what he terms the `empire of the 
Raj' - but it is clear from the study of the SMC that China also came under this Indian 
influence, at the same time as drawing on models from other sources. Experiences of India, 
Hong Kong and other colonies fostered similar attitudes towards Chinese in Shanghai as 
were common in the empire: that they were `natives' in need of controlling who should not 
be given a voice in governance. 
Hong Kong provides a significant point of comparison in analysing the nature of the 
colonialism that was present in Shanghai. The British expatriates who dominated the 
council were very similar to those who were prominent figures in Hong Kong, but of course 
the latter's Legislative Assembly, where they could be given a voice in managing the 
colony, was subordinate to the Governor, who ruled Hong Kong in a way that no one 
`ruled' the International Settlement. 3 The SMC enjoyed a high level of autonomy from the 
consular body in the city, the ministers in Beijing and the metropolitan authorities of 
London and, later and to a much lesser extent, Washington. It included settlers in its 
number, the Shanghailanders who had a local identity apart from their colonial connections 
to Britain and its empire. The internationalism of the council, notwithstanding the clear 
British dominance, also sets it apart from the colonies from which it borrowed many of its 
practices. This thesis has shown how American, Japanese and Chinese council members 
had an impact on council policy, so they signified more than a mere gesture towards 
internationalism, even if that was how they generally appeared or how many of the British 
2 Metcaliy Imperial Connections, pp. 1-14; Blyth, Empire of the Raj, pp. 2-8 and passim. 
3 This was, however, similar to the way in which the French Consul-General oversaw the French Concession. 
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council members wished them to behave. The increasing internationalism of the staff was 
also significant. This demonstrates that the colonialism in China was transnational in nature. 
I choose to use the term 'transnational' rather than `international' here because it 
captures the way that national institutions, governments and processes of inter-state 
relations were generally external to the workings of the council. The term stresses networks 
(or `honeycombs', in Patricia Clavin's usage) over nation-to-nation relations, as people and 
ideas increasingly interacted from the inter-war period on. 4 The influence of the League of 
Nations in areas of public health and industrial reform was an important factor in the 
council's development towards a somewhat more socially responsible role. The 
transnational nature of the SMC is also clear in the backgrounds of the Chinese who joined 
the council from 1928. All of them without exception had some international experience, 
through study in Britain, France or the USA, from international travel representing the 
Chinese government, and from exposure to western culture through Christianity and 
business. This facilitated their work with foreign members of the council, but did not mean 
they were any less likely to oppose the extraterritoriality and foreign privilege which 
underpinned it. On the contrary, international education and political experience heightened 
awareness of the racial inequality that was the foundation of the International Settlement. 
Men like Yu Qiaqing, who chaired the Chinese Ratepayers' Association during its 
campaigns against the council but also led negotiations to admit Chinese councillors and 
then served in the SMC himself, demonstrate the extreme tensions that existed within the 
council and the diverse political positions that it represented by the 1930s. 
4Patricia Clavin, `Defining Transnationalism', Contemporary European History, Vol. 14, No. 3, Theme Issue: 
Transnational Communities in European History, 1920-1970 (November 2005), pp. 438-9. 
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This leads into the final advantage of prioritising the people who shaped the council 
from within - its members and staff - in that it gives the SMC a personal face. The Chinese 
council members were leading figures of their day and an appreciation of their lives 
therefore enables a deeper understanding of Shanghai at this time. John Jordan, who headed 
the Public Health Department, was typical of the many British heads of department who 
were recruited directly from the UK, worked their way up the senior ranks of the staff and 
dedicated their careers to its service. Meanwhile the life stories of men and women like 
Stirling Fessenden, Shigeru Uyehara and Eleanor Hinder further enhance our understanding 
of the diversity of the council in the latter period under examination. Though not typical of 
the dozens of British council employees, they were extreme examples of particular 
elements of the council which require understanding. Fessenden, the Anglophile American, 
exemplifies the bellicose posturing that was more common among the settler element of the 
council and the Settlement than among the expatriates, whose long-term interests were less 
intimately bound up with China. Uyehara illustrates the growing Japanese influence in 
Council affairs in the 1930s, but also the conflicts and tensions experienced by council 
employees of many nationalities, most particularly Japanese and Chinese, when their 
national interests and those of the council did not coincide. Hinder represents in many ways 
the most progressive side of the council in the 1930s, as she strove to improve industrial 
working conditions in the Settlement despite the limitations of the legislation available to 
support this work. Hers was also the most international department, and she herself was 
deeply involved with transnational movements, cooperating with the League of Nations and 
engaging with leading figures of the feminist networks that spanned Europe, America and 
Australia. 
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The expanding scope of the council's work from laissez-faire governance towards 
accepting greater responsibility for certain aspects of social welfare is clear in its finances 
and in the two cases studies of the Public Health Department and Industrial Section. The 
Public Health Department expanded greatly from 1898 with increasing success in its work, 
particularly in providing free inoculations against some of the most threatening diseases of 
the day. The Industrial Section took on growing responsibility for the living conditions of 
Shanghai's workers, particularly from 1937. Yet keeping costs to a minimum was a 
constant constraint on these departments, as was the limited legal power of the council. The 
nature of the Land Regulations which governed the powers of the SMC, cumbersome to 
change and unsuited to the twentieth century as they had been written earlier with a much 
smaller Settlement in mind, posed a serious problem for those who wanted to see a greater 
municipal role in public welfare. The apathetic ratepayers and Chinese authorities opposed 
to increasing council powers often stymied the adoption of new byelaws. Frequently the 
Public Health Department and, even more so, the Industrial Section relied on education and 
publicity to achieve their aims in this environment. This signifies an important difference 
between the authority of the SMC and that of national or colonial governments, which 
could legislate freely. 
The comparison with national, in addition to colonial, governments is apt, because 
in many ways the SMC functioned as if it were the government of a state, with its own 
defence force, independent budget and sense of identity. It is for this reason that the 
Settlement is characterised as a semi-colonial statelet, highlighting both its state-like 
tendencies and the way in which it deviated from colonial status. Yet in addition, the SMC 
was and should be compared to municipal authorities elsewhere, and it often looked to 
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practices in Manchester or Calcutta for a model that could be applied to public health 
policy in Shanghai. Colonies were thus not the only model applied to the Settlement: 
Britain itself was the prime point of comparison and model for municipal practice, from the 
organisation of its committees, finances and recruitment to its free trade ideology. Colonies 
also looked to the British example, but the autonomy of the SMC meant the impetus for the 
comparison came from Shanghai, rather than from London. The independence of the 
International Settlement from formal colonial control is the key reason for it to be 
characterised as semi-colonial rather than fully colonial, while recognising the strong 
significance of British influence. 
The autonomy of the council was the defining distinction between the status of the 
International Settlement and a colony like Hong Kong. It rested in part on the fiscal 
independence of the council, able to collect taxes and float loans in its own right. Of course, 
the low cost of borrowing it enjoyed was due to its presumed `gilt-edged' status from its 
links to London, though when tested in 1939, this presumption was proved misplaced. The 
council's finances were built upon investments and tax receipts from the Chinese and 
foreign community, the Chinese contributing more in rates for most of the period but less in 
loans than the foreign residents, but the council consistently prioritised foreign views and 
needs in its policy-making. It was reluctant, however, to accede to interference from any 
ratepayers, foreign or Chinese, preferring to keep municipal business behind closed doors, 
for the consideration of the members of council and committees and senior staff alone. That 
this was resented by the rate-paying community had only a gradual impact in making the 
council slightly more open and accountable to the public. Council minutes were published, 
whereas committee minutes were not, and it is perhaps for this reason that the latter have 
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provided so many insights into the workings of the SMC that have been of value to the 
present study. 
Yet while the council was free from colonial control, to the frustration of 
Westminster in the 1920s when these `spoilt children of empire' threatened Sino-British 
relations, at the same time the legal constraints on the SMC made it less able to act freely. 
Unable to legislate on public health matters or working conditions, the council's employees 
were forced to be creative in their attempts to improve public welfare, such as expanding 
the scope of existing regulations relating to buildings to demand more sanitary conditions 
in residences and better safety measures in factories. But this approach was far from 
satisfactory. In this way, the semi-colonial nature of the SMC was a hindrance, as it was not 
at liberty to rule the Settlement the way it would have been had it truly been colonial 
territory. 
Nevertheless, the SMC was determined to manage the most modem municipality in 
China, and indeed `East of Suez'. It managed to attract men and women to lead its Public 
Health Department and Industrial Section who were versed in the latest developments in 
their fields and applied their cutting edge knowledge to Shanghai to the best of their ability 
within the constraints of the municipal system. Commissioners of Public Health published 
their research in leading medical journals and introduced recent innovations in the 
prevention of plague and malaria. The emphasis on scientific modernity was an element of 
colonial influence on public health policy in the Settlement, but the other side of the coin 
was the attempted enforcement of oppressive disease-prevention measures against local 
populations. The SMC's plague prevention measures were particularly draconian, reflecting 
similarly aggressive activities by colonial governments and causing conflict with the 
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Chinese authorities. Public Health was a particular source of contention between the 
council and its neighbours, French as well as Chinese, although it was an area in which 
cooperation with both was particularly important in view of the fact that diseases do not 
respect administrative boundaries. The council was forced to retreat from its deeply 
unpopular steps against plague and in later years favoured an approach based on education 
and persuasion (also due to its lack of legislative powers noted above) which was more 
typical of metropolitan public health policies. To the extent that the strategy was successful, 
and in areas like administering inoculations at least it appears to have been, a policy born of 
weakness thus became a strength. 
There was also a relationship of mutual influence between the SMC and the Chinese 
municipal authorities in the later period under examination, as the council was initially 
taken by the Municipal Government of Greater Shanghai as the model of modernity it 
hoped to represent, only to find itself in the position of playing catch-up in certain aspects 
of public health, such as the eye-care of municipal schoolchildren, and particularly in 
factory inspection. It did not accord with the council's self-perception (or the image it 
sought to project back to Britain) as a guiding light of modernity in China to be seen to fall 
behind its Chinese neighbours, even when, as in factory inspection, the Chinese 
government was ahead more in its aspirations than the reality of what it was in a position to 
achieve. However, as has been revealed by recent revisionist history of the Nationalist 
government, Nanjing was making significant progress in administration before it was 
derailed by the Sino-Japanese War, and the council's dismissal of the Chinese authorities 
did not reflect their capacity to effect real change. By demonstrating some of the ways in 
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which it was ahead of and influenced the SMC, this study has contributed to this revisionist 
historiography. 
From the 1920s the SMC's position was increasingly insecure, due to growing 
Chinese nationalism, the consequent impatience of London and Washington with the 
council and, in the 1930s, Japanese aggression and war. The late flowering of a degree of 
social responsibility was offset by the persistence of the council's racist arrogance and 
reluctance to change combined with the legacy of the May Thirtieth Incident and the 
damage it did to relations with the Chinese. Yet for most of its existence the council was 
remarkably secure in its position, despite the thin legal basis in treaties for its activities. The 
degree to which the SMC enjoyed political legitimacy with the residents of Shanghai, both 
within the Settlement and on the external roads, is clear from its ability to collect taxation 
with little opposition for much of its existence. Although it had no right by treaty to expand 
its activities beyond the Settlement in this way, it was generally accepted as precedent was 
quickly established and hard to dislodge. The council's self-perception as the de facto 
authority which could be expected to continue into the foreseeable future was apparently 
shared by the majority of ratepayers, Chinese and foreign. At the same time, the association 
of rates with policing and security reinforces the centrality of defence to the position of the 
council. 
The council's importance in the lives of the residents of the Settlement and the 
external roads was not necessarily always apparent. Cecil Uyehara assured me that at 
dinner table conversations about local affairs between his father, Deputy Commissioner of 
Police Shigeru Uyehara, and his mother, the SMC never featured. 5 Yet the council was 
Personal interview with Cecil Uyehara, 27 April 2011. 
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Uyehara's employer, as it was the employer of more Britons in Shanghai than any other 
organisation, and even greater numbers of Chinese. The Shanghai Municipal Police, subject 
to the authority of the council, was the sole legal defender of law and order in the 
Settlement and police were present on every major street corner. The SMC was not only 
responsible for everyday policing, but for the defence of the Settlement in times of 
emergency, when its authority became most obviously apparent to residents who found 
themselves either within or without the protection of the barriers erected along the 
perimeter of the Settlement. The council was also important to their everyday lives in ways 
that were far less visible but no less important. The council's intimate involvement in the 
public utilities companies helped ensure a supply of running water, electricity, gas, and 
telephone communication to the homes of residents. Many residents turned to the municipal 
hospitals when ill or hurt, while tens of thousands of Chinese were immunised and exposed 
to health and hygiene promotion propaganda at its branch health offices. Industrial 
employers were subject to inspections by the council's Industrial Section from 1932, while 
workers would encounter Hinder's staff if they sought mediation 
in disputes after 1937. 
This thesis has thus highlighted the importance of the SMC in the everyday lives of the 
numerous residents of the Settlement, and 
it was precisely because it was so much a part of 
the fabric of the Settlement that it was not necessary to discuss it at the Uyehara 
dinner 
table: it could be taken for granted as the managing 
force behind the daily lives of its 
inhabitants. 
At the same time, it is clear that often the SMC was an antagonistic presence 
in 
Shanghai, frequently producing or exacerbating conflict through its actions, whether 
through its plague-prevention measures or the shooting of protesters 
by its police force on 
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May Thirtieth, 1925. In declaring the state of emergency in 1932 that led to the initial clash 
between Japanese and Chinese forces in Zhabei, the SMC demonstrated the extent to which 
its actions could have devastating consequences for international relations. For this reason 
alone, it is important that the role of the SMC in the history of Shanghai in this period is 
recognised. 
Avenues for future research 
The constraints of time and space necessarily delimited the scope of this study. The French 
Concession was a both a rival and a partner in much of the municipal activities of the SMC, 
and it would be fiuitful to pursue a much more thorough comparison of the similarities and 
differences between the two authorities, to reach a greater understanding of the various 
kinds of colonialism that were present in Shanghai. Christine Cornet has provided the most 
thorough studies of the French Concession to date, but there is certainly room for more 
research on this neglected subject. 6 Further research would also be welcome on the treaty 
ports which looked to Shanghai as a `model settlement', noting the similarities and 
important differences between some of the British concessions and their larger cousin on 
the Huangpu. This would allow a more far-reaching characterisation of the nature of British 
colonialism in China. 
The focus of the archival research was very much on the records of the SMC, 
particularly the minutes of the council and its committees, and council correspondence. 
When looking at the intersections between the council and Chinese authorities, it would 
have been preferable to also make use of the records of the Shanghai Municipal 
e Comet, `The Bumpy End of the French Concession', pp. 257-76. 
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Government and the Nanjing Government, but these were unfortunately not accessible. A 
thorough study of the Municipal Government has been made by Christian Hentiot, but it 
remains underrepresented in considerations of Shanghai in this period. 7 This thesis has 
gone some way to correct this in examining the Municipal Government's interactions with 
the SMC in certain fields, particularly public health provision and industrial reform. From 
this it is clear that real attempts were made at cooperation but were stymied by the 
antagonism between the two authorities, though less so in industrial reform than public 
health due, it seems, to the personalities involved. More wide-ranging research into the 
relationship between the two would be revealing. 
This thesis has provided a wide-ranging study of the nature of the Shanghai 
Municipal Council where none existed before, and has illustrated just why this is so 
important. The council was subject to the influences of practices and policies locally, 
nationally, colonially in the British world, and globally. It is these myriad overlapping 
influences, combined with the council's ultimate autonomy from formal imperial rule, that 
leads me to define it as an exemplar of transnational semi-colonialism. The International 
Settlement is perhaps best compared to the city statelets of post-1949 Hong Kong or 
Singapore, in its independence and exposure to so many intersecting influences. But 
fundamentally the SMC was sui generis: it cannot be adequately explained with the simple 
application of categories such as `colonialism' or `sovereignty'. Existing conceptions of 
foreign colonialism in China are largely limited to the analysis of bilateral state-to-state 
relations, but the importance of the SMC as an independent, transnational actor, 
' Henriot, Shanghai. 
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demonstrated here, cannot be accommodated within this structure. The findings of this 
thesis therefore complicate the history of Sino-western relations and drive forward the 
debate on the nature of colonialism in China and elsewhere in the world, as historians 
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